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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development and implementation of Housing Action Trust (HAT) policy, 
with a particular emphasis on the theme of choice. When first announced, the Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Nick Ridley, argued that HATs would form the `cutting edge' of the 
Government's urban regeneration initiatives. In practice, as only six HATs were ever established, 
they became something much more marginal and experimental. HAT policy therefore represents a 
curious episode in the development of housing policy in England. The 1980s Conservative 
Government's political ideology had been particularly influenced by the New Right and their 
critique of the welfare state, which inter alia called for the removal of the local authority monopoly 
in the rented housing sector through the demunicipalisation of local authority housing. The first 
policy instrument to demunicipalise council housing was a statutory right-to-buy (RTB) for council 
tenants introduced in 1980. During the late 1980s, three further exit mechanisms were introduced: 
- Tenants' Choice, HATs and voluntary transfers. Proposals for HATs were met with fierce 
opposition from the Labour party, local authorities and tenants. None of the first six areas intended 
to be designated as HATs were implemented. In March 1991, however, the first successful HAT 
ballot occurred in Hull, followed by a second in the London Borough of Waltham Forest in July 
1991 and a third in Liverpool in August, 1992. In total six HATs were established. Chapter Two 
outlines the research agenda. Chapter Three discusses the major developments in housing policy 
during the 1980s. Building on Chapters One and Three, Chapter Four focuses specifically on HAT 
policy. Chapters Five to Seven examine HAT practice, with each Chapter focusing on one of the 
first three HATs. Chapter Eight draws conclusions. 
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Chapter One 
THE THEORY & POLICY CONTEXT 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the development and implementation of Housing Allion Trust (HAT) policy, with a 
particular focus on the theme of `choice'. During the 1980s, a neo-liberal ideology was influatial in the 
design of public policy and ideas of choice and freedom pervaded Government thinking. Although 
wally attached to a conviction in the superiority of markets, it was also argued that choice 
- 
and 
particularly the `freedom' to make individual choices 
- 
was a part of `real' democracy. The 
Conservative's 1987 election manifesto (which first announced the possibility of HATs), for example, 
promised the next Conservative Government would "... give people greater choice and responsibility 
over their own lives.... Our goal is a capital-owning democracy of people and families who exercise 
power over their own lives 
... 
they would take the important decisions 
... 
rather than having them taken 
for them. ". For the 1980's Conservative Governments 
- 
henceforth the Thatcher Government 
- 
the 
cardinal choice in ratted housing was a choice of landlord. This was seen as the fimdamental choice, 
from which would flow 
- 
at least, in principle 
- 
everything else in terms of housing quality. Choice 
required competition between providers. As local authorities held near monopolies of rested housing, 
there was no competition and, hence, quality and standards were low. As it emerged in terms of policy 
mechanisms, the choice for tenants was to `e dt' fron local authority tenure (discussed in greater detail in '. 
Chapter Three). The first initiative was the introduction of a stay rigtt4o-buy (RTB) for council 
tenants in 1980. Subsequently, three fiudw 'exit mechanisms' were introduced: 
- 
voluntary trarafers, 
Tenants' Choice and HATs. The latter were intended to "... to take over responsibility for local 
authority housing renovate i; and pass it on to dlf rent forms of management and ownership 
including housing associations, tenants' co-operatives and approved primate landlords. " (Cri d 214, 
1987, para 6.3). 
Iltis Chapter provides the cci1 oct for the thesis and is in six main parts. The first discusses `policy' and 
-irmw an', the second the policy conteoct, the third the concept of choice, the fourth choice as a 
policy objective and the fifth choice as an dement is the implementation of policy. The final part draws 
together the discussion of policy inýlemental *on and choice. 
1 
THE DEVELOPMENT & 1MPLEM MATIONOF HOSING AMON TRUST POLICY 
1.1 ` POLICY' & `IMPLEMENTATION' 
Prior to examining the development and implementation of HAT policy, it is necessary to review 
implementation theory. From the early 1970s onwards, prompted by the realisation that policies rarely 
had their intended outcome, a number of studies emerged examining the implementation of public policy. 
The issue had been highlighted by Pressman & Wildavsky's (1973) seminal work Implementation: How 
eat expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland: Ot why it's amazing that Federal programmes 
work at all. this being a sW of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic 
observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes. The book focused on the failure of a 
federal job-creation scheme to provide employment for black people in Oaldand. Mudi of Pressman & 
Wildavsky's analysis was concerned with the extant to which successful impl on depends on joint 
action by different organisations, agencies and actors. They argued that, where action depended upon a 
number of links in an implementation chain, even relatively small failures of co-operation between the 
different organisations could easily multiply to create a major 'implementation deficit'. In particular, in a 
Chapter, entitled `The Complexity of Joint Action', they stressed the significance of `veto' or 'clearance' 
points 
- 
those occasions in whidi an actor has the capacity (regardless of whether the actor also has the 
legal authority) to impede the achieve nervt of policy objects. Veto points required bargaining and 
negotiation between actors and, thereafter, consent or compromise. At best, they delayed implanertatian 
and, at worst, frustrated or distorted it. ' As each link is 
- 
in principle 
-a possible veto/clearance point, 
Pressman & Wildavsky proposed implementation strategies be designed to reduce the links in the chain 
and, thereby, reduce the potential implementation deficit. 
Pressman & Wildavsky's study encouraged the mice of a body of literature, on implemeitation 
studies. The studies danonstiated inter alia the naivete of expecting an automatic translation of policy 
into intended outcome, showed how policies became shaped, amended or blocked and emphasised that 
implemartatian strategies needed to be part of the policy-making process. The initial studies generally 
came to rather pessimistic conclusions about the success of impl on strategies and were followed 
by a series of models 
- 
subsequently described as `top-dcwm' models 
- 
attempting to idecmfy factors 
which made for successful impleinarotahan. These were followed by a series of bottom-up critiques and 
subsequently a series of `bottom-up' or hybrid models anewd. 
1.1.1 TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVES 
Top-down approaches 
- 
sometimes rd'wed to as `rational control' models 
- 
sousirt to provide advice to 
those at the top 
- 
the `policy-makers' 
- 
an how to minimise impl talion deficit as a result of the 
1 Pressman & Wildavsky emphasised that time was often a scarce mom and that delay could be as d=Wm to 
a policy as any her factor. 
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subsequent behaviour of implementers and target groups. A number of theorists offered lists of factors 
which made for successful implementation (e. g., Hood, 1976; Dunsire, 1978a, 1978b). Hogwood & 
Gunn (1984, p. 198-206), for example, set out ten preconditions for perfect implementation: - 
" circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints; 
" adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme; 
" the required combination of resources is actually available; 
" the policy is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect; 
" the relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few intervening links; 
" dependency relationships are mntimal; 
" there is complete understanding of, and agreement upon, the objectives to be achieved; 
" tasks are fully specified in correct sequence; 
" there is perfect communication and co-ordination; and 
" those in authority can demand and obtain perfect aomplianee. 2 
Lists of this nature epitomise top-down approaches: 
- 
policy is the property of policy-Makers at the `top' 
and there is 
- 
or should be 
-a high degree of control over implementers; policy-making and 
implementation are 
- 
and should be 
- 
separate; policy would first be determined and that implemented. 
Implementation was therefore a managanerrt problem. The overarching feature of top-dawn approaches 
was control. As Parsons (1995, p. 466) argues, the approach suggested implanaitatian was about 
`eng people to do what they are told' and developing a programme of control that minimised comic 
and deviation from the goals set by the initial policy decision. Hence, he notes, its view of the policy- 
implementation relationship was summed up in Rousseau's Emile: "Everything is good when it leaves 
the Creator's hannir; everydring degenerates in the haneb of own " (ibid, p. 466). Top-down approaches 
therefore effectively deny a policy-making role for lower level actors, leading to the oondusim that, where 
outcomes failed to match intentions, then, as Ham & Mill (1993, p. 113) put it, "... the top should get a 
better grip on the situation. ". 
Various criticisms of the approach were made induuding, first, that the conditions for sucoessfid 
implanalaticn were unrealistic and insufficiatly cognisant of the reality of both policy implementation 
and the ` real world'. Barrett & Fudge (1981, p. 18), for v=Vle, argued that the top-down approach 
assumed "... those responsible, or a iministering policy an in a position of total and 'rational' control, 
that implementation takes place in a static environment and in a politics free wrld ". 
Second, it was often difficult to determine precisely what the ` policy' was. In practice, policies change 
and develop and may variously be expressed in: 
- 
political manifestos; Crean and White Papers; 
parliamaitary debates; the Bill and subsequent Act; and then post-legislatively in regula1ioas, dreulars, 
codes, instructions to officials, reports and accounts of working practice (Hill, 1997, p. 141). More 
2 The section in their book vine in ciWJiflWY titled: ` Why "perfect implementation" is unobtainable' and wo based 
an an earlier per by Gunn (1978)4 which eanpbasised that ` perfection' was at analytical nonce Xi her than at 
`ideal' to be implemented (Hagwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 198). 
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generally, given that it is often difficult to identify the policy in the first place, it is correspondingly 
difficult to evaluate whether it has been successful or not. Fuwtheimore, some policies do not 
- 
nor were 
intended to 
- 
have explicit objectives and therefore lack benchmarks by which to measure them. Ham & 
Hill (1997, p. 104), for example, suggest that sometimes policies are "... quite deliberately made 
complex, obscure and ambiguous or even meaningless. ". Similarly, Edelman (1971) argued that some 
policies have a `symbolic' purpose and are merely intended to dertionstt'ate that action is being taken 
rather than the issue or problem is being addressed seriously. Policies may be demonstrably inappropriate 
or ineffectual f om the start; alternatively they may be starved of sufficient resources and, thereby, 
rendered little more than symbolic. Although, as is noted later, Sabatier & Mannanian (1979) suggest 
researchers focus on legally-mandated objects, Ham & Hill (1993, p. 104) caution that "... the executive 
dominates the governmental system and legislates in a multiplicity of pap, only some of which are 
made manifest in specific Acts of Parliament, and thus, practices legislative fine-tuning continuously in 
subtle and often ambiguous ways. ". Rather than setting detailed parameters, for example, 1980s public 
policy legislation frequently gave ministers' discretion and, as shown in Chapter Four, HAT legislation 
exemplifies this trend. 
Third, and related to the second criticism, was the consequent difficulty of drawing a dear distinction, 
between `policy' and `implemerrtation'. The difficulty of establishing dear and aorisistent policy at the top 
and at the beginning meant sonne policy decisions were left to what was regarded as the irrpl an 
stage and, hence, the dieoredcal dis in icn between policy formulation and impl I ti on could not be 
sustained in practice. The apparent inability to draw a dear distinction betweh policy formulation and 
implemerta . also suggested the fitility of eng to but implana>r on as a discrete field of 
study. HU (1997, p. 375), for mamVIee, comments on the 'dangerous tendency to separate 
implanaitation issues from policy-making issues and the importance of wing their irter- 
relationships. 3 For this reason, some writers prefer to dehne implecnaytation as the post-legislative stage 
of po ioy-making. 
Fourth, top-down approadves wem criticised for placing too muds man an the role of central actors in 
making policy and too little on other actors. As Sabatier (1986, p. 30) aigues, top-down approaches 
assume policy-makers are `the key actors' and others are `basically inceditnents'. As Means (1993, p. 7) 
notes, they tend to assume the "... top is a reflection of representative democracy, Spart the i»mplemente s 
are w elected q lcials, avd that the policies pw ued are rely ely wianbiguously in the public 
god "4 Critics argLxed, however, that discretion among low level actors and target groups was 
'Hill (1997, p. 383) also notes how a distinction between policy-making and impl on provides a `splendid 
vehicle for "ng the blame'. 
° This is inherently mae complex where there are oompebng democratic legtimacies (eg, where the implementers ate local authorities). 
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inevitable. Discretion occurs whenever the effective limits on an actor's power (i. e., the rules set down 
from above) left him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction (Davis, 1969, 
from Ham & Hill, 1993, p. 152). Although discretion can be regarded as the judicious exercise of 
informed judg ient (i. e., as a means to overcome bureaucratic inflexibility and insensitivity), its practice 
can be arbitrary, promote inequality and increase opportunities both for corruption and `control deficits' 
that distort the policy. Thus, from a top-down perspective, discretion posed problems if it subverted, 
fiustrated or obstructed adiievetnait of the policy objectives, resulting in problems of 'policy drift'. 
Conversely, from a bottom-up perspective, policy drift migtrt actually be regarded as the `natural 
evolution of policy. 
1.1.2 BOTTOM UP PERSPECTIVES 
Bottom-up and hybrid approaches (i. e., those which gave greater consideration to bottom-up factors and 
influences in policy formulation and implementation) derived from critiques of the top-dawn approach. 
Rather than start with a policy decision, such approaches typically started with "... an analpis of the 
multitude of actors who interact at the operational (local) level on a particular problem or issue 
... 
[and] 
... 
the strategies pursued by varrious actors in pursuit of their objectives. " (Sabatier, 1986, p. 22). 
Sabatier (ibid, p. 25) also argued that bottom-uppers were "... far less occupied with the extent to which 
a formally enacted policy decision is carried out and much more concerned with accurately mapping 
the strategies of actors concerned with a policy problem. They are not primarily concerned with the 
implementation (carrying out) of a policy per se but rather with widersta ing actor implementation in 
a specific policy sector. ". Asa methodology, Elmore (1981) coined the term `backward mapping'. By 
this he meant `backward reasoning' from "... the Individual and organisational choices that are the hub 
of the problem to which policy ar1d, sse4 to the notes, pmcedums and stnwtww that have the closest 
proximity to those choices, to the policy instruments available to dart chose things, and hence to 
feasible policy objectives. " (Ham & Hill, 1993, p. 109). Similarly, and working from an approach 
critical of top-down approaches, Barnett & Fudge (1981) saw the implecrýeý cn process in teens of a 
'service delivery network', which focused on: 
- 
the perceptions of individual actors; the organisations 
within which they work and the factors that influence their behaviour, the multiplicity and complexity of 
linkages; the problems of control and co-ordination; and the mit of conflict and consensus. From 
this perspective, implen on was a negotiating process in which various actors pursued disparate 
objectives and, hence, compliance with central (i. e., top-down) objectives was an inappropriate yardstick 
of success and failure. Thus, in contrast to top-down approaches, bottom-up approaches made a virtue of 
focusing on individual actors as starting points and argued that policy actions should be seen in terms of a 
range of actors making choices between alternative courses of action. The discretion of local actors was 
regarded positively and because implementers developed ` coping mechanisms' to deal with uncertainty 
and pressures upon than, discretion in the application of policy was inevitable. Many of the bottom-up 
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studies showed how local actors deflected programmes and policies towards their own ends (i. e., 
implementers use their discretion to further their own interests, which in turn may 
- 
or may not 
- 
be 
compatible with the policy's original objectives). Lipsky (1980), for example, argued that those at the 
`sharp end' of public policy 
- 
in his terminology, ` street level bureaucrats' 
- 
are often forced to 
compromise and/or modify higher level policy goals in the face of day-to-day pressures and uncertainties. 
Depending on the evaluator's perspective, the policy was either `improved' or `distorted'. Lipsky (1980, 
p. )dv), however, went much further, arguing that "... the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the 
routines they establish and the devices they invent to cope with wicertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out ". 
Bottom-up approaches also emphasised the interrelation of policy and implanerrtation. As Means (1993, 
p. 7) notes, while top-down theorists saw the lack of a clear distinction as `regrettable and undesirable', 
bottom-uppers saw it as inevitable. Some bottom-uppers perceived it as desirable because field-level 
implementers were in the best position to assess the local situation and set appropriate objectives. Barrett 
& Fudge (1981, p. 25), for example, saw irnpleýtierrtation as a `policy/action continuum' in which 
interaction and ration took place over time between those seeking to put policy into action and those 
on whom action depended. They argue that: "Policy cannot be regan*d as a *'but more as a series 
of intentionr around which bargaining takes place and which may be morhified as each set of actors 
attempts to negotiate to maximise its own interests and priorities. " (ibid, p. 24). Policy therefore evolves 
or unfolds and has to be understood as an evolutionary, `learning' process, in which the 'fiat end' 
(merely) produces potentialities and principles that change and adapt in practice (Parsons, 1995, p. 473). 
Given the important role of various actors in actually shaping policy, rather than as (simply) a dial 
or administrative process, bottom-up approaches saw implementation as a political process and stressed 
that most policies ultimately result from negotiation and compromise between top and bottom; each of 
whom make `policy'. As Barnett & Hill (1984, p. 22) ague, for exanple, policies represent compromises 
between conflicting values, involve compromises with key interests within the implemartation structure, 
and involve ca romises with key interests upon whom implementation will have an impact. 
Furtl more, rather than a simple duality of power sources (i. e., top and bottom), bottom-up approaches 
stressed that there were various sources of power. 
Bohan-up approaches were variously criticised From a radical democratic perspective, for example, 
some bottom-pars appeared to contest he top's legitimacy to make policy and, in exit mis, privileged 
the hotten and demonised the top. Top-downers thevefore reasserted the top's crederlials (i. e., its 
demotic credentials) to create and implen policy. Hogwood & Gunn (1984, p. 207), for example, 
argue that in Barnett & Fudge's work, top-down was used `virtually as an epithet throughout', while 
`hierarchy' and the `drain of command' were `dearly out of favour'. They also argue that even in the 
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case of arrtral4ocal relations, they found it difficult to see why "... the view from the top [was] 
necessarily less valid dvm dhat from other levels. " (ibid, p. 208). 
Second, some commatators (e. g., Marsh & Rhodes, 1992, p. 9) criticised bottom-up approaches for 
overstating the discretion available to street level bureaucrats and target groups. In addition to those 
imposed by the policy, such groups were also subject to legal, financial and organisational constnunts, 
which 
- 
while not dotemrinicgg behaviour - set limits won their actual discretion. Thus, while top- 
downers such as Sabatier & Maananian (1979) appreciated the arguments ccnc m ng the limitations of 
hierarchical control, they did not accept the inevitability of `adaptive' implanartation in which policy- 
makers are forced largely to acquiesce to the preferaioes of street-level bureaucrats and target groups 
(Sabatier, 1986, p. 24). Instead, they sought to identify a number of legal and political mechanism for 
affecting the pne hoes and/or constraining the behaviour of stet level bureaucrats and target groups 
both in the initial policy decision and then subsequently over time. 1bus, as Sabatier (ibid, p. 25) anpu s 
while they «... rejected hiemn*ical conti ul 
- 
in the sense of tightly constained behavior r- as 
impassible, they argued that the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats and tagst grow could be kept 
within acceptable bowvh owr lines. ". 
A third criticism of bottom-up approadhes was that while they described the complexity and distortions of 
policy implem 1 tatiai, they were less capable of providing prescriptive help to `policy-nak ers' an how to 
make 6 *W better (Means, 1993, p. 7). fill (1997, p. 375), for example, malm the Saeral point that the 
tap-down/battorn-up debate often confuses prescriptive concerns with analytical ones. ' 11his was a central 
problem in implemaitaticn studies. Critiques of imp] amert cri, for example, often faxxl it difficult to 
address both normadve c=z= (i. e., how policy should be implanaited) and n oddagical oonoams 
(i. e., descriptive or explanatory accounts of the policy and implen ... an process). Haim top-down 
approadies afar fail to explain the reality of policy implanentation, while bottom-up approadtes 
frequa lly fail to provide guidance to policy-makers on how to implement policy. 
1.1.3 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
The aitiaisms of both topfit and bottom -up approaches suggest the necessity of viewmg policy 
implanattaoEion with sensitivity to both perspectives - not luau because each perspective could led to 
dif e conclusions. Furthermore, although often presented as a dichotomy, the approaches actually 
focus on äffaant 
. 
As noted above, top-down approaches focus an how policies can be 
impkmetad w1Wa bot0om-up approaches were less concerned with' mplanýtatian as a nmem to achieve 
a particular outcome and i oro concerned with the study of implementaticn. 'There is the. t o1 potalial 
Hopwood & Own (1964, R2O7), r ou=p 
, 
van that in criticising the t p. down -4po. d Banelt & Fine 
App' ed "... to cc. fi t. idrd-t. mods ofpe! wxwtta ion i th a naffs or p owrtpdm modal 
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for a synthesis in which insights from the bottom (i. e., in terms of process) inform the top in teams of 
improving guidance for policy 
-makers. Hill (1997, p. 375), for example, concluded that the importance of 
implementation theory for policy-makers was the necessity of an awareness of what might happen 
`downstream'. 
In terms of selecting a framework for structuring an analysis of implementation, Sabatier (1986, p. 36) 
argues that a top-down approach is appropriate where there is a 'dominant public' programme. This 
contrasts with situations where a new initiative enters a crowded policy space, in which case he argues 
that it should be examined from a bottom-up perspective. The nature of HAT policy meant that once a 
HAT was established it became the dominant local policy initiative. As discussed previously, Sabatier 
also notes that bottom-up approaches are less concerned with the extort to which a formally enacted 
policy decision is carried out (e. g, HAT policy) and much more concerned with accurately mapping the 
strategies of actors concerned with a policy problem (e. g, improving a particular run-down housing 
estate) 
.6 He therefore argues that a top-down approach is appropriate where the analyst is solely 
interested in the effectiveness of a programme. To provide both a conceptual construct and a guide for 
empirical research, Sabatier & Maananian (1979; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; 1983) synthesised the 
ideas of top-down and bottom-up theorists into a set of six `suf dent and generally necessary' conditions 
for the effective implementation of `legally-stated policy objectives'. Their argument was that legal 
directives structure the implementation process and si iflcairtly constrain the behaviour of implementers 
and other officials (i. e., a `strong statute' approach). As their concern was with the effective 
impleinerrtation of policy, their approach was top-down and they argued that, if a policy achieved high 
scores on each of the conditions, there was a good probability that it would achieve its desired vials. 
They further argue that the first three conditions are dealt with by initial policy decisions, while the latter 
three are largely the product of political and economic pressures during the implem inn phase. The 
conditions are outlined below and provide a framework against which to analyse the h planmta>Yon of 
HAT policy. 
Condition One: Clear & consistent object 
This condition stressed that dear legal objects provided both a `standard of evaluation' and an important 
`legal resource' for implementing officials. For methodological reasons, they e hasised the importance 
of distinguishing the objects contained in the legal docunwnts (i. e., the statute) from both the political 
rhetoric surrounding policy fonnulation and what critics or evaluators might (mistakagy) perceive to be 
its objects. 
6 In the content of the late 1980s/1990s, the Latter might involve exploring wiry and haw local actors explored 
aiir t policy mechanisms and initi(e. g, Estate Action, IiATs, City ChallenM vduntyº acs 
PKhWs 'ß'° 8 PAP affaWmaro with the t, and wbeegntly te SRB Challenge Fuß. 
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Condition Two: Adequate causal dheory 
This condition emphasised that policy interventions, incorporate an implicit causal theory about how to 
effectuate social change and stressed the importance of the legal and policy levers available to the 
implementers officials as a means of acting on those causal assumptions and factors. 
Condition Three: Appropriate policy tools & sufficient resources 
This condition emphasised particular aspects of policy design as being crucially important in terns of 
effective implementation, including, 
- 
the delivery mechanism or agency; the number of veto points and 
the means to overcome them, the ` decision rules' for implementers; and the need for sufficient resources. 
Maunanian & Sabatier (1983, p. 27) noted that one of the best-documented findings in the implecnentaýion 
literature (pace Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) was "... the cif culty of obtaining co-ordinated action 
within any given agency and among the numerous semi-autonomous agencies imolvvd in most 
implementation efforts. ". They therefore argued that one of the most important attributes of any statute 
was the extant to which it `hierarchically-integrated' the implen ng agencies. They stressed that, if the 
system was too loosely integrated, there would be scope for variation in the degree of compliance among 
implemerrtas and target groups as each responded to the ` incentives for modification' within their local 
setting. The degree of hierarchical integration among implementing armes was determined by the 
number of veto/dearanee points (i. e., opportunities for actors to modify, delay or stop the implementation 
of policy) and the extent to which the policy was provided with iixkjcements and sanctions "... sufficient 
to ensure acquiescence among those who have a potential veto. " (ibid, 1983, p. 27). Their f amework 
therefore emphasised the importance of selecting implementing institutions supportive of the now 
programme and who would give it high priority and, in addition, suampasted the creation of new armes. 
Accepting the inevitability of veto points and links in the impl ore chain, they also emphasised the 
need to minimise or avoid veto points and, where that was not possible, to anticipate than and have 
strategies (i. e., incentives and sanctions) to overcome than. Maunanian & Sabatier (1983, p. 27) also 
stressed that the statute could further influence the implanaitation by stipulating the formal `decision 
rules' of the imply agencies (i. e., it could set boundaries on the discretion available to 
inplenaters). 
CondWon Four: Comte & ikA offi"knm ft 
Recognising the unavoidable discxe6an given to implementing officials, this condition emphasised that 
the r coram itmet to policy objectives and skill in utilising the available resources were critical. They 
fiudw argued that while this could partially be determined by the initial statute much of it was a product 
of post-statutory political fbi 
. 
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Condition Five: Support of- or compliance from 
- 
interest groups/agencies & sovereigns 
This condition emphasised the need to maintain political support throughout the 
- 
often prolonged 
- 
implementation process bode from interest and target groups and fron legislative and executive 
`sovereigns' 
- 
those institutions that control its legal and financial resources (i. e., Govemmont ministers 
and civil servants). 
Condition Six: Stable solo-economic contexts 
Tipis condition recognised that diarege in socio-economic onditions (e. g., the 1973 Arab oil boycott) could 
have dramatic repercussions in terms of undermining the political support or diange the conditions for the 
causal theory of the programme. The pursuit of the statutory objects might also be undermined by the 
emergence of competing public policies. 
1.2 THE POLICY CONTEXT 
Having discussed implementation in the previous section, this section will discuss the ideas that shaped the 
public policy agenda during the 1980s. Although HAT policy did not appear until the 1987 Conservative 
election manifesto, it must be placed within the much broader context of the Thatcher Goverment. The 
Thatcher Government's policies were especially influenced by New Right ideas; the core features of 
which included an economic and moral critique of both the welfare state and state intervention generally 
and the advocacy of five marla l mechanisms in all areas of public policy (King & Waldron, 1997, p. 414). 
Two principal New Right approaches have been identified: 
- 
`mo-liberal' and `neo-conservative' (Table 
1.1). The former stressed freed m, choice and individualism, while simultaneously expressing doubts and 
anxieties about Sowrnmei t action. The latter emphasised the importance of values such as hierarchy, 
authority and tradition and was "... broadly neutral in its attitude wwcin* the economic order of 
capitalism, defending it on utilitarian grouwth of of ciency but also advocating a strong interventionist 
state. " (Davies, 1985, p. 20). 
The New Right's particular target was the welfare state. Many New Rig#rt theorists drew directly and 
explicitly on the writings of Hayek (1944,1960), who had argued the case for market liberalism 
duvdghout the period of the post-war welfare state's growth. The other major source of New Right 
theory and ideology was Milton Friedmarm (1962) who argued that, left to their own devices, markets 
would naturally protect individuals because consumer sovereigpty would ensure that producers adapted 
their services to meet consumer needs. Throughout the post-rar period, Hayek and Fried=m's ideas 
viere prcpo ded in Britain by a right-wing tlvnlc-twik, the InstiMe for Economic Affairs (IBA). Initially 
a minn ity voice against the welfare consensus of the post-war years, the inflation and rising 
unamploymat oft he 1970s gave credence to its predictions of market distortions and dysf vxdcn through 
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state intervention, and the IEA found a wider audience for its ideas. In 1974, anodler think-tank - the 
Centre for Policy Studies 
- 
was formed by Keidi Joseph and Margaret Thatchw, and in 1979, the Adam 
Smith Institute was formed. Together the new organisations and new found political allies gave New 
Riet 
- 
and primarily neo-liberal 
- 
ideas a powerful push towards the centre of ideological debate. 
(Alcodc 1996, p. 126-127). 
NCO-LIBERALLSM NA)-CONSERVATISM 
" The individual " The nation 
" Freedom of choice " Hierarchy & subordination 
" Market society " Disciplined society 
" Laissez-hire " Social authoriý 
" Minimal government " Strong government 
TABLE 1.1 NEW RIGHT IDEOLOGY 
(Source Betsey, 1986, f om L, en+itas, 1986). 
The concept of choice was central to neo-liberal New Right ideas and was intimately associated with 
actions of `liberty' and 'freedom'. The following discussion is in three main parts. The first discusses the 
concept of choice m more philosophic and abstract terms and, in particular, draws a di on between 
`liberty' and `power' of choice. The second discusses choice as a policy object and explains the 
preference for consume or market choice. The third dm =w Choice as an dan t in the impl on 
of policy. 
1.3 THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE 
Choice can be considered i terms of three interrelated dimensions: 
- 
opportunity, capacity (i. e., power), 
and resources. Mally the most imponat1 is opportunity; once opporMnity is available, the anphasis 
switches to the power to exercise that choice. A distinction between the ability to make the choice (i. e., 
the opportunity and/or power) and the exercise of that ability (i. e., the outcome) should also be noted. 
1.3.1 OPPORTUNITY & CAPACITY 
Opportunity refers to the freedom or liberty to make dzoicee. Based an the liberal principle that each 
peisai is the best judge of his own wem, the New Right had a `negative' conception of freedom, in 
which freedom was not opportunity itself, but the absence of obstacles to opportunity. Hayek (1960, 
p. 12), for example, defined liberty or freedom (be uses the terms synonymously) as the absence of 
intentional coercion. Given this definition, he argues that whether an individual is free or not "... kes not 
depend on the range of choice but on whether he can expect to shape his commas of action in accor*ma 
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with his present intentions, or whether somebody else has power to manipulate the condition as to 
make him act according to that person's will rather than his own" (ibid, p. 13). For Hayek (ibid, p. 21), 
coercion was the control of one individual by another such that "... in oder to avoid greater evil, he is 
forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another. Except in the 
sense of choosing the lesser evil in a situation forced on him by another, he is unable either to use his 
own intelligence or knowledge to follow his own aims and beliefs. ". 
Hayek also distinguished three other definitions of freedom: `iri ', 'political' and `positive' freedom. 
Inner or metaphysical freedom was "... the extent to which a person is guided in his actions by his own 
considered will, by his rearon or lasting conviction, radjer than by momentary impulse or 
circumstance. " (Hayek, 1960, p. 15). Rather than coercion by others, the opposite of `inner freedom' was 
"... the influence of temporary emotions, or moral or intellectual weakness. " (ibid, p. 15). Thus, 
whether or not a person was able to choose int lligently between alternatives was distinct from whether or 
not other people imposed their will upon him. For Hayek (ibid, p. 13) political freedom was the 
participation of men in their choice of govenm 
, 
in the process of legislation and in the control of 
administration. While Hayek tolerated the first two types of freedom, he did not tolerate the third 
- 
positive freedom 
- 
which he equated to the ` physical ability to do what I want'. His major criticism was 
its potential to be used to demand or justify a redistribution of wealth. Hayek (ibid, p. 17) did not regard 
this as an issue of freedom but rather one of power: "Whether or not I am my own master and can follow 
my own choice and whether the possibilities, from which I must choose are many or few are two entirely 
dif rent questions. ". Positive freedom involves both opportunity (i. e., the freedom to make choices) and 
the power or capacity to exercise choice. Regarding the won between negative and positive 
conceptions of 6reedom, Scnl n (1982, p. 180) notes that a man may be f ee from constraints and thrmts, 
in a world that leaves him free to do very little. Hence, a distinction needs to be made between `liberty of 
choice' (the opportunity for choice or 
- 
in Hayek's terns 
- 
the lade of obstacles preventing choice) and 
`power of choice' (the ability to exercise dioice). For the New Rigrt these were separable; for others, 
choice was giess without power to exercise it. 
Both conceptions of freedom sum a need for autonomy (i. e., the ability to resist the coercion of others 
and freely or voluntarily make a choice). Autonomy is generally defined as the freedom to determine 
one's own adians or behaviour, and rdm to a freedom to manoeuvre and/or make Wependeirt decisions. 
Autonomy is a product of both the ability of individuals (and groups) to determine and pursue th& awn 
objectives and their ability to resist external aoerciav nfuenoe. Attonomy must therefore be considered 
with respect to the relationship with oder agencies or bodies. Manipulation of sie group (e. g,, tenants) 
by anoder (e. g., the landlord) may reduce the ability of the fonner to make its own choices. The abilityto 
resist coercion is aor went an a number of factors, inducting for example, the political mat uity of 
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organisations and 
- 
in principle 
- 
the greater the immaturity the more they can be manipulated. 
Autonomy parallels the concept of `consumer sovereignty', which exists vAien resources are allocated in 
line with consumers' pes. In practice, consumer sovereignty is subject to a number of limitations 
and/or influences that qualms rather than invalidate it, and, hence, the consumer's position of sovereignty 
is necessarily a `bounded' sovereigN, y.
1.3.2 RESOURCES 
Freedom often requires resources to enable the choice to be exercised. In neo-liberal terms, however, 
freedom was not necessarily diminished by a lads of resources: as Joseph & Sumpton (1979, from Hayes, 
1994, p. 34) argue, for example, "... a person who cannot afford to buy food may well have a justifiable 
grievawe 
... 
but it would be misleading to describe his grievance as a lack of freedom 
... 
liberty is 
liberty, not something else. And a slave is a slave, you do not set him free by feeding him. ". The power 
of choice, however, usually requires resources which typically include: financial resources (e. g., the 
ability to pay); information; and resources that help develop or increase capacity/autonomy. Except to 
note that individuals have differait financial resources, the first requires no fiutha discussion. The 
second two are discussed here. 
Information is rarely perfect and may be misleading or distorted, whether negligently or deliberately. 
Taking an analogy with consumers in a market, consumers do not have full sovereignty in their decision- 
making for a number of o informational reasons. The masons include, first, information is often 
imperfect (i. e., all possible future outcomes and/or their associated probabilities are not known). 
Consumer choice, for example, involves the ability to trade-off between altematives and, hence, 
information is required about all the choices available (i. e., the `opportunity cost'). Furthermore, rather 
than being mono-attribute, most choices are multi-attribute; as u gher order goods or services usually 
constitute a package of attributes, trade-alls are made between packages rather than individual attributes. 
Second, information may be used incorrectly or all the information relevant to decision-making is not 
used. Even with perfect information, individuals may have limited abilities to process it, particularly 
when it is of a specialist or technical nature. Third, due to the influence of advertising and other forms of 
persuasion, consumers may be deluded or deceived to equate thoir best tnmterests with their own wishes or 
with the interests or wishes of others. They may also look to others for guidance or advice on what to 
choose. Similarly, choices may be delayed until the choice of others is known and, as a consequence, their 
choice is influenced by what o hers choose (i. e., a herd instin t). in practice, therefore, decision-making 
reflects `bounded rationality', wl +eby, decision-malgig problems are reduced to a modest number of 
variables, and `satisficing' or `reasonable' rather than ` optimal' decisions are made. 
Resources may also be important to develop or enable autonmiy. Many local audwrities, for example 
provide assistance to town' groups (i. e., use of d rooms, assistance with newsldts and provision 
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of training). Some have appointed specialist tenant participation officers with an explicit brief to 
encourage `bottom-up' processes of tenant involvement and participation. Somerville (1998, p. 247) 
argues that resourcing for tenants is empowering (i. e., it develops their ability to exercise choice) but only 
if tenants have some say in determining how those resources are used. He further notes that `forms of 
mediation' between landlord and tenant are required to ensure resources upplied from the top are applied 
as effectively as possible at the bottom (ibid, p. 247). htetmediaries, such as `Tenants' Friends', may be 
necessary to explore differart options with tenants and advise than accordingly. In practice, however, 
such intermediaries teed to be employed to follow an agenda set by others rather than by the tenants (ibid, 
p. 247). Furthermore, resources may be given for particular purposes and must, Mote, be used with 
`appropriate' discretion. 
1.4 CHOICE AS A POLICY OBJECTIVE 
For die New Right, economic freedom via the market was seen as a prerequisite for every offer type of 
freedom: "For the neo-liberal, fieedom' and `the mw*et' are Siamese twins, and the terms 
, 
tree 
econonry' and 
, 
tree society' become almost interchangeable. " (Hayes, 1994, p. 35). Hayek (from Hoy, 
1984, p, 17), for example, argued that, in a competitive market, a supplier could not coerce a customer to 
buy his goods at an inflated price because the customer could always turn to another supplier for the 
goods. The preferred form of dunce was therefore individual or consumer choice within competitive 
markets: according to the (neo-classical) economic model of 'rational' choice, in any given situation, 
individuals had sovereignty and made rational decisions regarding their consumption of goods and 
services, choosing among those available the one expected to serve their interests best, given their 
preferences and perceptions of the relevant constraints. ' There were two interrelated sets of reasons for 
the preference for economic freedom: 
- 
markets were regarded as more efficient than bureaucracies (i. e., 
'economic' arguments) and markets offered individual choice rather than collective choices (i. e., 
`democracy' argumaits). As is noted below, consumer or market choice was also favoured due to the 
supposed advantages of `minimal' and `limited' government. 
1.4.1 Econonic argmmrnb 
Advocates of markets, generaIy claim, three advantages over other f(mis of allocative (i. e., bureaucratic) 
systems. First, as Barre is competition between producers and suppliers of goods and services, markets 
are more efficient alocators of goods and services. Competitive pressures eure that all providers strive 
Fists and sociologists, ho%e er, debebe how and with what capacity people make choices. Duesenbeay, for fie, argued that "... economics is all about how people make choices; axiology is all about why they d m't have my choices to make" (from Vanbag, 1994, p. 12). Although a deliberate caricatuM Vanberg (ibt'd, 
p. 12) argues Auesenbenry's stdoment captures the conflict betvmen the economic and sociological perspective. For the purpose of this thesi8, it is adkieW to admowledge that human behaviour is influenced by both econaaýic 
and non-economic facture and that ` rational' choice may talge place within a web of values. 
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to offer a service as good as that available from other providers, and that those who do not either improve 
their product, move onto something else or go out of business. Competition takes place on quality and/or 
price, and benefits consumers by providing goods and services at prices reduced by the benign forces of 
competition. Second, markets empower consumers. The market is the best medianism for discovering 
and co-ordinating dispersed knowledge and preferences, and the best way of finding out what people want 
and of co-ordinating knowledge about how best to organise its provision. Furthermore, markets allow 
consumers to choose between competing suppliers and to combine different packages of goods and 
services according to their own prefermc s rather than those of suppliers. The power for consumers is to 
take their custom elsewhere. In addition, people are able to maximise their individual welfare constrained 
only by their willingness and ability to pay. Third, market outcomes are neide fair not unfair, but simply 
the result of `impersonal forces'. George & Wilding (1993, p. 36), for example, note that "... ma>ket 
systems do not depend on their success on the beneficent motives of service providers. 
... 
Markets 
compel providers to be sensitive to the needs of potential users 
-for the sake of their own survival in 
business. ". 
To work efficiently markets require perfect competition. Markets, however, rarely work perfectly and 
often `fail' in some way. State intervention has traditionally been justified on the grounds of market 
failure, where intervention is required to 'correct' or `replace' the markt. For the New Right, this 
commits the fallacy of supposing the alternative to infect markets is `perfect' Bove mnent; the real 
question was which imperfect form of organisation lead to a better outcome. For the New Right, the 
answer was markets and market mechanisms ince, as Seldon (1990, p. 118) argued, market failure was 
`mostly corrigible' and govemmat failure `generally incorrigible'. Haue, their preference for 
government to be largely restricted to controlling the abuse of nark et power and that the pursuit of self- 
interest could be relied on to pro n to the public interest hrough the ` invisible hand' of market forces. As 
originally developed by Adam Smith and others, these ideas implied a minimal instrumental role for 
1.4.2 Democracy mgmuenb 
The New RigIt's prime for individual (i. e., mannet) äioices radw than collective (i. e., political) 
diaices was derived from a critique of the iahe t weaknesses of political democracy, drawn in large patt 
from the ` econarucs as politics' school (Buchanan & Tullodc, 1962; Buchanan, 1978). Mxwe are flume 
main issues or problems caioeming political democracy-. 
- 
the tedn cal difficulty of just procedures for 
collective choices; problems of representation; and the threat of the State to individual freedomn. 
- 
procedures for collective dudm 
There is a sjoficwnt difference between individual dices and cdledivve choices. Not all choices can be 
made individually and, in wirr terms, the important features of a 'genuine' couective choice are that ady 
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one choice can be made and the choice of some (e. g., the majority) is binding on all; hence, unless there is 
unanimity, individual preferences are inevitably overridden. If an individual is able to give his consent to 
procedures for collective choice, it would be irrational to consent to arrangements where his interests were 
- 
or could be 
- 
unreasonably overridden. The overriding of individual prefimwes is nevertheless part of 
the `coercion' of collectivism. It is also important to note that a collective choice is not simply the 
aggregate or coincidence of individual choices. Furthermore, as some choices, which could be made 
individually, are made collectively (e. g., for other reasons efficiency, time, convenience, economies of 
scale, etc. ), it is a matter of political debate which choices should be made collectively. 
Collective dioice procedures mit reasonably be expected to be: decisive; just; neutral (in the sense that 
individuals do not have the power to determine the outcome); and not unduly prolonged. The most 
common form is voting. Voting, however, is only one patt of the process of making collective choices. 
Saward (1998, p. 63), for example, identifies four stages to collective decision-making, - setting the 
agenda, including identifying the issue and setting out alternatives; debate, negotiation and discussion; the 
moment of decision (i. e., the vote); and implemi3tation. Hence, in principle, involvement at all stages is 
crucial in actually shaping the collective diaiee - although, in practice, such involvement may not always 
be forthcoming' The most common method of voting is the majority rule method, where the winning 
candidate is the one ranked first by more than half of the voters? An alternative method is the unanimity 
rule where the winning candidate must be the choice of all voters. 10 Many writers, however, express 
reservations about voting as a medhmnism for revealing collective choices and, taken to its e remik argue 
that in order for a collective choice to be made a `dictator' (or some other entity invested with dictatorial 
powers) must 
- 
inexorably and perhaps unreasonably 
- 
override individual pref6reices. This is the 
`vying paradox' and is one of the conclusions of social chore theory and, in particular, of Arrow's 
pbilitX Theocrý. 
Social th ce theory aims to produce a social welfare fiection that has a procedural justice (i. e., although 
an individual may not agree with the outcome an this or that occasion, he accepts the justness of the 
prods and, Eby, its outcome). Arrow's Imooss< ibility Theoran begins with the idea of a social 
g Although there may also be other reasons for non-involvement, including dart that involvement will be 
eactive (i. e., `resignation' rather than apathy), Hirschman (1981, p. 215-216) suggested a major reason for the 
`much-lamented apathy in relation to public issues' was "... often not an absence of interest in a public policy, 
but considerable interest combined with the expectation that someone else wf11 exert himself on one's own 
behalf ". In this respect, collective action can be considered to be analogous to a public good and the related issue 
of free-riders. The more free-riders, the mare the costs are concentrated on the activists who contrAute to the 
good's production. Those who get involved do so because th r consider the quality and quantity of the public 
good tobe insufficient and are prepared to incur additional personal costs to improve it and/or derive additional 
(individual) benefits from being involved 
9A1q-Ie problem is to account fror abstentions. Even if there are two candidates, unless the winning candidate 
Sets more than 50% of the possible votes, a majority cf pomUe voters do not support the winning catdidte. 10 Mueller (1989, chapter 7) discusses the merits of various voting methods. 
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welfare function that is interpreted as a set of rules for transforming the prefenawes of individuals into a 
social (i. e., collective) choice and lays down certain ostensibly reasonable conditions or requirements that 
such a function should satisfy. It is then shown that no such social welfare function can meet these 
conditions. Arrow's theorem provoked a variety of responses. Some considered Arrow's conditions too 
exacting for practical purposes, accepted the impeifedions of collective choice procedures and worked at 
limiting than. Others saw the theorem as indicating the need for a wider infonnational base. Weale 
(1992, p. 215), for example, argues that an alternative model is a process of dialogue in which reasons are 
exchanged between participants in a process perceived to be a joint search for a `consensus' (i. e., 
unanimity). " In effect, this returns it to stage two of the collective choice process outlined above. A third 
group (which broadly includes the New Right) accepted Arrow's result as showing the int rt 
impossibility of collective decision-making and, in effect, proposed side-stepping the ` Arrow problem' by 
severely reducing the range of collective choices (Barry, 1995, p. 288). 
Al hough the discussion implicitly assumes all individuals or parties have similar powers in terms of 
making of collective choices (nardictatorship, for e ample, being one of Arrow's conditions) and that 
decisions are 
- 
or should be 
- 
made in terms of the ` better argument prevailing' (i. e., on some notion of 
rationality), that is an ideal situation. In majority vote systems, for example, a group commanding an 
overall majority (or able to coerce a majority) can outvote other groups regardless of argumentation. 
Differential power can, in some circumstances, be redressed by giving some or all parties the power to 
veto a proposal; the advantage being that all parties have to be in agreement before a decision is takes 
(i. e., some form of consensus must be achieved 
- 
although for practical purposes, it may be agreed 
unanimity is not required and that a more exacting requirement than a simple majority 
- 
such as for 75% 
to be in favour 
- 
is sufficient). A veto may the 'ore be used to ensure that discussions continue until 
more acceptable or better-conceived proposals are made or agreed, an in-built majority, for example, may 
result in ill-considered decisions. Conversely, as a single dissident can veto an option favoured by 
everyone lse, a veto gives undue power to particular groups or individuals and increases the difficulties in 
actually reading a collective decision. There are also problems of time costs and strategic behaviour, 
such as `logrolling' in which an actor foregoes an option he values lowly in return for support for an 
option he values NW y. 
- 
represeitation 
A dis on must also be drawn between `u miediated' (i. e., where individuals express teirr own 
pry) and `mediated' (i. e., wh&e representatives express preferences) collective dhoices. In the 
11 Rather than fixed preferences to be wed, this pig of collative choice Warb with preferences that 
can be shared or modified as competing reasons are advanced during the course of diecausima. This process is, in 
fact, aversion of the unammity rite, the shortcomings of which are time costs involved in reaching a decision and 
the possibility of hic behaviour, such as `lag r fling'. 
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former, there is some form of direct collective choice procedure (e. g., a vote of all tenants on whedw to 
transfer to a private landlord). In the latter, a representative body (i. e., a parliame it or committee) 
exercises choice on behalf of its membership or constituency (i. e., it has ` sovereign authority' to make 
collective choices). '2 In mediated collective choices, the accountability of those making the choice on the 
group's behalf is important. In an elected committee or parliament, for example, the members are 
accountable to the extant that they can periodically be voted out of office. 13 In principle, representatives 
are elected or appointed to save individuals the time and cost involved in taking collective decisions; the 
trade-off being an acceptance that some decisions may be taken with which the individual does not agree. 
The objection, however, is that representatives 
- 
inevitably and perhaps deliberately 
- 
distort and 
misrepresent individual preferences. Furthermore, bureaucrats and professionals within the state sector 
- 
who are unelected, often unaccountable and possibly self-interested 
- 
may also make or influence the 
choices made by representatives. 
- 
interference with the freedom of individuals 
For Hayek, state inteervett n involved an unwarranted interference with the freedom of individuals to 
organise their own affairs. He, therefore, argued that won was only justified if its aim was to 
protect individual freedom (e g., criminal law to protect private property) (Alcodg 1996, p. 126). For 
Hayek, liberalism concerned what the law ought to be and the limitations of governmental power, while 
democracy was concerned with the mamer of detern fining what would be the law and who exercises 
power, more specifically, it designated the majority of citizens as a source of power. Hayek (1960, p. 103) 
argued that liberalism was "... concerned mainly with limiting the coercive powers of all grnver menu, 
whether democratic or »o4 whereav the dogmatic democrat krvm only one limit to govennnent 
- 
current majority opinion. The dif rence between the two s&vth out most clearly if we name their 
opposites: 
, 
for democracy it is authoritarian government; for liberalism it is totalit sm. ". Thus, for 
Haydn as the preservation of individual liberty was the more important, the source was not as important 
as the limitation of power. Hence, his preference for limited gmminent. 
1.4.3 TEE NEW RIGHT 
The New Right hqo igbted the shortcomings of reprowntafive democracy and mechanisms for making 
collective choices and contrasted them with the perceived success of market medhanisms providing 
(individual) choice and responding to consumer prefecaioes. They therefore adopted a critical stance 
towards democratic decision-making which underpinned "... a general presumption tom limiting the 
scope for decisioru to be mark in this collective way, for example, by limiting the role of local 
'2 As they are made up of a member of muss, pediaments and committees do rat resolve the problem of 
collective choice procedures. 
13 Raff than being elected, numbers of a committee cmdd be appointed by a thü d patty who is elected (i. e., the Secretary of State). 
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governmen4 or by privatisation and marketisation of state activities. " (Bramley & Lambert, 1998, 
p. 88). A longstanding director of the IEA, Arthur Seldon (1990, p. 114), for example, argued that while 
'control by the sovereign people of their spokesmen' was `very tenuous', "... in the market all the people 
make decisions themselves individually and enforce them by paying or moving elsewhere 
. 
Thereareno 
representatives to misrepresent them". Se don (1990, p. 115-116) also gave five reasons why markets as 
`vehides of individual decisions' were superior to governments as `vehicles of collective decisions'. First, 
in the market, people make decisions as individuals and do not have to wait for others to agree; in politics, 
decisions are made collectively with many odes and individuals "... have to persuade enough others to 
form majorities, to organise `movemente , to march with banners or create deputations' to intimidate 
politiciann'. " (ibid, p. 115). Second, individuals in markets decide for tlheinselves or for small private units 
like families or voluntary associations, while in the political process collective decisions are made for 
thousands or millions who are strands. 'Third, individuals in markets make decisions directly, though 
face-to-face or o wise personal exdiagge with other individuals, while in government decisions are 
made indirectly by delegation to representatives. Fourth, in markets people generally spend their own 
money, but governments pend other people's money and in much larger quantities. Furthermore, there 
are no safeguards in representative bodies that reproduce the "... intimate personal knowledge in the 
market of the conditions or regtdrements of each man or woman; no comparable arociety to make the 
most of every penny... ; no consciousness of the personal consequences or error, carelessness or 
foolishness; no corresponding sense of responsibility in spending, saving investing or wwting money. " 
(ibid, p. 116). Fift, in the market individuals who suffer from poor service can generally escape (i. e., exit) 
to other suppliers, while the very fact that they can escape prevents poor service being widespread or 
prolonged. By contrast, where services are provided by the government or the public sector, individuals 
are generally tied to the provision. 
bi summary, flierefore, the New Rigit argued that `economic' democracy was greater than `political' 
democracy because, first, the market offered a more effective form of democracy by enabling everyone to 
make choices and, second, the consumer in the marled making individual diaices based an preferences 
and the willingness and ability to pay was a better form of legitimaaian than social or collective dices 
made by imperfect political systems. Hance, public policy dioices should 
- 
wherever possible 
- 
be 
(individual) market 
- 
radier than (collective) political 
- 
choices. 
The New Right critique of die eifere state 
The above set of ideas informed the New Right's critique of the welfare state 
-a significant element of 
which was the council housing sector 
- 
and, in tum, its policy press nptians and proposals. Five main 
strands to the critique can be idenfified (adapted fron Wilding, 1989; George & Wilding, 1993). 14 First, 
'4 It is not proposed to 4et e or provide a critique of theme ides. George & VAkfmg (1993) undeitake both an 
e gx*tion and critique of the various ideologies regarding the provision of walfane. It should also be noted that the 
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the welfare state was fundamentally inefficient because it was monopolistic, there was no competition 
between providers, and only through competition could efficiency be achieved. As the state was seen as 
the main source and provider of welfare services, other sources and systems of welfare - the family, the 
community, the voluntary sector, the market - were neglected and weakened, and would ultimately perish. 
Second, as the welfare state provided what professionals, bureaucrats and sundry experts `diouglt' was 
wanted, it was paternalistic and unresponsive to individual needs and wishes. Choices were made for 
people, who therefore had little or no choice about the type or quality of service provided. In addition, due 
to the inadequacy of representative democracy, services were not subject to effective democratic control 
and accountability. Furthermore, the paternalism was morally corrupting and created perverse incentives 
and a syndrome of dependency. Third, the welfare state weakened the economy because it depended on 
debilitating rates of taxation that fuelled inflation, destroyed incentives and damaged investment, thereby, 
undermining the real sources of welfare -a healdry economy and economic growth. The welfare state 
also weakened the authority of government. Governments became the focus of interest group activity as 
groups fought for the recognition and protection of their particular needs. Politics was reduced to 
reconciling interest groups, who concentrated "... on the distribution of the economic pie rather than the 
production of a bigger pie. " (Ashford, 1985, p. 40). Fourth, the welfare state inevitably tended towards 
continual growth and increasing bureaucracy, the so-called `ratchet effect' (Britian, 1977, from Cole & 
Furbey, 1994, p. 179). Two main arguments supported this conclusion. The first was that the stmctures 
of large public bureaucracies created incentives for bureaucrats to gain prestige, higher salaries and 
security by expanding the size of their empires, by pressing for larger budgets and producing more goods 
for society than society would choose to pay for, while simultaneously, providing few incentives for 
bureaucrats to look for productive or allocative efficiencies (Dowding, 1996, p. 51). The second argument 
was that growth would result from the `fiscal illusion' that state services could be obtained without cost to 
individuals. Fifth, the welfare state had failed because resources had not been redistributed in favour of 
the poor and hidden transfers served to provide services for the middle lasses. Davies (1985, p. 22) 
argues that the New Rig t had a "... fierce hostility to privilege, in sense of special powers or 
dispensations acquired by groups or indäviaW, not by virtue of competition or agreement but rather 
through the manipulation of political power and thus force. ". As a result, many of the New Right's 
objections to the welfare state derived from the way in which - in practice - it worked to the benefit of the 
already better cf" 
Po&y Preuiipl iom 
Although the New Right argued that state welfare was mithat desirable nor practical, they did not 
, welfare ebbe critiqued by the New Right inevitably hw elements ofcariMwe 
13 There is some inconsistency between this acgm ant and earlier ogamenu about moral corruption and 
dependency. As Hirschman (1991, p. 6) observed, for example, it inquired "... special gifts ofsop i*y to aw n* 
at one and the same time that wlfare payments have bliese highly advertised perverse effects on the behavioNa of 
the poor and that they do not reach these samepooi, 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countenance its complete disappearance. Even Hayek, for example, considered there was a role for state 
welfare, primarily as a selective and residual provision for those not able to provide for themselves in the 
private market (i. e., as a `safety net') (Alcock, 1996, p. 12). Neverdhless, the New Rift's arpunent was 
that the existing welfare state needed fundamental and radical reform. Their critique gave rise to the 
political ideology that all aspects of the public sector should be exposed to the discipline of competition 
(i. e., a marketisation) and that private provision was superior (i. e., privatisation). 
In general, New Right policy prescriptions had four overarching themes (Davies, 1985, p. 21-23; Flynn, 
1989). First, market mechanisms should be used wherever possible. Second, won was the spur to 
efficiency and customer-onmtation and should, therefore, be established between providers. Third, 
individualism and individual choice took precedence over collective choices and planned provision - the 
overarching idea being that people were individualistic in their motivation, and responded only to 
individual reward and individual punishment. Foul, state provision should be kept to a minimum, to 
aicourage those who could afford it to supplement provision or to opt off. Hence, rather than views being 
channelled through elected representatives, the dominant argument was that social welfare needed to 
approximate market conditions by creating the possibility of choice; a distinction most dearly articulated 
by l man's (1970) contrast between ` exit' and `voiCe,. 16 Exit is where (some) users stop using a 
provider's services, customers stop buying a fine's products, members leave an organisation or tenants 
leave a landlord. For the mechanism to work effectively, users must be able to choose among suppliers 
since it is the potential for exit and the loss of users that imposes discipline on the service provider. Rather 
than going over to the competition, dissatisfied users could also `kids up a fuss' and, thereby, `force 
improved quality or service upon `delinquent Cana '. Hirschman tamed this voice. Voice differs 
from exit in some significant ways. For voice to be effective, a relationship has to exist in which the 
producer/provider wants to hear the consumer's voice. The relationship's continuity is important and 
parties may be cautious of irreparably damaging it. New Right policy prescriptions, hovff* ', focused 
primarily an providmg opportunities for exit 
- 
consumer choice being equated with the' ability to exit 
- 
rather than voice or the choice between exit and voice. In justifying this prefaiaiee, Seldon (1990, p. 107- 
9) argued that the "... power of escape from unacceptable suppliers or purchwers in capitalism has no 
parallel in socialism, which offers only the precarious power of 'voice ; 
... 
that usually fizvours and 
strengthens the already strong and ityluential. ". His remedy was "... not to attempt to equalise voice, 
which is wiequalisable, but to facilitate escape by exit which can be evened up by redistribution of 
purvhasing power. " (ibid, p. 110). 
16 Hirschmm's argument was based on voice and exit as `recuperative mechanisms' in firms and arpnisations in 
decline, reflected most typically and generally in an absolute or comparative dabetiaatian of the quality of the 
product or service produced (Hirschman, 1970, p. 4). Barry (1974, p. 90), however, a gnd that it wes more useM 
to consider situations where quality could be improved. He also argnd that this did not ipso facto provoke a 
reaction in terms of either an or voice, and that oonstm ere could simply steer in silence. 
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Consumer choice in the form of `exit' 
- 
connoting both the market mechanism itself and transfers away 
from State provision 
-was the policy form favoured by the New Rig t. As Furbey, et al., (1996, p. 256) 
note, the focus was on "... the creation of the economic democracy of choice in the market place and in 
wem, the promotion of `exit' options from the services of an `over-riding' state as opposed to the 
'voice' options of promoting user involvement in public services. ". As noted above, as a policy 
prescription, exit conflates two concepts. The first is exit as a market mechanism (i. e., related to a 
marketisation). Rather than direct provision by the state or by state subsidies to suppliers, for example, 
the New Right argued that, where welfare was required, a better means was the provision of subsidies or 
vouchers (on an individual and means-tested basis) which could be exchanged for goods or services from 
a range of competing suppliers. Recipients would therefore operate as consumers and the approach 
would, it was argued, offer the possibility of a more sensitive and responsive provision of welfare services. 
The second is exit as a means of reducing the size of government and of the public sector (i. e., 
privatisation). Privatisation might be pact of a marketisation but 
- 
because marketisation requires 
competition 
- 
privatisation does not constitute a marketisation. Although privatisation might be a means 
of achieving competition (i. e., as the first stage of a process of marketisatian), it may also 
- 
more simply 
- 
achieve the end of reducing the size of the public sector, for example, an irakhart public monopoly 
provider may simply become an inefficient, private monopoly supplier. 
1.5 CHOICE AS AN ELEMENT OF POLICY 
The discussion in the previous part was concerned with choice as the intended outcome of policies (i. e., in 
the sense of target groups operating as consumers or behaving more like mar al actors). It is also 
necessary to discuss choice as an inotýegral element of policy (i. e., as a means to enable or f litate the 
impla11, Wion of that policy and/or adieve the policy's intended outcomes). Two issues need to be 
discussed here: 
- 
how opportunities for choice are cocfeuvd and, second, the more problematic issue of 
why they mi& be ccnferned, 
1.5.1 The conferment of choice 
Top-down and bottom-up perspectives are useful when causidering choice as an dai art of policy. More 
opportunity for thrice 
- 
and/or an a wed ability to choose 
- 
can originate from those able to offer 
dx ice to others (i. e., top-down). Alternatively, it can statt with those seelang (or exercising) dwicethhe 
ability to Choose (i. e., bottom-up). In the context of the previous discussion of implecrrecýtiay pdicies 
can be seen as the top giving discretion to lower groups and/or lower groups exercising discretion wl er 
expressly authorised fron above or not. low groups can use either of two strategies to respond to or 
create opportunities for choice. First, they can accept the Chices permitted from above, which can be 
equated with top-do ni Processes and with playing within the ` rules of the game' (i. e., choice within the 
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limits of permitW discretion). Alternatively, they can challenge or question the framework of choice by 
seeking choices, outside or beyond that framework. This can be equated with bottom-up processes and 
with challenging and questioning the `rules of the pume' (i. e., choice beyond the limits of permitted 
discretion). Means (1993, p. 7), for example, notes that eves where discretion was not formally given by 
the `policymaker', target groups and lower-level implementers may still "... perceive themrelves as 
important `stakeholders' with the right to pursue their awn agendas. ". Detemrining precisely which 
process is happening may not be easy, since, while choices milt be made at the ` bottom', they are often 
enabled and shaped by decisions made at the `top' (i. e., the top determines the limits of the discretion 
permitted at the bottom). In general, `top-down' processes providing choice can be seen in four ways 
(adapted from Somerville, 1998, p. 241): 
- 
" conferral of specific individual and/or collective rigl is or powers by legislation or agreement (i. e., 
opportunities/powers of choice); 
" transfer or recognition of specific powers of negotiation and decision-making (i. e., 
opportunities/powers of choice); 
" communication of appropriate information, training and education (i. e., providing resources to 
increase autonomy); and 
" provision of financial and oder resources (i. e., providing resources for choice). 
A further factor cons ns the degree of certainty or permanence of oppotumities for dhoice (i. e., the ease 
with which it may be v awn). There are four broadly hiemrdrical levels of certainty: 
- 
" The opportunity might be a statutory riggt. Legislation may gmnt choice to one party and compel 
other parties to respect that choice: for acample, Smiting RTB to tenants rather than giving local 
authorities discretion to decide whether or not to sell. 
" Certain powers or decision-making functions might be transferred or delegated to lower bodies. The 
peýmaneýoe of the opportunity for choice is decedent on whether the transfer establishes om tractual 
rig is or is merely a matter of (current) policy without le al status. 
"A pah hip might be created by, for example, an estate agreement between landlord and taunts. " 
The permanence of the opportunity is again depaiderit on wliether contractual rights are established 
or whether it is simply a matter of (current) policy, the latter raises issues of the agreement's 
c redibi ity and the trust between the parties. 
" The opportunity might be a matter of (current) policy. Rights in this instance can be less 
pamanart/certain and may be subject to die. F mom those exercising choice remain 
beholden to the highe' authority and it mim be withdrawn if not ex rased 'appropriately'. 
1.5.2 Jasbiflcations for the conferment of choice 
Ccnfenna t of appoi unities for choice may be justified in two ways: 
- 
as an aid or goal in itself and as a 
meats or instnunat to adieve ode ads. Choices may be both means and ends. RTB, for example, can 
be seen as a means (i. e., to empower individual tos by, for vcample, offering than the power to 
threaten exit as a means of improving service provision) mid as an end (i. e., dis-empowering local 
17 The Waltham Foci at Waltham Fachet HAT and the Liverpool 
are wee these (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
NMI 
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authorities). 
ff choice is a goal in itself (i. e., an end), realistic choices might be regarded as part of a set of individual 
rights and ipso facto desirable. Hence, it may be considered desirable that people are free to make choices 
and pursue their own objectives in their own way, for example, choosing the services they receive and/or 
choosing between suppliers. Mis accords with what was previously termed the liberty of choice. If 
choice is a goal in itself, it is the existence of the opportwüty to choose that is important raff' than - 
necessarily 
- 
the exercise of that opportunity. A disbrxöon between the potential for and the 
exercise%utcome of choice is therefore important. Rather than actually making a particular choice, it 
may be important that an individual is in a position to decide whether to make a particular choice. in this 
respect, `enpowennat' can be understood as the creation of (more) opportunities for and/or greater 
ability to exercise choice (or reducing the coercive ability of oflrs). la 
If choice is an inshument (i. e., a means), it facilitates other policy aims (such as greater efficiency and 
responsiveness, or more generally aids implanentaýicn). Both the opportunity to choose and the exercise 
of that choice are important here. If choice is a means to an end, the outcome of Out choice is important. 
It may, for example, be important to those conferring choice that those entitled to choice make a 
particular dioice (for example, to exit from the public sector). Equally, however, as noted previously, 
too much local discretion might subvert, undermine or o heawise distort the intentions of the policy. 
Power may be exercised by either not permitting a `real' choice or by limiting the range of optians. 
19 The 
latter empowers people but also effectively determines (or at least limits) the possible outcome(s). 
In ves may also be offered to encourage and/or coercion and sanctions employed to , rove a particular 
choice. The incentive structures within a policy, for example, migit be configured in such a way that 
confuted with choices (i. e., the need for discretion) implementers or tarSd groups act in one way (m 
support of the policy objectives) rather than another - althomo, in extrernrity, an incentive is a bribe. As 
noted previously, Sabalier & Mazmanian (1979) discussed this with regard to veto points and suggested 
the deliberate weigjting of incentives and sanctions as a means towards effective', plementation. This 
raises issues of manipulation and coercion. For the purpose of this thesis, it is usefid to defaye a 
`voluclary' choice as one where an individual makes a choice that increases his welfare and a `coerced' 
choice as one where an individual's welfare is reduced by that choice or where a particular choice is made 
's This definition has similarities with a planning experiment in Cleveland in the early 1970s, where the City 
Planning Commission proposed "... Ahatgovernment institutions give p iorny attention to the goal ofprornoting 
a wider range of choices for dime Cleveland residents who have few, if any, choices " (froth Krumhaolz, et at., 
1975, p. 299). Knimhotz, et at., (1975, p. 299) argued this emphasis on choices reflected the Commission's 
commitment "... to providing a wider range of alternatives and opportunities while leaving individuals free to 
define dir own needs and prioritise ". 
19 In principle, naaningfiul choice must involve (realistic) alternatives; a 'Hobsons choice' being effac thely no 
choice. 
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to prevent welfare being reduced. 20 To illustrate this, a firm encouraging customers to transfer from 
product A to product B may, for example, give customers an incentive to transfer to B (e. g., it might 
simply be recognition of product B's superiority). As customers would increase tisir welfare (utility), it 
would therefore be a voluntary choice. Alternatively, the firm may adversely change the conditions of 
supply of product A (i. e., by increasing its price or reducing its quality). If the conditions of supply of A 
were changed for the purpose of encouraging a switch to product B, this would be a coerced choioe. 2' 
Before dosing this discussion, four other interrelated issues should also be ndsd. First, a key dimension 
of choice is who makes the choice. Paternalism is where the choice of an `eft' is substituted for that of 
the individual on the basis that people may not be the best judges of their own welfare and some other 
agony should substitute its judgement for their choice. It therefore contrasts with a strict liberalism that 
insists each person is the best judge of his own welfare (Heap, et al., 1997, p. 345). Those critical of 
paternalism 
- 
including the (neo-liberal) New Right 
- 
emphasise the rights of individuals to live their own 
lives and make their own mistakes. Paternalism may, however, be justified by the desire to save people 
from themselves: its advocates, for example, argue that the liberal principle states individuals are the best, 
but not perfect, judges of their own welfare (ibid, 1997, p. 345). The latter point also emphasises an 
important distinction between people's wishes and their interests. Second and more wally, one 
individual's choice can deny choice to another, honte, increasing the choices for some may reduce those 
available to others. Choices offered to current tenants, for example, may reduce choice for latter 
moons. A third point concerns the extent of choice: for example, whether arrangements artend 
choice to all or only to small 
- 
elected or unelected 
- 
cliques. The final point concerns whether the choice 
is reversible and whether costs are attached to subsequent changes. Those making a one and-for-all 
choice are likely to be prudently cautious and risk averse, favouring `the known' (i. e., the status quo) over 
`the unknown'. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
Tipis Chapter has irntroduced the policy contend and background to the thesis and has focused on 
imple mentation and the general policy conteoct and, in particular, the concept of choice. In conclusion it is 
necessary to relate impleina Cation and choice. In the following discussion, choice refers to dioice as an 
element in the impl on of policy ram than as a policy objective. Discretion and autonomy (i. e., 
choice) at the local level can be important for effective implemerýatian. As Malpass & Means (1993, 
p. 191) argue, "... implementation almalt by de, nation involves, flexibility in the application of general 
policy prlr plec to specific siluationc. The centre never hays complete irybrmation and therefore cannot 
20 This definition of coercion differs from Hayek's. Furthermore, for Hayek both enooe t and force world 
be coercive. 
21 By some method or of er, the firm could also compel (i. e., coerce) the consumer to purchase product B. 
25 
THE DEVELOPMENT BDUMNG AMONTRUST POLICY 
anticipate all the circumctamces in which its policie will be implemented ". Decisions may tha+efore be 
betr made by implementers both because they may be better equipped as a result of cotripetaice and 
specific training (Ham & Hill, 1993, p. 107) and because that' are closer to events an the ground and have 
better information. From a top-down perspective, the discretion of implementers and target groups 
should, however, be harnessed to ensure the effective achievement of the intended policy outcomes. 
Carüement of opportxmities and powers of discretion and choice might also be used to encourage 
implanenters and target groups to develop `ownership' and responsibility for the policy's imphai a>tatian 
(i. e., to give than a stake in the outcome). Wla particular (i. e., difficult) choices have to be made, for 
example, it might be considered bear ifthey are made at the local level by implementers and perhaps also 
with or by (rather than for) target goups. If target groups make the decision (or are involved in making 
it), the inevitable trade-offs and compromises may be more acceptable because they are their trade-offs 
and their promises. Hence, the abilityto make decisions (Le., choices) enoourages, 
- 
or necessitates 
- 
the acceptance of responsibility (and ownership) of those decisions. Affording opportunities for choice 
may amore be a means of generating or maintaining support for a particular policy because it becomes 
the choice of the implementers and/or the teiget group. One of Sabatier & Mazmanian's conditions for 
e ! ectivve irrplane nation, for example, is `c tmpliance from' or `support of interest and tauget groups for 
the policies. While compliance can 
- 
in principle 
- 
be compelled by the use of sanctions or force, support 
requires persuasion and/or the use of influence or incentives. As noted previously, discretion is inevitable 
and, while in pl s may use their discretion disruptively, policy cannot be so closely specified that 
inplemeirters simply need follow rules set down from above. If irnplanalers cannot be sufficielly or 
adequately `controlled' from above, they need to be motivated to support the policy objects. A similar 
logic applies for target groups; as Mannanian & Sabatiar (1983, p. 13) argue, for eo nple, "... an 
appreciation of the tit group's perspect 7es becomes critical when the programme is based upon 
assumptions about the target group's motM7t ion. ". Such a viewpaitt and approach to implementation 
also inheca11y recognises that top-lewd actors are not the only stalaeiwldm in the policy process. Hance, 
rather than being passive recipials of a policy, target groups migJt also become 
- 
and be explicitly 
reoogrused as 
- 
alive stal thdders. The next (wer outlines the research agenda and the ire of 
the reminder ofthethhis. 
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Chapter Two 
THE RESEARCH AGENDA 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter outlines the research agenda and is in six parts. The first discusses the relationship betweai 
theory and empirical research, the second the issue of the research sure, the third the research focus, 
the fourth the research methods, and the fifth the data collection methods. The final patt outlines the 
thesis's structure and organisafian. 
2.1 THEORY & EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
This thesis involves social science research in which the term `social science' refers to the scientific 
study of human behaviour. As all science aims to build explanatory theory about its data, the aim 
of social science is to build explanatory theory about people, their behaviour and institutions. 
Research therefore involves not only collecting data but also explanation of that data (i. e., theory). 
Theory involves the ability to explain and understand the findings of research (i. e., to make `sense' 
of the data). As Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (1992, p. 46) observe researchers operate in two 
`worlds' 
- 
one of `observation and experience', the other of `ideas, theories and models'. 
Explanation and description represent two levels of understanding. Description is concerned with 
making complex events and phenomena understandable. Although explanation is similarly 
concerned, it also operates at a higher level and involves finding reasons for events and situations, 
showing why and how they came to be as they are. Explanation therefore draws upon or creates 
theory. Theory and empirical research are intimately related. May (1993, p. 20), for example, 
describes it as a symbiotic relationship: theory informs our thinking, which assists us in making 
sense of the world, while our experience of undertaking research and its findings influence our 
theorising. 
In terms of approaches to research, a distinction is usually made between ` grand' theory and 
`grounded' theory. As May (1993, p. 21) explains, some theories "... appear to float over the 
social landscape as if they were unfettered by the problems and realities of everyday life. This 
ability to transcend or abstract theories from. everyday life allows us to have a perspective on our 
social universe which breaks free from our everyday actions and attitudes. ". Although grand 
theories of this nature allow us to "... locate our research findings within a general theory of the 
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workings of society" (ibid, p. 21), their level of generality and abstraction may be of little use in 
researching particular areas of social life. Hence, as May (ibid, p. 21) notes, "... some have been 
disparaging of the inability of `grand theorists' to grasp social problems which are important to 
spec c `historical and structural contexts : ". An alternative to such abstraction or generality is, 
as Glaser & Strauss (1967) argued, to `ground' social theories in observations of everyday life. As 
May (1993, p. 21) describes, in the grounded theory approach, "... instead of descending upon the 
social world with a body of theoretical propositions about how and why social relations exist and 
work as they do, we should first observe thane relations, collect data on them, and then proceed to 
generate our theoretical propositions. ". 
A research project that aims at explanation can proceed using one of two routes: 
- 
by testing or 
verifying theory or by generating theory. In general, grand theory research is concerned with theory 
verification; grounded theory research with theory generation. Theory verification 
- 
or theory-first 
- 
research starts with a theory from which hypotheses are deduced and studies designed to test those 
hypotheses. The approach is deductive and research functions to produce empirical evidence to test 
or refute theories (May, 1993, p. 22). In theory generation 
- 
or theory-after 
- 
research, rather than 
starting with a theory, the aim is to develop theory from the data collected. The approach is 
inductive: research comes before theory and theoretical propositions on social life are generated 
from the data (ibid, p. 22). A proponent of this approach, Robert Merton (from Frankfort-Naclunias 
& Nathmias, 1992, p. 46) argued that empirical research has not only a passive role in verifying and 
testing theory but also an active role in helping to shape the development of theory, by initiating, 
reformulating, deflecting and clarifying it. Hence, there is a positive engagement in which, rather 
than being a fixed and immutable entity, theory is capable of being shaped and refined in the light of 
and through empirical research. As Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (ibid, p. 47-48) note, the 
dilemma concerns the place of theory in the research process. Nevertheless, they argue that while 
"... there is a lively controversy as to which strategy mast fruitfully enhances scientific progress, 
our position is that theory and research should interact constantly and that the contrast between 
the two strategies is more apparent than real. " (ibid, p. 49). 
The research for this thesis started from a focus on HAT policy and its implementation and 
subsequently utilised implementation theory as a means of structuring explanation of that 
Phenomm. 
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2.2 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
In some research projects, the agenda, structure and focus is substantively known at the outset. 
Alternatively it may emerge or `unfold' as the research progress (i. e., it emerges from engagement 
with the data or with the phenomena being studied). ' Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 16) discuss this 
idea in terms of `tight' (i. e., pre-specified) and `loose' (i. e., unfolding) research and debate the issue 
of how much `shape' a (qualitative) research design should have before its fieldwork stage. They 
question whether prior bounding blinds the researcher to important features in the phenomena being 
studied and, conversely, whether a lack of bounding and focusing leads to indiscriminate data 
collection and data overload. They note, for example, that many social anthropologists and social 
phenomenologists prefer "... a more loosely structured; emergent, inductively `grounded' 
approach to gathering data. ", in which the research is highly responsive to the phenomena being 
studied. While 
- 
up to a point 
-- 
Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 17) agree with this, they also argue 
that the `looser the initial design, the less selective the collection of data' and that "... everything 
looks important at the outset if you are waiting for the key constructs or regularities to emerge 
from the case, and that wait can be a long one. ". Hence, they concur with Wolcott (1982, p. 157, 
from ibid, p. 17) who 
- 
while recognising the merits of open-mindedness and a willingness to enter a 
research setting `looking for questions as well as answers' 
- 
also notes it is "... impossible to 
embark upon research without some idea of what one is looking for and foolish not to make that 
quest explicit. ". 
The above discussion emphasises the need to strike a balance between the advantages of focus and 
structure (not least in terms of operationalising and managing the research) and those of flexibility 
and responsiveness (i. e., not `jumping' to premature conclusions). Striking that balance inevitably 
requires trade-offs: they note, for example, how in multiple case study research a looser initial 
framework allows the researcher to be receptive to local idiosyncrasies, while making cross-case 
comparability harder, increasing costs and the danger of information load (Mles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 17). Thus, as a case can be made both for tW ter prestructured research designs and for 
looser emergent ones, much qualitative research lies between the two extremes. Nevertheless, as 
structure and focus is needed in either case, the actual dilemma concerns when it occurs (Punch, 
1998, p. 25). Punch (ibid, p. 25) suggests the issue can be represented in the form of a continuum 
(see Table 2.1). At one end of the continuum (i. e., the left-hand end), research questions are pre- 
specified, the research design tightly structured and the data pre-structured. At the right-hand and, 
the research design is indicated in general terms only and takes a more detailed shape as the research 
1 This broadly parallels distinctions between grand theory/theory verification research and grounded 
theory/theory generation research. 
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progresses and as the specific focus is developed. The research questions are therefore general and 
guiding, the research loosely structured and the data not pre-structured. The argumer t in the latter 
case is that, until some empirical work is carried out, it is not possible (or 
-- 
if possible 
- 
not 
sensible) to identify specific research questions. These become clearer as the research unfolds and 
as a specific focus for the work is developed. In general, quantitative studies are likely to be towards 
the left-hand end of the continuum. Qualitative studies are more varied and may cover a wider 
range along the continuum. In general, however, the further to the right-hand side, the more likely it 
is that the research will be qualitative. 
PRE-FIGURED RESEARCH (TIGHT) UNFOLDING RESEARCH (LOOSE) 
PRE-SPECIFIED RESEARCH QUESTIONS GENERAL & GUIDING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
RESEARCH DESIGN TIGHTLY STRUCTURED RESEARCH DESIGN LOOSELY STRUCTURED 
DATA PRE-STRUCTURED DATA NOT PRE-STRUCTURED 
Advantages Advantages 
" efficiency in time & information " responsiveness 
" facilitates cross-case comparability " flexibility 
" provides focus " enables appropriate focus 
Disadvant Dbndvant 
" lack of responsiveness time costs 
" lack of flexibility " information overload 
" may provide inappropriate focus " difficulties of cros-case comparability 
" potential lack of focus 
TABLE 2.1- EXTREMES OF RESEARCH STRUCTURE CONTINUUM 
While it is desirable to have a fixed research agenda at an early stage, research is typically a 
recursive process in which the researcher constantly engages with the theory and data and with 
structuring, organising and presenting that theory and data in a meaningful and coherent marmer. 
Hence, the research agenda and structure, is frequently refined and more precisely focused during the 
research process: the extremes shown in Table 2.1 are therefore starting points only. Reflecting the 
fact that during the period of study, HAT policy was being implemented and continued to evolve, 
the research for this thesis was of an unfolding nature. The precise conwd and justification for the 
research questions given below therefore becomes more readily apparent in Chapters Three and 
Four. 
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2.3 RESEARCH FOCUS 
Typically either hypotheses or research questions are used to focus research and generally do five 
main things: 
-- 
organise the project (i. e., give it direction and coherence); delimit the project (i. e., 
show its boundaries); keep the project focused; provide a framework for writing up the project; and 
point to the data that will be needed (adapted from Punch, 1998, p. 39). 2 When it comes to their 
implications for research design, Punch (1998, p. 40) argues that there is no logical difference 
between research questions and research hypotheses. A hypothesis is a tentative or predicted answer 
to a research question and is important when the researcher has an explanation 
-- 
a theory 
-- 
in mind 
at an early stage in the research project. If this is the case, hypotheses should be formulated as 
predicted answers to research questions and then tested, thereby, exposing and analysing the theory 
behind than. If answers to research questions cannot be predicted, there is no need to go further 
with the matter of hypotheses and research questions will normally be sufficient. (ibid, p. 40). 
Research hypotheses or research questions typically have the following characteristics: 
- 
" clarity (i. e., they can be easily understood and are unambiguous); 
" value-free (i. e., in principle, the researcher's own values, biases and subjective preferences have 
no place in a scientific approach); 
" specific (i. e., their concepts are at a specific enough level to connect data indicators); 
" amenable to empirical testing (i. e., the data required to answer them and how the data will be 
obtained is apparent); 
" 
interconnected (i. e., they are related to each other in some meaningful way); and 
" 
(substantively) relevant (i. e., they are interesting and worthwhile questions for the investment of 
research effort) (adapted from Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1992, p. 61; Punch, 1998, 
p. 49). 
The overall aim of the thesis was to examine the totality of the development and implementation of HAT 
policy. In practice, however, this ambition had to be tempered and the thesis concentrated primarily on 
housing issues, with less attention paid to HATs as examples of housing led or neighbourhood 
regeneration agencies. The legislation for HATs was introduced under the 1988 Housing Act 
which 
- 
as its name suggests 
- 
was primarily concerned with housing rather than regeneration. To 
provide focus for the research, there were two interrelated research questions: 
- 
" Why did HAT policy fail to be irrplane iced in the pilot HAT areas and how and why was it 
subse1uatlY implananted in her areas? 
2 Punch (1998, p. 166) notes how traditionally much research (and particularly quantitative research) has 
followed the theory verification model; hence, the importance attached to the role of the hypothesis in 
structuring the research. He notes, however, that in the grounded theory approach, no `up-from' theory is 
proposed and, hence, no hypotheses are formulated for testing ahead of the research. 
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9 How did the concept of choice inform the development and impf natation of HAT policy? 
As there was no obvious explanation to the issues suggested, it was decided that research questions 
would be sufficiem to focus the research. 
2.4 RESEARCH METHODS 
In broad terms, data collection can be undertaken using quantitative mathods and/or qualitative methods. 
The difference can be defined relatively easily: in quantitative research the data is numerical, in 
qualitative research the data is not numerical. Qualitative studies tend to look at something 
holistically and comprehensively, in order to study and understand it in its context and complexity. 
Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 1) describe than as "... well-grounded rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts. " They summarise the recurrent issues in 
qualitative research as follows: - 
" 
Qualitative research is conducted through an intense and/or prolonged contact with a `field' or 
life situation. 
" The researcher's role is to gain a `holistic' overview of the context under study, its logic, its 
arrangements, its explicit and implicit rules. 
" The researcher attempts to capture data on the perceptions of local actors `from the inside'. 
" 
Reading through these materials, the researcher may isolate certain themes and expressions that 
can be reviewed with informants, but they should be maintained in their original forms 
throughout the study. 
"A main task is to explicate the ways people in particular settings come to understand, account 
for, take action and otherwise manage their day-to-day situations. 
" Many interpretations of this material are possible, but sonic are more compelling for theoretical 
reasons or on grounds of internal consistency. 
" Relatively little standardised instrumerdation is used at the outset. The researcher is essentially 
the main `measurement device' in the study. 
" Most analysis is done with words. (ibid, p. 6-7). 
They note, however, that while there might be recurring features, any particular research tradition 
configures and uses dien differently (ibid, p. 7). As these features seem appropriate for a complex 
and multi-faceted phenomena such as a public policy, the research adopted a qualitative approach. A 
quantitative approach (e g., a questionnaire survey of HAT tenants) was also rejected for the following 
reasons. First, contacts in the HAT areas warned tenants were suffering from `survey fatigue'. Second, 
due to local factors, the HATs developed at different rates and the policy itself was constantly in flux. It 
would the re have been difficult to identify appropriate and similar groups in the differu t HAT areas, 
given their different statt dates, diffe&S development programmes and contexts. Meaningful 
comparisons through quantitative indicators would also have been difficult. Third and most importantly, 
the research questions posed (i. e., concerned with the devdopment of policy and the politics/ 
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management of its implementation) need data and explanation/answers that are not readily amenable 
to quantitative methods. Although it might provide a great deal of detail about a particular aspect of 
HAT policy, a quantitative approach would shed limited light on the totality of HAT policy and, in 
particular, on its development and implementation. 
Case studies are a common method of qualitative research in which one or a small number of cases 
are studied in detail in order to gain a holistic overview of the context under study. As Yin (1994, 
p. 1) acmes, they are often the most appropriate method of research in instances where the researcher 
has no real control over the `real life' situations being studied. Yin (ibid, p. 23) stresses that a case 
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear, and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used. Although case studies involve an explicit attempt to preserve the 
wholeness, unity and integrity of the case, not everything can be studied and a more specific focus is 
often required. Similarly, Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 25) note that while there is a focus or 'heart' 
to a case study, the boundary (i. e., what will not be studied) is often somewhat indeterminate. 
In this thesis, there are two levels of case study: 
- 
first, a case study of a particular policy (i. e., HAT 
policy) (Chapters Four and Eight) and, second, case studies of locations where that policy was 
implemented (Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight). The latter is a multiple case study, where the 
focus is both within and across cases. The unit of analysis at the higher level is HAT policy, while at 
the lower level it is each individual HAT. The first three HATs to be established were selected as case 
studies. It was considered that this would provide sufficient diversity to typify the implementation of 
HAT policy, furche nore, the other three HATs areas had only just been established when the research 
was begs in 1994. Case studies also need to be bounded in terms of time and, in principle, the 
bounding should be internal to the research. It is often the case, however, that there is no obvious or 
`natural' stopping point (apart from the winding up of the final HAT). For this thesis, the cut-off 
point of Autwnn 1998 was selected by the researcher. By this time it was considered that was most 
of the likely trends in the development and implementation of HAT policy had become apparent. ' 
drin the above research questions, there are six research objectives that indicate the data required and 
further focus the research: 
" First, to develop an understanding and appreciation of implemetan tixory (Chapter One); 
" Second, to develop an understanding and appreciation ofthe general policy context fron which HAT 
policy enmBed (Chapter One); 
3 The disadvantage of this stopping point is that the landlord choice process had not been completed and in 
one case (Waltham Forest HAT) had not started 
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" Third, to establish the specific context for HAT policy within the housing policy context of the 1980s 
(Chapter Three); 
" Fourth, to examine the development and initial implementation of HAT policy (Chapter Four); 
" 
Fifth, to examine the implementation of HAT policy in three case study locations and, in particular, 
the following: 
- 
" the choice to establish a HAT; 
" the HAT's development programme; 
" tenant involvemait; and 
" 
landlord choices (Chapters Five, Six and Seven). 
" 
Sixth, in the light of the above, to draw conclusions and provide explanations to answer the research 
questions (Chapter Ei 2). 
2.5 DATA COLLECTION 
Case studies typically include a range of data collection techniques (see Table 2.2). Although most 
case studies are predominantly qualitative, the approach is not necessarily solely a qualitative 
technique. Two principal data collection techniques were utilised: 
- 
documentation and interviews. 
The various sources of data were also used to oncourage triangulation and convergent lines of inquiry 
. 
Much of the research effort was devoted to piecing together, understanding and subsequently 
explaining the `story' of the development and implementation of HAT policy. Hence, that `story' 
constitutes the research data. 
Docmnentadon 
For case studies, the most important use of docxunarts is to provide the initial and core information. They 
can also corroborate and augment evidence fron other sources including veaification of details and 
information obtained through interviews. Yin (1994, p. 82), however, cautions against `over-reliance' on 
docurnma in case study research and stresse the importance of appreciating that such documents are 
often "... written for some specific purpose and some specific au ience other dm those of the case 
study alone. In this sense, the case study investigator is a vicarious observer, and the documentary 
evidence ref ects a communication among other parties attempting to achieve some other objectives. ". 
Data collection was primarily from Govemmart policy documarts, reports and other material 
(particularly Hansard) and HAT doannoirtation (including annual reports, corporate plans, various 
progress and consultancy reports and studies, board meeting minutes, newsletters, etc. ). 
InterAe s 
Int«Mews are an essential source of can shady evidence. Reports and odw documents tend to report the 
outcome rater than the process of decision-malgig By contrast, well-infarmed respaidents provide 
important insights Tito a situation and offer explanation as to why, for example, certam options were 
pursued and clears rejected. Tc views also provide indications and accounts of the prior history of a 
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situation and help identify other sources of evidence. Research interviews can be structured, 
unstructured or semi-structured. In structured interviews the respondent is asked a series of pre- 
established questions, with pre-set response categories. If the interview is standardised as well, all 
respondents receive the same questions in the same order, delivered in a standardised manner. 
Although some open-ended questions may also be used, structured interviews generally permit little 
room for variation in response, while flexibility and variation are minimised. Unstructured 
interviews are non-standardised, open-ended, usually in-depth and are usually used as a way of 
understanding the phenomena without imposing any a priori categorisation that might limit the field 
of inquiry. 
Source of evidence Strengths 
Documentation " stable can be reviewed repeatedly 
" unobtrusive 
- 
not created as a result 
of the case study 
" exact 
- 
contains exact names, 
references and details of an event 
Archival reoordi " (same as for docame taticn) 
" precise and quantitative 
Interviews " targeted 
- 
focuses directly on can 
study topic 
" insigltfid 
- 
provides perceived causal 
inferences 
Direct observation I" reality 
- 
Covers events in real time 
" contextual 
- 
covers context of event 
Weaknesses 
" retrievability 
- 
can be low 
" biased selectivity, if collection is 
incomplete 
" reporting bias 
- 
reflects (unknown) 
bias of author 
" access 
- 
may be blocked deliberately 
" (same as for documentation) 
" accessibility due to privacy reasons 
" bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
" response bias 
" inaccuracies due to poor recall 
" rcffwd ity 
- 
interviewee gives what 
interviewer wants to hear 
" timo-coueaming 
" selectivity 
- 
unless broad coverage 
" reflexivity 
- 
event may proceed 
differently because it is being 
observed 
" cost 
- 
hours needed by hunun 
observers 
Parddpsnt " (same as for direct observations) " (same as for direct observations) 
"bservadm "n iil into interpersonal behaviour " bias due to investigator's 
and motives manipulation of events 
Physical arteßcb " insighdW into cultural features " selective 
" insightibl into technical operations " availability 
TABLE 2.2 
- 
SOURCES OF DATA 
(adapted from Yin, 1994, p. 80) 
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To supplement the documentation, interviews were conducted with a comprehensive range of actors 
associated with HATs (see Table 2.3). Each interview lasted a minimum of one hour and frequently 
longer. The interviews were undertaken in two sets; the first during 1994/95 and the second during 
1997/98. Their Primary purpose was to enable the researcher to `get closer' to those implementing the 
policy and the target groups. The interviewees were selected in consultation with the HAT infomnation 
officers. While this gives rise to the potential for bias, the potential bias is known and can be considered 
in interpreting the data. It should also be acknowledged that all of the tenants interviewed were `activists'. 
The interviews were also conducted with regard to the following co monly required interviewer skills: - 
" 
being able to ask good questions and interpret the answers/responses; 
" 
being a good `listener' and not being trapped by personal ideologies or preconception; 
" 
being adaptive and fleDdble, so that newly encountered situations can be seen as opportunities; 
" 
having a firm grasp of the issues being studied; and 
" 
being unbiased by preconceived notions (fron Yin, 1994, p. 56). 4 
NORTH HULL HAT WALTHAM FOREST LIVERPOOL HAT 
HAT 
NHHAI 1; NIýAT 3; NEHAT WHAT 1; WHAT 3; WHAT IBAT 1; LHAT 2; IBAT 5; 
HAT OýKýCt'S 4; NHELAT 5; NHHAT It 5; WFBAT 6; WFHAT 9; 18AT 6; LHAT 7; TRAT 8; 
NHHAT 9; & NNHHAT 14. WFHAT 12; & WFHAT 17. LHAT 12; &LHAT 13. 
NIEAT 7& NHHAT 11. WFBAT 4; WFHAT 10; WFHAT LHAT 3 &IHAT 9. 
HAT participation 14; & WFMAI 18. 
officers 
NHHAT 13 WHAT 19 LHAT 14; &LHAT 15 
be13 
NBIBAT 10 WFHAT WFHAT II; & LHAT 4 &IBAT 16 ýý 
members 
iý WFKAT 
NHBAT 2; NEiAT 5; NOW WFBAT 2; WHAT 4; WHAT LBAT 3; IHAT 10, LHAT 11; 
Reddeub b ä NHHAI 12; 4t14MAT it 7; WFBAT 13; &WFHAT 15. &LHAT 15. 
rept+at 
TABLE 2.3 
- 
INTERVIEWS WITH ACTORS IN THE HAT PROCESS 
NB Same ätbe interviewees had more than one role; 
numbers rehr to the reference mw* m used in the taxt 
In the interests of flexibility and as it was not blown precisely what the interviews would involve, 
semi-structured interviews were used. The structuring was by means of key themes and areas to be 
covered during the interview. The interviews were transcribed immediately Aw the interviews fron 
" Appends: A gives more details of and a commentary on the research method employed. 
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notes taken during the interview while the material was still fresh in the researcher's mind. The 
irrtarviews were oparended ad rospande 1s asked not only for the facts of the but also awouragod 
to express their q mi«ns and iisWts about events. hi tiffs respect, respondents are batter considered as 
`h*nnar ts'. The danger was, also neoo&rised of becoming "... overly ckpendent on a bey b#brman4 
especially because of the interpersonal inftuenee 
- 
figqueruly wndeftnabk 
- 
that the i#brmaw may 
have aver you.  (ibid, p. 84). Ym (Ibid, p. 84) su ats that a way of dealing with this is to utilise oder 
sounoes ofevidence to corroborate or dmlla any h sot by such klar *s. 
i Yin (ibid, p. 85) warms that i*erviews should be considered `vubal reports' acdy and, as suds, are subject 
to problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate artiailatran. A method of overoo g these 
problems is to triangulate and corroborate irtarview data bath with other interviews and with icdomuicn 
fron other sources. The researcher 
- 
and the reader 
- 
should also be aware of where any pooftial biases 
may he (for example, whether the interviewee was a HAT doer or a tenant). Senne, although 
interviewees are a unynised, they are di shed into the follows g: 
- 
tams and tee to 
representatives, termt or reside t HAT board mambas; HAT officers and city co AT board 
members. The draft can study sports were also reviewed by and discussed with key infouu is in each 
loc on; the Joey ir6OSnanta also elated the draus to other atom, whose aonm is were fed Ito the 
discussion. 
2.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis presets a chronological narrative and commentary on the background, developsnent and 
implementation of HAT policy. Chapter One began by discussing impl 
- 
... aa theory before 
outlining the ge feral policy context and policy theme of choice. This Chapter has introduced the 
research agada. Chapter Thine discusses the major devvelopmarts in housing policy during the 
19ß0s and, in particular, focuses an the now phase of housing policy in the mid-1980s, which 
introduced various new =ft mechanism including HATS. The Chapter provides the omtod for the 
more focused discussion of HAT Policy (Chapter Four) and of the case study HATS (Chapters Five, 
Six and Sem). Chapter Four discusses the &evvolopment and initial inýlaneaýaýian of HAT pdicy, 
indudms die abortive plat HAT arcs s, Wich is given to camtecpaglt wide the sucoessM HAT anus; do 
Chapter adopts a broody tap-dmm approach. Chapters Five to Sem disais the implementation of 
HAT policy, with each Chapter ecsn g one of the first three HATS; the Chapters adopt a broody 
bottom-up approach. Chapter Bight concludes the tesis. 
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Chapter Three 
THE HOUSING POLICY CONTEXT 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The changes in housing policy and legislation through the 1980s provide the background to HAT 
policy. This Chapter discusses those changes and is in eight main parts. The first briefly discusses 
the Thatcher Government and its approach to policy implemen ion. The second discusses the 
development of a `crisis' in council housing, while the third discusses the translation of this from a 
crisis in to a crisis of council housing and responses to that crisis. The fourth discusses the new 
phase of housing policy heralded by the 1987 White Paper, while the next three sections discuss 
aspects of that new policy phase. The final part comments on some of the outcomes of this new 
phase of housing policy. 
3.1 THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT 
The New Right critiques of the welfare state and the justifications for market mechanisms in public 
policy outlined in Chapter One provide the context for 1980s housing policy. Before discussing 
housing policy, however, it is necessary to focus on the Thatcher Governme t. The historical 
moment for New Right ideas came during the 1970s for a combination of reasons, including 
difficulties encountered by the prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy during the early and mid- I 970s and 
Margaret Thatcher becoming leader of the Conservative party. From the mid 1970s onwards and 
influenced by New Right ideas, Conservative policy became increasingly hostile to the welfare state 
as it had developed in the period of post-war political `consensus'. Despite a broad cross-party 
consensus, the welfare state had always been an amalgam of two meeting conceptions: 
- 
as a 
mechanism for increasing equality and social justice (or 
- 
seen slightly differently 
- 
reducing social 
inequalities) and, second, as a 
--- 
preferably temporary, individual and means-tested 
- 
safety not. 
The object of the former (the view to different degrees of `one-nation Tories' and the political left) 
was to ensure greater equality in the `basic' things of life, such as education, health care, and 
housing. The purpose of the latter 
-- 
the view of the Thatcher Government 
-- 
was to ensure that 
people did not drop below a certain minimum living standard due to personal misfortune. 
Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 183) warn against assuming that 11ia ism was the `perfect practical 
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embodiment' of New Right ideas. They note two primary differences between New Right `theory' 
and Thatcherite ` practice'. The first assumes the existence of an internally consistent, unified New 
Right ideology. As noted in Chapter One, there are at least two different perspectives on New Right 
ideology. Thatcherism was a pragmatic mix of both. ' From both perspectives, however, it saw the 
need for a strong state to ensure that interest groups did not frustrate the operation of the market, 
which lead both to a centralisation of power and a concerted `attack' on the powers and abilities of 
local government Second, noting Thatcherism's populist and pragmatic aspects, Cole & Furbey 
(1994, p. 183) argue New Right ideas received a `selective application' with "... an eye more to 
electoral arithmetic than every nuance in Hayek's writings. ". They argue that Thatcherism's 
pragmatic quality 
- 
its modification of New Right ideas 
-- 
was illustrated by its initial focus on 
council housing, rather than on more entrenched state services, and the preservation of mortgage 
interest relief for owner-occupiers. 
When returned to power in 1979, the Conservatives had what was regarded as a very radical 
agenda, including the ambition to `roll back the frontiers of the State' and, in particular, those of the 
welfare state. In 1979, the welfare state was the biggest area of non-market activity in the economy, 
with social security, education and health care, and - to a lesser degree - housing and social care 
being produced and allocated by bureaucratic mechanisms. Until 1987, however, rather than more 
radical reform, the Thatcher Government concentrated on controlling spending on the local welfare 
state. Furthermore, as part of its overall macroeconomic strategy, its overarching aim was to reduce 
public expenditure. Given the difficulty of reducing central Government expenditure, reducing local 
authority expenditure was an important part of the strategy. The overall effect of various pieces of 
financial legislation (e. g, the 1982 Local Government Finances No. 2 Act; the 19841tß Act; the 
1988 and 1992 Local Government Acts) was both to reduce local authority powers and discretion 
and to centralise power. Furthermore, capital spending is intrinsically less difficult to cut than 
current spending: it is easier to cancel a planned hospital extension than to lay off 20% of nursing 
staff. More particularly, the major itern of capital spending by local authorities was housing. 
As the 1979-83 and 1983-87 Thatcher Govemments refrained from fundamental reform, the welfare 
state's basic structure in 1987 was much the same as in 1979. The important exception, however, 
was council house sales through RTB which, as Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 182) argue, demonstrated 
that "... radical incursions could be made into the heart of public provision without disastrous 
electoral consequences. ". Bolstered by a third successive election victory in 1987, however, a 
' Several commantators have identified two themes within the Thatcher Governments' approach. Gamble 
(1984), for example, labelled them `social market economy' and `authoritarian populariem', and later as 
`free economy' and `strong state' (Gamble, 1988). 
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`major offensive against the bureaucratic structures of welfare provision' was launched, in which a 
number of initiatives sought to separate state finance from state provision with the State becoming 
an enabler and purchaser of services provided by others (Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993, p. 1-2) 2 Local 
authorities were also to be transformed from executive agencies and direct providers of services into 
facilitators and enablers of other service providers: the 1988 Housing Act, for example, repositioned 
local authorities as enablers rather than providers of rented housing. 
Thatcherism & policy implementation 
In its attempt to break with the post-war consensus and force change, the Thatcher Government produced 
a set of policies designed "... to produce a strong state and a Government strong enough to resist the 
seih claims of interest groups. " (Kavanagh, 1990, p. 9). Rhodes & Marsh (1992, p. 8) argue that from 
the outset, Thatcher was determined `not to waste time on internal arguments over policy-malting': "... 
her aim was to set objectivves, and force them through against opposition by holding to her position. ". 
They therefore assert that the Tbatcher Government operated with an uncompromising top-down model of 
policy-making in which it could and should: - set the policy agenda and choose the policy options; pass 
the legislation without amendment, given its majority in Parliament; and control the implantation 
process to ensure that its objectives were attained (ibid, p. 8). Thus, to implement its policies, the Thatcher 
Government adopted a `conviction' approach, which contrasted with the previous `consensus approach': 
which Kavanagh (1990, p. 6) defines as "... the political style by which policy differences are resolved 
namely a process of compromise and bargaining and a search for policies which are acceptable to the 
major interests. ". Even in the 1960s and 1970s, consensus as a style of policy-making had attracted 
criticism. Kavanagh (1990, p. 8), for example, notes how the "... emphasis on consultation with interest 
groups, incremental change, and the demonstrated ability of important pressure groups to veto change 
amounted 
- 
some critics argued 
- 
to plumlistic stagnation or political inertia. ". As one consequence 
of his conviction approach, the Thatcher Cknm nment attempted to use dominance over - or 
alternatively to circumvent 
- 
local authorities. Although traditionally involved in policy formulation and 
itrqýl on, local authorities were now seen as obstacles to change and a source of opposition to a 
sovereign parliament (Kavanagh, 1990, p. 7-8). Thus, rather than the more traditional view of a 
partnership between tiers c guvenuna*, the hatcher Government regarded local authorities primarily as 
impleitoters of policy detem fined by the centre. Given the Government's mistrust of local au horities 
and the difficulties encountered in trying to implement its pnofened policies, however, an increasingly 
2 The success of the Conservative's restructuring of the welfare state remains open to debate. Some argue 
that it was progressed more in terms of rhetoric and ideology than by substantive achievement (e. g., see 
Flynn, 1989; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Nevertheless, as Hill (1997, p. 377) argues, there had been 
`substantial chaagie, clearly initiated from the top', which "... altered the balance of power in health 
management; destroyed the partnership' concept in 'central-local' relations and radically altered control 
over education and housing. ". 
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common model for policy implementation during the 1980s was the creation of centrally-controlled 
agencies that would take over local authority functions in whidi local actors would be agents of the centre. 
As an implernerrtarion strategy, this accords with Sabatier & Maunanian's proposition that responsibility 
for implemarting a policy should be assigned to an agency likely to be both committed to it and giving it a 
high priority. Urban development corporations (UDCs) were a prominent early example of this and, as is 
shown in the neod Chapter, HATs were explicitly based on UDCs. 
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNCIL HOUSING 
As council housing is central to HAT policy, it is necessary to briefly outline its origins and 
development. As Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 179) note, the growth of council housing was not the 
`product of bold political visions' and "... was achieved less by a dramatic flourish than by an 
uncertain passage through a quagmire of ill-conceived politics, wavering public commitment and 
contradictory financial strategies. ". The council sector's growth dates principally from 1919 
when, with a national shortage of houses and a Government pledge to build `homes for heroes', the 
1919 Busing& Town Planning Act required local authorities to provide working-class housing 
where the deficiency was not met from other sources. The Act also provided subsidies to enable 
local authorities to build houses. By 1939, council housing had grown to about 1.3 million units 
(about 11 % of the total stock of dwellings) (Balchin, et al., 1995, p. 310). 
Although the 1945-51 Labour Govemmait brought a `welfare state' into being, the council housing 
sector's growth in the post-war years was not uniform. In general, when in government, Labour 
tended to encourage building by local authorities, while the Conservatives reduced local authority 
production and encouraged provision by the private sector. Nevertheless, during the 1950s and 
1960s both parties competed for housing completion numbers. The 1950s Conservative 
Government. for example, set a target of 300,000 completions per year, while the 1960s Labour 
Government set a target of 500,000 completions per year. Achieving these targets demanded action 
in both public and private sectors. By the early 1970s, however, the experience of redevelopment, 
the failure of the industrialised building programme and the scale of the problem of poor housing 
resulted in a shift away from large-scale comprehensive redevelopmmt and towards rehabilitation. 3 
Nevertheless, the council housing sector's growth had been such that by the 1970s nearly 30% of 
households 
- 
more than six million 
- 
in Fangland and Wales were in local authority housing. The 
3 The 1969 Hing Act widened the availability of improvement grants for individual dwellings and 
permitted the designation of General Improvement Areas (GIAs). The 1974 Ham' gt introduced 
Housing Action Areas (HAAS) intended to cover the worst areas of housing stress where poor physical and 
social conditions interacted. 
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bigger growth area, however, was owner-occupation; the growth of which reflected both state 
encouragement and subsequent rational choices made by households with effective demand. The 
inter-war period saw the initial growth of the owner-occupier sector and, in 1938, a third of 
households owned their own homes. After 1945, the continuing encouragement of owner- 
occupation was an enduring feature of post-war housing policy and, by the early 1980s, 60% of 
households owned their own homes. 
As previously noted, the welfare state had always been an amalgam of two competing ideas: a safety 
net and a mechanism for reducing social inequalities. The function of council housing could also be 
interpreted in two contrasting ways. First, with a `welfare role' assisting only those households 
unable to afford or find any other sort of accommodation. Second, as `general needs' housing - to 
satisfy the demand from households (through choice or necessity and irrespective of income) to rent 
rather than buy. Although both provided subsidies to local authorities to build housing, Labour 
Govemmerts tended to see it as general needs housing; Conservative Governments as special needs 
housing. Tensions between general and special needs housing are, nevertheless, illustrated by the 
attempts by Conservative Governments to change the basis of local authority rerrts 4 
Under the 1956 Housing Subsidies Act. for example, the requirement for local authorities to 
subsidise housing from the rates was removed. As Malpass & Murie (1994, p. 80) note, this was an 
attempt to encourage `realistic rent policies' and give councils an incentive to raise rents. Realistic 
rents would mean higher rents for those who could afford to pay the full economic costs of their 
housing, with rents for poorer tenants being reduced through rent rebates. This was the beginning of 
a change from a universal to a more discriminating subsidy system; subsidising tenants who could 
afford to pay the full rent being considered a misuse of public money (ibid, 1994, p. 80). Universal 
subsidies create an unearned or unmerited consumer surplus for those tenants who acquire the good 
at a price lower than they are able to pay; it also gives them an incentive to stay in the sector and, as 
a result, deprive those in greater need. Better-targeted subsidies would reduce consumer surplus and 
result in a more efficient provision. Local politicians, however, were generally reluctant to raise 
council rents 
-- 
either as a matter of political or ideological principle or because increased rents were 
tantamount to electoral suicide. Many houses therefore continued to be let at rents lower than the 
economic level, which failed to cover costs of repairs, maintenance and administration, or loan 
4 Local authority rents were calculated on the difference between loan charges an capital expenditure (i. e., 
the debt) plus the cost of maintenance and management, lese any Government subsidy (and possibly a rate 
contribution). As the result was often different rents for similar dwellings, local systems of rent-pooling 
involving an element of cross-subsidisation usually provided a degree of equity between tenants. As local 
authorities had developed their housing stocks at different tines, in different quantities and under different 
subsidy systems, rents also differed from one authority to another. 
42 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
servicing charges and required continued subsidy either from the rates or from central Govemmern. 
Through the 1972 Housing Finance Act. a later Conservative Government again attempted to 
rationalise local authority subsidies and rents. The intention was that each local authority would 
pay its own housing costs from rental income, with most subsidies being phased out. Short-term 
transitional subsidies would enable local authorities to adjust to the new system. Fair rents were to 
be charged for all public-sector dwellings, bringing them into line with the private sector and a 
system of rent rebates and rents allowances was to operate, whereby subsidies would be targeted to 
those in need and unable to pay the new raft. The measures were bitterly contested and ultimately 
provided abortive as an economic crisis, a rent freeze and, subsequently, the return of a Labour 
Government resulted in the Act's repeal and the return to a subsidy system through the 1975 
Housing Rents & Subsidies Act (Baichin, et a1., 1995, p. 312). 
3.3 THE CRISIS OF COUNCIL HOUSING 
3.3.1 FROM THE 'CRISIS IN' TO THE 'CRISIS OFCOUNCIL HOUSING 
Until the late 1960s, there was general agreement about the need for high levels of housing 
construction in order to eliminate shortage, remove slums and provide for a growing population. 
The emphasis on production targets, however, distracted attention from other issues, such as the 
housing stock's quality, the need for repairs and the quality of management; all of which became 
increasingly apparent through the late 1960s and 1970s. Hague (1990, p. 248), for example, 
observed that during the 1960s "... issues of production and cost were to the fore, not tenants' 
rights. ". More generally, he argues that, from 1919 until the late 1960s, a paternalist form of 
housing management had developed because neither central Government nor local authorities nor 
tenants were pressing the case for tenant involvernert in the management of public housing. In 
addition, scarcity made it easier to exclude tenant choice and initiative. Tenant activity did, 
however, increase in the years 1968-73 coinciding with a more general development of community 
action focusing around urban renewal. Housing departments, however, were slow to develop new 
relationships with service users and the spur for their eventual interest was the experience of 
`housing consumers' sought as a response to the management problems encountered on some estates 
during the 1970s (Furbey, et at., 1995, p. 253). 
By the mid-1970s, central Government was becoming increasingly aware of problems in the public 
sector housing stock. An investigation of difficult to-let estates' undertaken in 1976 (Burridge, et 
al., 1981), for example, revealed problems of social stigmatisation, management incompetence, and 
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hostility between tenants and local authority landlords. Although most local authorities had only a 
few thousand houses, many London boroughs and larger cities 
- 
usually Labour-controlled 
-- 
had 
vast numbers of houses' with significant management problems and, as a direct consequence, 
inevitably appeared to have "... insensitive procedures and cumbersome, inflexible and remote 
management arrangements. " (Balchin, 1995, p. 138). Pre-war housing needed both repairs and 
modernisation due to its age, but defects were also appearing in much of the non-traditional housing 
built in the 1960s; in 1974, for example, it was discovered that over half the difficult-to-let estates 
were less than ten years old (DoE, 1974, from Scoffiam, 1984). Problems of disrepair, inadequate 
maintenance and the absence of improvements could be regarded as stemming from a lack of 
financial resources. In this respect and especially during the 1980s, there was mutual accusation 
between the tiers of government: local government blaming spending restrictions imposed by the 
centre; central Government claiming local authorities were ineffidei t and did not charge economic 
rents. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, major problems of poor management, poor quality 
housing and difficult-t&-let estates had impressed themselves on the public agenda and many areas 
of council housing could convincingly be portrayed 
- 
at least at the level of political rhetoric 
- 
as 
being in crisis and in need of reform. 
As discussed in Chapter One, the New Right critique associated the failings of council housing with 
the wider failings of the welfare state. State intervention was inefficient compared to the free market 
and worked against the interests of individuals by reducing liberty and eroding incentives to 
achievement. Furthermore, the design and management of council housing was dominated by 
professional and bureaucratic self-interest and was impervious to consumer preferences, inefficient 
and monopolistic. The critique was particularly influential on the Conservative party in the late 
1970s and, as Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 212) observed, the problem was redefined: it was no longer a 
crisis in but a crisis of council housing Government housing policies, therefore, 
"... simply assumed that local authorities were uni e bad landlords, that the 
`crisis' had been their own making: a result of their inefficient practices, their 
lack of responsiveness to consumers or their monopoly position in the rented 
housing market in many local areas. In other words, local authorities were 
accused of causing the crisis they were struggling to confront. " (ibid, p212-213). 
Developing and emphasising ideas that had previously been part of Conservative thought, the 
Thatcher Govemnwt showed a greater dstemrination than previous goveaunents both to redefine 
the sector's role and to implement the necessary policies. Council housing was to be for those who 
could not fend for themselves in the market, while general needs housing was to be catered for by 
By the 1970s, for example, Glasgow owned 170,000 dwellings, Birmingham 120,000, Manchester 
100,000, Liverpool 60,000 and Newcastle-upon-Tyne 45,000. 
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the private sector. As a result, the Thatcher Government came to regard council housing as "... a 
`safety net' for the disadvantaged rather than a general needs tenure and to favour the disposal of 
as much as possible of the public sector stock " (Ballhin, 1995, p. 189). Among other issues, this 
was a formula for the residualisation of the council housing stock. 
3.3.2 THE RIGHT TO BUY POLICY 
The 1980 Housing Act (henceforth the 1980 Act) formalised Conservative thinking on housing, with 
the most significant element being a statutory 'right-to-buy' (RTB) the freehold of their home 
conferred on council tenants. The policy involved not just tenants but also properties leaving the 
sector. Council houses sales had first been permitted in 1925, but 
- 
until the late 1970s 
- 
house 
building had priority over disposal. In the mid-1950s, however, public sector house building had 
been cut back and the sale of council houses encouraged. The 1957 Housing Ad. for example, 
permitted local authorities to sell council houses to sitting tenants. Significantly, local authorities 
had discretion whether or not to sell council houses. The 1980 legislation removed local authorities' 
discretion for most housing types and set down a statutory procedure for sale and for determining 
valuation. The Secretary of State also had powers to intervene to prevent local authorities 
frustrating and obstructing RTB. The Act also offered discounts based on the length of tenure, 
which provided an additional incentive for tenants and ensured it was taken up more widely. With 
this new stimulus and active marketing, the number of sales achieved in 1980 was higher than any 
previous year. The 1980 total was exceeded in 1981 and in 1982 reached a new record of over 
240,000 sales. By the end of 1984, one million council houses had been sold (nearly 20% of the 
stock). Sales continued steadily, albeit at a lower rate, for the remainder of the decade. The only 
year that departed from this downward trend being 1988; the high level of sales achieved in that year 
(second only to 1982) being attributed to uncertainty engendered by the 1987 White Paper (Malpass 
& Murie, 1993, p. 97). In 1979, the stock of dwelling owned by local authorities and new towns in 
Great Britain had been 6.5 million. By the end of March 1993,1.65 million dwellings had been 
sold, mostly under RTB (Murie, 1993, p. 156). 
Although the policy was highly controversial, 6 it nevertheless represents a successful example of the 
policy implementation. Furthermore, as Marsh & Rhodes (1992, p. 182) observe, those affected by 
the policy either had `no effective means of resisting' (Labour local authorities) or `wholeheartedly 
endorsed it' (Conservative local authorities and council tenants). RTB also epitomised the 
individualism inherent in New Right thinking: Malpass (1993, p. 30), for example, considered its 
success "... lay in its appeal to indMthwil self-interest, while opposition to it was ground in more 
Balchin (1995, pp163-173) gives detailed accounts of the arguments Ear and spinet council house sales. 
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esoteric arguments about the collective benefits of council housing. ". It also had party political 
benefits; research undertaken by Johnson (1987, from Balchin, 1995, p. 177), for example, showed 
owner-occupiers tended to vote Conservative by a ratio of 3: 1, while council tenants had a 
preference for Labour by 2.5: 1. Although initially opposed, the Labour party began to recognise 
both RTB's inherent popularity and the unpopularity of opposing it; Griffiths & Holmes, (1984, 
p. 10), for example, noted how RTB had "... succeeded in portraying the Conservative party as 
champions of choice and rights, and Labour as bureaucratic bullies. ". 
The success of the RTB was partial. Selective and relatively indiscriminate sales were changing the 
quality of the remaining council housing stock. Houses (and particularly three-bedroom, semi- 
detached properties) in suburban locations made up the overwhelming majority of sales, thereby 
increasing the proportions of one-bedroom houses and two- and three-bedroom flats and, in 
particular, the proportion of flats with design defects among the local authority stock (Forrest & 
Murie, 1984). The remaining local authority stock was also increasingly concentrated in the inner 
cities or less popular suburban areas, while sales of flats were very low and large estates stood 
relatively unaffected by the privatisation policy. 
In addition to disposals through RTB, the council housing sector was further squeezed by 
restrictions on new building. To control public expenditure, the Thatcher Govemment severely 
restricted the funding available to local authorities. Prior to 1977, there were few restrictions an the 
amount of housing built by local authorities 
- 
the cost of each scheme being controlled by a cost 
yardstick with loan approval refused if it exceeded this constraint. As the than Labour Government 
sought both to control and reduce public expenditure, the system was changed. Through the 
Housing Investment Programme (HIP) system (introduced in 1977/78 and operative until 1989/90), 
local authority capital spending was limited each year to an approved allocation. The system 
allowed central Government to set an overall limit and to distribute allocations between authorities, 
with authorities choosing their own spending priorities. Allocations, however, merely constituted 
permission to spend or borrow, not a grant or subsidy. While Labour had reluctantly introduced 
such controls, the in-coming Conservatives continued than with ideological zeal and consistently 
reduced the overall allocation. The 1980 Local Government & Plaimina Act modified the 1977 
system by replacing block allocations of borrowing permission with block allocations of permitted 
capital exxpendirkns. Authorities could also spend 100% of receipts from council house sales 
immediately on housing repairs, or a specified proportion in the year of generation together with a 
fixed proportion of unspent receipts from previous years (the `cascade' effixt). In 1980, the 
proportion of capital receipts that could be spent in the year of generation was 50%, subsequently 
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reduced to 40% in 1984/85 and 20% from 1985/86. As a result of expenditure restrictions, council 
housing building was drastically reduced. In 1975, there had been 173,800 housing starts. This fell 
to 80,100 in 1979 
- 
the lowest level since the 1930s. In 1982 and 1983 the figure was less than 
40,000, falling to 8600 in 1990. In 1993 there were fewer than 2000 starts. Hence, high levels of 
sales through RTB was set against a background of exceptionally low rates of new building. The 
cumulative impact of RTB legislation and other changes therefore diminished the direct role of local 
authorities in housing provision. Furthermore, due to a range of factors, the sector increasingly 
became one of last resort 
- 
all those able to exit were likely to do so, while new council tenants were 
increasingly drawn from marginalised social groups in accordance with the safety net idea. As a 
result, council estates faced problems not only of disrepair but also of unemployment, crime and 
social exclusion (Forrest & Murie, 1990). 
3.3.3 DEALING WITH THE CRISIS IN COUNCIL HOUSING 
The 1970s and 1980s saw some attempts to improve council housing. From the 1970s onwards, 
some local authorities gave attention to the quality of service and developed decentralisation 
strategies, provided more information and consulted with tenants. The first systematic survey of 
local authority arrangements for tenant participation was undertaken in 1977 (Richardson, 1977, 
from Cairncross, et at, 1997, p. 19). It found that only 12% of English authorities had `formal 
schemes' of tenant participation (including tenant involvement in housing committees or sub- 
committees, advisory committees and regular discussion meetings between councillors or officers 
and tenant representatives. If `irregular discussion meetings' were included the proportion rose to 
44%. For a variety of reasons, tenant involvement increased through the 1980s. The 1980 Act 
introduced the Tenant's Charter (consolidated and amended by the 1985 Housing Act 
- 
henceforth 
the 1985 Act) which included certain rights for public sector tenants, including: 
- 
definition of 
security of tenure and procedures; grounds for obtaining possession; rights of succession; rights to 
take lodgers or to sublet; rights to carry out improvements (subject to landlord's permission); rights 
to apply for improvement grants; rights to consultation and provision of information on housing 
allocations and transfers (Malpass & Murie, 1993, p. 116). Nevertheless, although major policy 
changes were required in some localities, Malpass & Murie (ibid, p. 116) note that, in general, it 
required a change in the way policy was carried out, rather than in the substance of policies. 
With regard to rundown and hard-to-let estates, an important Government response was the 
establishment of the Priority Estates Project (PEP) in March 1979 with pilot schemes in Hackney, 
Bolton and Lambada. The PEP brief was to experiment with locally-based housing management and 
tenant involvement in an attempt to restore the forhunes of unpopular estates. At the same time 
-- 
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and independent of PEP 
-- 
several local authorities were pursuing similar initiatives. The PEP 
approach evolved over time and culminated in a three volume guide to local housing management 
(Power, 1987). Based on intensive estate-based management, the PEP model involved the following 
elements: 
- 
`ring fencing' the estate as an organisational and financial entity; setting up an estate 
office to run all day-to-day services; putting locally based staff in charge of rents, lettings and 
repairs; consulting tenants and providing an open door to their representatives; helping tenants form 
representative organisations; supporting tenants in controlling anti-social behaviour, preventing the 
`dumping' of disruptive households, and enforcing tenancy conditions; providing discrete and 
targeted budgets for repair and improvements; monitoring progress to show the costs and benefits of 
local management; providing training for staff and tenant representatives; and bringing in other 
services to help improve social, economic and environmental conditions (Power, 1993, p. 225). 
By the mid-1980s, tenant invwlvetna t was more widely recognised as an important componst of good 
practice in public sector housing managenie t. The lesson was that good housing management could 
not be simply imposed from above but needed informing by insight and experience from below. A 
survey of local authorities by Caimcross, et al., (1997, p. 19) showed that the proportion of local 
authorities with `formal schemes' for tenant involvement had risen from 12% in 1975 to 44% in 
1986-7. When informal methods were included the proportion had risen from 44% in 1975 to 80% 
in 1986-87. Nevertheless, although the need to develop channels and mechanisms for tenant 
consultation and involvement had been accepted, the degree of commitment and the methods 
employed at the local level differed (see Caimcross, et al., 1994; 1997). 
Tenant involvement also developed as a consequence of public sector housing renewal programmes. 
The main programme was Estate Action (EA), which was set up in 1985 and directed at the 
comprehensive regeneration of larger more rundown estates. The initiative had a range of objectives 
including: 
- 
developing new solutions to the problems facing run-down estates, including transfers of 
ownership and/or managanent to estate mana$enerrt boards (EMBs) or tenant co-operatives; 
encouraging authorities to adapt existing disposal solutions such as sales of tenanted estates to 
private trusts or developers and sales of empty property to developers; encouraging authorities to 
improve management and maintenance by establishing autonomous estate-based management 
schemes on PEP lines; and advising ministers of the need for new machinery, incentives or 
legislative changes to promote a full range of solutions (DoE, 1985, from Pinto, 1995, p. 124-125). 
In developing proposals, local authorities had to demonstrate that they were `fully consulting' 
tenants in working up the proposed scheme and promoting tenant participation in the estate's 
management (DoE, 1993b, s28). To encourage local authorities, an elanait of borrowing consent was 
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made conditional on decentralisation and tenant inMvemennt being key elements of the proposals. Pinto 
(1995) argues that two other factors were also important. First, by 1985, the repairs backlog was 
estimated at £19 billion and the Treasury was under pressure to allow local authorities to spend 
more on their deteriorating housing stock. By top-slicing funds from the mainstream HEPs and 
allocating than to particular projects, EA directed funds to a limited number of authorities deemed 
to experience disproportionate housing stress. The approach was, however, regarded as a further 
c tralisation of power at the expense of local discretion and autonomy. Second, EA was presented 
as an exit medianism for local authority housing - although privatisation is probably best regarded 
as a `hoped for outcome' radier than an integral part of EA. 
Originally intended as a series of demonstration projects, EA rapidly became a well-established 
programme. By the end of 1994/95, over £2 billion of public money had been spent and 540,000 
homes improved in 170 authorities (DoE, 1995). Pinto (1995, p. 146-7) noted that of 1,200 EA 
schemes developed by 1995, only 36% had involved the private sector and fewer than 30,000 
dwellings had been privatised. Nevertheless, he argued that it played "... a crucial role in 
conditioning housing authorities to the concept and value of selling either parts of their housing 
stock or land parcels. ". ' Balchin (1995, p. 140), however, notes that while EA improved many 
estates, it was `tragic' that, for reasons of political ideology, it was not adopted by many Labour 
councils. 
3.4 THE NEW PHASE OF HOUSING POLICY 
3.4.1 THE RIDLEY REVIEW 
While greater tenant involvement, more intensive and localised management and assistance with 
repairs and improvement were attempts to address the crisis in council housing, the greater pact of 
the Thatcher Government's energy was directed at resolving the crisis of council housing. It 
therefore required much more radical and fundamental reform of the sector. At the time, realisation 
of limits to the number of council house sales suggested the need for other policy measures. Thus, 
during 1986, the Secretary of State for the Envirariment, Nick Ridley, set up a major review of 
housing policy, which proposed aiding the municipal monopoly in rented housing and the creation 
of competition 
- 
and, thereby, choice 
- 
in the sector. Future housing policy would therefore focus 
not just an increasing owner-occupation but also on dismantling the council housing sector. The 
proposals had two main themes: - increased rents in all sectors with State interverrtion through 
' HATS were 
- 
in pert 
-a development of EA, with the main differences being the scale and severity of the 
problem, the resources and time-ecak required to tackle them comprehensively, the degree of involve t 
of the local authority, and the emphasis on landlord/ tenure diversification. 
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housing benefit (HB) a rather than direct provision and transfers of local authority housing stock to 
other landlords (i. e., a denunicipalisation). 
Rents & housing benefit 
The review questioned the State's role as a direct provider of housing. If the State housed someone 
during a period of hardship 
- 
given the difficulty of removing people from their homes when they no 
longer required support and the incentive of low (i. e., below market) rents 
- 
it could end up housing 
them for much longer than the period of their particular hardship. Hence, over time, the State ended 
up housing people whose conditions no longer merited help. Ridley (from Lipsey, 1986, p. 10), for 
example, argued that council rents were below their economic level, that low rents were a cause of 
the dereliction of much of the housing stock and that many local authority tenants could afford 
economic rents. He therefore argued that, as there were many tenants in council houses who could 
afford an economic rent and many people not in council houses that could not, it was better "... to 
attach the subsidy to the person than it is to attach the subsidy to the houses. " (ibid, p. 10). The 
intention was to move away from the direct provision of housing and towards the provision of 
financial assistance that could be turned `on and off more flexibly as circumstances changed 
without turning people out of their homes. Hence, new financial regimes for HAs and for local 
authorities would reduce the indiscriminate subsidies paid to housing producers (i. e., HAG and 
subsidies to local housing authorities) and extend means tested, tenure-neutral, and portable 
personal subsidies (i. e., HB). The effect of this would empower tenants as consumers and aid the 
creation of a more diverse rented sector, since 
- 
in principle 
- 
tenants could switch landlords 
without losing subsidies (i. e., it would reduce the financial `advantage' of renting from a local 
authority rather than from an HA or private landlord). As equalising rents 
- 
or, at least, reducing 
differentials 
- 
between sectors was a prerequisite of competition between sectors, it was also 
proposed that local authority rents would be increased! and controls on HA and private sector rents 
removed. Higher rents in the latter would also provide a better return on investment in the sector 
and an incentive for entrepreneurs to increase supply. 
Transfers of local authority lousing stock 
For the existing stocks of local authority housing, the intention was not to add to it (new social 
housing provision would be through HAs) and where possible to transfer it to other landlords. As 
g Housing subsidy is given to landlords to enable them to provide dwellings at affordable rents, while 
housing benefit (HB) is a payment to tenants to enable them to pay the rent for their home. There are two 
farms of HB payment: 
- 
rent rebates paid to local authority tenants and rent allowances paid to private and 
HA tenants. 
9 By reducing the consumer surplus provided by low council rents, this would result in a more efficient use 
of public fluids. 
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Labour-controlled local authorities owned the bulk of council housing, there was also a party 
political dimension to the proposals. Ridley (1992, p. 87), for example, later wrote of his 
determination to weaken the `almost incestuous relationship' between some councils and their 
tenants: 
"Absurdly low rents, and a monopoly position in providing rented housing, 
allowed some councils to make their tenants entirely dependent on them. They 
received a rotten service 
- 
repairs and maintenance and improvements were 
minimal 
- 
yet the tenants were trapped in their homes by the lack of availability 
of alternative accommodation to rent, and by such cheap rents that no other 
landlord could match them, even if they had a house to offer them. The tenants 
felt beholden to the council, and most paid the price expected of them by giving 
their political support to them. ". 
The new policy proposals were also based on the assumption that tenants were dissatisfied with their 
local authority landlords and would welcome the opportunity to transfer to other landlords. Cole & 
Furbey (1994, p. 213) argue that, in order to legitimise this strategy, it was essential for the 
Government o 
"... gloss over those aspects of council housing dependent, at least in part, on 
central Government action, such as the overall level of investment, the use of 
receipts from council house sales, or the comparative balance of housing tenure 
subsidies. Instead, attention turned to the failure of local authorities to carry out 
their responsibilities as landlords 
- 
especially in their management and 
maintenance functions. The failure of council housing, in short, was down to the 
inadequacies of local authorities. ". 
Hence, as Kemp (1990, p. 798) observed, the Government engaged in a `sustained ideological 
assault' on local authority housing, which stressed its `supposed inefficiency, paternalism, and 
failures'. The Audit Commission's study M 'ng the Crisis in Council Housing M nest 
(Audit Commission, 1986) provided an apparent vindication of the Government's assumptions. The 
report opened with the statement: "Crisis is a heavily over-worked tern. Yet it is difficult to think 
of a more appropriate way to describe the state of much of the stock of 4.8 million council-owned 
dwellings in England and Wales. ". The survey conveyed a picture of local authorities charging 
rents too low to meet the demands of stock maintenance and offering a fragmented form of service 
delivery to tenants, weighted too heavily towards middle management and hijacked by local 
councillor intervention (Cole & Furbey, 1994, p. 215). A weakness of the Audit Commission's 
report, as Cole & Furbey (ibid, p. 215) note, was the lack of a comparative dimension: "For the 
case against council housing to be argued strongly, it was equally necessary to convince tenants 
that alternative landlon* would offer a higher quality of service: that transferring out of council 
control would provide a better deal. ". Possible alternative landlords were private sector landlords, 
tenants co-operatives and HAs. Kemp (1990, p. 795-6) argues that the Governme is initial aim 
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was to demonstrate to private investors that rented housing could be profitable, but -- as it became 
apparent that such investment was unlikely -- it changed to providing an alternative to council 
housing. The most favoured alternative was HAs, which had an image of being locally-based, 
offering sensitive management and largely avoiding the stigma attached to many council estates. A 
further attraction was that, when compared with councils, HAs offered the centre more influence 
and control (through the provision of subsidy through the Housing Corporation), while removing 
housing from local political control where rants could be manipulated to buy votes. 
3.4.2 THE 1987 HOUSING WH1TE PAPER 
The major outcome of Ridley's review was the 1987 White Paper, Housing 
- 
The Government's 
Proposals (Cmnd 214,1987). Echoing New Right critiques of the welfare state, it argued that it 
was 'not healthy' for the public sector to dominate provision of rented housing: "... short-term 
political factors can override efficient and economic management of housing in the long-term, 
leading to unrealistically low rents and wholly inadequate standardr of maintenance. " (pars 
1.11). The intention, therefore, was to go beyond privatisation and create a more marketed-oriented 
system for `social' housing provision. The White Paper outlined the Government's principal 
objectives: 
- 
to continue to spread home ownership as widely as possible (para 1.14); to put new life 
into the independent rented sector (para 1.15); to encourage local authorities to change and develop 
their housing role (para 1.16); and to focus the use of scarce public money more effectively so that 
tenants were given a better deal (para 1.17). Under the fourth objective, there would also be new 
Government agencies 
- 
to be known as Housing Action Trusts 
- 
which would "... bring public and 
(crucially) private sector resources to bear on some of the most intractable areas of mainly local 
authority housing. " (para 1.17). 
The White Paper's most significant intention was to remove the presumption that local authorities 
should take direct action to meet new or increasing demands. Instead, their future role would be a 
`mac one': "... identifying housing needs and demands, encouraging innovative method of 
provision by other booties to meet such needs, maximising the use of private finance, and 
encouraging the new interest in the revival of the independent rented sector. " (para 5.1). The 
Whits Pier. nevertheless, noted the importance of improving conditions for those who continued to 
live in local authority housing. Echoing New Right critiques, it gave its understanding of the cause 
of problems: `7n the public sector too little attention hce been paid to the wishes of tenets or to 
their views on how their requirements can but be met; tend have generally not been allowed to 
express their choices clearly, and have therefore not always found the kind of accommodation they 
waves " (pare 1.3). While accepting that, in some areas, the system had provided good quality 
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housing, it argued that in many cities local authority housing operations were so large that they 
inevitably risked becoming ` distant and bureaucratic'. Furthermore, insensitive design and bad 
management had `alienated' tenants and `left housing badly maintained' and, as a result, a wide 
range of social problems had emerged and whole communities slipped into `a permanent dependence 
on the welfare system' from which it was `extremely difficult for people to escape' (para 1.9). It 
therefore argued that the prevailing system of ownership and management was not in tenants' long- 
term interests. Thus, for local authority housing stock, the overarching theme was exit from the 
public sector, which would take two forms: 
-- 
first, through `Tenants' Choice' where tenants could 
choose to transfer to a private landlord, and second, estate privatisation through HATs. 
The proposals were subsequently enacted in the 1988 Housing Ad (henceforth the 1988 Act) and 
the 1989 Local Government & Housing Act (henceforth the 1989 Act). It was evident from the 
White Paper that the proposals would involve a fundamental restructuring of the `social' housing 
sector, which would: 
-- 
first, make the local authority sector less attractive by increasing rents; 
second, deregulate the private rented housing sector and `marketise' the HA sector (i. e., it would 
change the exit destinations); and, third, introduce new (exit) mechanisms by which local authority 
tenants and properties could transfer or be transferred to the private sector. The following three 
sections discuss these changes. 
3.5 THE CHANGING LOCAL AUTHORITY CONTEXT 
The 1989 Act significantly changed the financial system for local authority housing. As Mullins, et 
at, (1992, p. 7) concluded, local authorities soon came to realise that it posed an `even greater 
challenge' to their traditional role in providing `affordable housing for local households in need' 
than either RTB or Tenants' Choice. The Act changed both the revenue and the capital rules for 
council housing. The context for these changes was the history of housing subsidies but especially 
the changes resulting from the 1980 Act. Changes on the capital side resulting from the 1980 Act 
have been discussed previously. The 1989 Act changed the capital rules in two main ways. First, 
annual credit approvals to control borrowing were introduced, through which central Government 
set `credit approvals' covering local authority capital spending. Second, the regulations regarding 
capital receipts were changed. New (and already accumulated) capital receipts were divided into 
two parts 
-a `reserved part' (75% of housing receipts and half of other receipts) and a `useable' 
part (25% for housing; half of other receipts). The ` reserved' part had to be used to redeem debt or 
put aside to meet future liabilities. Authorities were free to use the `useable' part for capital 
spending on house building or rehabilitation as and when they chose. (Balchin, 1995, p. 179). 
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In terms of revenue, the 1980 Act had introduced a new rent subsidy consisting of a `base amount' 
(equal to the total subsidy paid in the previous year) plus a `housing cost differential' (representing 
the expected increase in the total housing costs over those for the previous year) less the `local 
contribution differential' (the amount the Government expected the local authority to pay towards 
housing through increased rents and/or rate fund contributions). In principle, the latter gave the 
local authority a choice between increasing rents or increasing the rate fund contribution. The DoE 
also had powers to specify the target rate of annual rent increase. As Balchin (1995, p. 126) notes, 
the result of the new system was that rents increased by 39% between 1982-83 and 1988-89, while 
housing subsidies to local authorities decreased from £1,423 million to £520 million between 1980- 
81 and 1988-89. By 1987,80% of local authorities did not receive any housing subsidy at all. As 
well as increasing rent levels, as Malpass & Murie (1994, p. 201) note, the system had two other 
outcomes that became important reasons for further change. First, as large numbers of authorities 
lost all their general housing subsidy (but not rat rebate subsidy), their Housing Revenue Accounts 
(HRAs) moved into surplus, which was often moved into the General Rate Fund, thereby, 
subsidising local rates. The hidden transfer was aptly shown in Carvel's rhetorical question whether 
it was a good use of public money to increase income support for East Carobs' tenants so that East 
Cambs' ratepayers could pay lower rates? (from Baichin, 1995, p. 127). Second, aggregate rate 
fund contributions to HRAs came to exceed Exchequer subsidy, which meant that (some) local 
authorities had become the major suppliers of `indiscriminate' (i. e., non-means-tested) assistance. 
The 1989 Act made three major changes to the revenue side. First, the HRA was `ring fenced', 
whereby the net cost of providing housing services not met from subsidy had to be covered by rents. 
This prevented local authorities from using the rates to subsidise their housing (or their housing to 
subsidise the rates). Although local authorities could continue to cross-subsidise within their 
housing stock, they would no longer have a universal subsidy for their housing stock. It was also 
argued that local authorities would be more accountable to tenants; the consultation document on the 
proposed changes suggested that: "Well run housing departments will be able to provide a good 
standard of service at a modest rent; on the other hang inefficient landlords will be unable to 
conceal their poor standards or their extravagant costs. ". Second, the Act introduced anew HRA 
subsidy intended to make up the gap between notional expenditure and notional income. If a local 
authority made a surplus from its income from rent plus the rent rebate element then that surplus 
would be deducted from the rebate element. Home, the local authority (rather than catral 
Government) would have to pay 
- 
at least some 
-- 
rent rebate by cross-subsidising from better-off to 
poorer tenants. Third, the Act further increased central control over local authority rents. Under the 
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new system, the DoE assessed the total value of all the local authority housing stock in the country, 
it then decided what the total national increase in rents should be and calculated each local 
authority's share. 
The Government's consultation paper, issued following the 1987 White Paper, stated that, under the 
new financial regime, council tenants would be able to take `better informed decisions' about 
whether to exercise the options the Government was giving than through the RTB and Tenants' 
Choice. On the one hand, tenants would have better information about their landlord's performance; 
on the other, exercising RTB or transferring to another landlord would be made increasingly 
financially attractive. Hence, while the changes could be seen benignly as a way of introducing 
rents that better reflected the costs of providing the service and of introducing an individual and 
targeted subsidy (instead of a universal subsidy), they could also be seen as a means of increasing 
tenants' willingness to exit. The changes, therefore, created a coerced choice for tenants (i. e., 
tenants would exit from the council housing sector because that sector had been made less 
attractive). This change, however, would not necessarily be regarded as coercive by the 
Government and would merely be a consequence of adopting a superior system for local authority 
housing. 
3.6 THE CHANGING EXIT DESTINATIONS 
It was anticipated that the major destinations for local authority tenants exiting (or being exited) 
would be 
-- 
what the Government termed 
-- 
the `independent rented sector', which included private 
landlords and HAs. Although both the privately rented and the HA sectors were materially changed 
by the 1988 Act, as noted previously, the strategy for rented housing embodied in the 1988 Act was 
largely predicated upon the expansion of the HA sector and its effective substitution for local 
authorities' landlord role. 
3.6.1 THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR 
During the twentieth century, the private rented sector in Britain declined from the mainstream 
tenure in 1914 with 90% of housing provision to the margins of housing provision in 1987 with only 
8.2%. The sector's decline effectively reduced the choices available in the provision of both rented 
housing and housing generally. Greater choice was available in the rented sector because 
- 
in 
principle 
- 
there were fewer barriers to housing realisation. In the local authority sector, potential 
households had to fulfil appropriate criteria of need (i. e., a points system) and usually spend time on 
a waiting list; in the owner-occupier sector, they needed to raise a deposit and be able to service a 
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mortgage. 
Controls on private renting had two main elements: 
-- 
controls on rent levels and controls on security 
of tenure. The Labour party argued that controls were a necessary safeguard against landlords 
charging exorbitant rents, exploiting tenants (especially in areas of housing shortage) and denying 
them security of tenure. Although many tenants benefited from regulated rents, this was 
- 
arguably 
- 
at the expense of inadequate repairs and maintenance. The Conservatives argued that the prime 
cause of the sector's decline was the controls that made the provision of rented accommodation 
unattractive to inventors. The combination of controls on rents and tenants' security of tenure, tax 
incentives for owner-occupation and the low income of many private tenants also created a `value 
gap' between vacant possession and sitting tenant prices. The value gap also gave an incentive to 
speculators to acquire tenanted property, persuade or induce the tenant to leave and then to sell it for 
owner-occupation. Security of tenure (including security for spouses, children and other 
dependants) combined with rent controls was therefore important for tenants. 
For the Conservatives, relaxing controls would mean greater flexibility and higher returns for 
landlords and, thereafter, an increase in the supply of private lettings as entrepreneurs responded to 
price signals. Nevertheless, until the mid-1980s, the Government was cautious of a major 
deregulation for fear of accusations of actively promoting Racism (Ginsburg, 1989, p. 57). 1° 
Indeed, the term 'independent rented sector' in the 1987 White Paper was seen as an attempt to 
distance itself from the negative associations of the term `private landlord'. In his response to the 
Housing Bill, David Winnick MP (CD, 30 November, 1987, col. 662), for example, argued it was 
"... a charter for property companies, unscrupulous landlordr and potential Rachman. ". The 
lousing minister, William Waldegrave (ibid, col. 718), responded by arguing that, although the 
Labour party had tried to make it impossible to rat in the private sector, it had not `driven those 
wide boys out of business'. They would only be driven out of business when there was "... a range 
of alternative property available from better and serious landlords with investment That gives 
people the choice, which means that they do not have to go to Mr Hoogstraten. ". 
Measures to revitalise the private rented sector introduced in the 1988 Act were an expansion of 
those in the 1980 Act, which had introduced `assured tenancies' and `shorthold tenancies'. Assured 
tenancies allowed `approved landlords' to let new dwellings outside of the various Rent Acts. 
Shorthold tenancies were only applicable to new lettings. At the end of a fixed term of between one 
10 Rent deregulation introduced under the 1957 Rent Act was regarded as having led to `Rachmanism', 
which 
- 
in turn 
- 
was considered to have contributed to the Conservative Government's defeat in the 1964 
electiol 
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and five years, landlords had the right to regain possession. Initially landlords had to charge fair 
rents, but after 1981 (and initially outside Greater London only), market rents were negotiable. 
Neither tenancy was successful in practice. While the 1980 Act deregulated rents for newly-built 
Property let by approved landlords and the 1986 Act extended this to include refurbished properties, 
the 1988 Act took this further by deregulating all new lettings 
- 
private landlords were allowed to 
charge a market rennt, while tenants' security of tenure was weakened. 11 The Act created new-style 
assured tenancies and extended than to all new lettings 
-- 
for an indefinite or fixed period with `full 
security of tenure', renewable at the end of the period. Security of tenure was not as fill as in the 
past (e. g., eviction was possible if the landlord wanted to redevelop the property and offered 
alternative accommodation) and only spouses had a right of succession. Shorthold tenancies were 
renamed `assured shorthold tenancies' (ASTs). These provided no security of tenure beyond the 
fixed term, while the minimum period was reduced from one year to six months. In both cases, rents 
would be `freely negotiated' between landlord and tenant. In addition to rent deregulation, the 
Government also used fiscal means in an attempt to increase the supply of private rented 
accommodation. The March 1988 Budget, for example, extended the Business Expansion Scheme 
(BES) to rented property, thereby giving a financial incentive in the form of tax breaks for investors 
in companies set up specifically to invest in housing for rent. Tax relief ceased in 1993, and as 
Balchin (1995, p115) notes, many individuals subsequently contemplated withdrawing their 
investments while landlords tended to seek capital gains 
- 
both necessitating selling the properties. 
The new measures had limited impact. Malpass (1996, p. 466) notes that, in the period 1989-93, the 
increase in private renting in Britain amounted to only 0.2% of the total stock (21,400 units). Crook 
& Kemp (1996, from ibid, p. 466) concluded that, rather than hart deregulation, much of this could 
be attributed to the short-run impact of the BES and to the property slump where 
- 
unable to sell 
- 
owner-occupiers let out their houses. More generally, Kemp (1992, p. 116) argued that removing 
rest controls was a `necessary but not seäücia t' condition for a revival of private reciting and that 
reducing the fiscal privileges of home-ownership was also necessary: "Successive Governments 
have so feathered the home-owners' nest with tax relief that anyone who can afford to buy 
generally does sa But most of the people who have to rent c lot afford to pay the level of rents 
that landlords require to mak. letting good quality housing a profitable business. ". '2 
'l It thereby signalled an end to the system of regulated tenancies and fair rents assessed by independent 
. 
rent doers introduced under the 1965 Rent 
12 The 1996 Finance Act introduced Housing Investreent Trusts (iTs), which are private companies ist ip 
to tome binds to provide rented housing using tax relief as an incentive to encourage investors. 
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3.6.2 THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION SECTOR 
HAs are non-profit-making, non-statutory bodies that provide affordable housing and receive public 
funding. Until the mid-1970s, they did not play a significant role in housing provision. In 1971, for 
example, they provided 200,000 dwellings (1% of the total stock). HAs grew after 1974 when a 
new capital subsidy scheme was introduced -- housing association grant (HAG) - which was paid to 
HAs on new development schemes in order to reduce outstanding loans to levels that would enable 
`fair' or `affordable' rents to be charged. In order to receive HAG, HAs had to be registered with 
the Housing Corporation. 13 Residual loans (on the cost not covered by HAG) were also provided 
through the Housing Corporation. An annual discretionary Revenue Deficit Grant (RDG) covered 
allowable management and maintenance costs as well as loan charges. The financial framework 
therefore provided a relatively risk-free environment and, as Malpass & Murie (1994, p. 207) note, 
the generosity of the grant regime combined with the effect of inflation on rents meant that -- at least 
with respect to their post-1974 stock -- HAs were likely to be in surplus rather than deficit. Hence, 
following the 1980 Act, HAs were required to pay surpluses into a Grant Redemption Fund (GRF), 
the benefits of which accrued to the Treasury. By 1981, HAs provided 453,000 dwellings (2% of 
the total stock) and, by 1991,724,000 (4%). Given the overall decline in the number of rental units 
available that occurred over the same period, the HA proportion of the rented sector had grown 
significantly during the 1980s. 
The 1988 Act was a major watershed for HAs. A new financial regime reduced their state funding 
and increased dependence on private finance and exposure to financial risk. The new regime had 
two main objectives. First, to increase the volume of rented housing that could be produced for a 
given amount of HAG. Under the new system, HAG rates were predetermined for different types of 
project and for different locations and were paid as a fixed percentage of development costs at a 
level set annually. Thus, for development projects, HAs were required to top up a specified 
percentage of HAG with private funding. One of the reasons for making HAG a fixed grant was to 
make it possible to mix private with public money; to do this within public spending conveentions, it 
was necessary that the risk was borne by the private sector. After 1989, HAG levels were subject to 
downward pressure. In 1989/90, the rate was set at an average of 75%, falling to an average of 
72% in 1992-93 and 54% by 1996/97. As grants were increasingly allocated on a competitive 
basis, HAs had an inoortive to reduce overall sdieme costs. To do so they had to increase efficiency 
and/or contribute from mir own reserves. This had at least two effects: to reduce the quality of 
13 Set up Following the 1964 Housing Act. the Housing Corporation took over from the National Federation 
of Housing Societies (NFHS) and was intended to mck with housing societies, building societies and the 
Government to provide loan to HAs. 
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development and, as HAs could trade off grant levels against rents charged, to increase rerrts. '4 
Second, to create incentives for HAs to deliver services in the most cost-effective way. In terms of 
housing management, efficiency was rewarded rather than penalised: RDG was abolished, while 
revenue surpluses were no longer clawed back by the GRF. For any new letting, tenants would have 
an assured tenancy and HAs could now set their own rents, although `affordable' rests had to be 
diarged as a condition of HAG. 
The impact of these changes was to expose HAs to risk and to market disciplines in new ways. 
Prior to 1988, they had tended to be small-scale operations with a relatively dose and personal 
relationship with tenants, a relatively good repairs and maintenance record and reasonable rents. 
The advantages of relatively small-scale and generous finance subsequently disappeared as the 
sector became increasingly dominated by larger organisations with a more commercial ethos. 
3.7 THE NEW EXIT MECHANISMS 
The 1988 Act introduced two new exit mechanisms for local authority dwellings: 
- 
Tenants' Choice 
and HATs. It also diaaged the arrangements for an existing exit mechanism, which ultimately 
become more significant than either Tenants' Choice or HATs. Transfers under this mechanism 
subsequently became known as 'voluntary transfers' or large scale voluntary transfers (LSVTs) 
- 
LSVT usually refers to transfers to specially established HAs (also referred to as LSVTs). Tenants' 
Choice and voluntary transfers are discussed below; HATs are discussed in the next Chapter. 
3.7.1 TENANTS' CHOICE 
Tenants' Choice gave secure tenants of local authorities the right to exit by choosing and that 
transferring to an alternative landlord. Tenants or prospective landlords could initiate transfers 
- 
although prospective landlords had to be approved by the Housing Corporation. Tenants intending 
to transfer would need to identify a landlord willing to take than on; they would also become 
assured tenants, although they would retain their RTB. Public sector landlords were under a 
statutory duty to sell the properties and could not 
- 
in principle 
- 
frustrate the policy. The Act 
introduced a ballot for all tenants affected by a transfer proposal, whereby, if a majority of those 
eligible to vote did not reject the proposal, the transfer would proceed; abstentions therefore counted 
in favour of transfer (aldwugh tenants voting against transfer would not change landlord). 1s This 
14 To addroes this trade-cIX the Reusing Corporation produced its own benchmark rents for each local 
authority to be used as guidelines ageing which to judge HA bids capital for finding for new projects in 
1998/99. 
15 This individual veto means that it was not 
- 
in strict tame 
-a collective choice. 
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was widely regarded as a form of ballot-rigging. A certain cynicism appeared evideirt in the voting 
method's design because apathy 
- 
which might have been expected 
-- 
would work in favour of 
transfers. 16 Simon Hughes MP (CD, 11 November, 1988, col. 708), for example, argued that a 
`distorted, biased voting system' was the `plainest evidence' that the Goverment was not concerned 
about tenant choice and that its "... primary purpose in introducing the Bill is not that tenants 
should choose, but that council estates should be de-municipalised and privatised ". 17 Although 
referred to as Tenants' Choice, the power of choice was effectively given to the prospective landlord 
not the tenant. Indeed, Kemp (1990, p. 803) noted it could hardly be otherwise: landlords could be 
encouraged to bid for council properties, but "... could hardly be forced to purchase against their 
will at the insistence of a tenant. ". Hence the tenant's right was only that of being able to veto a 
proposal by a landlord. 
As Mullins, et at., (1992, p. 6) note, it initially seemed that Tenants' Choice might offer scope for 
`predatory' landlords to make tenants `offers they could not refuse'. There were widespread 
suspicions that it was a measure to open up the council sector's more desirable and profitable parts 
to landlords, "... looking for lucrative deals to gentrify council estates, sometimes in collusion 
with the local authority. " (Ginsburg, 1989, p. 67). Nevertheless, as Mullins, et at., (1992, p. 6) 
note, as safeguards were put in place, it became apparent that there would be little scope for large- 
scale speculative activity. Although Tenants' Choice was envisaged as one of the main vehicles 
- 
the other being HATs 
- 
for transferring stock away from local authorities, by the and of 1991 
neither had directly resulted in the exit of a single property. By the time it was abandoned in 1995, 
only 981 dwellings had transferred from council ownership. In repealing the legislation, the housing 
minister acknowledged the scheme `no longer served a useful purpose' (Inside Housing. 19 January 
1996) and had been overtaken by more effective initiatives, such as voluntary transfers and a new 
initiative, the Estate Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF). Tenants' Choice did, however, give an 
indirect boost to tenant consultation and participation. As well as providing an exit mechanism, the 
1987 Conservative election manifesto had argued that Tenants' Choice would improve the quality of 
the rest of the stock: "Exposing councils to healthy competition should also contribute to a better 
general standard of services even for tenants who do not trans, jer. ". Birchall (1992, p. 86), for 
16 For example: if there were 100 tenants eligible to vote, 49 of whom vote against transfer, with a single 
tenant voting in favour, then it would go ahead (from Bridge, 1989, p. 116). One minor amendguent o the 
Bill (introduced in the Lords) required that at least 50% of eligible tenants must vote far the ballot to be 
valid Although this added some degree of fairness, as Bridge (ibid. p. 116) observed, it could also produce 
some rather odd results. Taking the example above, the 49 who voted age inst would have, achieved their 
objective by not voting. By his act of voting, the final person voting to reject the proposal, quo dd turn 
rejection into acceptance. Another Lords' amendment requiring a mvp ity of eligible tenants to be in 
favour of transfer had failed to carry by two votes (from Hughes, CD, 11 November, 1988, vol. 680). 
17 Hughes' interpretation is that choice for tenants was not an end in itself but a ukeans to achieve 
pm'atisation. 
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example, observed how, following the introduction of Tenants' Choice, `hitherto arrogant and 
insensitive landlords' began to placate the tenants with belated promises of participation and 
improved services. As noted in Chapter One, the potential for choice can be as important as its 
exercise, while tenant action might not be necessary if local authorities responded to the possibility 
Of exit. 
3.7.2 VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS 
In addition to Tenants' Choice and HATs, the 1988 Act facilitated the disposal of council properties 
by a third means: `voluntary' 
- 
on the part of local authorities 
-- 
transfers to HAs and private 
landlords. In contrast to Tenants' Choice, the existing landlord initiated the process. The principle 
of voluntary transfers had been prefigured by the 1985 and 1986 Acts. "' Prior to 1986, councils 
had 
- 
in principle 
-- 
only been able to move tenants out of their homes against their will if repairs 
and maintenance were to be effected. In order to enable transfers, the 1986 Act widened local 
authority powers to facilitate estate disposal by moving tenants to alternative accommodation; to sell 
blocks of flats or estates with sitting tenants; and to put out tenders to private agents or non-profit 
trusts (Balchin, 1995, p. 182). While the 1985 Act had had no requirement for the local authority to 
consult tenants, the 1986 Act required the Secretary of State to refuse consent for a transfer if it 
appeared a majority of tenants did not wish the transfer to proceed. In essence, the 1988 Act 
removed ambiguities in the earlier legislation, clarified the process of transfer and extended the 
requirement to consult tersants. 
Although for some local authorities transfer might be motivated by political ideology, research by 
Mullins, it al., (1993, p. 170) suggested that voluntary t ansfers were primarily defensive reactions 
to the Government's housing policies (i. e., a bottom-up response that happened to coincide with the 
Government's desire for demunicipalisation). By the late 1980s, local authorities faced an 
environment in which much of their ability to control their own housing stock had been diminished 
1e Prior to the 1988 Act, Westminster city council had been one of the first to explore these powers and had 
implemented tenant transfers, offering alternative accommodation in the outer suburbs on the other side of 
London. Similarly, once the Liberal-Democrats had taken control in LB Tower Hamlets, the borough 
emberkmd on a policy of selling council estates to private developers, thereby exploiting its proximity to the 
City of London (Shotbon, 1987). Transfers were also made with respect to new town public sector housing 
stock, Under the 1986 Act, 60,000 houses scheduled for transfer from the remaining NTDCs to local 
authorities by 1992 were privatised via transfer to HAs, building societies and property companies As 
Balchin (1995, p. 183-4) observes, it was doubtful whether such transfers were popular with tenants; in 
advance of Peterborough Development Corporation being wound up in 1988, an opinion poll showed wer 
90% of tenants preferred to be transferred to the local authority. The Government had also originally 
contemplated giving tenants a vote on the transfer. During Commons debates, Nigel Griffith. MP (CD, 14 
June, 1988, col. 396) pointed out that 
- 
Fearful of tenants maidng a choice to go with their local councils 
- 
the Government had "... repudiated those democratic methods and prefeºred to endorse autocratic 
j ethodt ". 
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by RTB, while Tenants' Choice and HATs offered further threats. Such threats were compounded 
by proposals for CCT of housing management, which was intended to strengthen the local 
authority's strategic role by creating a clear client-side function for the management of its housing 
stock 19 Furthermore, as noted previously, the 1989 Act reduced local discretion over rent-setting 
policies and introduced further revenue and capital controls. Thus, for many local authorities, the 
future appeared to offer little other than the prospect of presiding over deteriorating services. More 
positively, however, transfer offered several benefits for local authorities. First, it offered the 
opportunity to maintain a stock of rented housing for letting to those in housing need. Transfer of 
housing to a new landlord was seen as an effective means of both excluding new tenancies from 
RTB (i. e., by letting than under assured tenancies), and maintaining a capacity to develop new 
homes (Mullins, et at., 1993, p. 171). Nomination arrangements were usually negotiated as part of 
the transfer. Second, transfers offered the possibility of a capital receipt and, thereby, reduction or 
elimination of debt. The proposed system for assessing transfer values was based on the notion of 
the `business' of council housing. The transfer value was assessed by anticipating future `streams' 
of income and expenditure over a run of years and discounting the figures to arrive at a capital `net 
present value' for the housing stock. Many councils realised their stock had a value in excess of the 
historic debt and would provide a capital receipt that could be used for new housing provision. 
Third, due to the changes introduced by the 1989 Act, there was a growing tendency for HRA 
surpluses to be required to meet HB costs. Hence, if councils retained ownership (and perhaps lost 
control through CCT), they would continue to have responsibility for paying HB. If estates were 
transferred to HAs or private landlords, central Government would have responsibility for paying 
HB. Although local authorities disposing of their housing stock would have to pay 5% of the HB 
requirement of that stock, they would maximise central Government subsidy for HB in their area 
(Mullins, it al, 1995, p. 15). Fourth, rather than the continued uncertainty experienced by local 
authorities, the new landlord offered the probability of a more stable environment in which to 
manage the stock. In addition, unlike local authorities, the new landlords could borrow money to 
carry out improvements outside the constraints on public expenditure. Hence, as Forrest (1993, 
p. 45) notes, councils and housing managers made increasingly creative use of the legislation and, as 
transfers often involved the same personnel with the new landlord taking over most of the local 
authority housing department's staff, they can be likened to `management buyouts'. 
The legislation was supplemented by guidance produced by the DoE and the Housing Corporation 
setting out expectations an such matters as protection of tenants' interests and terms of sale. in 
19 Although powers for CCT of housing management were eetgilished under the' 1988 Local Cio to 
Ate, it was not introdwxd until IM. 
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effect, and as with Tenants' Choice, landlords had to be approved by the Housing Corporation (i. e., 
they had to be social landlords). Furthermore, as the Government did not intend that large public 
housing monopolies be convected into large private housing monopolies, a ceiling was placed on the 
size of disposals likely to be approved to a single purchaser. DoE guidelines issued in 1993/94, for 
example, limited transfers to a maximum of 5000 properties and required split transfers for 
Proposals exceeding this limit. 
For voluntary transfers a ballot was not required by statute. " Ministerial consent was required, 
however, and under the 1986 Ad, the Secretary of State would not consent to a transfer if it 
appeared that a majority of tenants did not wish it to proceed. Many authorities concluded that a 
way to show this was a ballot and, following the 1988 Act and the provision for a ballot under 
Tenants Choice, local authorities were under fu ther pressure to hold ballots on voluntary transfers. 
Some local authorities, therefore, conducted ballots similar to those in the 1988 Act (i. e., with a 
requirement for a minimum turnout of 50% and abstentions counting as votes in favour), where 
tfansfers would only not proceed if a majority of tenants voted against transfer. 21 If the transfer 
want ahead, a crucial difference, however, was that tenants who voted No or abstained would be 
obliged to transfer to the new landlord; hence there was no individual veto to the proposal 22 
Research by Mullins, et al. (1993, p. 181) showed that a number of factors influenced ballot results. 
Those important in gaining a Yes vote were a `simple and dearly expressed case for transfer' and a 
`good and trusting relationship' between tenants and housing staff. Although a strong local 
campaign opposing transfer was an important factor in ballot defeats, not all opposition campaigns 
were successful; some of those studied, for example, suffered from a lack of tenant involvement, 
limited financial resources and unimpressive publicity material. Ballot turnouts were almost 
uniformly high. In more than half, the turnout exceeded 80%, and only in Torbay was it under 70%. 
There was also a wide variety of ballot outcomes ranging from 8% to 91% of those voting being in 
favour of transfer. Votes for and against can be regarded as indicating a genuine choice for to ants. 
Mullins, et al. 's research on the early transfers showed limited tenant involvement (ibid, p. 180). 
Although tenants were consulted, they were not actively involved in the decision process. In only 
20 New regulations issued by the DoE in 1993 required a ballot and a majority of tenants to be in bvaur of 
trans6er. 
21 Some of the early outcomes brought the voting system into disrepute. The first ballot to be publicised 
took place in Torbay in November 1988. At the bellet, 787 tos voted in Favour of the truer, 2,210 
voted against and 2,209 abstained (Ginsburg, 1989, p. 67). After counting abstentions as votes in favour, 
the council asked the Government to approve transfer. 
' Some authorities (for example, Cherwell and Thanes) did permit tenants to haue an individual veto (i. e., 
those voting against transfer were excluded from the transfer) (Mullins, et aL, 1995, p. 32). 
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two of their case studies was independent advice made available to tenants from a body other than 
the council or new landlord. Many important decisions were taken in dosed meetings and, aside 
from tenant representatives on the management committees of the new landlords, tenants played 
virtually no part in either the initial decision to progress the transfer option or the final negotiations 
over the terms of transfer. Mullins, et al., (ibid, p. 180) acknowledge that this reflected the character 
of the authorities in which the early transfers took place, where there were "... few if any organised 
tenant groups prior to the transfer, and consultation on the transfer was often the first serious 
attempt at tenant consultation on any aspect of housing policy. ". The research also reflected the 
experience of the earliest transfers. Mullins, et al., (1995, p. 3) later noted that it had become 
normal practice for independent advice to be provided by consultants, who usually performed two 
tasks: 
- 
information dissemination to inform tenants' ballot decisions and specialist advice to tenant 
representatives to enable them to negotiate a better deal from the transfer. 
Despite their observations, Mullins, et al., (1993, p. 181) note that existing tenants did have 
considerable influence on transfer packages since, to achieve positive ballot results, transfer 
proposals had to be attractive to them. This was usually tackled by offering rent guarantees and a 
package of service improvenents. Tenancy agreements were also used to restore some of the 
statutory rights lost in the move from secure to assured tenancies. Rent guarantees after transfer 
were usually contrasted with high projected increases for council tenants under the new financial 
regime introduced by the 1989 Act 
-- 
although the implications for existing tenants once the rent 
freeze had ended were not necessarily dear. As Mullins, et at., (1993, p. 181) observed, an equally 
significant contrast 
-- 
illustrating the influence of existing tenants 
- 
was the higher rents to be paid 
by new tenants. This would result in a two tier rem system that would normally converge over time 
to become a single system. Pearl (1997, p. 177) also noted how the momentum for transfer could 
result in terms being geared exclusively towards safeguarding existing tenants' interests to win their 
support. This raised concerns that the fa ure strategic function of the social housing stock would be 
compromised; the choice made by one generation of tenants being effectively at the expense of 
future generations. She also noted concerns that local authorities had vested interests and were 
placing more importance on `getting the proposals through' than `genuine consultation' (ibid, 
p. 177). 
Although LSVTs started from uncertain beginnings, by the e of 1991 
- 
by which time, no 
properties had transferred either to HATs or through Tenants' Choice 
- 
thirty local authorities had 
balloted tenants on voluntary transfer and sixteen had disposed of their entire ranted stocks. The 
77,000 properties transferred meatrt that such transfem provided a major coc ributi(m to the 
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Government's privatisation programme (Mullins, et at., 1993, p. 169). In nearly every case, the 
transfer was to an HA set up for the purpose. Furthermore, as Mullins, et al., (1995, p. 1) note, the 
Conservative's victory in the 1992 election sent a "... strong signal to authorities who had been 
keeping their options open, that the policy context was unlikely to change. ". As a result, local 
authorities began to explore the benefits of transfers with greater determination. In essence, this 
signalled an acceptance that their traditional role as providers and managers of housing was coming 
to an end. Al the same time, the Governmern embraced voluntary transfer as the key mechanism 
for demunicipalising local authority housing and introduced a stock transfer programme, which 
- 
because transfers involved public expenditure 
- 
limited the number in any one year. The 
momentum for transfers continued and by March 1996, fifty local authorities had transferred their 
stock (although a further twenty-seven had had their proposals rejected by tenants). Transfers 
initiated by local authorities had, therefore, become the major componait of the Government's 
privatisation programme and would later continue as part of the 1997 Labour Government's stock 
transfer programme. 
The voluntary stock transfer mechanism was extended by the introduction of the Estate Renewal 
Challenge Fund (ERCF). As transfers had to be largely self-funding, stock transferring was better 
quality with relatively low debt in rural areas, suburbs and small towns. Thus, given the limited 
scale of the HAT programme and the end of EA as a dedicated estate rehabilitation initiative in 
1994, a new initiative to deal with run-down estates was required. ERCF was introduced in 
December 1995 and facilitated estate transfer to social landlords together with a dowry taking 
account of the housing stock's (poor) quality, which would permit a development programme. The 
new landlords could also borrow money to improve the housing outside public expenditure controls. 
Hence, as with HATs, ERCF combined housing improvements with an exit mechanism. Successful 
ERCF bids had to: 
- 
represent good value for money; package both better and poorer quality stock 
and higher and lower cost stock; be likely to receive support of majority of tenants (i. e., through 
ballot); focus on a distinct estate or group of estates; include at least 500 properties (although 200- 
500 could be considered); include largely tenanted stock; not include a large element of demolition 
or demolition and redevelopment, and contribute to regeneration and long-term sustainability 
(DETR, 1997, s14). Three rounds of the programme were held. Under the first two, £316 million 
was allocated to twenty local authorities for thirty-three schemes covering 41,000 homes on 69 
estates. By February, 1998, four estates had actually transfirreid and fourteen successful ballots 
had been achieved. In the third round, £248 million was provided to fifteen local authorities for 
23 Given this limitation, it is unlilmly that the development progremmee at Liverpool and Wafthmm Forest 
HATs could have been considered under this mechanism. By contrast, t ha North Hull estate could have 
been considered under ERCF. 
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22,000 properties on 58 estates. All transfers were subject to tenant ballots and in successful 
transfers the average dowry was £11,000 per property. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has reviewed 1980s housing policy. During the decade, central Government increased its 
control over housing finance (and, in doing so, largely curtailed house-building by local authorities) 
and rent levels and began to enlarge and change the role of HAs as a substitute for local authorities; 
in effect, it `nationalised' housing policy. The changes demonstrated the centre getting a `better 
grip' both to control and reduce local authority expenditure and to encourage the shift towards a 
more market-based form of social housing provision. In order to do this, it both constrained and 
curtailed local authority autonomy and discretion in matters of policy. With regard to local authority 
housing stock and in accordance with New Right ideas, the primary emphasis was an the development of 
exit mechanisms. Malpass (1985, p. 232-233), for example, argued that, rather than a housing 
policy, the Government had `tenure policies', concerned primarily with transferring ownership and 
having "... little or nothing to do with the key housing policy issues of quantity and quality. 
Council house sales throes RTB, for example, provided benefits for those already well-housed and 
did nothing for those in greatest need. Nevertheless, from the mid-1980s onwards, the focus was 
broadened to include collective exits (i. e., collective choices). Each of the exit mechanisms 
contained a distinctly limited notion of `choice' and, in essence, meant a choice whereby tenants 
could transfer 
- 
or threaten to transfer 
- 
to a different landlord. Everything else in terms of housing 
quality would 
- 
in principle 
- 
flow from this basic choice. In addition, the exit was one-way and 
irreversible. Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 231) note that 
- 
in theory at least 
- 
it would have been 
possible to have extended choice to all sectors of the rented market by permitting transfers into 
- 
as 
well as out of 
- 
the council sector. As a result, their comparative strengths and weaknesses could 
have been put to "... a genuine tesA bored less on statistical indicators and more on consumers' 
own some of security and their aspirations, perceptions and experiences. " (ibid, p. 231). 
Two general out== of the dwges warrant fuxther comment. 
- 
the impact on rents and taunts' 
WMitW= to trasfer. 
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The duu in the 1988 and 1989 Ads were predicated on increased rant levds, which, in turn, 
would provide a batter return on invwest nervt in the sector and an incentive for mtripreneius; to 
increase supply. The new ßnanc al regimes for HAs and local authorities reduced subsidies paid to 
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housing producers (i. e., `bricks-&-mortar' subsidies) and extended means-tested, tenure-neutral 
subsidies. The changes had two interrelated effects. First, deregulation of rents involved an implicit 
acceptance of additional HB costs. After 1989, rents rose in all three sectors. In the local authority 
sector, the policy of 'guideline' rent increases above inflation each year from 1990-1991 to 1995- 
96, resulted in council rents rising by an average of 40% in real terms (Malpass, 1996, p. 466). 24 
Similarly, HA rents at the end of 1994 were 80% higher than at the start of 1989 (Malpass, 1996, 
p. 466). Although the poorest tenants were 
- 
in principle 
-- 
protected in full or in part from rent 
increases by HB, they also became more dependent upon it. As rents rose, so did the need for HB: 
in 1992/93, for example, about three-fifths of local authority tenants were receiving HB, as were 
more than two-fifths of HA and private tenants (Kemp, 1994, p. 533). Furthermore, rent 
differentials remained between the sectors: the 1995 White Paper (DoE, 1995, p. 25-26), for 
example, stated that in 1994/95 local authority rents averaged £36 per week; in 1994, HA rents 
averaged £38 per week and £54 for new properties, while market rents were around £75 per week. 
Second, the public expenditure burden was moved from the DoE to the Department of Social 
Security (DSS). Although the HB budget was intended to `take the strain', the cost rose much 
faster than had been anticipated (Malpass, 1996, p. 466). As Malpass (ibid, p. 468) noted, the move 
towards higher rents highlighted how a market approach to reit setting required a limit on the 
State's liability for claimant's housing costs. With increasing impact from 1989 onwards, HB was 
capped or limited in other ways. The dilemma, as Kemp (1994, p. 537) noted, was that while the 
DSS had an imperative to cut expenditure on HB, increased rents were caitral to the DoE's 
objective of shifting rented housing away from local authorities. The Government, however, had 
greater scope to control the amount of capital subsidies allocated than the HB it had to pay out and, 
as Kemp (1994, p. 537) noted, between 1989 and 1994, the net cost of `bricks-&-mortar' subsidy 
and HB combined fell rather than rose; HB rose by £4 billion but savings in capital subsidies 
amounted to £6 billion. 
Transfers 
In terms of transfers, two main issues were important. First, the identity of the new landlords (the 
exit destination). Forrest (1993, p. 42) noted that, although surveys during the 1980s showed public 
sector tenants approved of council house sales as a route into home ownership, the extension of this 
to transfers to other landlords raised a diäeraL set of issues. In this situation, as Forrest (ibid, 
2" The 1995 Housing White Panet (DoE, 1995, p. 27) proposed reducing the rate of increase in local 
authority guidelines rents and implied that, by the and of the decade, mitt v^ M increase broadly is line 
with inflation. This process was speeded up and, in November 1995, the GGovernment announced " ft 
guideline increase in April 1996 would be pegged to infiation (Matpase, 1996, p. 467). 
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p. 42) argued, there was no popular mandate: "The same surveys which showed the popularity of 
home ownership also showed that private landlordism was the least preferred option. ". He also 
considered that tenant willingness to opt for privatised forms of rented housing provision would vary 
according to the type of landlord. Certain safeguards had, however, been introduced. The original 
proposal in the 1987 White Paper had been for a wider range of possible landlords, which, in the 
1988 Act, was reduced to `social' landlords only. In committee, William Waldegrave referred to a 
`social landlord's charter', arguing that it would be `quite an unusual private company' that would 
be able to satisfy its terms? ' The Act made no reference to this and instead provided for a `tenants' 
guarantee', to be developed and enforced by the Housing Corporation. 26 Second, there was reluctance 
on the part of council tenants to avail themselves of the opportunities to exit. Equally, however, 
increasing the opportunity for exit 
- 
or reducing the costs of exit 
- 
includes the possibility of a positive 
choice not to exit. Decisions to transfer involve both `push' and `pull' factors. With regard to RTBs, 
research by Forrest & Murie (1991) showed that tenants were attracted by the prospect of heavily 
discounted ownership rather than being repelled by their municipal landlords. Murie (1995, p. 157) 
also argued that, while many of those who exercised RTB had sufficient resources to buy houses 
elsewhere, certain incentives favoured the choice to buy their existing home, including the 
discounted purchase price, the opportunity to buy what 
-- 
in most cases 
- 
was an established family 
home and the prospect 
- 
again, in most cases 
- 
of substantial capital gains from rising house prices. 
RTB can therefore be seen as a positive `exit to' (i. e., a choice with incentives) rather than a 
negative `exit from' (i. e., a coerced choice). Furthermore, the choice did not test attachment to 
home and area; tenants could exit the tenure and the financial regime without leaving the dwelling. 
Although RTB can be seen as a choice made with incentives, the other mechanisms had denials of 
coercion. On the one hand, the local authority sector was made less attractive by increased rats.; on the 
other, exit destinations were made less attractive by the deregulation of rats and security of tenure. 
Tenants' Choice (and HATs) had little success and the most successful exit mechanism was 
voluntary transfers; a mechanism best regarded 
- 
at least initially (i. e., until 1992) 
-- 
as a local 
authority initiative (i. e., a bottom-up response). Successful transfers could also be distinguished by 
certain common features: 
- 
stock in good condition with low debt levels; transfers made `voluntarily' 
25 The phrase disappeared with Waldegrave's departure to the Foreign Office during the summer 
(Ginsburg, 1989, p. 69). The loss of the proposal's lending advocate raised concerns that the idea would 
also disappear (R, July-August, 1988, p. 4). 
26 The criteria created by the Housing Corporation for approved landlords 
- 
although ostensibly well- 
intentioned 
- 
would create a situation where the only approved landlords were HAs. Coleman (1989, 
p. 55), for example, argued that the Government might be `minimising the chances of genuine private 
sector involvement' in rented housing by `institutionalising HA privileges'. Furthermore, due to the 
continuing availability of HAG, Ginsburg (1989, p. 80) argued that the Government was not allowing flair 
competition between private landlords and HAs. The 1996 lignigg clarified this situation by creating 
registered social landlords (RSLs). While all registered HAs will be RSLs, not all RSLs will be registered 
HAs. HAG was also replaced by Social Housing Grant (SHG), with all RSLs eligible to l for SHG. 
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- 
if defensively 
-- 
by local authorities; and 
- 
most important 
-- 
the necessity of a favourable ballot 
result meant that tenants would be offered 
- 
or could negotiate 
-- 
acceptable conditions and 
guarantees. The choice still had elements of coercion: as Mullins, et al., (1993, p. 181) found, 
several transfers had been presented to tenants as the `least change option' under which they would 
retain the same housing staff, and enjoy a similar but better service for reasonable rent. Without a 
transfer, maintenance of standards would not be possible. 
This Chapter has outlined the important developmerrts in housing Policy Prior to and as a result of 
the 1988 and 1989 Acts. The remaining five Chapters focus on the development and 
implementation of HAT policy. 
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Chapter Four 
HOUSING ACTION TRUST 
POLICY 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter discusses HAT policy and is in four main parts. The first discusses the ane gene of 
HAT policy. The second discusses the early controversy about HAT policy. The third discusses 
the implantation phase. The fourth draws some initial conclusions on the implementation of HAT 
policy. Table 4.1 is a chronology of HAT policy. 
4.1 THE EMERGENCE OF HAT POLICY 
The first announcement of proposals to establish HATs came in May 1987 in the Conservative 
election manifesto. Following the Queen's Speech in June 1997, the Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher (CD June 25,1987, col. 57) referred to HATs and, more generally, stated it was `high 
time' for "... the town hall monopoly to be replaced by individual choice in renting. ". A White 
Paper followed in September 1987, a discussion paper in October 1987, a housing bill in November 
1987 and enabling legislation in November 1988. ' The White Paper (Cmnd 214,1987, pare 6.7) 
stated that the Government saw HATs as a `vital part' of its housing policy and as "... a means of 
single-mindedly tackling some of the most difficult areas of local authority housing. ". HATs 
would be for estates where `social problems and housing disrepair' were so serious "... more direct 
action 
- 
involving both public and private sectors 
- 
is needed to obtain improvements over a 
reasonable timescale. " (ibid, para 6.7). The discussion document stated that, although a number of 
local authorities had made sipgt0cant progress in dealing with their worst estates, "... in a number 
of cases the size of the areas involved and the extent of dw problems are such that they are beyond 
the capacity of local authorities to tackle. " (DoE, 1987, para 3). It also stated that a HAT'S 
primary task would be "... to secure the renovation of properties in its ownership; to tranrfer them 
to a range of different forme of ownership and management; and generally to improve conditions 
in its area so that it becomes acceptable and attractive to those who already live there and to 
' Appendix B contains transcripts of parts of the Conservative's 1987 election manil gtp and the 1987 
White Paper regarding HATs and a full transcript of the HAT consultation paper. 
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May 
- 
June 1987 Concept of HATs outlined in election manifesto. General election victory for 
Conservatives 
September 1987 White Paper 
- 
Housing: The Govenment's Proposals 
- 
announces HAT concept 
October 1987 Discussion paper 
- 
Housing Action Trusts: A consultative document issued. 
December 1987-May Deadlocked discussions re HAT in Huhns. Government refuses to had an open-ended 
1988 feasibility study and are willing only to fand a feasibility study that explores the 
benefits of a HAT in Eiulme. 
May/July 1988 Government backs down in Halme and agrees to had an open-ended feasibility study 
with no guarantees that any recommendations would be implemented. 
July 1988 Pilot HAT areas announced with intention to declare than by April 1989. 
House of lords defeat Government re amendment to introduce a ballot of tenants. 
David Trippier replaces William Waldegrave as housing minister. 
November 1988 Housing Act passed including requirement for ballot of tenants. 
February 
- 
March Consultants' feasibility studies on the 6 pilot HAT areas. Following consultants' 
1989 reports, Government declares intention to proceed with HATs in five areas. Tower 
Hamlets abandoned. 
May 1989 Private meeting between the housing minister, David Trippier, and tenant 
representatives from LB Southwark. 
July 1989 Chris Patten becomes Secretary of State Sur Environment 
July 1989 First contact between DoE and Hall city council re possibility of HAT in Hu 1. 
September 1989 Lambeth commission MORI poll of tenants that shows 72% of tenants against 
November 1999 Offer made of HAT m Waltham Forest 
April 1990 80% No vote in HAT ballot in Sunderland. Unofficial ballot shows 92% against in 
Leeds. Government abandons HAT proposals in Sunderland & Leeds 
May 1990 Government abandons HAT proposals in Lambeth & Sandwell 
October 1999 67% & 73% No vote in HAT ballots in Sodb k 
Treasury Autumn Statement shows £67 million for HATS in DoE's 1992/93 allocation. 
November 1990 Official announcement of HAT discussions in Hall 
December 1990 John Major becomes Prime Ministeg; Michael Heseltine becomes Secretary of State for 
environment, 
March 1991 69% Yes vote in HAT ballot in North Hull 
August 1991 81% Yes vote in HAT ballot in Waltham Forest 
May 1992 General election victory for Conservatives 
August 1992 82% Yes vote in HAT ballot in Liverpool 
TABLE 4.1 
- 
CHRONOLOGY OF HAT POLICY & PROPOSALS 
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prospective tenants and owners. " (ibid, pars 11). (see also Table 4.2) 
While precedents cited included EA, GIAs and HAAs, it was evident both in the White Paper and 
the consultation paper that the most significant precedent came from a policy more removed from 
housing 
-- 
UDCs. For the Government, one of the strengths of UDCs was that 
- 
unlike local 
authorities 
- 
they were single-function agencies. The White P er (pars 6.2) argued UDCs had 
shown "... the results that a body devoted to developing a run-down area can achieve. They have 
brought a new drive to their task and results have been achieved that the local authorities have 
not been able to achieve by themselves in the past. ". Using this model, the intention was to "... 
establish analogous bodies in designated areas to take over responsibility for local authority 
housing, renovate it, and pass it on to different forms of management and ownership including 
housing associations, tenants' co-operatives and approved private landlords. " (para 6.3). 
Although uncited, key precedents from which important lessons could be drawn were Stockbridge 
Village in Knowsley, Liverpool and certain aspects of the Thamesmead estate in London (see 
Appendix Q. These were intended as demonstration projects to show how large-scale, private 
sector management of social housing could be commercially viable. Given their mixed success, it is 
not surprising that they were not explicitly cited as precedents. Nevertheless, each was repeatedly 
mentioned 
- 
usually by the Opposition 
- 
during debates in Parliament. An uncited proposal that 
may also have served as a precedent was for Housing Management Trusts (HMTs), which would 
take over and manage local authority housing (Heaney, 1986). HMTs would be statutory trusts, 
typically composed of nine trustees: one of which would be a local authority nominee, one would be 
a representative of the financial backers, two would be co-opted, and five would be elected by the 
tenants. The trustee's duties would include managing and renovating the stock (but not the building 
of new stock), appointing staff, and allocating three-quarters of the tenancies 
- 
the local authority 
retaining the right to nominate the remainder. Stockbridge Village Trust was cited as an example of 
an HMT. 
The Housing Bill was presented in the Commons on 19 November 1987. As this was shortly after 
the end of the consultation period on the discussion paper (6 Nov), it was unclear how much weight 
had been given to any represa tations. Given the potential magnitude of HAT policy, the initial 
consultation period (from 6 Oct to 6 Nov) was c ely limited if local authorities were to engage 
in meaningful consultation with tenants and tenant groups. The committee stage was completed in 
March 1988 and the Bill received Royal Ascent in November becoming the 1988 Housing Act. The 
Act contained enabling legislation permitting HATs to be established under subordinate legislation. 
Although the Bill's basic structure and principles remained intact, during its passage the 
71 
d o 
-ffi 
I § ' I Call t ' S 42 ý:, ý, i I! 
a 
A 0'. iIIa It 
ý"1 
t" I Egg 
y "" Q 
° 
4 
1 
60 r. ýf (Q yj iy 
"'e% 
G y O 
I A 
ý} 
F i 
eta 81 
oil I 
,b 1 
iji I b 
-I ILA is 
s 
a 
' ýýN II I" IIII ý6. 
$4I1 ßi3 v ei 3, ý 
I 
ey ýf 
sell 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
Govemmerrt made some important changes. These changes are the focus of the next section. 
4.2 THE LEGISLATIVE STAGE 
The 1987 White Paper made the late 1980s one of considerable turbulence and gave rise to large- 
scale tenant activism and unusually well-attended public meetings on estates throughout the country. 
As the Government's proposals for HATs were clouded by uncertainties and affected a number of 
strongly-held interest groups, controversy was to be expected. The most controversial element was 
that a HAT would result in the enforced privatisation of local authority tenants and properties. The 
climate of confusion was also exacerbated by uncertainty regarding the scale of the HAT 
programme. With the retrospective knowledge that only six HATs were ever established, it is 
important to appreciate the significance of this. Although, in the first instance, the Government had 
only committed itself to a pilot programme and had not given any definite indication of how 
extensive the programme would be, there was concern that HATs could be designated in every town 
and city. The Government was under continual pressure to announce where HATs were envisaged. 
While it initially resisted this pressure, it was also keen to establish HATs as soon as possible and 
in July 1988, six pilot HAT areas were announced in Lambeth, Tower Hamlets, Southwark, 
Sandwell, Sunderland and Leeds. Hence, the implementation period started before the legislation 
had been concretised in statute. 
The prevailing climate of uncertainty and mistrust fostered conditions in which rumour, expedient or 
selective interpretation, exaggeration and `scare-mongering' could prosper. Although an important 
resource for choice, information can be biased or distorted in some way and - in extremity - may be 
propaganda. Both parties made references to campaigns of misinformation; Ridley (CD, 11 Nov, 
1988, col. 676), for example, claimed that the Opposition and councils had gone in for "... a 
campaign of gross misinformation about what HATS will mean. ". This was a constant problem 
and was particularly pertinent because - as is shown in this Chapter - HAT policy evolved and 
changed significantly. 2 Furthermore, the proposed legislation gave considerable discretion to the 
Secretary of State, giving grounds for further uncertainty and suspicion. 
One of the consequa ces of the uncertainty and the MWy c onfrontadonal stances adopted by all 
parties, was for positions to quickly become entrenched, frustrating the development of constructive 
2 The extent of uncertainty is illustrated by the number of amendments (nearly 400) proposed by both the 
Government and the Opposition. The HAT legislation wet only one part of a major Bill and its 
implications were sufficient for it to have been the subject of a separate Bill (Spearing, CD, 14 June, 1988, 
cal. 372). 
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dialogue. An example of this was a meeting in July 1988, between the Secretary of State, Nick 
Ridley, and tenants from the pilot HAT area in Lambeth. Following the meeting, Ridley (CD, Nov 
2,1988, cols. 1015) commented on the difficulty of discussing issues with people "... if they walk 
out before the meeting starts. I find it difficult to discover whether they are in favour or against 
IIATs when they do not stay to talk to me. ". Community Action (1988c, p. 25) reported Mary 
Clerk's 
-- 
chair of Loughborough Road TA 
- 
account of the same meeting: "Ridley was as nice as 
could be at the start of the meeting. We could have coffee, we could have tea, we could have 
biscuits. But when we asked for a ballot, we could get stuffed! We then asked if we could get the 
money he was offering without the FIAT. When Ridley said `No, Dora Boatemah, the Angell 
Town chair, banged her fist on the table and said. " Meeting over, and we all walked out. ". 
Referring to the same meeting, the Earl of Caithness (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 410) argued 
discussion was a two-way process, which for the Government meant "... making our best efforts to 
explain our proposals and hearing what people have to say before making final decisions.... It 
also means that tenants' representatives must be willing to examine our proposals, to listen to 
what we have to say about them and pass that information fairly and squarely back to those they 
represent. ". 
The controversy surrounding HAT policy can be examined under five headings: 
- 
" the purpose of HATs; 
" the identity of future landlords; 
" transfers of housing stock; 
" the tenant ballot; and 
" the accountability of and control over HATs. 
4.2.1 THE PURPOSE OF HATS 
The two key aims of HAT policy were to improve and privatise 
-- 
or rather, in less emotive terms 
and as it appeared among the legal objectives, to promote diversity in the identity of landlords of 
rented accommodation =- some of the worst areas of local authority housing (Table 4.3). 3 Debate 
concerned which of these was more important and whether they were separable aims. 4 The 
Opposition, local authorities and tenants doubted that improvement was an end in itself and saw 
improvement as a means to achieve privatisation. HAT policy therefore seemed to focus on housing 
as property development rather than as people's homes. This perception was given additional 
credence by the analogy with UDCs, which, at the time, were coming wider increasing criticism. 
The House of Commons Employment Committee Report (1988, p. xxv), for example, concluded that 
3 As HATs would take over local authority housing, diversity of landlords and demunicipalisation could be 
regarded as the same thing. 
AS discussed later, the political rhetoric differed from the legal objectives of HATS. 
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UDCs could not "... be regarded as a success if buildings and land are regenerated, but the local 
community is bypassed and does not benefit from regeneration ". The Opposition also raised the 
prospect of displacement and gentrification, highlighting the value gap between tenanted and vacant 
properties, which would inter alia provide an incentive for HATs to displace existing tenants in 
order to sell property with vacant possession. Hence, it was argued HATs would be a mechanism 
by which property companies, private developers and landlords could `asset strip' local authority 
housing. Ian McCartney MP (CD, 14 June, col. 515), for example, argued that it was "... probably 
one of the largest asset-stripping jobs in the privatisation programme. ". For the Government, 
Marion Roe MP (ibid, col. 518) expressed amazement at the Opposition's `wild allegations', and 
stressed that HATs would not be asset strippers and that tenants' interests would be essential to 
HATs. The Earl of Caithness (LD, 25 Oct, 1988, col. 1585) also condemned `loose talk' portraying 
HATs "... as unaccountable, unsympathetic and unresponsive bodies whose primary concern will 
be to transfer tenants against their will to private racketeers. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. ". The association with property development and privatisation rather than housing issues, 
however, was further exacerbated by the Government's refusal to give HATs responsibilities for 
addressing homelessness; an issue that provoked extensive discussions in committee. 
The Opposition also argued that the problems HATs were intended to address had been created by 
the Govemmant's refusal to approval funding for local authorities to carry out improvemants. Keith 
Bradley MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 388), for example, argued that the Govemmant would not 
need to carry out such an experiment if it had "... properly funded local authorities so that they 
could provide decent housing for people throughout the years that [it had] been in power. ". The 
Opposition therefore suggested that the problems of rundown estates would be solved by properly 
funding local authorities. In the final debates, however, Ridley (CD, 11 Nov, 1988, col. 677) 
claimed that HATs would be a means to concentrate resources and, fiuthennore, that there was "... 
no other way in which large sums of money [could] be targeted on especially deserving estates. ". 
A former Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore MP (ibid, col. 684-685) firmly 
refuted this. He argued that, if Ridley had some `administrative problems' in allocating additional 
funds to the EA programme or to PEP, he could have sought additional powers from the House, 
agreed with local authorities which estates should be allocated funds and ensured that it was speit 
for that purpose. Shore (ibid, col. 685) therefore argued that HATs were `irrelevant' unless there 
was an ulterior purpose: "That ulterior purpose has been expressed and is rightly feared by 
tenants. It is to bring about the dissolution of local authority housing in a new way by assisting 
the transfer of such estates to private landlords and housing associations. ". 
In the subsequent Act, Seilion 63 oulined the primary objectives and general povmn of HATs. The 
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primary objectives were to: -- 
" secure the repair or improvement of housing held by the trust; 
" secure the proper & effective management & use of that housing; 
" encourage diversity of tenure and, in the case of accommodation occupied under tenancies, 
diversity in the identity of landlords; and 
" generally to secure or facilitate improvement of the area's living & social conditions & its 
general environment. 
In addition, HATs could also provide and maintain housing and facilitate the provision of shops, 
advice centres and other facilities for the benefit of the community in the designated area (s63.2). 
Significantly, the inclusion of housing provision under the secondary objectives indicates that HATs 
were envisaged primarily to refurbish housing rather than to provide new build housing. Under 
Section 63.3, HAT had powers to: 
- 
" acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of land and other property, 
" carry out building and other operations; 
" seek to ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage and other services; and 
" carry on any business or undertaking. 
Under the same section, they could also "... generally do anything necessary or expedient for the 
purposes of those objects and powers or for purposes incklental thereto. ". These are almost 
identical to the powers given to UDCs in the 1980 Local Government. Planning & Land Ad. HATS 
were to be grant funded and, under Section 71, HATs could give financial assistance to any person. 
HATS could also take on other duties and powers that would normally be the local authority's 
responsibility. Under Section 65, a HAT could become the housing authority for its designated 
area. Although the Secretary of State did not have powers to impose general duties in relation to 
housing homeless persons, HATs would be required to offer 'reasonable' assistance to a local 
housing authority to help it discharge its functions towards the homeless (s70). Under Section 66.2, 
the Secretary of State could make a special development scheme for the designated area, 
incorporating development proposals submitted by the HAT, while, under Section 67.1, the HAT 
could become the local planning authority (LPA) for its designated area. The provision of such 
powers was to enable HATs to avoid attempts by local authorities to obstruct its work by, for 
example, delaying planning permissions. 5 Although these powers gave HATs considerable freedom 
in carrying out their functions and in achieving their objectives, Section 72.1 stated that, in the 
exercise of its functions, a HAT had to comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State. 
Section 72.1 also stated that the Secretary of State would provide HATs with detailed ` management 
guidance'. 6 Under Section 88, HATS were intended to be limited life agencies and were to use their 
I Although no HAT was given such powers, it demonstrates the ambition contained in HAT policy. 6 In fact, no supplementary guidance (apart from financial mem ms) was issued. HATs have 
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best endeavours to achieve their objectives as soon as practicable. 
4.2.2 THE FUTURE LANDLORDS 
Although both the 1987 White Paper and the HAT consultation paper included private sector 
landlords in the list of possible future owners, neither included the possibility of a return to the local 
authority. This was heavily criticised in committee and the Government began to make changes. ' 
First, as with transfers under Tenants' Choice, transfers of secure tenants could only be made to 
landlords approved by the Housing Corporation (Waldegrave, Commons Committee G. 16 Feb 
1988, col. 853). Second and more significantly, property could be transferred from HATs to local 
authorities; Waldegave (Commons Committee G. 23 Feb, 1988, col. 1011), for example, stated 
that "... tenants should be given the option of going back to the local authority. That was not in 
the Bill originally, and is a major change. ". In principle, this gave tenants a safety net: if 
alternative landlords were not superior to the local authority, they could return to the status quo 
ante. The provision, however, was qualified by the requirement for the local authority to be willing 
and able to buy the property back. Furthermore, the Government refused to compel local authorities 
to accept tenants back (Waldegrave, ibid, col. 1015). Although the discretion afforded to local 
authorities was contrasted with RTB where local authorities were compelled to sell, Waldegrave 
(ibid, col. 1018) argued that the analogy was not valid and that compelling an authority to sell 
property in which someone had a lifelong interest was "... entirely different from compelling a 
public authority to buy something which it does not want to buy. ". Nevertheless, he accepted a 
local authority might be keen to have the tenants (and their properties) back and might want to say: 
"... if we remain in power, it will be our intention to take tenants back " (Waldegrave, ibid, col. 
1020). The situation was made more uncertain for tenants by the fact that a particular local 
authority may have apolicy to accept tenants back but 
- 
at a later point in time 
- 
might change that 
policy. 
Ridley (CD, June 27,1988, col. 41) subsequently confirmed the changes: 
- 
first, HATs could 
transfer segue tenants and their properties only to approved landlords; second, HATs would be 
required to consult local authorities about their willingness to take on tenants who wished to return 
to the local authority, and third, tenant consultation procedures would be improved "... because we 
recognise the importance of ensuring that all HAT tenants have adequarte information about the 
therefore been relatively free to interpret the legislation as they see fit and to determine their own style of 
operation; the major constraint being the Government's rules and regulations for the expenditure of public 
money. 
7In committee, for example, unftvourable comparisons were drawn with British Coal's attempts to divest 
itself of its housing assets "... not to the community, not to the local authority, not to housing associations, but, in the main, by private auction to absentee landlords and property speculating companies " (McCartney, Commons Committee G. 16 Feb, 1998, col. 850). 
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disposal options available, and enough time to digest those options. ". In the same debate, an 
Opposition amendment sought to give HAT tenants a right of return to the local authority. Ridley 
(ibid, cols. 41-42) opposed this, arguing that it was not "... reasonable to compel a local authority, 
many years ahead of a potential HAT disposal, to take back any tenant who so asks. The 
authority may no longer be in the rented housing business or it may have a different perception of 
its priorities. ". In reply, Simon Hughes MP (ibid, col. 42) noted that at the end of a HAT's life, 
even if tenants explicitly showed they wanted to return to the local authority, that may not be 
possible. Hughes argued that this was `regrettable and inconsistent' with the `supposed philosophy 
of the Bill': "Of course, the ultimate philosophy is not a right to choose; it is to de-muncipalise 
housing. Therefore, it is consistent with that to make it difficult, if not impossible, for tenants to 
return to the local authority. ". 
A DoE press release (see Appendix B) issued on 7 October 1988, titled Government Promises Free 
Choice for HAT Tenants, gave details of the choice of landlords when the HAT was wound up. It 
also stated that tenants would "... be able to refuse any landlord the Trust offers if they do not like 
them and will be free to make their own suggestions 
-a housing association, a tenant co- 
operative or back to the council. " (from McIntosh, LD, 25 Oct, 1988, col. 1584). The 
commitments in the press release were confirmed in a letter from the housing minister, David 
Trippier, to all tenants in the proposed HAT areas, which stated that tenants would be "... given a 
choice by the Trust about who you would like to see managing your home. " (see Appendix B). 
The significance of this was a shift in emphasis with tenants being offered an individual choice of 
landlord and 
- 
in principle 
- 
being able to refuse any landlord. Prior to this, it had not been explicit 
who would make the choice of landlord. The ability of tenants to refuse a landlord was qualified, 
however, as the Government wished to avoid situations where tenants could consistently veto the 
HAT's winding up. 8 As noted below, however, the legislation did not require HATs to dispose of 
property in accordance with tenants' wishes; neither did it include the right for tenants to refuse a 
transfer to a particular landlord. As Kam (1993, p. 79) noted, although the ability to return allayed 
some fears about privatisation, anxiety remained 
- 
in part because of the implications of such re- 
purchases for local authority borrowing (discussed below), but mainly because the stated aim of 
HATs was to `diversify' ownership. Permitting the ability to return seemed to undermine that aim; 
Community Action (1988d, p. 12), for example, expressed its doubts that the Government would "... 
go to all this trouble just to hand back modernised estates at rock bottom prices to the very 
The Opposition expressed some concern about possible abuse of this provision; Allan Roberts MP (Commons Committee G. 23 Feb, 1988, col. 1036), for example, questioned whether the minister was "... 
saying that if a HAT finds an unsuitable landlord who is not acceptable to the tenants, because wie have to 
wind up the HAT wie must hand over the tenants to that unsuitable landlord ". The Opposition also tried 
unsuccessfully to pass an amendment requiring the final disposal to be to public sector landlords only. 
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councils it's been starving of cash for the last ten years. ". 
4.2.3 TRANSFERS OF HOUSING STOCK 
Financial terms of transfers were important at two instances in the life of HATs: -- transfers of local 
authority property to HATs and transfers of property to local authorities from HATs. 
Transfers to the HAT 
The proposed terms of transfer to HATs were in effect - if not by design - punitive to local 
authorities in three ways. First, although previous transfers of property between public sector 
bodies had been accompanied by a transfer of the outstanding loan debt, transfers of properties to 
HATs would be at market value and without the outstanding debt. In many cases, the outstanding 
debt was greater than the property's value and if local authorities were paid the market value, it 
would not discharge the debt. Before transfer, a local authority might have an asset worth less than 
the remaining debt; after transfer, it would be left with the debt, the interest on the debt and no 
income from the asset. ' Jeremy Corbyn MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 414) outlined the implications 
for local authorities: "Local people, from a declining rate base 
... 
and on a declining income base 
are expected to pay the debt charges on an estate that they have built, which is handed over to a 
HAT, which can sell it on to a bunch of property speculators, who can winkle out poorer tenants 
to create a paradise for the upwardly mobile so beloved of the Tory party. ". Second, even if the 
property had a positive value, the transfer would not give rise to an automatic right to compensation 
for local authorities. Nigel Spearing MP (CD, 27 June, 1988, col. 28) argued that a transfer of 
property without compensation amounted to `confiscation', while Bob Cryer MP (ibid, col. 35) 
argued that if a Labour Government rescued a tottering industry, by taking it "... into public 
ownership and [did] not pay compensation 
... 
the minister would describe that as theft. ". rd, if 
property had a negative value, local authorities might be required to pay a dowry, which could mean 
a council paying for the improvement of property it no longer owned. The Government argued that 
this was justified as the local authority would have had to expend money an the properties. 
Paradoxically, however, due to the financial implications whereby estates in the worst condition 
were likely to incur the largest dowries, local authorities were more likely to oppose HATs on such 
estates. 1° In rebutting criticisms of the proposed transfer terms, Waldegrave (CD, June 27,1988, 
col. 36) argued that the Opposition was under `some misapprehension'. The arrangements 
concerned valuations for transfers `within the public sector', were not aimed at preventing local 
authorities from getting anything' and, instead, established the `only logical way' of proceeding: "... 
9 During the debates reference was made to the transfer of the Thame d elate (see Appendix C). 
10 Daring committee, the Government indicated that local authorities would receive additional HIP 
allocations to pay a dowry (Waldegrave, Comm Cpwnittee Q, 18 Feb 1988, ca. 964). 
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the argument is not about confiscation or trying to do down local authorities. It is about trying to 
value property rationally and sensibly. ". 
As set out in the subsequent legislation, Section 74 provided for transfer to a HAT of the local 
authority housing in the designated area. Other land within the HAT area held by the local authority 
could also be transferred. HATs also had powers to vest land from statutory undertakers or any 
other public body (s76) and powers of compulsory purchase within their designated area (s77). 
These powers extended to land adjacent to the designated area and to land required for the provision 
of services. Tenants whose homes transferred to a HAT would remain secure tenants for as long as 
the HAT retained ownership (s83). Transfers would be on such terms, including financial terms, as 
the Secretary of State thought fit (s74.4). The acquisition would be made compulsorily and would 
not give automatic rights to compensation, while the local authority might be required to pay a 
dowry if the property had a negative value (s74.5). Shortly after the passage of the 1988 Act, 
however, the housing minister, David Trippier (1989, p. 4), stated that the Government intended to 
ensure any losses incurred by local authorities as a result of transfers to a HAT would be met by the 
Exchequer and that it did not want "... any additional costs arising from such transfers to be 
borne by the tenants remaining with the authority, [or] to ratepayers in the formt of rent or rate 
increases. ". The outstanding debt, however, remained with the local authority. " 
Transfers from the HAT 
Although the Government had conceded the principle of tenants returning to the local authority, two 
areas of uncertainty remained: 
- 
whether local authorities could afford the price and, second, 
whether the Government would permit them to borrow money to pay for them. As there was likely 
to be a significant difference between the value/cost on disposal to the HAT and the value cost on 
return after improvements, the Opposition (Bradley, Commons Committee G, 23 Feb, 1988, col. 
1021) argued that the local authority could end up paying for improvements, in the re-purchase 
price. Waldegrave (ibid, col. 1012), however, refused to guarantee that local authorities would be 
given funding approvals to purchase the improved HAT stock. Similarly, Ridley (CD, June 27, 
1988, cols. 41-42) argued that as local authorities would have received a capital receipt for the 
original transfer, there was "... no care for a further adjustment to prescribed expenditure at the 
later stage. ". Once again, however, the Gover nnent's policy was to change. The DoE's 7 October 
press release stated that local authorities in the pilot HAT areas would have additional borrowing 
approvals to enable diem to bid for HAT property. The Earl of Caithness (LD, 25 Oct, 1988, col. 
11 A DoE consultation paper issued in January 1989 proposed a residual debt subsidy (RDS) for outstanding debt on property transferred by local authorities. The level of RDS would be 75% for Tenants' Choice 
transfers; 90% for voluntary transfers and 100% for HAT, (on the basis that HATs were imposed on local 
authorities) (Inside Housing. Jan 20,1989, p. 1-2). The proposal vras new ipplemente& 
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1592), however, stated that the credit approval would cover 100% of the purchase price unless the 
local authority was clearly in a position to raise part of the costs. Shortly before the final passage of 
the 1988 Act, the housing minister, David Trippier (Commons WA 1 Nov, 1988, col. 558), again 
confirmed that authorities wishing to repurchase HAT property would be given the necessary 
approvals. 
In the legislation, under Section 63.3, HATs were gieren powers to dispose of any land and other 
property they owned. Section 79.1 dictated how and when they could make a disposal; the general 
remit being that HATs could dispose to `such persons, in such manner and on such terms' as 
considered expedient to achieve their objectives. For properties subject to secure tenancies, this was 
highly qualified and there were only two categories of person to whom the HAT could dispose: 
- 
'approved persons' and local authorities. 
- 
transfers to approved persons 
Approval of landlords was to be at the Housing Corporation's discretion. A secure tenant 
transferred from a HAT to an `approved person' would become an assured tenant, although he 
would retain his RTB. Section 81 placed restraints upon the onward disposal of tenanted property 
purchased from HATs, whereby the new landlord would have to covenant not to transfer the 
freehold, transfer an existing lease or grant a new lease without the Secretary of State's consent, 
who would have to have regard to tenants' views (s81.5). Certain disposals, including RTBs, were 
exempt from this requirement (s81.8). 
- 
transfers to local authorities 
Before a HAT could transfer properties subject to secure tenancies, it had to satisfy a procedure set 
out in Section 84, which gave local authorities the right to express their interest in acquiring them. 
If a secure tenant expressed a preference for the local authority as landlord rather than the landlord 
proposed by the HAT, the HAT would have to re-consider the proposed disposal and could decide to 
dispose to the local authority. The local authority had a `right-to-air' its views but not a 'right-to- 
purchase' and, hence, the HAT did not have to accept the local authority's bid. Similarly, as the 
HAT was not under a duty to dispose to a local authority because that was the tenant's wish, secure 
tenants did not have the 'ri&-to-choose' a landlord, merely the `right o-make-representatjon' 
(Bridge, 1989, p. 103). The legislation did not, therefore, support the pledge made in the October 
press release. It allowed the possibility of 
- 
but not a right for 
- 
tenants returning to the local 
authority. A HAT would, however, be under a duty to give `due consideration' to tenants' 
representation and a failure to do so 
- 
or the apparent existence of a policy not to allow transfers 
to local authorities 
- 
would be susceptible to judicial review (Bridge, 1989, p. 103). If the HAT 
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agreed to sell properties to the local authority, it would be on the basis of the property's TMV. 
'Z 
Section 84 was subsequently changed by the 1993 Leasehold Reform. Housing & Urban 
Development Act (henceforth the 1993 Act), which established a statutory right to-return to local 
authority landlordship for (most) HAT tenants. 13 The Act added a new section, Section 84A, which, 
with regard to properties subject to secure tenancies, meant that, in the case of houses, if individual 
tenants wished to become tenants of the local authority then the Secretary of State would direct the 
property's transfer from the HAT to the local authority. In the case of blocks of flats, the vote 
would be on the basis of a simple majority; hence, individual tenants did not have a statutory right- 
of-return. 
4.2.4 THE BALLOT 
The Government's original intention was that HATs would be imposed on tenants and local 
authorities. 14 Most opposition focused around this issue, particularly because the ability to return to 
the local authority was not initially envisaged, and, hence, a HAT would be a forced exit for tenants. 
During debates in both Houses, the Government gave few explicit justifications for not permitting a 
ballot. The nearest being the rather specious argument that HATs involved transfers of tenants and 
property from one public sector body to another, which did not warrant an explicit approval from 
tenants (Ridley, CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 402). The Government's refusal to allow tenants and local 
authorities a choice whether to veto a HAT fuelled a series of speculations. The most prominent 
was that it was unwilling to allow tenants or local authorities to have a choice because they would 
reject the proposal: Ridley (from Ginsburg, 1989, p. 72), for example, said on BBC television on 
July 18,1988, "... if you are trying to help somebody 
... 
you don't want them to vote against that 
being done! ". The Government's stance was therefore higt ly paternalistic; the implication being 
that tenants did not know what was good for than. From an implementation perspective, however, 
it also avoided the creation of a formal veto point that could subsequently frustrate implementation. 
The Opposition made considerable political capital out of the Govenuna is apparent autocracy. 
I As practice developed, the properties would return to the local authority at zero cast. This was a means 
of shortening public accountancy procedures. In order to buy the properties, the Government committed 
itself to giving the local authority sufficient funds which would then be given to the HAT. By allowing the 
properties to transfer at zero cost, the Government was therefore paying the HAT directly (through its 
grant-in-aid). This does, however, have some diäir+ences because the lifetime funding provided to the HAT 
is based on a planning figure for properties likely to return to the HAT rather than the actual figure. There 
is also a financial benefit to the HAT of selling the properties to HAs because it receives a capital receipt 
13 When introducing this legislation, the housing minister, Sir George Young, stated that he did not feel 
that further legislation was necessary because sufficiently firm assurances had been given in those areas 
where HATs had been set up (Bright, 1991, p. 10). 
" This also tended to overshadow the fact that local authorities could propose areas for consideration as 
HATs. 
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First, the refusal was contrasted with promises made in their election manifesto. Keith Bradley MP 
(CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 395), for example, cited a paragraph which promised that the next 
Conservative Government would "... give people greater choice and responsibility over their own 
lives. 
... 
they would take the important decisions 
- 
as tenants 
... 
-- 
rather than having them taken 
for them. ". Second, reference was made to the Prime Minister's own views. Paul Boateng MP 
(CD, 9 Nov, 1988, col. 452), for example, utilised Thatcher's own words in `lecturing' Poland's 
General Jaruzelsld: "You know, people ought to be able to make vital choices that affect their 
lives. They ought to be able to make these choices. And do you know what we have found when 
we give them the opportunity to make these choices? Well normally, you know, people make the 
right choice. ". Third, reference was made to the Government's expressed intentions in introducing 
the Bill. Allan Roberts MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 441), for example, argued that the 
Government had claimed "... they are widening choice, that they are freeing tenants from the 
shackles of large-scale bureaucratic local authority housing management and that they will 
provide choice and freedom. However, that will not extend to allowing residents to decide 
whether they want a HAT imposed on them. ". The Government's response was that choice would 
come at the end of the HAT process. The Earl of Caithness (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 408), for 
example, stated that HATs would "... give tenants decent housing, good management and 
maintenance services and more choice. That choice will become a reality when HATs have 
finished their improvement work ". The points made illustrate the different conceptions of choice 
and, in particular, the distinction between choice as an element in the implementation of a policy and 
as an intended policy outcome. The Opposition had found it politically convenient to conflate these. 
In late July 1988, however, the Government was defeated in the Lords on an amendment requiring a 
ballot with a majority of eligible tenants required to express a preference in favour of establishing a 
HAT. During the debate, Lord McIntosh (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 393) argued that tenant support 
was fundamental and a HAT could not succeed unless tenants had "... the opportuarity to make a 
decision at the outset as to whether or not it should take place. ". He continued that this was not 
just a proposal to meat the `requirements of common sense and common justice', it was essential if 
HATs were to work. The impasse lasted from July until November 1988. The Government argued 
that, since tenants would be `misinformed by Labour-controlled councils', there would be `no 
dance of balanced and informed opinion among tenants' and it would therefore overturn the 
amendment in the Commons (Ridley, CD, 2 Nov, 1988, col. 1157). Similarly, David Trippier (cited 
in Roof. Sept-Oct, 1988, p. 7) had written to Southwark's chair of housing arguing that there would 
be `no chance' of a `balanced and informed campaign' taking place: "Those opposed to HATS 
would play on people's concerns and frighten then into believing that a HAT would make their 
lives worse, which is the opposite of the truth. ". The Government also maintained that the lack of 
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a ballot was the sole cause of complaint regarding HATs and other tenant opposition was `whipped 
up' by `Labour party campaigning' and `municipal harassment' (Ridley, CD 2 Nov, col. 1005). 
Ridley (ibid, col. 1005), for example, confessed that he had "... never quite understood why the 
Labour Party seems so determined to whip up a campaign of misinformation about a matter that 
is of pure benefit to tenants, who will have a large amount of public money put at their disposal to 
improve the rotten houses in which many of them have to live. ". John Cunningham MP (ibid, col. 
1005) nevertheless asked why, if the proposals were `so good for tenants', he was `so reluctant' to 
let tenants decide for themselves?. 
The issue was also an important focus for tenant activity and opposition. Tenants in Sunderland 
were particularly active, forming `Sunderland Tenants Against No Democracy' (STAND). A week 
before the Bill's final reading in the Commons, STAND lobbied Parliament with a petition signed 
by 86% of eligible tenants. Reading the petition to the House, the local MP, Bob Clay (CD, 2 Nov 
1988, col. 1156), explained they were not opposing HATs in principle but simply asking for the 
Lords' amendment to be upheld. Clay argued it was `appalling' that the Secretary of State had told 
them "... they should not be able to vote on their own future because they may be misinformed 
and vote the wrong way. ". As expressed here, tenant concern was for the opportunity for choice; 
the Government's concern was how it might be exercised. 
Once more there was to be a dramatic change. On Sunday 8 November, the day before final 
amendments to the Bill had to be tabled, the Earl of Caithness was `cornered' by David Dimbleby 
on lunch-time television and `blurted out' that tenants would get a ballot (Kam, 1993, p. 78-79). 
Why the Government conceded a ballot was unclear. Some suggest hat, as the Bill was running out 
of time, the Government did not want to delay it further by resisting the amendment (Gregory & 
Hainsworth, 1993, p. 113). Ridley (CD, 11 Nov, 1988, cols. 676-677) explained that he had come 
to the conclusion that "... the real arguments were impossible to get across if the ballot question 
was obscured Let there be a ballot. Then there will only be one issue: which is more important 
- 
the political opposition of the Labour party, or greatly improved living conditions for the people 
in those areas?. ". 
Despite its acceptance of a ballot, the Government was accused of inconsistency and double 
standards. Although the Lords' amendment required a majority of tenants, this was reduced to a 
majority of tenants who voted without a requirement for a minimum turnout. The former would 
mean that voter apathy (i. e., a low turnout) would work against the proposal (i. e., in favour of the 
status quo); removing the requirement meant apathy would work in favour of the proposal (i. e., in 
favour of change). Margaret Thatcher (1993, p. 601) later stated that she had expected ne from 
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Tenants' Choice and from HATs; the obstacle to both being "... the deep-rooted hostility of the 
Left to the improvement and enfranchisement of these who lived in the ghettos of dependency 
which they controlled ". She further noted that propaganda against Tenants' Choice was `as 
nothing' compared with that directed against HATs and lamented that the Lords had amended the 
legislation to require that a HAT could only go ahead if a majority of eligible tenants voted for it: 
"This would have been an impossibly high hurdle, given the apathy of many tenants and the 
intimidation of the Left. We finished up by accepting the principle of a ballot, limiting it to the 
requirement of the majority of those voting. " (ibid, p. 601). '5 Furthermore, Simon Hughes MP 
(CD, 11 Nov, col. 708) noted that, in the case of trade union legislation, the Government had argued 
that a vote of 70% in favour might not be adequately representative. He also noted that 
-- 
in the 
Government's own words 
-- 
it was `right to be suspicious of a major change' if it was `not certain' a 
real majority was in favour (ibid, col. 688). 
In the subsequent Act, Section 60 gave the Secretary of State power to designate an area of land 
where it was expedient a HAT be established. In deciding whether to establish a HAT, he would 
have regard to such matters as he thought fit (s60.4), qualified by Section 60.5 which listed the 
following: 
-- 
" the extent to which the area's housing accommodation was occupied by tenants or owner- 
occupiers and the extent to which it was local authority housing; 
" the housing's physical state and design and the need to repair or improve it, 
" the way in which the local authority housing was being managed; and 
" the area's living and social conditions and general environment (Table 4.4). 
As the Government's criteria for establishing HAT's included not only physical criteria and social 
conditions but also the quality of local authority housing management, proposals for HAT areas 
would be an implicit indictment of local authorities and a public indication of their apparent failure. 
Prior to making a designation order, the Secretary of State was required to consult every local 
housing authority any part of whose district was included in the proposed area (s61.1). The form of 
the consultative process and the extent to which local authority views were to be taken into account 
was not specified. Under Section 61.2, the Secretary of State had to ensure that notice of the 
proposal was given to all secure tenants in the proposed HAT area, while Section 61.3 required him 
to arrange for a ballot or poll. If a simple majority of tenants who voted were against the proposal, 
he could not impose a HAT (s63.4). 
If the HAT proposals are considered as originally conceived, then 
- 
for the Government 
-- 
a choice 
's Thatcher is disingenuous. Although har opposition is presented as based on the method rather the 
principle of a ballot, her Cent was clearly opposed to the principle of a ballot. $4 
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for tenants to go into a HAT was unnecessary because it was simply a transfer between public 
sector agencies (i. e., from the local authority to a HAT) and their choice would come once their 
housing had been improved (i. e., a choice of landlords). The landlord choice, however, would not 
include a return to the local authority and the `choice' to leave the public sector would have been 
made 
- 
by the Government not by tenants 
- 
at the time of the HAT's designation. The Opposition 
therefore argued that it was not simply a transfer between public sector agencies. As the Bill 
changed and evolved and, in particular, once HAT tenants could return to the local authority, the 
transfer to a HAT was no longer necessarily a de facto exit from the public sector (although it could 
be if the local authority was unwilling to accept tenants back or the HAT disposed of the property in 
a manner contrary to tenants' wishes). Hence, the necessity for tenants to have a choice on whether 
to approve the establishment of a HAT became 
-- 
in principle 
-- 
less important and Ridley (CD, Nov 
11,1988, col. 676) was correct to assert that this was the deal offered and that misinformation "... 
prevalent throughout the affair [had] obscured that deal and focused on the ballot. ". More 
generally, it was curious that there should be concern for a ballot: Gregory & Hainswoith (1993, 
p. 113), for example, note that while there was `no constitutional precedent in Britain for decision- 
making by plebiscite', the denial of a tenant veto was regarded as `an infringement of personal 
liberty'. They suggest that the reason it seemed natural was due to the vote offered under Tenants' 
Choice and that criticisms of the voting method had obscured the fact that any decision making vote 
for tenants was a `remarkable constitutional innovation' (ibid, p. 113). Nevertheless, although the 
Government had accepted the principle of a ballot, the twist was that 
- 
if tenants voted against 
-- 
no 
other source of funding would be made available. John Fraser MP (CD, 9 Nov, 1988, col. 449) 
therefore argued that the Secretary of State was `engaging in blackmail': "On the one hanrt tenants 
are being asked to vote for the Secretary of State's proposals, but on the other for a denial of 
those funds and a continuation of damp and too much asbestos. ". John Cunningham MP (CD, 11 
Nov, 1988) argued that it was "... coercion to say that unless people do what he wants them to do, 
their housing problems will be left unattended and no money will be made available. ". Ridley's 
response was more benign: the Government was simply offering those estates priority, which they 
could turn down (ibid, col. 692). 
4.2.5 THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF & CONTROL OVER HATS 
Suspicion regarding HATs was also fuelled by the intention that the housing stock be improved 
under by a quango rather than by elected local authorities. In @meral terms, the establishment of 
single-purpose agonies was not especially unusual and during comittee, Waldegrave had pointed 
out that both political parties "... had and would set up quarngoes when they felt central 
Government policy Wright be fnrstruted by local government opposition. ". Hence, Labour 
Govemmerns had set up NTDCs in rural areas, while Conservative Governments had set up UDCs 
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in cities. As with UDCs, the controversy concerned the lack of local accountability, which was 
contrasted with the accountability of local authorities through local elected councillors. During 
committee, for example, Tony Banks MP (CD, 9 Feb, 1988, col. 767) described the concept of 
HATs as `authoritarian, lacking in accountability and democracy', and `essentially fascist'. Keith 
Bradley MP (CD 14 June, 1988, col. 394) cited Shelter's submission on the discussion paper, which 
argued that HATs did not even make a `pretence at being democratic': 
"Transferred council tenants and local people will have little confidence in future 
housing opportunity, for power will not only be out of their hands, either as 
individuals or as local electors 
- 
it will be concentrated in the hands of nominee 
board members meeting to decide policy in camera 
... 
the Secretary of State will 
be accountable to Parliament only through the ineffective channels of statutory 
instrument inspection. ". 
Such issues concern a more general debate concerning a `democratic deficit' and the role of 
unelected quangos vis-a-vis elected local government. As discussed in Chapter One, various critics 
- 
especially the New Right 
-- 
argued that local authority accountability to the local community was 
exaggerated and, second, the creation of a centrally-controlled agency can be an important part of an 
implementation strategy. 
HAT legislation also epitomised a wider trend in 1980s social policy, which had moved from a 
pattern in which detailed requirements and obligations were laid down to a much looser system 
involving a considerable degree of ministerial discretion (Gregory & Hainsworth, 1993, p. 113). 
Many of the crucial choices, for example, remained the Secretary of State's responsibility or 
-- 
if 
not his to make 
-- 
were subject to his consent, while Section 72 stated that "... a HAT, in carrying 
out its functions, must comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State which shall be 
published ". The legislation therefore created potential for autocracy and authoritarianism or, 
conversely, flexibility and responsiveness to local conditions and preferences. As the Secretary of 
State had considerable scope for discretion, HAT policy was crucially dependent on the particular 
Secretary of State and the relevant ministers. Hence, the prospect of HATs inevitably involved 
significant uncertainty for tenants and local authorities. Thus, while the legislation provided `room 
for manoeuvre' for the Secretary of State, it also introduced a concomitant need to trust him not to 
mis-use that discretion. Gieren the prevailing mistrust of the Government, the Opposition sought to 
have commitments written into the primary legislation or 
- 
failing that 
- 
to introduce certain 
parameters to qualify the Secretary of State's discretion. In essence, these involved adding detail 
and creating statutory requirements and rights rather than allowing issues to be shaped by 
subsequent policy decisions or ministerial discretion that could (more easily) be altered at a later 
time. 
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One of the most important areas was the Secretary of State's power to appoint HAT board 
members. Bob Cryer MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 448), for example, drew attention to the 
Government's tendency to appoint `political placemen' to the boards of quangoes and argued that it 
had been "... assiduous in sacking people whom they regard as having been critical in any way 
and appointing people who conform to their own point of view. ". The Bill's first draft required the 
Secretary of State to consider appointing people with `special knowledge of the HAT area'. This 
was amended in committee to a requirement to consider appointing `people who live in a designated 
HAT area' as well as those with special knowledge of it. Although the Opposition proposed 
amendments requiring a majority of local people, the Government, argued that it was more important 
to have necessary and appropriate expertise on the HAT board (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 419). A 
subsequent amendment in the Lords proposed that not less than 50% of the HAT board, not 
including the chair and deputy chair, be local people. As Lord McIntosh (LD, 25 Oct, 1988, col. 
1563) explained, this would allow the Government to retain effective control of the HAT while 
giving tenants `slightly more confidence' and `rather less suspicion' of the HAT board. The 
amendment was not carried. 
In the legislation, once the HAT was approved the Secretary of State could appoint to the board 
between five and eleven members (Schedule 7.1). He could also remove any or all of than (even 
create a new board) at will (Schedule 7.6). In making appointments, he had to have regard to "... 
the desirability of securing the services of persons who live in or have special knowledge of the 
locality. " (Schedule 7.2.2). Although the provision allowed the possibility of tenants or other local 
people being appointed, the Secretary of State was not required to appoint any local people. Unlike 
local authority housing committee meetings, HAT board meetings would not open to the members of 
the public nor would the 1985 Local Govern (Access to Information) Act apply (Driscoll, 
1989, p. 149). 
More generally in terms of local accountability; the HAT consultation paper (DoE, 1987, pare 18) 
had outlined the Government's commitment to tenant involved and stated a HAT would "... only 
be able to do its job properly with the involvement and co-operation of the people who live in the 
area. HATS will there, fore put great stress on consulting tenants, asking them for their own ideas 
and keeping them informed about plans and progress. ". During commrittee, the Government 
committed HATs to organising `non-statutory tenants' advisory fora' (Waldegrave, CD, 14 June, 
1988, col. 447). The Opposition argued that 
- 
in the absence of strong representation on the HAT 
board 
- 
fora were not sufficient. Lord Stallard (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 421), for example, argued 
that as a non-statutory advisory body the forum would "... have no power to overturn HAT 
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decisions. It will have no access to written information and it will have no guarantee of having its 
questions answered 
... 
Such a forum cannot be seen as a realistic alternative to proper tenant 
representation. ". In the legislation, HATs were only required to consult tenants at two particular 
times: 
-- 
on the Statement of Proposals and on the choice of a new landlord. As `soon as practicable' 
after it had been established, a HAT was required to prepare its Statement of Proposals to show 
how and over what period it intended to carry out its functions (s64.1). With regard to these 
proposals, the HAT was required to consult each local housing authority or county council, any part 
of whose area lay within the HAT's designated area (s64.2). Furthermore, under Section 64.3, the 
HAT was required to ensure that 'adequate publicity' was given in the HAT area (according to 
Bridge (1989, p. 94) sending a copy to every resident was `advisable but probably not necessary') 
and that those living in the HAT area were made aware of their opportunity to make representations 
and given `adequate opportunity' to do so; Bridge (1989, p. 94) noted that a public meeting, well 
advertised throughout the area and with HAT members present, would satisfy the statutory 
requirements. Although the HAT had to `consider' representations, consultation was on the HAT's 
terms. Once the HAT had complied with these requirements, it had to send its Statement of 
Proposals to the Secretary of State, together with a report of the steps taken to obtain 
representations from residents and the consideration given to them. While the Statement of 
Proposals gave an overview, an annual Corporate Plan had to be more specific about what would be 
done, by when, and how much it would cost. 
4.2.6 FROM THE MARK I TO THE MARK 1! HAT 
To close this discussion of the legislative stage, the two fundamental changes in the development of 
HAT policy need to be highlighted; each of which increased the opportunities for choice by the 
target groups. The first was the possibility of tenants returning to the local authority. The second 
was the introduction of a ballot of tenants, which introduced a formal veto point for tenants and 
fundamentally changed the prospects for the implementation of HAT policy. These were also 
fundamental in the development of HAT policy and the change from 
- 
what shall be termed here 
-- 
the Mark I `Ridley' to the Mark II `Waldegrave' HAT (Table 4.5). 16 
4.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
Having discussed the development of HAT policy during its legislative stage and before discussing 
16 The Opposition housing spokesman, Clive Soley MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 526-527), for example, 
commented that Waldegravve had "... tried hard to improve the Bill. In Committee he made about 100 
concessions, rightly and properly. He agreed to change the Bill in places, to reconsider points or to come back to us with recommendations or suggestions ". 
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assua cs dug 1P adocaticss would be maessed 
to ambleLAtobddfa HAT propatiea" 
Bastdlnf (ina4nod8amamýalOoya met EachR T Gra 
-iaidfoamaaltralGovemmmtmadvaaca 
eýpededtosedýmixmbespassbLs+ipp« rum Capäalreolgpl amdiepaMlswaildaffsdpub&c 
private uctm Capital nompts f: +amf g RATS boding 
to bs recyaludto ßmd L tar HATS. 
TABLE 4.5 
- 
MARK I& MARK II HATS 
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its implementation, it is necessary to confirm that the framework for policy implementation outlined 
in Chapter One is appropriate for HAT policy. Table 4.6 summarises the key features of HAT 
policy in accordance with Sabatier & Mazmanian's (1979) framework Table 4.7 gives an indicative 
assessment of the effectiveness of the legal structuring of the implementation strategy in terms of the 
six conditions. It indicates that expectations of effective implementation were favourable but with 
an unknown factor being the tenant ballot. 
4.3.1 THE FIRST HAT PROPOSAL 
As noted earlier, the HAT implementation phase started prior to the completion of the 14slative 
phase. More precisely, it started prior to the 1987/1988 Housing Bill, When the Hulme estate, 
adjacent to Manchester city centre and consisting of 5,500 dwellings, was considered for designation 
as a HAT. Between 1968 and 1971, the area had been cleared and system-built deck access flats 
constructed. Problems quickly manifested and, in 1985, the Hulme Tenants Alliance (HTA), a 
forum for the various TAs active on the estate, organised a conference to discuss the problems. 
Discussion was not restricted to housing issues; Community Action (1988b, p. 23), for example, 
noted that "... after years of fighting over symptoms, the tenants were determined to talk about the 
root causes of the problems. ". Following tenants' lobbying of Manchester city council and the 
Government, plans were made for a feasibility study and, by the autumn of 1986, the Government 
had agreed to find that study. Launched in December 1986, the study was headed by a tripartite 
supervisory group with Professor Valerie Kam as an independent chair. Furthermore, tenants had 
sought and got a majority on the supervisory group: seven representatives alongside two council and 
two DoE representatives (Dibblin, 1988, p. 25). In terms of physical change, while tenants accepted 
the best solution might 
- 
once again 
-- 
be the demolition of most of Hulme, they wanted `cast iron' 
guarantees that any demolition would be phased, that communities would not be scattered and that 
tenants would not be displaced once improvements had been made (ibid, p. 25). 
During 1987, it became apparent that the Government had its own agenda: the feasibility study was 
to explore how a HAT would improve the estate. As described in Community Action (1988b, p. 23), 
Kam was told to `persuade' the supervisory group thw it should convince tenants that a HAT was 
the `best way forward for Hulme'. Kam heard tenants' views and informed the housing minister 
(William Waldegrave) of Hulme's opposition to the plan i(j, p. 23). HTA also mounted a 
campaign to head off the threat of a HAT. Tenants argued that while a HAT might be a possible 
conclusion, it should not be decided in advance. Furthermore, accepting a HAT in its then form 
(i. e., Mark I) would ipso facto remove other issues from negotiation, including the estate's 
privatisation. Tenants were also aware that, as the council did not have the resources needed, a 
HAT had certain attractions to it. Community Action (ibid, p. 24), for example, reported that when 
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Clear & consistent Aims of HAT policy were dependent on the nature and scale of the HAT programme, 
objectives. The statute listed four objectives: - 
" improve housing, 
" ýe housing 
" encourage diversity ofte um landlords 
" improve living & social conditions and general environment 
Although no hierarchy or prioritising, objectives are reasonably consistent Some 
debate about whether objectives of improvement and to u ellandlord diversity were 
separable. 
Adequate causal theory The original causal theory for HAT policy was as follows: 
- 
" There were poor quality local authority housing estates in which poor physical and 
environmental conditions interacted with social and economic problems. 
" For political reasons, local authorities were charging rents that were insufficient to 
enable the proper maintenance of the properties and the estate. 
" Local authorities were inevitably poor landlords and because they was no effective 
competition, they had few incentives to improve the quality of their service, hence, 
their customers had no option but to accept the service as provided. 
"A limited-lire agency (Le., a HAT) would take other and manage the estates 
temporarily. At the same time, it would rapidly elect a significant `tun around' in 
the estate's social, economic and environmental qualities, thereby, malting it 
attractive to a range of other landlords and purchasers. 
" Having improved the properties, HATs would trap fer them to other (La, private) 
Endlords who would have pvdw incentives both to manage the housing properly 
(La, with a consumer ethos and in a prudent commercial and business-like 
manner) and to charge rents that would enable them to maintain the lang.. teim asset 
value of the properties and the quality ofthe estate as a whole. 
" Having disposed of its properties, the HAT would be wound up. 
The policy was based on the assumptions that local authorities were very poor housing 
managers and, second, tenants were greatly dissatisfied with local authority landlords 
and would welcome the opportunity to transfer to a better landlord. 
Appropriate Policy Policy created an arm's length quango single-purpose agencies (La, a HAT), 
tools & windrot bared by broader & diverse responsibilities, & with broad powers to pursue 
resources their statutory objectives. In particular, HATs had powers to acquire local authority 
housing, manage & improve it & release it to other landlords. Flexibility & discretion 
was available to SooS while s72 gave him power to provide very specific guidance to the 
implementing agency. 
CI-- ed& alWb Appomtrn of members of quango's managing board was the Gove nment's 
of impismaa erg 
omdab 
responsibility. 
Support of- or Policy aimed to bypass local authorities (dt, in principle, local authority support was not 
tonplane from 
- 
required). Tenants were expected to welcome the policy & would also have the 
brtaet pvnp/agssdss incentive of a not freeze (altl not weed by legislation) until their homes were 
& sever* 0 improved. In the original policy twigs, explicit tenant support was not required 
because ultimately the Government would decide whether or not to establish a HAT. 
The provision for a ballot crated an explicit veto point for tenants. 
Stable sods-econoestc 
orb 
I his could not be detsmºined is advarca 
TABLE 4.6 
- 
SUMMARY OF HAT POLICY & SABATIER & MAZMANIAN'S 
CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE DVLEMENTATION 
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CONDITION ONE 
Clear & combiwt For HAT policy LOW: Lack of specific aims & objectives regarding in particular, 
objectives size & scale of HAT programme & precise specification of areas appropriate for 
designation as HATs. 
For HATs HIGH: four clear objectives set out in statute 
CONDII'ION TWO 
Adequate causal theory inGH: Theory was clear. Validity was subject to debate due to the strong 
ideological and normative dimensions (ag, private sector agencies are inherently 
superior to public agencies). 
CONDITION THREE 
Appropriate policy tools ffiGH Broad sat of powers to effect all parts of causal theory. 
Assignment to a 131GH: Creation of specific delivery agencies. 
gmpathefic agency 
-lnt ated MODERATE: Policy reduced links & veto points in the implementation structure by 
system with few v etn bypassing local authorities A creating arm's length quango, single-purpose agencies 
points & adequate (i. e., HATs), unencumbered by broader & diverse responsibilities & with broad 
maath& sanctions br powers to pursue statutory objectives. 
compliance BUT inherent weakness of formal veto point for target groups (dependent on 
available incentives & sanctions). 
Impkmentms' derision HIGH: Secretary of State has power (ender s72) to provide very specific guidance to 
role implenuadels. 
dent r+es m+ces DIDXD: Resources dependent an political support, limited knowledge about how 
much would be needed; expectation of private sector esources to reduce need for 
public sector fiends. 
CONDIITION FOUR 
Commitment & skill of HIGH: Managing board appointed by Secretary of State subject to limited 
implementing dadsb qualifications. 
CONDIITION FIVE 
Support of- or cmepWace HIGH in theory; DID= in Practice Intention to bypass local armes but 
ä+am 
- 
b1erat doubts about reality of being able to achieve this. Policy intended to inherently 
g oupdagoadas appeal to tenants. 
Support of s veedp s HIGH Policy desips was Suauary of StMe tos likely+to comnund pol is al 
sappoet dnnu boat initialperiod of imo m mdL- Polley also eeh bad reasonably 
early in the life of s, Govemmmt with a signifcsnt pszlvmeotney majority. 
CONDIITION SIX 
Stable sado. eemnnic 
amoab 
fGH: Policy launched at tine of roaaooably booby economy. 
KEY: 
- 
HIGH- very conducive to obtaining statutory objectives. 
MODERATE 
- 
condition met fairly well but some problems. 
LOW 
- 
Condition not mat, a serious obstacle to aNsmmg statutory objectives. 
TABLE 44.7 
- 
INDICATIVE ASSESSMENT OF IM LEMENTATION STRATEGY 
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the campaign was first launched, the chair of housing had declared full support for the tenants' 
position. Within months, he was telling the supervisory group that, as a HAT was inevitable, they 
should concentrate on geäing the best HAT possible. The council also drew up a list of criteria for 
an `acceptable HAT'. 
Representing tenants fell on about a dozen people elected by delegates to the HTA (Shaughnessy, 
1989, p. 345). Tenant representatives had simultaneously to address two different audiences - the 
DoE and the rest of the tenants. In terms of addressing the DoE, as Shaughnessy (ibid, p. 344) 
noted, in Hulme it was "... risky to deal with authority. To deal badly [was] quite simply 
dangerous. ". Hence, being seen to do business over HATs was tantamount to betrayal; to strike 
any kind of deal would be seen as a sell-out. On the other hand, the Government was adamant 
resources would only be made available through a HAT (i. e., a HAT was to be imposed from the 
top-down and tenants were expected to acquiesce with that decision). Although they were supposed 
to take their cue from a constituency of over 11,000 tenants, representatives did not have any well- 
developed means of liaising with them; as Shaughnessy (ibid, p. 345) noted, representatives were 
`unpaid, under-resourced and overworked' and could not produce or distribute newsletters, or 
arrange meetings sufficiently frequently. The council did not help with these tasks and took the view 
that Hulme was rapidly becoming the DoE's responsibility and a place to save rather than spend 
money (ibid, p. 345). Hence, no mandate for tenant reps to negotiate existed and, in December 1987, 
negotiations became deadlocked. 
Early in 1988, tenants sought another meeting with the minister, which took place in May. 
Shaughnessy (1989, p. 346) argued that tenants' organisational structure forced them to opt out of a 
`negotiations' approach and to adopt a 'presentational' approach. DoE officials, however, required 
tenant representatives to make commitmonts (in effect, on behalf of all tenants) but any decisions 
and assurances required from the DoE were `referred upwards' (ibid, p. 350). As Shaughnessy 
(ibid, p. 350) observed, this accentuated tenants' feelings that they were "... in the lap of the gods, 
rather than being in a direct relationship with the human powers that be. Decision-making power 
[was] never laid bare in front of them so that it [could] be inquired of, or challenged or reasoned 
with. ". Thus, neither party was actually able to negotiate and a constructive dialogue could not be 
established. Although tenants were not entirely powerless, their actual `power' (i. e., the threat of 
violence) was negative and probably detrimental to their own interests. A tenant ballot with the 
potential to endorse or veto a HAT would have changed this situation. Through a ballot tenants 
would collectively choose to accept or veto a proposal. Tenant representatives would, therefore, 
only be required to negotiate `the best available deal' to be approved or rejected by tenants. This 
would, thereby, place an onus an all parties to negotiate a deal that would be acceptable to all 
S 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
parties, including tenants. '7 At that meeting, however, Waldagave again insisted that if tenants did 
not accept a HAT, they would lose the feasibility study. Tenants refused and the campaign of 
opposition continued 
On 28 June 1988, Waldegrave announced that he had consented to tenants' wish for a wide-ranging 
study. Hence, in the face of tenant opposition, the Government had decided not to impose a HAT 
(i. e., not to implement the policy in this location). In abandoning the HAT proposal, Waldegrave 
stressed that the Government was not committing itself to implementing the study's 
recommendations. In some quarters, this was presented as a major victory. In fact, all tenants had 
actually achieved was to have sperrt nearly two years persuading the DoE that the study needed to 
have a wide-ranging brief (Kam, 1993, p. 89). As Kam (ibid, p. 89) reflected, as a potential HAT, 
Hulme had been offered £50 million for housing renewal 
-a figure that would probably have risen 
as the Government became committed to the project. Other reasons may also explain why Hulme 
was less attractive to the Government as a HAT area, such as the difficulty of refurbishing 
- 
and 
that selling 
- 
the system-built housing and the weakness of the local housing marlaet. 
4.3.2 THE PILOT HAT AREAS 
The HAT consultation paper (DoE, 1987, para 32) stated that the Government was committed to 
establishing a pilot programme of HATs, which would contain only a `modest number' of schemes. 
On July 11 1988, two weeks after the Hulme decision, Waldegrave announced six pilot HAT 
areas. `8 The announcement conveyed an image of tenants desperate to exit from local authority 
landlords. John Heddle MP (CD, 11 July, 1988, cols. 24-28), for example, stated: "Will my Hon. 
Friend accept the congratulations of all the tenants in the areas that have been mentioned as the 
opportunity that he has just announced will enable them to release thenvelves from the clutches of 
unsympathetic local authority landlords? ". The areas announced were in Lambeth, Tower 
Hamlets, Southwark, Sandwell, Sunderland and Leeds and included a total of twenty estates (see 
Table 4.8). The budget was £125 million over three years. Kam (1993, p. 76) noted that, as it was 
dear that this would only go a small way towards the cost of improvements, tenants "... feared that 
the balance would be met by transferring property to the private sector. ". 
HATs were ostensibly an exceptional response and were intended to focus on `some of the most 
17 This assumes that all the parties want to secure a mutually aerie arrangement. It also disregards the 
fact that the ballot would involve a choice between two competing packages: for example, `Yes to a HAT, 
improvements to the housing and the privatisation of the housing' or `No to a HAT, no improvements to 
the housing and remain local authority tenants'. 
'$ As none of these areas were implemented, they are strictly the aborted pilot HAT areas. For the purpose 
of this thesis, however, they will be referred to as simply the pilot HAT areas. 
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AREA ESTATES DETAILS /OUTCOME 
TOWER Solander Gardens £97 million offered (period not specified). 
HAMLETS Shadwell Gardens Local authority against 
Announced July 1988 Berra Boundary March 1989: HAT proposal abandoned without ballot, 
Abandoned March 1989 Holland following consultant's recommendation. Report cited Boundary overcrowding as a key problem. 
Ocean (pad) 
SANDWELL Windmill Lane Cape No formal offer of funds made. 
Announced July 1988 ffill Local authority against and developed alternative strategy. 
Abandoned May 1990 Whitehesth March 1989: Whitehath estate abandoned. 
May 1991: HAT proposal abandoned without ballot. DoE 
impressed with `sub tial progress' by council in selling 
homes for redevelopment. 
Subsequently Estate Action project implemented. 
LAMBETH Angell Town £93 million offered (over 6 years). 
Announced July 1988 Ugh Local authority against. Limited At un vve 
Abandoned May 1990 negotiations between Government and teoaats. 
May 199: HAT proposal ab ndoned. witont ballot MORI 
poll of 1163 showed 72% against. 
Subsequently Estate Action project an Loughborough estate 
and pat of Angell Taws estate. 
LEEDS Kalten Moor £66 million offered (over 9 yearn). 
Announced July 1988 sescrad South Local authority apinst. Limited A move 
Abandoned April 1990 ß negotiations between Government and tenants. 
March 1989: Halton Moor A Sacroft estates abandoned. 
April 1991: HAT proposal abandoned without ballot 
Unofficial ballet showed 80% agakut on 77% 
SUNDERLAND Downhill £58 million mend (over 4 years) 
Announced July 1988 Town End Farm Local authority neutral. Tenants had been especially active 
Rejected April 1990 Hylton Castle in campaigning for a ballot. Limited negotiations between 
Red House Wed Govs®mmt and teeeng. 
April 199: HAT proposal rejected at ballot 80% sysmst on 
77% turnout. 
SO S North Peckham £112 million afered (over 8 years) 
Announced July 1988 Gloucester Grove Local authority intially opposed, dean neutral but sceptical 
Rejected October 1990 than inamdistdy boors ballot apposed. Extensive 
negotiations between Government, local authority and 
tenants representatives, resulting in formal documents. 
OabM1998: HAT proposal rejected at ballot. 73% 
spiest on Gloucester Grew estate and 67% against an 
North Peckham esbft 
Subsequeoetly redeveloped/ refurbishment funded under SRB 
Challenge Find 
TABLE 4.8 
- 
THE PILOT HAT AREAS 
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difficult areas of local authority housing' (Cmnd 214,1987, para 6.7). Kam (1993, p. 79), however, 
suggests there were two schools of thought in the DoE: the first thought the policy would lack 
credibility if it did not target the very worst estates, while the second favoured selecting less 
deteriorated areas where successes could be more easily and quicidy demonstrated. Critics also 
speculated that an additional criterion was the potential attractiveness of estates to private-sector 
investment. 19 Clive Soley MP (CD, Nov 11,1988, col. 675), for example, argued that the Secretary 
of State had chosen areas "... he can sell off, not the worst areas. ", while Community Ac ion 
(1988a, p. 22) observed that, in different ways, each offered "... valuable assets to be stripped by a 
HAT. ". All of the London estates, for example, were in prime locations for gentrification. 
Anticipating opposition, Ridley (cited in Ulleri, 1989, p. 8) expressed the hope that local authorities 
would not "... play politics with the lives and fortunes of these tenants. Now we are doing 
something dramatic and major. I hope it is not going to be the subject of political tomfoolery. ". 
Each area was Labour-controlled with the exception of LB Tower Hamlets which was Liberal 
Democrat20 The Government had not consulted with the local authorities affected ostensibly 
because it felt that Parliament should be the first to be informed. In the debate following the 
announcement (and as the principle of a tenant ballot had not then been conceded), Waldegrave 
(CD, July 11,1988, col. 26) repeatedly asserted that it was for the House to decide whether a HAT 
be established. The Government's autocratic approach and its lack of consultation served to fuel 
tenant and local authority hostility in the six areas and a National Organisation of Tenants Opposed 
to HATs (NOTOHATs) was quiddy established with its headquarters on the Ocean estate in Tower 
Hamlets. 
- 
Tower Hamlets 
Woodward (1991) provides a firsthand account of tenant opposition to the pilot HAT proposals in 
Tower Hamlets. Tower Hamlets was a `classic monopoly landlord' with 83% of the borough's 
households being in local authority tenure (Shotton, 1987, p. 16). As in all the pilot HAT areas, the 
process began in July 1988 with tenants receiving individual letters from the Secretary of State 
informing them of the Goveeinment's intention to remove their estate from local authority control 
(see Appendix B). To make the HAT more palatable, tenants were informed that there would be a 
2l rent freeze until their properties were improved. The letter was somewhat selective in its 
19 This had been one of the key problems at Stockbridge Ville (see Appendix C). 
20 It was also suspected that there were other elements of political calculation in the choice of the estates. 
In each area, for example, one of the estates was in the leader of the council's own ward. 
21 During dem in Parliament, the Government had promised no rent increases during the improvement 
period. There was no legislative backing for this. Under Section 95, HATs had powers to make 
`reasonable' charges for the tenancy or occupation of its housing and `from time to time' to review rem 
and males such changes as circumstances may require. An unsuccessful attempt had been made in 
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description of HATs omitting key details, such as the fad that tenants could only return to the local 
authority if it was agreeable and could afford to buy the properties at the new, improved price. 
The HAT proposal raised tenant activity to its highest ever level (Grant, 1988, p. 23), while the 
degree of distrust about the Government's intentions resulted in meetings attended by over a 
thousand tenants and an 80-90% willingness to sign anti-HAT petitions (Gregory & Hainsworth, 
1993, p. 115). Tenants' experience of the neighbouring LDDC made them particularly fearful of 
another quango. Ocean estate TA chair, Dick Charlton (from Grant, 1988, p. 23) summed up 
tenants' mood: "We feel that money needs to be spent on this estate, but we want that money to be 
spent by the council, in consultation with the tenants not through an unelected body. ". Many 
tenants had been heartened by the experience of the tenants in Hulme who had successfully resisted 
a HAT (ibid, p. 23). Based on her involvement, Woodward (1991, p. 49-50) identified four themes 
used to mobilise and unify opposition to HATs: 
- 
first, arguments justifying the existence of council 
housing; second, commonly held experiences and perceptions of the LDDC, which was seen as 
`unacceptable, unaccountable, undemocratic and a dangerous precedent' (speaker at anti-HAT 
meeting, Sept 1988, from ibid, p. 51); third, the notion that only tenant power and tenant action 
could defeat the HAT (for reasons noted below, the local authority was an `unreliable ally'); and, 
fourth, arguments appealing to people's local knowledge of the `housing crisis'. Woodward (ibid, 
p. 50) considered that the most powerful theme to be that justifying council housing for those unable 
to afford to buy their own homes, who did not wish 
- 
or could not afford 
- 
to rent from a private 
landlord. Furthermore, democratic accountability was asserted as a strength of council housing 
(ibid, p. 50). Such ideas were significantly at odds with the Government's view. 
Despite a series of press releases declaring its opposition, Tower Hamlets' councillors had had 
discussions with Govemmat ministers and civil servants about the possibility of a HAT (f 
Sept/Oct, 1988). Furthermore, prior to the HAT proposal and following the election of a Lib-Dem 
administration, the borough had developed an extensive policy of estate disposals and privatisation 
(see Shotton, 1987). On at least three estates (Hadrian, Waterlow and Bactcn), tenants discovered 
`by accident' that decisions had been made to decant their estate for sale under terms that would 
prevent their rd uming (ibid, p. 18). At Batton Tower, for example, tenants had been decanted for 
committee to amend the Bill to prevent HATs from increasing rents until they had improved properties. 
Waldegrave assured the Opposition that Section 72 management guidance would prohibit HATs from 
increasing rents until properties had been improved. It was further stated that HATs would not promote a 
market regime for rents and that the rent policy would be "... such as to keep them firmly in the social landlord sector. " (Watdegtave, Commons Committee G_ 23 Feb 1988, col. 1043). There was also some 
uncertainty whether rent increases would be to pay for the improvements or simply to maintain properties in their improved condition. With hindsight, the proposals for a rent freeze were ill-conceived. The 
expected size of HATs would suggest a major improvement programme lasting many years and, over time, 
a rent freeze would become a major draw on resources. 
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asbestos removal and, while decanted, the council put their homes up for sale to private developers. 
Although Tower Hamlets tenants were caught between two unsatisfactory situations, they appeared 
to prefer the 'known' to the unknown': "Although often inefficient, and despite the problems on 
many Tower Hamlets estates due to neglect and lack of maintenance in the past, tenants were 
aware that they still possessed via the ballot box, a form of control over their landlord " 
(Woodward, 1991, p. 50). 
- 
Lambeth 
Opposition was similarly strong in Lambeth. The two estates -- Angell Town and Loughborough -- 
had a high proportion of single parent and elderly households and about 70% of tenants were black. 
Tenants felt that they had been picked on because the Govemment considered them disorganised 
and incapable of resistance (Ginsburg, 1989, p. 73). Rao (1990, p. 42) noted tenants had several 
anxieties. Many were worried that homes would be sold to developers to provide owner-occupied 
housing for people with high incomes. They also believed that following demolition and the 
construction of new homes, there would be fewer homes and that property retained for rented 
housing would be re-let at unaffordable rents. 
LB Lambeth opposed HAT policy both in principle and for the two Lambeth estates in particular 
and supported tenants' campaigns against HATs. At tenant request, it decided not to co-operate 
with the Government's consultants and `obstructed' access to information, premises and other 
material that would have been of use (Rao, 1990, p. 41-42). In the council's view, as HATs would 
focus on a limited number of areas, they would siphon off funds that would otherwise be available 
to the local authority and areas in Lambeth without HATs would suffer (ibid, p. 40). It also argued 
that imposing a HAT on the Angell Town estate would disrupt its programme of work there; rents 
would increase; new lettings in the borough would fall; and renovated properties would be unlikely 
to go to local people in the greatest housing need (ibid, p. 41). A council officer, however, was 
responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating the responses of all council departments within the 
HAT areas, including measures to improve service delivery. In addition, a tenant liaison team was 
established to develop loser relations with tenant groups, act as an intermediary between the 
council and tenants and provide tenants with information about HATs (ibid, p. 41). Tenants, 
however, also felt antipathy towards the local authority, which was widely believed to be responsible 
for allowing the estates to deteriorate. Tenants had also become aware of Lambeth's politically 
motivated decision not to bid for EA funding the council 
- 
it transpired 
-- 
had not wanted to be 
seen to be accepting Government handouts (Harding. 1988, p. 9, from Ginsburg, 1989, p. 73). 
The situation in Tower Hamlets and Lambeth was replicated across the proposed HAT areas 
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Although in most areas there was little dispute that physical improvements were necessary, the 
overarching concerns were about future rent levels and security of tenure. While tenants would 
have no choice about whether they would become part of a HAT, they would have to bear the 
consequences in terms of reduced security of tenure and higher rents. Tenants also felt there would 
be little point in their homes being improved if they could not afford the new rents and/or were 
displaced during or after improvement. 
4.3.3 CONSULTANTS' REPORTS 
Consultants undertaking feasibility studies in the pilot HAT areas reported in February 1989. In 
Sandwell the consultants were Price Waterhouse, in Leeds PIEDA and in the four other areas, the 
Property Investment Company and Peat Marwick McLintock (PIC/PNIlVI). PIC/PMM produced a 
single report on their four areas. Despite the ballot issue being resolved, the consultants found many 
other causes of uncertainty and hostility. In particular, tenants were worried that: 
-- 
tenanted 
property would be sold to private landlords ` only interested in maximising their profits'; rent levels 
would `skyrocket and become unaffordable'; estates would `move up-market' and existing tenants 
would be `long-term losers' in that process; they would lose their right to transfer out of the estate 
into other local authority housing after the designation of the HAT; and their security of tenure 
`would be materially and adversely affected' (PIC/PMM, 1989, p. 3 1). The consultants noted that 
"... whether or not these fears were true, they were 
... 
believed to be true. " (ibid, p. 31). It also 
pointed to tenants having been manipulated by local authorities and other interest groups making 
partial or selective use of information to suit an anti HAT agenda. There was also a degree of 
confusion regarding what has been termed here the Mark I and the Mark II HAT; the consultants, 
for example, reported that opposition was "... founded on a particular perception of how a HAT 
would operate. This perception is markedly &fferent from the type of HAT we envisage and 
recommend " (ibid, p. 2). A key problem was uncertainty 
-- 
tenants did not really know what they 
would be letting themselves in for. PIC/PMM (ibid, p. 31-32) noted a critical problem: under the 
1988 Act, a HAT would develop its plans for the estates after it had been created. Tenants would 
therefore not know what a HAT would mean for them until after they had committed themselves to 
it. Hence, there was a `c1 ick n-and-egg' situation. Given the inevitable uncertainty, tenants needed 
assurances and/or confidence that their interests would be protected. 
If the pilot HATs were to have `any chance of implemontation', the consultants' considered that 
there had to be a change of approach, involving building support among and with interest and target 
groups. They made three recommendations (PICA? W 1989, p. 32-33). First, the Government's 
dismissive approach to local goven moat had to be dropped, it had to `procure the understanding and 
support' of local authorities for the designation of a HAT in their area, and furthermore, the first 
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step should come from the Government offering discussions and consultation. Second, to enable 
them to make an informed choice, tenants needed to be better informed about what a HAT involved. 
Prior to the ballot, illustrative plans needed to be distributed to all households affected by a HAT 
proposal. Plans needed to be specific to individual estates, cover physical renovation, financial 
arrangeme ts, costs, rent policies and likely rent levels, fiture management structure and 
consultation and participation procedures. In addition, the consultants advised that there should be 
statements about arrangements for after the HAT, including the likely new landlords and their likely 
rent structures. Third, given the existing hostility, the consultants recommended that at least six 
months be allowed for consultation processes after the HAT plans had gone out, to give time for the 
`bitter feelings to heal' and to allow time to involve tenants in making plans `their own' before 
endorsing them in a ballot. More generally, they considered that the HAT programme would be 
`more coherent and logical' and `more widely accepted within the housing community', if it was 
seen as `an exceptional response to an exceptional situation' (ibid, p. 58). 
The consultants' reports also provoked realisation of the likely cost of the HAT programme. 
Although by November 1988 the budget had increased from £125 million to £192 million, the 
consultants' reports suggested that this would still be inadequate. Their estimates were: 
-- 
Southwark (£112 million); Lambeth (£93-132 million); Leeds (£135 million); Sandwell (£13.5-22.4 
million); Tower Hamlets (£231 million); and Sunderland (£51-75 million). They therefore 
suggested that a minimum of £635.5 million was required. Although the final cost would also 
depend on the scale of property sales; PIC/PMM (ibid, p. 59-75) estimated that only £97 million 
would be recoverable by property sales at the end of the HATs. As Kam (1993, p. 74) observed, an 
initial idea had been for the HAT programme to be substantially financed from the proceeds of sales 
of land and renovated property, and that public expenditure would be minimised and private finance 
channelled into renovation. Given the contemporary experience of Stockbridge Village and 
Thamesmead (see Appendix C) and with the significant exception of those areas where larg)-scale 
gentrification might be expected (which would, in turn, have created problems of displacement), this 
seems an absurdly optimistic expectation. 
4.3.4 THE DEMISE OF THE FIRST HAT PROPOSALS 
The Government's original intention had been to proceed with declaring HATs by April 1989. in 
March 1989, following the consultants' reports, the Governmart announced plans to proceed 
towards HATs on nine estates in five areas with consultants being reappointed to carry out further 
consultations in preparation for ballots. The areas selected were: 
- 
Lambeth (Loughborough & 
Angell Town estates); Southwark (North Peckham & Gloucester Grove estates); Sunderland 
(Downhill, Townend Farm, Hylton Castle & part of Red House estates); Leeds (Gipton estate); and 
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Sandwell (Windmill Lane & Cape Hill estates). Despite consultants (PIC/PMM) concluding that 
the estates' problems were severe and the case for designation very strong, Tower Hamlets was the 
first area to be abandoned. The official reason given was overcrowding problems that could not be 
relieved within the designated areas or within the programme's cost constraints (Kam, 1993, p. 82). 
Thus, as the problems could not be resolved through the designation of a HAT, the Government 
intended to `ignore' them. 
- 
Sandwell 
In Sandwell and in contrast to the more negative opposition shown by LBs Tower Hamlets and 
Lambeth, the local authority developed its own strategy to demonstrate that it could achieve what a 
HAT aimed to do (Dwelly, 1990, p. 25). When first announced in 1988, three estates were proposed 
for a HAT in Sandwell 
- 
the Windmill Lane and Cape Hill estates in Smethwick and the Lion Farm 
estate in Oldbury, two miles away. While tenants formed SHOC (Sandwell HAT Opposition 
Campaign) to demonstrate their active opposition, the council's response had two themes. First, 
240 homes on the `unlettable' Whiteheath estate (part of Lion Farm estate) were sold off to private 
developers with the requirement that they be immediately demolished. Later several tower blocks on 
the estates were demolished and the sites sold to developers, while other properties were sold to an 
HA. As Dwelly (ibid, p. 24-25) observed, the council hoped the sales would help defeat the HAT 
proposal. Although the council's actions resulted in the Lion Farm estate being dropped from the 
list of HAT estates in March 1989, the Windmill Lane and Cape Hill estates were still affected. 
Second, major improvements on these estates were to be funded through an EA programme. The 
consultation exercise for this helped establish a new spirit of tenant-council co-operation that would 
subsequently alter the council's whole approach to housing managnent (ibid, p. 24). The local 
management offices that opened on both estates were the beginnings of what became an extensive 
decentralisation policy. The council also hired consultants to develop improvement schemes (ibid, 
p. 24). As the improvements requested by tenants were accepted by both the council and the DoE, a 
£7 million three-year EA scheme was subsequently approved. ' In late May 1990, the Government 
announced that the proposed HAT had been abandoned and cited as reasons the sales programme 
and the council's new decentralised estate management (ibid, p. 25). 
The first ballots 
By early 1990, it was evida t that only Southwark and Sunderland of the six pilot HAT areas 
offered a real possibility for a Yes vote. The Government therefore concentrated attention on these 
and offered significantly increased budgets: £80 million in Sunderland and £112 million in 
22 This does, however, contrast with the estimate of £13.5 
- 
£22 million for a HAT. 
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Southwark. At the same time, preliminary and secret talks about the possibility of a HAT in Hull 
had begun in July 1989, and, in Novanber 1989, a public offer of a HAT had been made in LB 
Waltham Forest. 
- 
Sonderkind 
Four estates in Sunderland had originally been included in the HAT proposal (Downhill estate, 
Townsend Farm, Hylton Castle and the Red House West). Of these, Hylton Castle estate had just 
come to the end of a £6 million modernisation programme. The estate was made up of houses, 
many of which had been sold under RTB, and had always been popular with waiting list applicants 
(Grant, 1988, p. 22). Tenants were particularly offended by the implicit labelling of their estates as 
among the worst in the county by dint of the proposal to establish a HAT. Ginsburg (1989, p. 72), 
for example, reported that, despite high levels of unemployment, tenants described their estates "... 
as living and supportive communities with little vandalism and crime. ". Although the estates 
remained predominantly in council tenure, the proportion of non-local authority housing had 
increased through tenants exercising RTB; from 5% in 1981 to 16% in 1989 (Rao, 1990, p. 43). An 
upsurge in RTB applications was also believed to have been stimulated by concern about the HAT 
proposal (Rao, 1990, p. 43; Ginsburg, 1989, p. 74), which can be seen as a pre-emptive exit: an exit 
that would be the tenant's own choice. 
Despite seeing the advantages of a HAT, the council neither publicly supported nor opposed it and, 
in contrast to LB Lambeth, co-operated with the Goverame is consultants (Rao, 1990, p. 44). 
Furthermore, it argued that the ultimate decision was for tenants to make and 
- 
if tenants voted in 
favour 
- 
it would accept it (Bright, 1990, p. 8). One of the attractions was that, because of its easier 
access to financial resources, a HAT would meet housing needs more quiddy (Rao, 1990, p. 44). 
The council did have some concerns (ibid, p. 44). It was unhappy that the resources being made 
available to the proposed HAT had not been given to it and considered that a change of ownership 
was not necessary in order to achieve the desired objectives 23 It was also initially worried that the 
stock would not return to municipal ownership after the HAT had completed their work, and 
obtained assurances that it would be able to buy back the estates and would be given resources to do 
so. Furthermore, the housing minister, Michael Howard, indicated that the council could appoint a 
deputy chair to the eleven-member HAT board with four places for tenant representatives (I 
Rollsinn. Nov 10,1989). The main tenant group, STAND, which had been prominent in lobbying 
for a ballot, campaigned for a say in the running of the HAT but 
- 
once certain Government 
undertakings had been given 
- 
did not oppose it. 
23 With finding, the local authority might have achieved the housing improvement objective; whether it 
would have achieved the tenatMandlord diversification objective is more doubtful. 
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As neither STAND nor the council opposed it, Sunderland had been widely tipped as the pilot HAT 
area most likely to go ahead (Inside Housing, April 20,1990, p. 5). Held in April 1990, however, 
the ballot resulted in an 80% No vote. 24 Bright (1990, p. 8) suggests that an explanation was the 
concern about the reliability of the Government's assurances. Prior to the ballot, legal opinion 
concluded that the assurances would be unenforceable. At the same time, the London Housing Unit 
acting on behalf of the Association Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) had sought a legal opinion 
from Hodge, James & Allen (from Dennis, 1990, p. 15). The opinion was that a local authority 
could not enter a legally-binding agreement to buy back property when it had not yet been 
transferred and the HAT was not in existence. It did note that, while a local authority could adopt a 
policy to repurchase the housing, it was of limited use because it would not bind future councils and, 
second, the local authority could not force the HAT to sell to it. 
The overwhelming No vote in Sunderland led to the withdrawal of HAT proposals 
-- 
without ballots 
-- 
from Leeds (in April 1990), Lambeth and Sandwell (in May 1990). In these areas, various 
combinations of the Government, local authorities and their own representatives effectively 
disenfranchised tenants: the Government by withdrawing the proposals without a ballot and local 
authorities and tenant representatives by the str of their opposition. Although academic to the 
extent that tenants would 
- 
in all probability 
- 
have rejected HATs had there been ballots, tenants 
were not given an opportunity to collectively accept or reject the HAT proposal: HAT proposals 
were therefore rejected for them not by than. Leeds and Lambeth, however, had both been scenes of 
unofficial ballots that dearly demonstrated tenants' views. In September 1989, Lambeth 
commissioned a MORI poll which showed that 72% of tenants would reject a HAT (Frew, 1990, 
p. 13). In March 1990, backed by the council, tenants on the Gipton estate in Leeds organised a 
ballot that showed 92% of tenants against a HAT (Inside Housing 9 March 1990). ' Hence, by the 
middle of 1990 only Southwark remained of the pilot HAT areas. 
- 
Southwark 
The proposed HAT in Southwark included two estates: 
- 
North Peckham and Gloucester Grove; the 
latter undergoing an EA programme. Although initially opposition was strong, as time passed a 
more calculated and pragmatic attitude emerged among tenant representatives. John Johnson, 
''' The ballot coincided with the arrival of the first Community Charge bills. 
2' In Leeds, the question asked was whether the tenants' group should negotiate with the Government about 
proposals for a HAT or ask the Government to withdraw the proposals. The No vote was therefore a 
refusal to negotiate. One of the by issues at Leeds was the continuing lack of clarity about what a HAT 
vwnuld mean. The chair of the Gipton tenants' group, Lorraine Wells (from Ulleri, 1989, p. 9), said that 
they had drawn up a list of more than 140 questions relating to the HAT but had only got `vaigue' answers 
back 
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secretary of Gloucester Grove TA (from Dwelly, 1989, p. 22), admitted: "It's just not good enough 
to keep playing at head-bangers with a blanket 'No HATS' stance. ". Similarly, Sandy Cameron, 
chair of North Peckham TA (ibid, p. 22) stated that "... we're not in a position to look a gift horse 
in the mouth 
... 
but for now we will treat it like a Trojan Horse. ". Hence, in contrast to those pilot 
HAT areas that sought to resist the imposition of a HAT, in Southwark, tenant representatives 
sought. 
- 
through negotiation 
- 
to modify its impact in ways that suited their own objectives. In the 
hope of implementing HAT policy in at least one location, the Government was also prepared to 
relax its single-mindedly hierarchical approach and to accommodate bottom-up views and concerns. 
Expectations of an acceptable `deal' between Southwark tenants and the Government were further 
fuelled by the housing minister's (David Trippier) close interest in the estates (ibid, p. 22). At a 
private meeting in May 1989, Trippier agreed in principle to do all he could to meet the (newly co- 
operative) tenant representatives' demands. Tenant representatives argued that if `cast iron 
guarantees' could be given on certain issues, there could be a Yes vote (ibid, p. 22). The tenants' 
conditions included: 
- 
an assurance that Southwark council would be able to buy back the estates 
without making cuts elsewhere; substantial tenant representation on the HAT board; and a ballot to 
determine who eventually owned and ran the estates, including provision for separate votes in 
different parts of the HAT (ibid, p. 22). Trippier's letter following the May meeting agreed to "... 
produce a statement of what a trust might do. ". In responding to a series of written questions in 
July 1989, Trippier (Commons WA. 18 July, 1989, cols. 106-108; 19 July, 1989, cols. 212-214; & 
20 July, 1989, cols. 337-342) clarified other important areas. In particular, he confirmed that the 
HAT board's composition as a chair and ten other members, half of whom could be tenants or 
council representatives. Trippier also stated that the ballot would be for a HAT to cover both 
estates and, with regard to the possibility of conflicting results, it was `premature to speculate on the 
outcome of the ballot'. 
Negotiations in Southwark were the most extensive of any of the pilot HAT areas. With the help of 
consultants, the TAs, the DoE and the shadow HAT chair negotiated policies for an evo teal HAT 
regarding redevelopment, housing management and economic rege ieration (Chumrow, 1995, 
p. 257). 26 Public meetings were held with the participation of local authority representatives and the 
agreed policies set out in a formal document (ibid, p. 257), which the Secretary of State, Chris 
Patten, also publicly endorsed (Dwelly, 1989, p. 24). 27 The agreed package of measures included: 
- 
" 
better rights of repair; 
"a resit arrears policy; 
" the establishment of EMBs; 
26 The shadow chair was John Chumrow, subsequently chair of Waltham Forest HAT. 
2' Patten had replaced Ridley in July 1989. 
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" guarantees that no private landlords or non-social landlords would appear and no emptied 
homes would be sold; 
" 
individual household vetoes over changes of landlord during the HAT; 
" 
decanting and arbitration procedures; 
"a rent freeze until rents had dropped to 80% of the borough average; and 
" 
four tenants on the eleven member HAT board (from Dwelly, 1991a, p. 25). 
LB Southwark took an agnostic but sceptical view. Its chair of housing (ibid, 1989, p. 23) argued 
that: "Even if there's only a tiny possibility of the estate getting £112 million, without strings, we 
must do all we can to ensure it goes ahead. ". He nevertheless considered that the Government 
would never agree to the conditions emerging in the document. Furthermore, without enabling 
legislation or ministerial directives, he would not trust the Government's word and neither would 
tenants: "Our mistrust is based on experience 
... 
our bid for continued Estate Action funding for 
improvements already underway has 
... 
been refused We're told we can't have £7 million, while 
in the same breadth they're taking of spending £112 million under a HAT. ". As negotiations 
progressed, LB Southwark appointed an outreach worker to explore the possibility of a tenant 
management co-operative (TMC), while a grant of £20,000 was made available to the TAs to 
employ their own lawyer or consultant to examine the guarantees' legal ramifications (ibid, p. 23). 28 
The ` chicken-and-egg' problem re-appeared: while `legally-binding' deals could only be struck once 
the HAT existed, it would only exist if tenants voted for it. Chumrow (1995, p. 257) describes how 
the "... nature of commitments given by the DoE and shadow chair over and above those in the 
primary legislation were argued extensively, particularly their validity in law. ". A Queen's 
Counsel advised that, while the commitments were `far reaching', they were `commitments, not 
guarantees' (ibid, p. 257). Tenant representatives appreciated the difficulties; John Johnson, 
secretary of Gloucester Grove TA (from Dwelly, 1989, p. 22), stated that: "... if we can't get 
something legally-binding, we will go for the next best thing. We want ministers to publicly 
endorse the document we are drawing up. ". The council, however, continued to point out that it 
was not possible to make many of the key pledges legallybinding and that there was no certainty the 
Government or the HAT board would not subsequently depart from these pledges (Frew, 1990, 
p. 12). Immediately prior to the ballot, the ruling Labour group voted 15-14 to oppose the HAT 
(Chumrow, 1995, p. 257). The council ceased its agnosticism, withdrew its support for the 
consultation process and aggressively lobbied for a No vote prior to and during the three-week 
ballot. The council's opposition was not on the substance of the proposals, but on the possibility 
that the Government and the HAT board would not honour the commitments (i. e., a lack of trust). 
Nearly eighteen-mates after the apparent thaw in relations, the ballot was finally held m October, 
2 It is notable that the possibility of a HAT galvanised the local authority in Southwark, and previously in Sandwell, to become more proactive in terms of improving housing management. 
1S1 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
1990. Writing during the ballot period, Dennis (1990b, p. 8) noted that the mood differed on the 
estates. Although Gloucester Grove was passionately anti HAT, North Peckham estate tenants 
- 
`no less suspicious of central Government' 
-- 
were more willing and the estate's TA committee 
caused `shock waves' when, immediately before voting began, it recommended a Yes vote. As 
Dennis (ibid, p. 8) observed the TA committee seemed "... determined to wrest control of their 
neglected estate from Southwark LBC and take advantage of the Government's generous 
concessions in HATS 
- 
which the tenants' association believes it won. ". Although the estates 
appeared divided, each returned similar results. In each case the vote was against a HAT; on North 
Peckham estate it was 67% against (45% of those eligible to vote) on a turnout of 68%, while on 
Gloucester Grove it was 72% against (52% of those eligible) on a turnout of 72%" The local MP, 
Harriet Harman, regarded it as a vote "... against the Government, not in favour of the council 
... 
Southwark should not become complacent. " (from Cameron & Frew, 1991, p. 14). Furthermore, as 
the HAT consultation had raised expectations and as LB Southwark had been instrumental in 
persuading tenants to turn it down, it now had a special 
- 
albeit only a moral 
- 
responsibility to 
help find solutions. Southwark's chair of housing admitted that it would be impossible to return to 
the `paternalism of the past' and the council now wanted to enter into a 'genuine relationship' with 
tenants' (Frew, 1990, p. 12). 
Writing immediately after the ballot, Frew (1990, p. 12), a tenant representative, posed a series of 
rhetorical questions: 
- 
" Why did tenants reject proposals put together by tenants in a consultation process `probably 
unprecedented in its scale and ope ness'? 
" Why did they reject a deal offering the prospect of a £100 million refurbist rt of their estates, 
which the council could not begin to match 
-a deal that contained dear commitments that the 
estates would be retained within the social housing stock, that HAT rents would be no higher 
than Southwark council resits, and that at the end of the HAT, tenants could go back to the 
council if they wished? 
" Why did North Peckham tenants reject a HAT that had the public backing of the majority of 
their TA representatives? 
Explanations varied. Kam (1993, p. 84), for example, argued that some felt that consultants had 
only ever talked to the TA and had not wan tenants over by door-to-door visits; others felt that it 
was largely due to the borough's opposition. Frew (1990, p. 12) also regarded LB Southwark's 
eleventh hour decision to campaign against the HAT as `undoubtedly having an important influence' 
and conduced that ultimately residents rejected a HAT, not because they felt the estates could not 
benefit from what a HAT had to offer, but because "... the risks associated with abandoning their 
29 Under the Tenants' Choice voting method, North Peckham vwuld have become a HAT, while Gloucester Grove would not. 
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council tenancies for HAT tenancies were too great. ". 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter has discussed the emergence of HAT policy, its development through the legislative 
stage and the ultimately abortive attempt to establish HATs in six pilot areas. By October 1990, all 
six had been abandoned or defeated at ballot. The Government's high-handed and 
uncompromisingly hierarchical approach had met with an equally entrenched resistance from tenants 
and local authorities. Thus, for the first two years after the passing of the 1988 Act, HAT policy 
seemed a total failure. Following the Southwark ballot, for example, a DoE spokesperson stated it 
was unlikely that the Government would earmark estates for HATs and, instead, councils and 
tenants would be encouraged to consider HATs as a means of improving particular estates (Inside 
Housing. 12 Oct, 1990). In retrospect, this marked a major change in the implementation strategy. 
To conclude this Chapter, reasons for the failure to implement HAT policy in the pilot HAT areas 
will be discussed. Of Sabatier & Mazmanian's six conditions, three 
- 
`dear & consistent 
objectives'; `commitment & skill of implementers'; and `stable socio-economic contexts' 
-- 
are not 
relevant to implementation had not been sufficiently advanced. The other three conditions each offer 
some explanation for the failure to establish HATs. The conditions of `adequate causal theory' and 
`support of affected interest groups' will be discussed first and can be discussed together. The other 
relevant condition 
- 
`appropriate policy tools' 
- 
will then be discussed. 
Adequate causal theory & support of affected interest groups 
In essence, the two principal interest groups affected by HAT policy were local authorities and 
tenants. HAT policy was based 
- 
in part 
-- 
on the assumptions that local authority were poor 
housing managers and, second, that tenants were greatly dissatisfied with local authority landlords 
and would welcome the opportunity to transfer to a better landlord. Even if they were not 
dissatisfied with their housing services, it was assumed that tenants would vote for a HAT simply 
for funding for improvements to their housing, which together with the rent freeze was an incentive 
to support the policy. Tenants were therefore expected to welcome HATs and the Government 
expected to be allied with tenants in imposing HATs and overriding local authorities. In this 
respect, however, the Government made a major political misjudgement and failed to appreciate 
tenants' apparent loyalty to local authorities (i. e., it misjudged the implementation context). 
Opposition to HATS by local authorities and tenants was 
- 
at least on one level 
-a reaction to 
presentation as well as substance. The Government's approach was personified by Nick Ridley, 
who presented HATs as an offer tenants could not refuse and initially refused to allow a ballot 
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because tenants would be so `misinformed' they might vote against a HAT. Similarly, Kam (1993, 
p. 76) suggests that, some local authorities might have consented to a HAT in order to be relieved of 
the managerial and financial burden of poor quality housing. Nevertheless, because they were 
presented in a manner `readily perceived as a further attack' on local authorities, it was `politically 
impossible' for local authorities to accept them since 
- 
in doing so 
- 
they would be seen to be "... 
accepting humiliating terms for themselves and colluding with central Government in putting 
tenants at risk of being priced out of areas in which they lived ". Kam (ibid, p. 76) also noted the 
curiosity that an alliance of local authorities and tenants should spring up with "... the apparently 
unlikely aim of rejecting substantial HAT investment for the renovation of some of the most run- 
down estates in Britain ". 
- 
opposition by local authorities 
Announced prior to the passage of the 1988 Act and before the full transition from the Mark I to 
Mark II HAT, the pilot HAT areas were to be imposed on local authorities. The original HAT 
proposals (i. e., the Mark I HAT) also permitted the Government to transfer local authority housing 
and tenants to an unelected quango 
- 
and, in addition, to do so at financially punitive terms to local 
authorities. The legislation also gave Government ministers considerable discretion to act in either a 
benign or an authoritarian manner. Thus, as the policy offered few positive incentives to local 
authorities, it gave than ample reason to oppose it and, in addition, to influence 
- 
or manipulate 
- 
tenants to oppose it. 
The pilot HAT period was also characterised by a clash of political ideologies between central and 
local government resulting from the Thatcher Governme is attempts to ßuadamwtally reform the 
welfare state and its attempt to downgrade local authorities from partners to agents of central 
Government. Given the Government's reluctance to trust local authorities as implementing 
agencies, HAT policy was designed to bypass local authorities. Kam (1993, p. 77), however, 
considered this `politically naive': even if HATs could be imposed against the will of local 
authorities, it was doubtful whether they could actually operate in a highly confcontadonal climate. 
Although the legislation enabled HATs to take over many local authority powers within its 
boundary, opportunities would remain for local authority obstruction (ibid, p. 77). In supporting the 
principle of a tenant ballot, Lord Mcintosh (LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 393), for example, had warned 
that HATs could not work if they started their lives in "... in an abnasphere of wwertainly, 
acrimony and cons oversy. ". 
Despite a Government intent on overriding and bypassing local authority opposition, the legitimacy 
of local authorities to obstruct the implementation of the policy 
- 
and thereby frustrate the sovereign 
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parliament 
- 
must also be considered. Although local councils are elected (and, hence, thew are 
- 
in 
principle 
- 
competing democratic legitimacies), as discussed in Chapter One, the New Rigg was highly 
sceptical of about the real democratic legitimacy of local authorities 30 Hogwood & Gum (1984, p. 208) 
sass that implementation should "... inwohre a process of interaction between organisations, the 
members of which may have clffrent values, perspectives, and priorities fivm one another and from 
those advocating the policy. ". They further argue that, although Biere is no guarantee that such 
consultation will produce prior consort, muds of this interaction should take place before policy 
formulation. While attempts might still be made by unconvinced local authorities and others to modify 
and redirect the policy's trust, for Hogwood & Cram (ibid, p. 208) there were "... surely limits 
- 
if only 
legal and constitutional limits 
- 
to how fair such past-legiskuivve guerrilla skirmishing should be 
taken. ". The Government, however, made a somewhat cursory attempt at consultation. The consultation 
period for the discussion paper was extremely short and it is difficult to discern what influence 
- 
if any 
- 
representations might have had. Given its conviction approach, doubt must also be placed on the 
Government's sincerity in seeking to consult interest groups. The six pilot HATs areas, for example, 
were announced in Parliament before the relevant local authorities had been consulted. 
- 
opposition by tenants 
Tenants in poor quality accommodation were caught between local authorities that (allegedly) 
provided poor housing services (and had no funds to do anything about it) and a central Government 
- 
offering the incentive of funds to improve the housing stock 
- 
but whose motives and intentions 
they did not trust. Three major reasons suggest why tenants in the pilot HAT areas opposed HATS 
(adapted and developed from Gregory & Hainsworth, 1993, p. 115-6 and Karn, 1993, p. 77). In 
combination, these challenge some of the assumptions underlying the causal theory that ostensibly 
underpinned HAT policy 
First, the Govemmetrt misjudged the scale of insensitive manago n nt by local authorities. By the 
late 1980s there had been substantial changes, increases in taunt consultation and extensive 
decentralisation of managwa t to estate level. Many of the changes were due to the Gove nma is 
own legislation, including the Tenant's Charter and demonstration projects, such as PEP, similar 
local authority initiatives, and later EA. Furthermore, a large-scale research programme undertaken 
by the Centre for Housing Research (CHR, 1989) found infra-tenure differences to be so large that 
any overall judgement as to which was superior was invalid (Cole & Furbey, 1994, p. 216). In 
pointed contrast to the 1986 Audit Commission report, the CHR (1989, p. 1) concluded that ".. 
social lousing and its management in England um not in a state of crisis. ". it furdw 
30 See also RidI y's Commute in Chapter Three about local a tt«ities maniPulagg nos to buy votes. 
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recommended that a `more informed debate' about the social ranted sector should "... drop the 
widespread assumption that there is a pervasive crisis in managing council housing and take as 
its starting point that there are good and bad managers amongst local authorities and housing 
associations. " (ibid, p. l). The study showed that councils were not inherently worse landlords than 
HAs and the major factor that influenced differences in performance was the extra subsidy afforded 
to HAs, enabling them to spend half as much again on landlord functions as local authorities. As 
Cole & Furbey (1994, p. 216-217) concluded, the `myth of the unique failings of council housing 
services' had been ` confounded by empirical investigation' and the report "... paid testimony to 
some of the changes in the organisation of service delivery by local authorities during the 1980s 
... 
Housing management in local authorities was being reformed from within 
- 
and the pay-offfor 
the councils was a more tenacious degree of support front tenants than had once been assumed ". 
Equally, these observations generalise about the sector as a whole, whereas, in principle, HAT 
policy would be directed at the worst parts of the sector. 
Second, although the Goverment had stressed its intention to dispose of HAT properties to HAs 
and private landlords, it overlooked the threat tenure diversification, loss of secure tenure and the 
likelihood of higher rents presented to local authority tenants (Kam, 1993, p. 77). Under the 
1988/89 legislation, both the private rented sector and the HA sector were to be deregulated, tenants 
would have assured rather than secure tenancies, and the new financial regime for HAs was likely to 
increase rent levels. Although in the Act, properties could only be transferred to `social' landlords, 
this did not allay tenants' fears. Tenants were unfamiliar with HAs and considered than similar to 
private landlords. Thus, despite the prospect of higher local authority rents (due to the 1989 Acct), 
for many tenants the other changes made local authority tenancy more attractive. They ire 
decided in favour of the `the known' rather than `the unknown' and were less ready to avail 
themselves of exit options than the Government had expected. Furthermore, while RTB was a 
choice with incentives, similar incentives were not present in the other exit rinds sms. Although, 
in the case of HATs, the prospect of improvements and a rent freeze were incentives, these were 
outweighed by uncertainty and the expectation of higher rents and reduced security of tenure. 
Third, there was considerable mistrust of the Government who 
- 
it was suspected 
- 
were more 
concerned with ousting local authority landlords than with improving property for existing tenants. 
HAT policy therefore appeared to focus primarily on exit with improvement simply a means to that 
end; an issue epitomised by Ridley's frequent assertions that, if taunts did not vote for a HAT, the 
resources would be sperrt elsewhere. The Government's autocracy and r luctanoe to appreciate 
tenants' views, opinions and preferences, epitomised by its reluctance to permit a ballot, exacerbated 
tenant mistrust regarding its intentions. Although a ballot was conceded, the climate of swpWon 
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did not abate. Positions had become entrenched and attitudes had hardened to the point of a failure - 
- 
by both local authorities and tenants in the pilot HAT areas - to appreciate the significance of the 
changes that had been made. 31 As the choice to accept or reject anhand the ability to negotiate and 
to modify or amend the policy to bring it into greater accordance with one's own objectives, the 
premature vetoing of the pilot HATs was short-sighted. 
Appropriate policy tools 
The failure of the initial attempt to establish HATs resulted from the introduction of a formal veto 
point for target groups. Local opposition to the prospect of a HAT should have been - and 
probably was 
- 
anticipated. HATs, for example, were explicitly modelled on UDCs, which - in 
turn 
- 
were modelled on NTDCs and the establishment of both UDCs and NTDCs had been 
opposed by local interest groups. Ward (1994, p. 103), for example, notes that New Towns policy 
opened with a `public relations disaster' when residents of the existing town of Stevenage "... 
objected strongly to the Government acting in, as they saw it, a high-handed and dictatorial 
way. ". Furthermore, of the eight new towns designated for the London area in the 1940s, only the 
new town proposed at Basildon was not opposed by the local authority. Of the initial UDCs, the 
LDDC attracted forceful objections from the Greater London Council, the Docklands Boroughs and 
various community groups, resulting in a fifty-five day hearing at the House of Lords before it was 
able to take up its role (Oc & Tiesdell, 1991, p. 313). fl In the case of UDCs and NTDCs, however, 
there was no formal ability for local groups to veto their establistnnart. hi the HAT legislation, the 
provision for a ballot introduced a formal veto point for target groups. This was the Achilles' had 
of the Government's implementation strategy: HATs could not simply be imposed an tenants. 
Despite the implications of the ballot, Nick Ridley (CD, 16 Mardi, 1989, WA, col. 324) corwnuod 
to argue that estates turning down a HAT could not expect any extra resources to be channelled 
through local authorities: "If [tenants] do not want a Trust, then the available resources can be 
used to tackle areas and problems elsewhere. ". The implicit coercion did not endear tenants to the 
concept of HATs: Steam (1989, p. 5), for example, noted that dislike of HATs was eihanoed by 
Ridley `... playing Godfather and presenting the Trusts to the tenants as an or they could not 
refuse. ". Thus, as they did not feel able to trust the Gove nmart, tenants in Sunderland and 
Southwark vetoed the HAT proposals. 
31 During the Bill's passage, for example, over four-hundred amendments were proposed and one-hundred 
incorporated As was demonstrated by the consultants' reports in the pilot HAT areas, tenants did not Ally 
appreciate the changes made to the proposed legislation (i. e., Arom Mark I to Mark II). It can also be 
speculated that had HAT policy been in its Mark II version from the outset (and presented is a less 
tationa' fashion) it might have achieved wider acceptability. 
32 The 1977 Wbite Paper, Policies for the Inner Cities (DoE, 1977, p. 10) had specifically rejected the idea 
of a body similar to the NfDCI on the grounds that in an inner city development con it wie 
important to preserve accotmtability to the local electorate. ". 
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The first HATs 
Having started from a strongly hierarchical approach to implementation, the Government 
subsequently became more willing to accommodate the concerns of tenants and local authorities. 
The necessity for a ballot meant that HATs could not simply be imposed and the Government would 
need to procure tenant support for 
- 
and trust in 
-- 
the HAT proposal. Sabatier & Mazmanian's 
condition for effective implementation was `compliance from' or `support of interest and target 
groups for the policy. While compliance can 
- 
in principle 
- 
be compelled by the use of force or 
power, support requires persuasion and the use of influence or incentives. Hence, as discussed in 
Chapter One, where hierarchical control is not possible, implementation must give consideration to 
the incentives for implementers and/or target groups. The necessity of a Yes vote in a ballot meant 
that proposals had to appeal to target groups. The Government therefore had to understand the 
resistance and opposition to HATs by tenants (if not by local authorities), seek to overcome it and, 
thereby, avoid tenants vetoing the policy. Nevertheless, as Gregory & Hainsworth (1993, p. 1 14) 
observed "... the whole flavour of the legislation wres not compactible with the need to win over 
potential customers. ". 
Initially, Ridley had maintained that the ballot made no difference to the Government's approach 
and that the incentive of resources for improvement combined with the threat of no resources if 
tenants did not vote in favour was sufficient. With increasing realisation of the necessity of ensuring 
a favourable ballot, a more conciliatory approach emerged in some of the pilot HAT areas, such as 
Sunderland and especially Southwark (aldwugi not Lambeth or Leeds). The start of this can be put at 
around May 1989, shortly after the consultants' reports in the pilot HAT areas, when David 
Trippier met with `newly co-operative' tenants from the pilot HAT area in Southwark. The 
softening of the Government's approach also received a fur her boost in July 1989 when the more 
conciliatory Chris Patter replaced the politician most associated with the HAT progtumnee Nick Ridley, 
as Secretary of State. In the same month, initial contact was made about the possibility of 
establishing a HAT in North Hull and, in November 1989, a HAT offer was made in Waltham 
Forest. In each case, the local authority was willing to consider the possibility of a HAT in its area. 
The Government may also have been keen to establish the first HAT, which would give a positive 
signal to other local authorities. As the first area would be a 'guinea pig', these would be a 
collective hesitancy to be the first HAT area. If no obvious (political) harm came, then others might 
wish to be a close second. Establishing one HAT would therefore make it easier to establish 
subsequent HATS" At the time, however, as Frew (1990, p. 12) noted, it was unclear whether the 
33 Unlike LSVTs, where there has been a mix of outcomes, aller the first successful ballot, there were no further No votes. At Stonebridge, however, a minority of eligible tenants voted in ftvc of the HAT. 
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Govemmer t would be willing to risk the `political embarrassment' of another ballot box defeat. 
By late summer 1990, rumours circulated that the Treasury wanted to abandon the HAT 
programme and there appeared to be divisions within Government about whether to continue with a 
HAT programme. Arguably what stopped the Govt abandoning the policy was the political 
embarrassment of having failed to implement its policy, Gregory & Hainsworth (1993, p. 117), for 
example, argued that the Government needed "... at least some token scheme before respectable 
burial of the policy. ". Although the solid No vote in Southwark 
- 
despite extensive negotiations 
- 
was seen by many as having sealed the fate of HAT policy, the Treasury's 1990 Autumn Statement 
unexpectedly left £67 million for HATs in the DoE's 1992/93 budget (Dwelly, 1991, p. 24). The 
funds were linked to the Goverme is 
- 
until then 
- 
secret negotiations with Hu l city council and, 
in March 1991, there was a Yes vote at the ballot. In August 1991, there was a Yes vote at 
Waltham Forest and in August 1992, tenants in Liverpool voted to become the third HAT. 
Having discussed the initial failure of the implementation of HAT policy in this Chapter, the next 
three Chapters outline and discuss the implementation of HAT policy in these three locations. This 
Chapter has had a broadly top-down perspective, the next three Chapters have a bottom up 
perspective. As the HATs developed there was mutual learning and transfers of practice between 
HAT areas. References are therefore made in each Chapter both backwards and forwards to the 
experience in the other case study areas. The final Chapter compares the experience in the pilot 
HAT areas with that in the first HAT areas. 
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Chapter Five 
CASE STUDY I: 
THE NORTH HULL HAT 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter is a case study of the North Hull HAT, the first to be established. It is in five main 
parts. The first discusses the choice to establish a HAT; the second the HAT's development programme; 
the third taw t involvement; the fourth the c cues about future landlords. The fifth indicates the HAT's 
wider relation role. Table 5.1 is a diraiology of the HAT. 
5.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HAT IN HULL 
5.1.1 THE BACKGROUND TO THE HAT OFFER 
The public announcement of the possibility of a HAT in Hull came out of the blue in November 
1990, shortly after the overwhelming No vote in Southwark The first contact regarding the 
possibility of a HAT in Hull, however, had occurred in July 1989, when the housing minister, David 
Trippier, visited the city. Assigned to drive the minister and knowing he had been `tar-and-feathered' on 
the Gipton estate in Leeds, a Hull city councillor (NHHAT 13,1998) took the opportunity to offer his 
own views on the Govemnat's approach to HAT policy "... in my opinion, the tmops were abeadY, on 
the ground and half a dozen men from the ministry woulan't be able to than it If the around wwo 
resisted the HAT proposal, then local authorities were alwa}v going to support the tenants. ". The 
councillor (NUHAT 13,1998) argued that if the Govemment warted to get a HAT set up, it needed to 
replace its ooid'raýtational approach with co-operation: "There »a policy of rubbishing local 
authorities and tenaw were being per ma*d to exit into the un crown.... There is+as an on 
-going battle 
between local government and cenmal Government and tenants were lasing out ". The minister was 
receptive to the suggestions and, tree days later, the eouiicillor received an invitation for him and his thief 
housing officer to discuss the possibilityof a HAT in Hull. ' 
At the time, the council had sought finding to carry out further refurbishmei t to its large public 
sector housing stock, including the completion of a project on the Nordi Hull estate. Over the 
1 The approach was almost simultaneous with Chris Patten replacing Nick Ridley as Secretary of State. 
110 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
July 1989 First contact about possibility of a HAT in Hull. 
January 1990 Start of secret HAT negotiations. 
October 1990 Feasibility Study by Hull city council. 
November 1990 Official announcement of HAT discussions in Hull 
February 1991 Shadow HAT board formed 
March 1991 69% Yes vote on 77% turnout in HAT ballot 
May 1991 First Community Planning Weekend 
July 1991 Designation Order to set up North Hull HAT laid before Parliament. 
January 1992 Transfer of the estate from Hall city council to the HAT. 
January 1993 Neighbourhood Paitnership Steering Groups set up 
October 1993 RPWG set up/ recognised by the HAT 
February 1994 500° house improved 
October 1994 Receives Charter Mark 
November 1994 RBM elections 
February 1995 1000° house improved 
June 1995 RBM election 
January 1996 Start of trial management scheme with HAs 
1996 Resident Aganda Meetings started 
May 1996 Decision to delay tenants exit from the HAT until 1998 
October 1996 Decision to form a community development trust 
December 1996 Govetnmmt's decision on life-time grant-in-aid (1115 million) and wi sp date of 1998-99 
March 1997 Neighbourhood partnerships become North Hull Community Alliance 
May 1998 Unity In Community (community development trust) business plan published 
November 1998 Completion of work 
November 1998 
- 
Final winding down 
February 1999 
TABLE 5.1 
- 
DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH HULL HAT 
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previous six to seven years, about half the houses on the estate had been refurbished, but -- at 
existing funding levels 
- 
it would take twenty years to do the rest. To refurbish than in five or six 
years would cost about £50-60 million and an EA bid had been submitted. Although the 
Government refused to provide EA funding, the housing minister, David Trippier, indicated that 
funding earmarked for HATs was still available. Furthermore, given its experience in the pilot HAT 
areas, the Government seemed willing to make a HAT more palatable to a Labour council. In 
return and provided a series of conditions were met, the council agreed to promote a HAT proposal 
to tenants. A councillor and subsequently a member of the HAT board (NHHAT 13,1998) admitted the 
decision had been very pragmatic: "... the money uw aº lable and needed ". Thus, in January 1990, 
despite political opposition to HATs from the national Labour party and from other Labour local 
authorities, the council entered into secret negotiations with the DoE. For a Labour council to 
countenance a HAT at this particular point in time was a radical step. With the prospect of a 
general election and having effectively undermined the campaign of opposition to HATS, there was 
an issue of how Hull would stand if it Labour won. Members of the shadow cabinet, for example, 
had suggested that a Labour Government would repeal the 1988 and 1989 Acts (Dwelly, 1990, 
p. 22). Furthermore, despite leading the council's negotiators, John Black, chair of housing and 
deputy leader, had himself campaigned nationally against HATs. Black (from Dwelly, 1991b, 
p. 22), however, argued that the council had kept the Labour party informed of the progress of 
negotiations. 
The inner core of politicians and officers involved in the negotiations had to sell the idea to the 
remainder of the Labour grýroup. Although any proposal would have to be voted upon by tenants, the 
Labour group (at the time Labour held 57 of the 60 seats) within the council could deny than that 
opportunity. The local MP, Kevin McNamara, argued that the council should not adopt a 
politically partisan stance and prejudge HATs as `good' or `bad', but should let tenants decide 
whether they wanted a HAT (NHHAT 1,1994). The HAT proposal had some opposition from within 
the oamcil, with some councillors finding it difficult to understand why the council appeared to be 
giving away two4housand 
- 
albeit poor quality 
- 
properties. The council negotiators therefore tried to 
"... pm-empt what concerm there would be from our own star, i. e., fivm the union. 
We needed to accommodate veryone. The direct labour oigarnisaaiom, for example, 
possibly faced big losses in terms of work We nn* sure Chart the DSO could tender 
for soak 
- 
we made sham that legally the FIAT would be able to give work to them and 
dart they wouldn't be excluded from tenderftfor that wort 
... 
We also made sure 
drab the HAT would be able to employ local authority staff 
Opposition was also eased by the prospect of a capital reooipt for the estate's transfer, by the st h of 
assurances that tenants would be able to return to the local a ihoiity and by the fad that the local 
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authority would not have to pay for the properties. 
By October 1990, the council had carried out its own Feasibility Study for a HAT on the North Hull 
estate, which concluded that a HAT was "... the only mechanism by which the resources necessary 
to comprehensively improve the estate and uplift the social and economic conditions could be 
made available. " (NHHAT 1992, Annual R ort 1991/92, p. 1). Beyond the council, however, the 
discussions remained a well-kept secret. A HAT officer (NHHAT 1,1994), who had been involved 
at an early stage, described it as "... 'cloak-and-dagger' stuff before going public on the HAT "2 
Tenants were not told of the possibility of a HAT until November 1990, when tenants were also 
informed of the intention to hold the ballot in February or March of 1991. 
5.1.2 THE HAT AREA 
The site for a possible HAT was the North Hull estate where, from the mid-1980s, the council had 
been undertaking a refvrbishmont programme on the North Hull estate. As only the unimproved 
part of the estate was proposed as the site for a HAT, the HAT area was therefore only a part of a 
larger estate. The HAT would also be in two parts: the larger part was either side of Greenwood 
Avenue, the main road through the estate; the smaller part was Watton Grove to the east. The 
proposed HAT area contained 2421 dwellings, predominantly two- and three-bedroom houses dating 
mainly from the 1930s but including a small number (111) of early post-war houses flats and 
bungalows built as infill development on Second World War bomb sites. In terms of the stock 
condition, the major problems were unsound structural condition, poor internal layouts, inadequate 
heating and insulation, and the poor external environment. The community was regarded as 
relatively stable but increasingly polarised into the elderly and those with a priority call on social 
housing, especially homeless families. The F Dili y Shy (HCC, 1990) stated that the proposed 
HAT area contained a population "... who may be living there because they have no other choice 
in dwellings which exhibit serious problem of disrepair, are inadequate to present-day suds 
and extremely expensive to manage. ". There was also a widening mismatch between housing 
supply and housing demand, with significant, levels of under-occupation (approximately 30%) and 
overcrowding (approximately 13%). Surveys indicated that: - 30% of tenants were aged over 60; 
44% had lived in the HAT area for more than 20 years; almost 25% of properties were occupied by 
2 The secrecy created problems of `departmental jealousy'. As the HAT had been formulated in great 
secrecy, some actions within the council felt excluded. The HAT proposal did not therefore take the entire 
council with it: "There was also some resentment by other senior oMcers It is not their baby and they 
have no commitment to the success of the HAT. " (NHHAT 3,1994). A HAT officer/tenant (NHHAT 14, 
1998) noted that some co ncillors had been qpind the HAT proposal: "... they were jealous because it wo mI 
then 
-and they're still ggafru the HAT now It's a po*vr dq really. ". When the council initi lly i sed 
planning consent for the HAT offices, this was seen as `badmtabbing' and certain facxions in the council Seft 
their own be& (NHIiAT 3,1994). 
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single people, while 7% of households consisted of six or more persons; over 70% were in receipt of 
housing benefit; and more than 20% of the active population was unemployed, with 15% being long 
term unemployed (NHRAT 1992, Annual eport 1991/92, p. 4). The estate also contained a small 
but significant number of owner-occupiers (338 or about 14% of residents) who had exercised RTB. 
The number of tenanted properties that would transfer to a HAT was therefore 2083. 
5.1.3 THE PRE-HAT NEGOTIATIONS 
Prior to the official announcement of the possibility of a HAT, the council had conducted extensive 
negotiations with the DoE. In their account of the HAT's development, Stephen Brindley (former 
director of housing at Hull city council and the HAT's chief executive) and Peter Arnold (a HAT 
board member) argue that 
- 
in the absence of established tenant groups 
-- 
the council took the lead 
and negotiated on tenants' behalf. A councillor (NHHAT 13,1998) considered that the council did not 
have to fight people with a `political agenda' because it had seen the proposal from tenants' point of view. 
From the council's perspective, tenants required assurances regarding the composition of the HAT 
board, rant levels before and after improvement, and rights of transfer to the council after 
improvement (Brindley & Arnold, 1992, p. 4). Akhoiigh Hull was not the first HAT proposal to 
negotiate the `right' for tenants to return to the local authority, it did achieve firmer assurances, which 
were regarded as impoitait in achieving a Yes vote (NHHAT 9,1997). Har. M and as in the pilot HAT 
areas, a chicken-and-M situation had arises regarding legally-binding assurances. A councillor 
(NHHAT 13,1998) admitted his own reservations: "No matter what the Government sai4 it coulth, 't 
assure the tenantr. There iat**i't been a HAT before.... Alnisters could give assonances to tenants, but 
there coulth't be legally-büdng aawsmvww until the HAT ºs ' established but the tenants woulan't 
vote for a HAT unless dine were asswwwes. ". The resulting agreement was that if a secure taunt 
wished to return to the local authority, then the Govemmat would direct the HAT to dispose of the 
property in accordance with the tuia is pre%ranoes (i. e., it overrode the HAT's discretion in respect of 
such disposals). In Mum, the council agreed to accept all taunts who wished to return. It was also 
agreed that landlord choices would be made individually rather than by majority voting. The 
Government was also asked to formally commit itself to detailed assurances and, with their ballot 
forms, tenants received a letter from the housing minister, Sir Gere Young, co flmring that they would 
be able to return to the council. A HAT deer (NHHAT 9,1997) fett these leäas were very important: 
`It ways a very public commitment 
... 
If it harbt't been for that guarantee, there night have been a 
nuance of a No vote. 3 There was also a letter to tenants from the council affirming its desire to have 
than back` The ability to ftun, however, was not legslly4bhiding the Govenune t could change its 
3 Following the ballot, in December 1991, a Declaration of Intention was signed by the housing minister, 
the HAT chair and the leader of Hull city council, setting out the basis of the tenants' choice of future landlord and individual rights to return to the council (NHHHAT, Soaual Report 1991/92 p. 2). 4 As discussed in Chapter Fau, this undertaking could only be binding on the party then in power provided 
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mind (or there could be a change of Govemm t), while the local authority could also change its policy 
(or there could be a change of council). Despite the continued lack of legal enforceability, these 
assurances were geared to ensuring that tenants had more certainty about the future than in the pilot 
- 
and aborted 
-- 
HAT areas. Guarantees were also given on rwt levels, which would be frozen 
during the period of improvement and, thereafter, would increase only to the level of equivalent 
improved properties in the city. To simplify accounting procedures, it was also agreed that properties 
would return to the local authority at mo-cost. 
The council also sought assurances from the Government in a number of other areas, which as a city 
councillor (NHHAT 13,1998) argued, "... would be the only rwzj to guarantee a Yes vote. ". First, 
the Government was to stay out of the consultation process and the council was to take the initiative. 
The council would thereby vouch for the HAT proposal. Second, before the ballot, the HAT chair 
had to be named and a shadow HAT board set up. A councillor (NHHAT 13,1998) argued that the 
shadow board could be presented at public meetings and tenants told that these would be their landlords: 
`It would also be made clear that there were some vawnt seats and Haase would be for residents.... The 
chairman could wiser questions and take fa 
. 
He would be accessible. If people were going to vote, 
they needed to Avow who they were going to vote for. ". Third, t ere needed to be an agreed composition 
of the HAT board Representation was not only to be divided equally between the DoE and local 
authority/tenant members but all, including the chair, had to be mutually acceptable. In January, 
David liggins was appointed as shadow HAT chair and the council's chair of housing (John Black) as 
deputy chair. ' The shadow HAT board was established in February 1991 and consisted of four 
DoE nominees (each with local connections), three councillors and one council nominee. Two 
positions were reserved for tenants. Dwelly (1991b, p. 23), however, noted an `early skinnish' 
between council and tenants regarding how many residents should be on the HAT board. John 
Black had argued for one tenant and four councillors, a formula endorsed by the council's official 
literature. In a letter to Black, Sir George Young, stated his preference for "... a higher level of 
tenant representation 
- 
ideally two tenants and three councillors. However, I would be content, 
provided the tenants agree, to go along with your suggestion. " (from Dwelly, 1991b, p. 23). The 
tenants did not agree: at the AGM of the newly founded residents' association (RA), in late January 
1991, they passed a motion calling for two resident board members (RBMs) (ibid, p. 23). 
Although the DoE's supposed concessions on HATs were presented as achievements won by the 
council, this was economical with the truth. As Hull's deputy director of housing, Tom Hogan, 
admitted to Dwdly (1991b, p. 23): "We're well aware we inherited concession fought for 
it did stay in pow. Given the Laboer majority in Hall this vm likely to be the case. s David Li88inc subsequently resigned and was replaced by Lord Bellwin in July 1993. 
114 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
elsewhere. ". While council officers and members were aware of this, tenants were less aware; as 
reported by Dwelly (ibid, p. 23), Steven Sharp, the chair of the RA steering committee, was unaware 
of the work of residents' groups elsewhere to secure concessions: "We're been told time and time 
again that those concessions are new to Hull 
... 
I'm shocked ". 6 In Southwark, for example, 
tenants would have had four members on the HAT board; at Hull - and after a struggle -- they had 
two. In retrospect, a tenant (NHHAT 5) felt the council had been disingenuous: "At Waltham 
Forest, the pros and cons of the proposed HAT were spelt out. The city council [Hull] claimed 
that it had fought for the right to return to the council but that battle had already been won 
elsewhere. ". 
Prior to the public announc eme t, the council could use the threat of withdrawing support from the 
proposal to negotiate more favourable terms (dependent on the strength of the DoE's desire to 
establish a HAT and its need for a supportive local authority). Once the proposal had been made 
public and vouched for by the council, the power to veto it 
- 
or to threaten to veto it 
- 
was 
transferred to tenants. 7 Assuming the council was in favour, it could campaign positively for a Yes 
vote or remain neutral. The council launched a campaign to persuade tenants that voting for the 
HAT was in their interests, investing heavily in a consultation exercise, locating specialist staff on 
the estate, co-ordinating public meetings and circulating literature to tenants (Brindley & Arnold, 
1992, p. 4). Prior to the ballot, more than fifty public meetings were held. These were initially 
unsuccessful and subsequently an Advice Shop (on Greenwood Avenue) was set up and the 
council's staff went door stepping (NHHAT 1,1994). Although the consultation team supplied 
information, explanation and advice, they did not actually sell the proposal; councillors, however, 
actively campaigned for a Yes vote, while the newly-founded RA also decided to campaign for a Yes 
vote (NEEHAT 9,1997). 
The council also had to perform a volte-face and change tenants' attitudes from being passively anti- 
HAT to being pro-HAT 
- 
at least to the extent of voting for the kind of HAT proposed for North 
Hull. An important part of the publicity campaign therefore was to stress that the HAT proposed 
was different from previous HAT proposals. Hence, the council's campaign emphasised that the 
`North Hull Voluntary HAT' was an 'entirely different prospect' to the HATs rejected elsewhere 
(Dwelly, 1991b, p. 23). ' Both John Black and Tom Hogan, stressed to Dwelly (ibid, p. 23) that the 
6 Do to its gagraphical isolation, tenants in Hull were far less aware of what had happened in the pilot HAT areas than, for example, tenants in Waltham Forest. 
7 As tenants had individual votes, the pow of veto waald result from the aggregate of individual choices. 
To be effective as a threat of veto, therefore, demanded a collective action and probably also collective 
organisation. 
' It was `voluntary' becawo the council had a and for it, rather than the Government trying to impose a HAT. 
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comparisons made between Hull and other HATs were based on the original HATs of the `pre-ballot 
Ridley era' (i. e., the Mark I), rather than the `compromise deals put to tenants in Southwark and 
Sunderland' (i. e., the Mark II). Regarded favourably, the council's approach was an attempt to 
make the issues clear-cut. As noted in Chapter Four, the magnitude of the change that had occurred 
during the legislative stage and subsequently during negotiations at Southwark and Sunderland 
created immense confusion about HATs. Rather than on the information presented to than, the way 
most tenants would form opinions was in terms of whether they could trust the person or group 
supplying that information. Sir George Young, however, expressed concern for a more balanced 
presentation of arguments for and against a HAT. In a letter to John Black, he emphasised the 
Government's responsibility to ensure that all tenants were "... fully and objectively informed of the 
implications of the decision which they would be invited to make. " (ibid, p. 23). 
As surprising as the public azmouncement in Novenber 1990, was the plan to move swiftly to a 
ballot in February or March of 1991, leaving little time for consultation and discussion with and 
among tenants and provoking suspicion of the council's motives. Neve ess, a HAT officer 
(NHHAT 9,1997), who had been involved in the pre-HAT nego ans, argued that 
"... it' important to have a quick ballot; we needed to make the process dynamic 
and fart nerving.... The importance of the decision tenants were making had to be 
made clear to them. There i i" a simple and star* choice. If they voted in 
, 
amour, 
their louses would be improved over the next five or six yeas. The HAT would do 
other things, but wie cosdthi't be more explicit than dial There eoulun't be perch 'e 
commitments until the HAT had been set up. Tha# um why the shadow HAT board 
was set up 
- 
to indeate in more detail what dw HAT might do. ". 
According to Dwelly (1991b, p. 24), Torn Hogan was sanguine about the importance of consultation 
and expressed concern that a long period of consultation could lead to confusion. Dwelly (ibid, 
p. 24) observed that, despite the statement an the council's video that `to enable you to look at the 
pros and cons you'll be given plenty of time', tenants had been told a delayed ballot would "... 
Jeopardise the project and stop their homes being unproved ". Dwelly also noted that the video 
lacked any detail of the `cons' of a HAT and concluded that "... it's perhaps worth bearing in mind 
that [without a Trust] all the prospects of improving your estate in the foreseeable future are 
join ,,. 
Time for consultation was particularly important on an estate initially without an RA. One of the 
Government's preconditions for the HAT was for tenants to be actively involved. On the North Hull 
estate no tenant organisations existed and, in the run-up to the ballot, the council had to create an 
RA; the chair and secretary of which would have places on the HAT board. Prior to the ballot, the 
RA steering committee chair told Dweüy (ibid, p. 23) that although he expelled a Yes vote, the 
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committee had not been given enough time to prepare for the March ballot. Hull had little tradition 
of tenant organisation either autonomous or council-encouraged. During the late 1980s some 
residents' groups had been established but only as a condition of EA funding. A HAT officer/tenant 
(NHHAT 11,1997) argued that Hull's courting of resident involvement had always been very 
expedient: "For Estate Action, they needed an estate management board, so they had one; for the 
HAT, they needed a residents' association, so they formed one. ". Similarly, a HAT participation 
officer (NHHAT 7,1994) noted that there was no tradition of resident involvement at Hull and that 
the RA had been created from "... the top down for an ulterior purpose, not for tenant involvement 
or tenant empowerment. ". The council, however, favoured the traditional democratic local 
government prcatice of councillors representing constituents across all issues, rather than having 
single interest or area specific groups. The city council had a large amount of housing, which had 
generally been well managed and the housing committee was its largest and most powerful 
(NHHAT 4,1994). A HAT officer/tenant (NHHAT 5,1994) commented that although tenants at 
Waltham Forest and Liverpool had been active, Hull city council had managed its housing well and 
tenants had little cause for complaint. Another HAT officer (NHHAT 4,1994) admitted that, 
although the council was `very parochial' and a `paternalistic landlord', it provided good services. 
The council appeared reluctant to allow the fledgling RA to develop independently. Dwelly (1991b, 
p. 23) recounted how Advice Shop staff had "... attended every meeting of the nascent tenant's 
committee, offering to type their correspondence and keep their files inside the shop. ". 
Furthermore during his visit, the committee had held an emergency meeting on the eve of the first 
AGM to discuss resident representation on the HAT board: "Excluthng council o icers for the 
first time, the tenants were amazed when one of them arrived at the home and asked to be allowed 
in. ". The incidents indicate both the fine line between support and interference and tenant suspicion 
and mistrust of the council's motives. Dwelly (ibid, p. 24) also noted how ministerial letters to Hull 
repeatedly emphasised that tenants should have the opportunity to seek professional advice, 
independent of the council and the DoE. Although allowing the RA to operate independently could 
have helped to secure the desired Yes vote, Dwelly (ibid, p. 24) detected a reluctance to embrace 
consultants and tenants' advisors. He also noted that while Hull was ostensibly committed to 
funding independent advisors for tenants, no moves had been made to set this in train. The council 
was wary of consultants; Joint Black (from Dwelly, ibid, p. 24), for example, told Roof that: 
"Sometimes people don 't wart academic professionals to take over. ". This view was diallenged 
at the first RA meeting, when a vote to seek advice was carried without dissent, knowing it could 
delay the ballot. A local solicitor was subsequently employed to advise tenants; the solicitor did not, 
however, regard himself as a housing consultant. 
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5.1.4 THE BALLOT 
Following the public announooment in late November 1990, consultations with tenants and the 
ballot were completed within four months. The council sought a swift and decisive ballot; Tom 
Hogan admitted to Dwelly (1991b, p. 24): "We twisted the Government's arm to have the ballot 
earlier than it ºwmted ". Some tos were suspicious of the ballot's timing, attributing it to the 
council's desire to be the first to establish a HAT: "The Hull ballot ww scheduled for one week before 
the Waltham Forest ballot so that it could be first " (NHHAT 14,1998). 9 Although there were 
suspicions that the speed of the ballot was to offset the threat of a withdrawal of finding, a HAT officer 
(NHHAT 9,1997) considered that, while the Treasury was `itching to taw back' the funding for the 
HAT program e, the DoE had been very hear to establish a HAT. Dwelly (1991b, p. 24) speculated 
that the prospect of a general election was exercising the council's mind. More pragmatically, 
however, the city's director of housing, Stephen Brindley, argued that any postponemerrt of the 
ballot could delay the start because of the need to get the necessary parliamentary orders through 
before the summer recess (ibid, p. 24). 
Held in March/April 1991, the turnout for the ballot was 77%, with 69% voting in favour of a HAT 
(i. e., 53% of those eligible). Following the ballot, the HAT was designated on 18 July 1991, when 
the shadow board members were also formally appointed. In January 1992, the properties were 
transferred to the HAT. During the autwm of 1991, there was formal consultation about the 
HAT's Statement of Propels with the council, Humberside county council, the RA and other 
bodies. The Statement of Proposals listed the HAT's main aims as: 
- 
optimum organisational 
efficiency; housing and estate improvements; quality local housing services; community 
development; and tenure diversification (NHHAT, Annual Review 1992/93, p. 4). Central to the 
HAT's strategy was recognition that the elements were interdependent and contributed to a sixth 
aim: "To leave behin4 at the end of the HAT'S active life, a community equipped for the long- 
term with viable and sustainable housing, social and economic infrastructures. " (ibid, p. 4) 
5.1.5 COMMENTARY 
The implana tion of a HAT in Hull can be seen in tams of a choice (i. e., to support the initiative) 
by the local authority and, may, by tenants. Although 
- 
in principle 
- 
HAT policy would 
bypass local authorities, the North Hull HAT was the result of a positive intervention by the local 
authority. The mal, however, had no coma itment to the HAT programme per se and its object 
was to got a HAT in Hull on its own terms. h therofore eocploited the Government's weakness and 
embarrassme t at the fate of the pilot HAT proposals. Given the developing situation in the pilot 
9 The Waltham Forest ballot was subsequently delayed and actually took place in July/august 1991. 
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HAT areas, the Government had been receptive to the council's approach. Tenants acknowledged 
the pragmatism and political opportunism of its politicians and officers (NHHAT 5,1994). North 
Hull was the only HAT where the local authority was paid a dowry (£5,755,000 or £2763 per unit) for its 
housing, which was used for a major improvement scheme elsewhere in the city. '° The council also 
had the money it would have spent on the North Hull estate, while a HAT officer (NHHAT 1,1994) felt 
the council's pragmatism had also been rewarded by consent for EA projects at Bilton Grange and 
Bransholme. 
Having pledged itself to the establishment of a HAT, the council was concerned about tenants 
vetoing it. It therefore asked the Government to stay out of the consultation process and managed 
the presentation of information to tenants. A councillor (NH[IAT 13,1998) argued that the council did 
not advocate a HAT or not a HAT, but instead said: `Here is an opportunity. We've done our best to 
safeguard your interests. ' Its approach was justified on the basis that: "You can't ask 2000 people to go 
into all the details. " (NHHAT 13,1998). Tenants would the<+efore b  told what was good for them and, 
in particular, needed educating that the proposed HAT was significantly different from previous 
models the council 
- 
including prominent individuals within it 
- 
had opposed. Hence, in the absence 
of further or indepe dent information, the council was effectively asking tenants to trust it and to 
vote for a HAT. The council's approach was also justified by an analogy with shop stewards working 
on behalf of their membership: "The memberslrip doesn't have the time to study all the opportunities 
and the related üybnivadon so they need to rely on shop stewavts to do that for dwm and then to make 
recommendations to 
- 
and to do the best for 
- 
their wo *e c. " (NHHAT 13,1998). 1 lie 
however, is not wholly valid and raises issues of represatation and misrepresentation. in pimple, shop 
stewards are workers with material interests similar to other workers; councillors may not be tenants and 
may have other interests, while the council itself would have wider interests than those of the tenants on a 
particular estate. 
Some tenants felt the ballot was reduced to a few simplistic issues: "... a straight issue of whether 
you wanted your house done up infive years or twenty oars. " (NHHAT 2,1994). Although the 
council's message to tenants had the virtue of simplicity, it ran risks of being an over-simplification, 
which could arouse suspicion and mistrust, and of tenants being manipulated, whether by omission 
or by commission. Retrospectively, some tenants felt they had been manipulated: the council had 
been very careful not to let tenants know all about the HAT and was very `selective' about what 
information was given: "There was no mention of the choice of landlord only about the return to 
10 As discussed in Chapter Four, it was possible for estates to be given a negative valuation and for the local 
authority to be required to pay a dowry. The other estates when HATs were established transferred at zero 
cost and without debt. 
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the council. The council did everything internally 
- 
there were no consultants. TPAS tried to get 
involved but they were told where to go. I was thinking: `Is it really that wonderful? What's the 
catch? '. " (NHHAT 14,1998). Furthermore and despite its desire to establish a HAT, the 
Government was placed in the somewhat unlikely role of encouraging the local authority to give a 
more balanced account of the arguments for and against a HAT. 
Although the council used its power to withdraw support to negotiate favourable terms, the tenants 
did not have any real opportunities to use their power of veto to negotiate terms. As presented to 
tenants, the HAT proposal was largely a falte accompli. Although tenants could still reject it, that 
would probably have been detrimental to their interests. Had tenants be permitted greater 
opportunity to negotiate, they might have obtained more favourable terms, in respect of, for 
example, greater tenant representation on the HAT board. To negotiate effectively, however, 
tenants would also have needed organisation, which had been lacking on the North Hull estate. 
Ultimately, therefore, the vote in favour of a HAT can be seen as a demonstration of loyalty to the 
local authority. The fundamental decision for tenants was the balance between two considerations: 
- 
the prospect of the improvement and repair of their home and the strength of assurances they could 
return to the local authority once their home had been improved. The very firm assurances 
regarding the ability to return to the local authority 
- 
together with the expectation that it would be 
a Labour council when the landlord choice came about 
-- 
meant that tenants had little to lose by 
voting in favour of a HAT. An effective `safety net' had therefore been put in place. 
5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
As the parameters were substantially known in advance and were, in general teens, a continuation 
of the council's improvement programme, the improvement programme at Hull was straightforward. 
Essentially a refiubishment, design involvement was largely individual and atomised. Tenants 
could gauge quite accurately what their stake was in the overall programme and could act 
accordingly. The only area where collective choices needed to be made was the environmental areas 
within the housing. 
5.2.1 THE FEASIBILITY STUDY 
The council's Feasibility Study (MCC, January 1991) considered four possible development 
programmes. 
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Opflon One: Minimal change 
The minimal change option assumed sufficient resources would not be available and no fiuther 
house improvements would be carried out and that maintenance costs and management problems 
would increase as the housing stock deteriorated. Although there would be no capital costs 
associated with this option, the revenue costs of managing and maintaining the estate were likely to 
rise and conditions on the estate would continue to get worse. Hence, the Feasibility Study (s6.8) 
argued that although the estate was currently relatively stable, "... to take no further action would 
tip the estate over into a spiral of decline which would be extremely difficult and costly to 
rectify. ". It therefore concluded that, at a later date, the only `practical solution' might be the 
estate's `wholesale demolition' (s6.9). 
Option Two: Comprehensive improvement 
Under this option, the houses would be reäurbished to the council's specification. At 1990 prices, 
the cost was estimated at £20,500 per dwelling (£41.4 million for all the pre-war dwellings). In 
addition, the council's experience suggested 40% of tenants would need to be decanted during house 
improvements and, hence, the costs of decanting, loss of rent and compensation for tenants 
remaining in-situ during improvement also had to be considered. It was also proposed that a 
number of `advantageous' extras be considered, such as energy measures, increased environmental 
works, and modifications to the housing stock to reconcile the mismatch between the stock and the 
demand. The post-war dwellings, which were generally in better condition, would also be repaired 
and improved at an estimated cost of £15,000 per house (£1.4 million in total). Including some 
allowance for social facilities and employment initiatives, the cost was estimated at £50 million. A 
four-year programme was envisaged involving 500 units pa. The cost would 
-- 
it was argued 
-- 
be 
offset by dramatic reductions in maintenance costs following improvement (s6.17). The report 
(s6.17) also argued that, although tenants would be disturbed during improvements, they 
`wholeheartedly supported' this option. 
Option Three: Selective demolition & redevelopment 
To provide a basis for calculating costs, a selective demolition & redevelopment scheme was 
devised entailing the demolition of 228 dwellings and the construction of 245 new dwellings (34 
flats for single people, 37 bungalows for the elderly and 174 three-bedroom houses). A further 80 
houses were to be converted into 160 single person flats and a communal facility was also to be 
provided. As it would not be possible to re-house a large number of tenants quickly either within the 
HAT boundaries or in nearby council stook, it was expected that redevelopment would be phased 
over a number of years. The capital cost of this option was estimated as follows: 
- 
demolition, 
conversions (160 dwellings) & new build (245 dwellings) at £11.6 million and improvement (1,801 
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dwellings) at £36.9 million, giving a total of £47.5 million. In addition, environmental works and 
traffic management and measures would be undertaken bringing the cost to around £60 million. it 
also noted that a rolling programme of small-scale clearance and redevelopment would be both 
difficult to manage and expensive. Furthermore, the report argued that, even in selective areas, the 
process of redevelopment would cause significant disruption to what was considered to be a 
generally stable community (s6.24) and speculated whether the level of redevelopment envisaged 
might. `so disrupt the community as to be considered unacceptable to tenants' (s6.25). 
Option Four: Deferred improvement 
The report also gave brief consideration to the possibility of deferring improvements for ten years 
and then carrying out comprehensive improvements as in Option Two. As it entailed all the 
disadvantages of Option One, it was swiftly rejected. Furthermore, prior to starting improvemait 
works, the estate could have deteriorated physically to the extent that large-scale demolition would 
be the only solution in some areas, while the present, relatively stable community might no longer 
exist as tenants became increasingly frustrated at the lack of action and 
- 
where possible 
- 
moved 
away, to be replaced by households in more severe housing need (s6.28). 
The report calculated that at its current rate and level of resourcing, the council would take twenty 
years to complete improvanents in the proposed HAT area. In consideration of the various options, 
the F Study recommended that comprehensive improvement (Option Two) should be 
implemented. Given the subsequent amounts spent on each house at North Hull, the fundamental 
choice might have been between new build and refurbishment. A HAT officer (NHHAT 9,1997) 
argued that, while the cost diffeiu e was probably quite small, if the HAT had been intended as a 
redevelopment scheme it would not have happened: tenants would have said "Our houses era OF you 
don't have to back diem dcwit ". il Proposing a refurbidtawyt programme, thec+aby increased the 
probability of a Yes vote in the ballot. 
5.3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
For the most part, the major development issues had been identified in the Feasibility Rudy. For the 
incroveme t programme, the HAT area was divided into five neeghbourhoods (Greenwood North I 
& H, Greenwood South I 8t II, and Watton). Each area was further divided into up to five 
11 The issue of redevvelcpmeat versus refurbishment had occurred on another estate in Hull. A regeneration 
scheme had been proposed on the Gypsyville estate 
-a local authority housing estate similar to the North 
Hall estate. In partnership with an HA and a housing developer, the council's proposal was to demolish half of the estate (about 600 houses) and build housing for sale. Some, of the proceeds from the new housing wog ld be used to fund the refurbishment of the other half of the estate. The controversy lay in the 
council's decision to use CPO powere to buy properties from those who had exercised RTB. 
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improvement phases, with each phase consisting of about 100 properties. Tenant involvement was 
primarily focused around the development programme and, in principle, involvement in the design 
process generated opportunities to raise levels of awareness, incorporate individual and collective 
opinion and foster wider tenant participation in the HAT's activities. One of the first resident 
involvement events was a series of community planning weekends (CPWEs) held as a means both to 
present ideas and information to residents and to take stock of local opinion. The first CPWE was 
held in May 1991. Following this, residents became more involved in the organisation and a series 
of CPWEs was held between August and November 1991. The CPWEs also developed a more 
informal and interactive approach. Rather than public meetings where residents were `talked at', 
residents could `drop-in' to a marquee staffed by architects and HAT workers, discuss their houses 
in detail and have questions answered. The CPWEs' focus was broader than the improvement 
programme and other services were included (e. g., Health, Education, Police, etc. ) so that the 
benefits of a wider regeneration strategy would be understood (Brindley & Arnold, 1992, p. 4). 
The key issues that emerged from the CPWEs included: 
- 
overcrowding and under-occupation of 
properties; houses being quite small; tenant's eligibility for extensions; standard and discretionary 
improvements; the range of di4%rent housing types on the estate; issues beyond the dwelling (e. g., 
speeding traffic, rat runs; on-street parking; the existing green areas); and the availability of play 
areas for children. For most tenants, however, the overriding issue was the date of improvements 
works to their home (MMA, October 1991, p. 4). Following the CPWEs, Neighbourhood Groups 
were formed in each area as sub-groups of the RA to work with the architects, consultants and the 
HAT's project managers. Ideas fron the CPWEs were fed into the preparation of the HAT's 
Statement of Proposals. In retrospect, this was the high-water mark of tenant involvement and 
towards the end of the HAT, a HAT officer (NHHAT 9,1997) felt that, while the CPWEs 
generated a lot of ideas, "... little has been done, we're only Just getting round to it. ". 
As the improvane t programme was essentially a refurbishment, resident involvement could largely 
be individual and atomised. A tenant (NHRAT 5,1994), for example, argued that tenants wanted 
"... a lot of involvement in what happens to their own homes and in the brief given to the 
architects. 
... 
People also wanted more choice than they head previously haar Under the city 
council, the choice used to be what colour you had your front door painted ". In their system of 
choices for internal improvanents, the HAT utilised an innovative menu-based system developed 
through discussions at CPWEs and intensive pilot work in the Wattor area. In addition to a set of 
standard choices concerning styles, colours and materials, each tenant had a budget of 400 points 
(equivalent to about 12000) to spend an a range of additional eternal improvements and higher 
quality finishes. Tenants could spend all their paints on an eight metre square kitchen extension or 
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spend 100 points on superior bedroom fittings, 85 points on having the whole house wallpapered, 75 
points on enhanced kitchen units, etc. The system required tenants to consider the opportunity cost 
of their decisions since they needed to foregone some items in order to have others. It also gave 
greater individuality "People could pick things to suit themselves. It brought excitement into the 
process and positive invohrement " (NHHAT 10,1997). 
The improvement pro mme 
One of the HAT's first actions was to refurbish ten houses as show houses to demonstrate design 
featues and menu options to residents. Work started in December 1991 and the first two opened in 
March 1992. From February 1992, there was also an `early start' programme, involving re-roofing 
and window replacement in those houses scheduled for full improvement towards the end of the 
main programme. One of the benefits of this programme was that most tenants could see immediate 
benefits from the HAT. The main programme started with the refurbishment of twenty one- 
bedroom flats in South Close for elderly tenants in 1991/92. The improvement programme was 
highly concentrated and progressed rapidly. By March 1993, ninety-three properties had been 
improved. By February 1994, the HAT had completed its five-hundredth refurbishment and in 
February 1995, its one-thousandth refurbishment. In total 1637 full improvements were carried out 
(143 of which included extensions) and 200 partial improvements where tenants declined to have 
their homes fully improved. 
The improvemat programme was planned and coated an the basis of most tenants remaining in 
their homes during refiubishment. Some tenants (e. g., those with an illness or disability) could be 
decanted to alternative accommodation. living in through the refurbishment programme was 
problematic. Tenants lived upstairs while the downstairs was refurbished and then moved 
downstairs while the upstairs was refurbished. A tenant (NHHAT 5,1994) colourfully explained 
that living in through refurbishment was `awful': "It's like having a baby. There is a long wait 
with the excitement of mafdng choices through the Tenant's Choice scheme, then the hell of labour 
and afterwards it's well worth it. You forget the labour pains 
-- 
they quickly recede. But it is a 
prolonged period of labour. ". Those who lived-in (or stayed with relatives) received a disturbance 
allowance equivalent to the rent they would have paid during the period of refurbishment, which 
many tenants used to buy new carpets and curtains. An owner-occupier (NHHAT 2,1994), 
however, speculated that, if tenants had "... Jbioim all this was coming, they would not have voted 
for the HAT Two or three people have contemplated suicide.... Money cannot compensate for 
the disruption of living in one or two roans with families and kids. ". In some of the early 
improvement phases, the reiürbishmaýt period for individual properties took longer than the planned 
fourteen weeks, in sow CRSOS tarty-two weeks or more. As the improve n progra me 
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progressed, however, the average period for in-situ refurbishment got shorter as contractors and the 
HAT became more experienced; ultimately, it was a couple of weeks shorter than the contract 
period (NHEIAT 9,1997). On the 4'h Avenue contract, however, the contractor went bankrupt and 
some tenants were away from their homes for nearly a year. 
New build projects 
One of the estate's problems was the mismatch between housing demand and housing stock; the majority 
of houses being two- and three-bedroom. Surveys undertaken early in the HAT's life showed significant 
overcrowding (13%) and under-occupation (30%), particularly by elderly people living alone. The 
CPWEs had also highlighted this issue. Beyond building extensions onto some properties, the 
refurbishment programme could not materially address this problem and, to create a more diverse housing 
stock, the HAT developed a number of new build projects in partnership with HAs. The HAT would 
provide grants to HAs in return for nomination rights on the completed developments. In order to develop 
such sc nes, the HAT had to determine in consultation with the Govemma t whether HATs were able to 
give grants to HAs. As there were few development sites within the HAT area, the developments 
happened outside the HAT area.. The development of bungalows, in particular, would address the 
problem of under-occupation. The HAT was aware of the substantial number of elderly people an the 
estate and, f nlIMMO 
, 
that the majority of people who voted against the HAT were elderly who did not 
want the bother and disruption of refurbishment. Many were living in houses that were too big for them, 
which they could not afford to heat properly or maintain the garden. The HAT amore provided the 
option for elderly people to transfer to a new bungalow. 
Five main projects were umdectalmn in pail norship with HAs: 
- 
92 balows at the junction of Endiloe Lane and Weatgatth Avenue, undertaken with Pickering & 
Fens Homes'2 and North British Housing Assoc atian (NBHA). 
" 73 dwellings on the do did 106 Avenue allotmnts undertaken with NBHA. 
" 34 bungalows near the jur ion of Endike Lame and Cranbrook Avenue undertaken with NBHk 
12 The choice of Pickering & Ferens Homes was controversial because of its close links with the council. 
Until 1991, a committee drawn from the council's housing committee had run the Pickering Trust. 
Realising that it needed access to public funding to develop and finance improvements, the trustees decided 
to merge with another council-administered charity, Ferens Haven of Rest Homes, and to register with the 
Housing Corporation (Bright, 1997, p. 17). The Housing Corporation, however, was concerned about 
Pickering's independence from the council and reluctant to register it. The nomination of 16 new 
committee members in Match 1991 satisfied the Corporation that Pickering & Ferens was sufficiently 
independent and it was registered as an HA. Nevertheless, the council's chair of housing remained the 
IA's chair; the deputy-chair of housing was on the HA's board (both of whom were also on the HAT 
board); the city treasurer was the HA's treasurer and the town clerk the HA's secretary (Inside Hoosina. 
1991,22 November, p. 1). Afar 1991, the new HA 
- 
Pickering & Ferens Homes 
- 
grew rapidly from 
twenty-four properties to over a thousand. The issue of its independence from the council was not fully 
resolved, however, and in September 1997, Inside Housing reported it had been banned from development 
using SHG, banned from merging or taking over other associations and would be refused new borrowing 
consent until it demonstrated its füll independence from the council (Bright, 1997, p. 2). 
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" 
28 bungalows on Endike Lane undertaken with Pickering & Ferens with NBHA as development 
agents. 
"a 38 flat Category Two sheltered housing scheme on 21st Avenue undertaken with NBHA. 
The first four were all undertaken early in the HATs life and were completed by 1995. The HAT also 
negotiated three agreements with HAs: - nomination rigja for twenty bungalows at Ashberry Close with 
Pickering & Forms Homes; nomination rights for twenty-six bungalows at Cranbrook Avenue with 
NBHA; and the transfer of fifty-four tenants to a NBHA development of homes and flats at Bedside 
Close. 
Tents dwosing to move to these developments would charge from secure to assured tenancies 
(altho* many of the statutory rights would be restored as contractual rig ts) and would lose the option 
of retuming to the local authority 
.A further consequence of moving was that rents would be higher 
than council rents. Tenants did not, however, have to move and could dioose to remain in their existing 
properties, whidi would in due course be refurbished. The HAT also funded Tenants' Friends to 
investigete the diange on tenants' behalf. As well as enabling greater diaice for the wider tenant body by 
increasing the flexibility of the available housing stock, the developments had other advantages for the 
HAT. The HAT's object was to improve all the houses in its area and to improve the properties of 
those tenants who had been secure tenants at the time of the ballot. Once the HAT had transferred 
secure tenants away from its original stock, those properties could be refurbished and let to new 
tenants (i. e., from the council's waiting list) or disposed of by the HAT (either before or after 
refurbishment). 
As a consequence of the poor quality of existing dwellings and land conditions, there were two new 
build schemes within the HAT area. The first was at Green Close, where an existing development 
of fifty-eiglrt properties was becoming increasingly difficult to let, most tenants had moved out and 
the design presented particular problems. A schare was developed in partnership with Pickering & 
Ferens Homes and Harbour Farm Community Housing. Fifteen properties were refurbished (one 
property was owner-occupied) and forty-two demolished and replaced with twenty-eight Category 1 
(semi-sheltered) bunplows. 13 Refurbished properties were to be owned and managed by Harbour 
Farm; the new bungalows by Pickering & Ferens. The HAT retained nomination rights to 75% of 
the properties. The second scene was at Ettern Grove, where subsidence problems and the 
generally poor condition of sixteen properties meant it was a better solution to demolish rather than 
refurbish them. Following demolition, the HAT sold the site to Haslam Homes who built twenty- 
five low-cost homes for private sale, further diversifying the estate's housing tenure. At Lasringham 
" As residents had not expected any demolition, the proposed demolitions at Green Close were 
controversial. 
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Avenue, the HAT transferred a small complex of thirteen post-war flats and bungalows to 
Housemartin HA to refurbish for social renting. 
5.2.3 LIFETIME COSTS & THE FUNDING SHORTFALL 
The DoE initially funded the HAT programme as a programme in its own right. From April 1994, 
HATs became a ring-fenced element of the SRB. The programme had, however, been started with 
an initial budget but without specific costs (i. e., benchmark costs) and without a calculation of its 
expected overall costs. As there was very little DoE manag guidance for their operation (i. e., no 
s72 guidance), HATs were able to interpret directly from the 1988 Act, with an onus placed on than to 
justify their actions and costs. Funding for HAT projects was approved on an incremental basis, with 
HATs periodically required to bid for resources based on what they considered would be needed for 
certain periods of time (usually three years). The funding to be provided was then determined by the 
Government and allocated each year. 
In March 1996, the Government sought to determine the HAT programme's lifetime costs and, in 
turn, the costs of each HAT. Each HAT was asked to assess its expected lifetime costs within a 
total grant-in-aid for all six of between £850 million and £1,150 million. Each HAT was given its 
own limits and a date by which to have completed its work. As part of the life-time costs exercise, 
HATs would also have to make an assessment of the number of secure tenants likely to return to the 
local authority. Those who returned to the local authority would do so at zero-cost to the local 
authority and the HAT would not receive a capital receipt; those who transferred to HAs or 
exercised RTBs would earn the HAT a capital receipt that could be offset against the life-time costs. 
Although the planning figure for tenants not returning to the local authority would need to be 
realistic, it would also tend to overestimate the number likely to return since if the estimate was 
high, the HAT's life-time costs would be lower than its life-time costs budget. Although it 
fluctuated slightly, North Hull HAT's planning figure for tenants returning to the local authority 
was about two-thirds. 
Both North Hull and Waltham Forest HATs had been able to bid up their expected budgets. At 
Hull, for example, the Feasibility Study estimated the improvement programme's cost at about £50 
million. In accepting this and in progressing negotiations towards a ballot, the Government tacitly 
agreed to incur the likely costs of the subsequent HAT. The HAT's 1992 estimate of its 
improvement programme, incorporating an enhanced refurbishment, options and menu choices, was 
£87.5 million at 1992 prices (NHHAT, Armual Rsoort 1991/92= p. 10). 14 Part of the reason for the 
14 Part of the reason for the increase was the realisation VAT world have to be paid on impro nt wart 
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increasing costs stemmed from the HAT'S discretion to determine the quality level for its 
development work, combined with the lack of explicit incentives (or necessity) on the HAT's part to 
balance quality against cost. 
HOUSING ACTION DWELLINGS PLANNING FIGURE GRANT-IN-AID PER 
TRUST TRANSFERRED FOR LIFE-TIME DWELL NG 
GRANT-IN-AH) TRANSFERRED* 
Nosh Hull 2,084 £115 m £52,200 
Waltham Foret 2,422 £227 m £93,700 
Liveq oo1 5,337 £260 m £48,700 
Cale Vile (B m) 3,423 LM M £59,900 
Tower Hsmlats ([melon) 1,629 £123 m £75,500 
3twebridge (L idm) 1,777 £165 m £92,900 
Total 16,672 £1,115 m 166,700 
TABLE ä. 2 
- 
PLANNING FIGURES FOR LIFE-TIME GRANT-IN-AID 
(sewn: DOE, 1996) 
* Figue includes the cost of environmental & community werk as well as the cost of physical redevelopment 
& rnfttbishmeaL 
In November 1996, the DoE sat lifetime grant-in-aid budgets/c lings for each of the six HATs 
totalling £1095 million (TsMe ä. 2). 13 Thus, although North Hull HAT had been designated in July 
1991, it did not know its life-time buc%et would be £11S million until it had been in existence for 
five and a half years. As the overall fincu ing would nat be adjusted for inflation, HATs had to make 
allowance it and, as the impact would be more onerous if the development progiramme was delayed, 
HATs had an incentive to progress the work quicidy. They could not, however, spend the allocated 
funding from later years in the earlier years, since, although the life-time budget was fixed, it would 
be paid in annual trarthes. In contrast to HATs and in addition to ft r public funds, UDCs had 
their own assets (i. e., devdopmert land), that they could draw upon to ease problems at the end of a 
financial year. Fur e, if it un part in any particular year, the HAT might not regain the 
u The three London HATS had highem unit cods than the other three IiATs. This figure ooald, however, be 
misleading and the DoE considered the wide variation in the planned cost per dwelling transferred was 
explained by the different needs and plans of each HAT, together with the timing of their work (NAO, 
1997, p. 13). Liverpool had a relatively low total cost for the number of dwellings transferred because it 
planned to rmüubish or replace only a proportion of then. Waltham Forest had a relatively high cost per 
dweiiü traasßerred became it planned to replace more of its accommodation with now build properties. 
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I oney in another financial year. 
The lifetime costs ceiling had a number of implications. First, HATs had greater certainty and no 
longer had to `second guess' the DoE in terms of the magnitude of spending that would be 
acceptable. To a greater extent, therefore, each HAT's fate was in its own hands and it could plan 
its expenditure more effectively. Second, HATs had greater certainty in terms of knowing their 
overall budget. Prior to this, there was the possibility the Govemmait could reduce a HAT's 
projected funding once it had bogus its development programme, effectively compelling the HAT to 
reduce quality in later phases (which was important if a HAT was trying to maintain an even level 
of quality throughout its development programme). 16 Third, by determining an overall budget, the 
responsibility for containing costs was more explicitly placed on the HAT. 
As the life-costs exercise came late in the Hull HAT's life, it resulted in less radical actions than 
either Waltham Forest or Liverpool. Although the HAT's total Government funding was £115 
million, it actually spart about £140 million; the extra money coming from rents, capital receipts and 
other earned income (N RAT 9,1997). Nevuth less, wicectainties about funding and the funding 
shortfall caused impleoratation problems and complicated the HAT's relation with its tenants. The 
shadow HAT and the HAT itself in its early days had made - what were taken to be - promises and 
had raised expectations. A HAT officerhanant (NHHAT 5,1994), for example, commented that 
there had been a lot of consultation at the beginning which had 'tailed off': "The HAT is still 
committed to consultation 
- 
but quite moor decisions are made without tenant involvement 
... 
There was a change in the design to save money, but the tenants did not Jbtow this until the walls 
went up. If they had been told that it was going to change and why then people will understand ". 
Nevertheless, a HAT officer (NHHAT 4,1994) argued that decisions of where to make cuts were 
made by HAT officers and the HAT board, not by tenants. Although there was scope for this, "... 
the tenants did not want to talk or hear about cuts. The HAT also loses credibility and raises 
fears and concerns within the tenant body. ". A HAT participation aficer (NHHAT 11,1997) felt 
that around the time of the life-time costs exercise there had been some cost-cutting that the HAT would 
not admit to: "At the Parbnerslap meeting one of the HAT directors stated that the stwelard had 
changed from 'excellent' to Wry good' ' The apparent reduction in quality primarily affected the 
aalanal works with work to the dwelling remaining the same. A HAT officer (NHRAT 9,1997) 
adnriäed that Wide the Tenant's Choice points value had stayed the same, the choice "... had been 
- 
perhgps the best wwri lr it is 
- 
'sb ecanlbwd : Some savings had to be made as a result of the DoE 
setting limns on the HAT's lifstlme gnats. ". Larger savings, however, were made on the environmental 
16 HATS argued that it was a manor of equity that all phases Of the development programme had a similar 
quality. Difficulties waild arise if a HAT started with a level of quality subsequently deemed too high. 
in 
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works, wlem for example, tarmac was used instead of block paving at road crossings (NHHAT 9, 
1997). Furthermore, although design changes had always been planned to give more character to local 
areas, dm is an obvious change in the quality of the metalwork fencing to the front gardens, which is 
most dearly apparent where a street forms the boundary between two different improvement phases. 
5.2.6 COMMENTARY 
The HAT recorded high levels of satisfaction with the improvement programme. A HAT officer 
(NHHAT 1,1994) argued that: "Because people have had such an input into the housing and 
environmental improvements they have a higher degree of pride and are taking responsibility. 
They have had a stake in what har been done and have a stake in maintaining it. ". An RBM 
(NHHAT 10,1997), for example, stated that refiuhishmart had given people pride in their homes and 
areas, while another resident (NHHAT 2,1994) felt tenants were a `little bit more respectful': 
"They're buying, flowers for the gardens and carpets. The HAT works have certainly brought the 
place up. People feel better. ". The major cause of complaint, however, was defects and poor 
workmanship. In January 1996, the HAT undertook a major survey resident consultation exercise, 
involving HAT staff visiting every home on the estate to get resident's views an what they would 
like to see happen in their area and on the estate as a whole (NHHAT, Annual R port 1995/96. p. 8). 
The HAT's management of defects was one of the few areas where tenants were especially critical 
(HAT News. September 1996, p. 15). The HAT subsequently changed its procedure for reporting 
complaints and problems, and introduced a computerised logging of defects and responses. Once their 
homes had been improved, reside is became focused on `quality of life' issues and the HAT ran a 
programme called `Operation Crackdown', involving a series of measures to crack down on crime. There 
was also a series of measures to address more general issues, such as nuisance neighbours and unkempt 
Wdeas. 
5.3 RESIDENT EWOLVEMENT 
This section discusses the various formal `cads of communication' between tenants (i. e., the 
target groups) and the HAT (i. e., the top's local agents). Through these channels tenants' 
preferences and opinions could be determined and feed into the decision-making process. The 
channels could arise in several diftrat ways: 
- 
the HAT could inherit those existing between 
taunts and the local audwrity; the HAT could create and impose new channels (i. e., top-down); and 
tenants could propose and lobby for changes to or new channels of communication (i. e., 'bottom- 
'). Before discussing resident involvement, two other issues must be discussed to provide a 
necessary context: housing Management and the presence of owner-occupiers in the HAT area. 
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Housing management 
Initially, the HAT made an agency agreement with the council to provide a full management and 
maintenance service until the transfer of properties in October 1992,17 which allowed the HAT 
opportunity to determine its basic approach to housing management, devise policies, recruit and 
train staff, and set up appropriate systems. The estate was divided into three neighbourhoods 
(Greenwood North & South and Watton) and a decentralised housing management system 
introduced. The housing management offices also became the focus for wider social support. In 
mid-1994, the HAT produced its Residents' Charter, which spelt out in detail the standards tenants 
could expect, including, for example, target response times for repairs. Although there had been 
attempts to produce this as a `contract of mutual demands', despite consultants working with 
residents' groups, it did not happen (NHHAT 4,1994). Similarly, tenant management options were 
not developed, primarily because an independent consultant's report had identified `no groundswell' 
for tenant seif-manageme t (NHHAT 4,1994). Nevertheless, provision of information by the HAT 
was in itself empowering and contrasted with the council: "Under the council, although repairs 
took a long time, no one knew about taget tines. " (NHHAT 5,1994). Similarly, a HAT 
officer/tenant (NHHAT 14,1998) felt that as tercets' expectations of the HAT were higher, they were 
more demanding of it. 
Owner-occupiers 
At Hu 1, one of the differences fron the other can studies was the presence of a significant number of 
owner-occupiers (about 14% of residents). The HAT therefore had two distinct groups with which to 
deal: 
- 
tenants and owner-occupiers; the latter, however, did not have a vote in the ballot. 18 Although 
the owner-oc i piers had excited from the public sector, they still had a major interest in the estate and were 
concerned about property values. While they would not have improvements to their houses, by 
purchasing their homes they had committed fives to the area. Although owner-occupiers had a 
privileged position with the Thatcher Government, in North Hull there was a curious paradox. 
Owner-occupiers would witness local authority tenants gaining the benefits of improvements to their 
homes (ostensibly for free) that owner-occupiers had had to pay for; a situation likely to provoke 
resents t. The HAT (NHHAT, Armort 1992/93. p. 8) argued that owner-occupiers would 
benefit in various ways. Those whose homes were attached to HAT properties where renovation 
work was being carried out were offered some in rovements free of charge, such as garden walls 
and boundary faxing, The HAT also supplied materials for external decoration and, if the 
11 This contradicts the supposed justification %r HATs es a response to poor management by local 
authorities. 
1$ Laasteholders at Waltham Forest and Liverpool did have a vote. 
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occupant was elderly or infirm, undertook the decoration. Owner-occupiers could also take 
advantage of `favourable' rates negotiated by the HAT and have parts of the improvement package 
undertaken on their properties. They were also encouraged to be involved with the HAT's work, 
particularly the environmental works where they would have a direct stake in the improvement. 
More generally, the HAT sought to ensure that owner-occupiers were not adversely affected by the 
building work and encouraged owner-occupiers to take part in the HAT's work and subsequently the 
Neighboudwod Partne ps. A HAT officer (NHHAT 9,19971 however, argued that owner-occupiers 
had not really been involved in the HAT "... except where they were pushing to get improvements to 
their own homes at no cast to themsehves.... The most involved people have been tenants. ". 
5.3.1 RESIDENT INVOLVEMENT 
The HAT board 
The HAT board was the main decision-making forum within the HAT. Board meetings were 
initially held in dosed session, but subsequently became open to the public. The board's initial 
composition was the chair, five private sector representatives, three city councillors and two 
residents. The council members included the chair and deputy chair of the housing committee, and a 
local ward councillor. The HAT's vice-chair was the council's chair of housing, John Black. North 
Hull was the only case study where prominent local politicians were on the board throughout the 
HAT's M. The resident positions were assigned to the RA dhair and secretary. ' Tenants did not 
regard the first RBMs' performance very td? and the private sector members were generally held 
in higher esteem and regarded as better at representing tenants than council members (NHHAT 5, 
1994; NHHAT 6,1994). Although board members may have been nominated or elected, as they all 
have a primary duty of care to the interests of the HAT they cannot be mandated to act against its 
i terests. Board members were therefore not delegates from their organisations or constituencies, 
but individuals acting in a role similar to that of a company director or a trustee of a charity. In this 
respect, RBMs had a `difficult path to follow' and were answerable in different ways to the 
minister, to the board chair, to their fellow board members and to tenants (LHAT 16,1998). 
The Raidemb' Area 
Tire main tenants' organisation when the HAT was established was the RA set up in the run-up to 
the ballot. In the HAT's first years, however, tenants felt the RA had not functioned effectively, did 
19 At both Waltham Forest and Liverpool RBMs were elected directly to the HAT board, rather than 
becoming board members by virtue of their position in another (tenant) oiganisation. 
20 The AM RBMs were Andy Brown and Ji l sower, chair and secretary respectively of the Rk Andy 
Brown resigned within his AM year and Joan Minn, the now RA chair, took his place. The te'rms' 
comments did not rem to Andy Bwwn who was no longer an RBM at the time of the interviews. 
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not command respect nor adequately represent them. It was also regarded as having been blighted 
by the circumstances of its establishment and in the "... lap of the HAT and the city council. " 
(NHHAT 5,1994). A resident (NHHAT 2,1994), for example, noted that in the run-up to the 
ballot, the council had wanted to be involved with the tenants' structures, threatened not to recognise 
other bodies and was "... trying to maintain power. ". As a result, most of the active RA members 
had left the committee `through frustration' and, although it had 800 members, its AGM had an 
attendance of just 30 people (NHHAT 5,1994). In effect, the RA remained a top-down imposition 
rather then becoming `owned' by residents. 
Given the apparent ineffectualness of the RA, the HAT's challenge was to establish channels of 
communication better suited to its purposes. As stated in its 1992/93 Annual Report (NHHAT 
1993, p. 4), the HAT recognised that resident participation in the improvement process had "... to 
act as a springboard 
... 
[enabling the HAT] 
... 
to encourage residents to become involved in and 
`own' all its activities, both in terms of decision-making and by training and employing residents 
to take on specific tasks. Over time, this will create a climate in which resident's support for new 
systems of housing management and tenure divers cation will f ourish. ". Following the CPWEs, 
Neighbourhood Residents' Groups were established in each area, as sub-groups of the RA, to work 
with architects, other consultants and the HAT's project managers. As noted at an RA day in April 
1992 (NHRA, April 1992, p. 2), however, the actual role of these groups was unclear: "Currently, 
most groups meet to discuss the improvement choices. However, the opportunity is there to 
discuss other issues, such as housing management, which should also include people in the later 
phases of development. ". To address this and to improve resident involvement within the HAT's 
decision-malting structure, Neighbourhood Partnerships were established. 
The Ne bOurhsod Partnerships 
Although originally created alongside the RA, the Partnerships were 
- 
in effect 
-a means (by both 
the HAT and tenants) to by-pass and replace it (NHHAT 7,1994). Furdwmore, by emphasising 
the Neighbourhood Partnerships as a way of consulting with tenants, the HAT would 
- 
by 
commission or omission 
- 
marginalise the RA. The Partnerships were also a means of focusing 
issues and discussions at an intermediate (i. e., n ighbourhood) level and to areas that tenants could 
broadly identify with. The original objects for Partnerships were: 
- 
" to create a self-sustaining vehicle for the promotion, development & sustenance of political, 
social & economic initiatives throughout the neighbourhood; 
" to transfer power to residents of the neighbourhood; 
" to foster links with her agencies & co m unity groups; and 
" to improve overall service delivery from all agencies providing services within the 
neighbourhood (NHHAT, Decenber 1992). 
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What Neighbourhood Partnerships would actually do, however, was left open in the hope that 
residents would offer ideas, make suggestions and take ownership of than. A HAT participation 
officer (NHHAT 7,1994) argued that this was better than the HAT `imposing a structure'. It was 
originally thoug t, for example, that the Neighbourhood Partnerships could become an EMB or 
another form of TMO (NHHAT 7,1994). Certain powers could also be delegated from the main 
HAT board to the partnerships. 
The Partnership areas were the same as the housing management areas; the boundaries of which 
were administratively convenient but, in a social sense, arbitrary. 21 In January 1993, steering 
groups were set up to develop the Partnerships during the remainder of the year and be fully 
established by January 1994. Each Partnerships was to comprise three HAT board members, an 
RA representative and the ward councillor, with membership open to all residents. A 
Neighbourhood Partnerships Worker was also appointed to service and develop the Partnerships' 
The original idea was that board members and councillors would offer guidance and support and 
initially chair meetings. With time, it was intended that the Partnerships would become more 
autonomous with an elected board and residents chairing and running the meetings; HAT board 
members and councillors could then be co-opted as and if necessary 
. 
initial attendance at 
Partnership meetings was disappointing, and there was suspicion that this was still a top-down 
structuring rather than a bottom-up residents' forum; residents also held resident-only meetings to 
discuss the Partnerships' role. 
During 1993, due to dissatisfaction with the level of resident involvectunt, a group of residents 
organised themselves into an ad hoc committee 
- 
later called the Residents' Participation Working 
Group (RPWG) 
- 
to put forward constructive suggestions. A tenant (NHHAT 6,1994) argued that 
initially the HAT had not wanted to recognise the group, questioned who it represented and 
suggested it was `unrepresentative'. Similarly, a HAT participation officer (NHHAT 7,1994) felt 
the HAT had played "... fart and loose with just who the commun«y representatives actually 
were. ". This was perceived to be the result of the council's influence on the HAT board; anno her 
HAT partidpatim officer (NHMAT 11,1997) stated that the only groups dot "... m represenkatiw we 
owe set alp by Bis coaoacil; they're ass rrpr+esentaýtiº+e then. ". The group was, however, recognised 
by the HAT is October 1993; after which there was a series of constructive meetings with HAT 
oficers and board members. 
zl The HAT also ao red part of an same rotbar than a more dim et* defined, geographical enw 21 This was a HAT position and was similar to the somebond community development cg'icers at 
Waltham ForeoL 
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The RWPG visited tenants' groups in the Waltham Forest and Liverpool HATS' They drew 
several conclusions from those visits, including that a more structured system of resident 
representation allowed for more resident participation, that independently-elected RBMs ensured 
accountability to residents, and that more resident involvement at board level ensured fairer 
decision-making from a resident's point of view (RWPG, 1994a). Many of the positive features 
that the RPWG observed had 
- 
in part 
- 
resulted from greater tenant involvement in pre-HAT 
negotiations and tenants groups being organised and autonomous by the time the HAT was 
established. The RPWG (1994a) therefore made the following recommendations. First, that there 
should be four RBMs, three of whom were to represent Partnership areas 24 The other position 
would remain with the RA. In this way, the two main residents' bodies would have direct input into 
the board through resident representation. To gain two fu ther board places, the RPWG 
recommended that a twelfth board place be created and a non-resident board member's contract not 
be renewed when it fell due in July 1994.25 If RBMs were not elected from each Neighbourhood 
Partnership area, then a resident should be elected to advise the board members attending the 
Partnership meetings. Second, that residents should chair the Partnerships. Third, that the board 
should recognise the Partnerships as a source of resident input (as well as 
-- 
or instead 
-- 
of the RA) 
(i. e., Partnerships were not only a means of top-down information transfer but also a means of 
bottom-up resident input). Fourth, that Partnerships should be formalised through local elections. 
Fifth, that all board reports have a summary sheet and that all Partnership members have an 
opportunity to comment an than at a Partnership meeting one week prior to the board. For papers 
addressing long term planning, Partnerships should form an integral part of the consultation process 
and development process through membership of working groups/panels. Sixth, that instead of 
being based on individual issues (such as alloca ions, neighbour nuisance), the HAT's working 
groups should be based on generic areas and that all working groups should be made up with a 
majority of residents. 
In early 1994, a paper on resident invodvmmt was drafted by the RPWG, for presentation to the 
HAT board. Residents feit that HAT officers had blocked their paper; as redrafted by a HAT 
participation officer, it was again blocked. The RPWG took their paper to the next round of 
Partnership meetings and gained wider support for it. In February 1994, the group had a meeting 
23 A HAT participation officer (NHHAT 7,1994) admitted to being `very depressed' by the comparison. 
'" It was not clear whether the intention was to elect an RBM from each Partnership area so that they were 
accountable to that area (i. e., in the maaner that each TBM at Waltham Forest was elected from an estate). 23 Although not explicitly stated, it was clear it was a council member whose contract should not be 
26 This is similar to the HAT't sub-committees at Waltham Forest and the Advisory Groups at Liverpool 
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with the HAT chair, Lord Ballwin, and its chief executive, Stephen Brindley. The group's first 
priority was board membership. Bdlwin (from RWPG, 1994b), however, stressed he was `very 
happy' with the board's membership and "... would not wish to see anybody removed during their 
current contracts. In particular, he valued highly the input of the three city council 
representatives and would wish to maintain that level of involvement. ". Nevertheless, he agreed to 
approach the housing minister about increasing the board's membership. 
Following subsequent discussions and meetings, the main substance of the RWPG's paper was 
presented to the HAT board in a paper drafted by the HAT's Director of Community Development 
(NHHAT, April 1994). The RWPG also met shortly after the board meeting and discussed the 
outcome (RPWG, 1994c). The board paper concentrated on three issues: 
- 
" 
RBMs: By this time, there was widespread acceptance of elected RBMs and an increase in their 
number to three. Despite gaining only one additional board place, the RPWG accepted it with 
the proviso that residents could at a later date 
- 
and if necessary 
-- 
request a fourth member 
(RPWG, 1994c). 
" Resident involveme t in decision-making: The main input to decision-making was via 
consultation on board papers; the RA were consulted on board papers by virtue of two of its 
officers being board members. As the RPWG had proposed, the preparation of board papers 
was rescheduled so that they would be available to the Partnerships one week prior to the board 
meeting, residents' comments could then be passed on to the board (NHHAT, April 1994) 27 
Although residents had suggested greater resident involvement in working groups and that 
residents should form the majority on such groups, the HAT feit that, given the relatively small 
number of residents who may be interested in a given issue, an alternative would be for a few 
residents to be involved who would "... make it their business (with support if required) to 
develop a specialist knowledge in that field " (NHHAT, April 1994). 2* 
" Neighbourhood Paibnerships: Although much of the paper focused on the role of the 
Partnerships, the HAT saw Partnerships having a wide role 
- 
wider, in fact, than the HAT: "... 
the Neighbourhood Partnerships have a role in deciding wider community issues than solely 
those issues concerned with HAT roles and frictions. " (NH}IAT, April 1994). Furthermore, 
if the Partnerships were to have an existence beyond the HAT, they would have to develop other 
areas of involvement. Hence, they would need 
- 
if possible 
- 
to develop their autonomy and 
indeperýde ce fron the HAT. 
27 This was the syUem employed at Waltham Forest. 
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Although the RPWG had originally proposed that Partnerships be formally constituted in a 
committee structure with elected members, it was later felt this would detract from residents 
participating and contributing. The RPWG felt the Partnerships' role was still developing and, as 
there would be no clear role for new un-elected members, formalisation through elections would 
alienate new members (RPWG, 19944 Residents also argued that, before any elections were held, 
Partnerships needed to gain a higher profile both with residents and the HAT. To provide a link 
between board meetings and the Partnerships, it was agreed that RBMs would attend Partnership 
meetings. This had not happened previously: although meetings had been held on a six-week cycle, 
the RBM assigned to the Greenwood South partnership had only attended one meeting in the 
previous eighteen months (RPWG, 1994c). As Partnership meetings had tended to be dominated by 
people grumbling about development problems and needing to `let off stream', it was proposed that 
`grumbles' meetings be held for this purpose 
- 
acknowledging that they would never be very 
eve 
- 
thereby, allowing Partnership meetings to work more constructively (NHHAT, April 
1994). 
5.3.2 RESIDENT INVOLVEMENT POST-RPWG 
In November 1994, RBM elections for two positions were held, the Government having agreed to an 
additional broad place and one of the existing RBM's term of office having ended. " All residents 
were eligible to stand, dire were five candidates, and a trennt and an owner-occupier were elected. A 
fuser RBM election was held in June 1995, when another owner-occupier was elected. Although two of 
the RBMs were owner-ocmpiers, this was not regarded as a problem: "It's th, wn to their c, Ability; it's 
how tiwy get on with the job. Its never been a problem and it's not been allowed to bean mw.,, 
(NHRAT 9,1997). An RBM (NHHAT 10,1997) stated that the issue had only been raised on a couple 
of occasions: `1 ab say that I ndgk be a home-owwser but I live here too and my interest is as keen 
as arty ". Rather than holding elections in 1997 and 1998, the RBMs' contracts were extended to 
take than to the and of the HAT's life. In total, there were six different RBMs; three of whom had 
been directly elected to the position. Aldhou there was still sane condom that the RBMs were not 
sufficiandy foM4ul in putting aver residers' views (NHHAT 14,1998), the Neighbourhood 
Partnerships became better integrated in the HAT's consultative and decision-making structures 
through the HAT's board papers being discussed at Partnership meetings. The HAT changed to a 
six week cycle of board meetings and, as practice developed, the three Partnership meetings were 
held cn Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of the same week, followed by a board briefing for 
RBMs on either the Thursday or Friday, at which the minutes from the partnership meetings were 
29 All board members had three-year, amble contracts. One of the Nolan Commission 
reoommendatiou was that board members of Government quangoos should only be able to serve a 
maximum of tvw terms. As yet, it is unclear how this will act HATS, particularly board members who 
are elected for each term they serve. 
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available. The board meeting itself being on the following Monday. RBMs also had regular 
meetings with HAT officers every six weeks. Resident involvement on the working groups that 
produced the board papers was also increased. In 1996, Resident Agenda Meetings (RAMs) were 
set up, where RBMs met with residents to discuss board papers (NHHAT 1996, Annual Report. 
1995/96, p. 8). 
At Hull, there was no hierarchy of representative structures to mediate between RBMs and the occupants 
of the estate's 2000 plus properties, eorcept through Partnership meetings. As a consequence, RBMs were 
effectively accountable to residents individually rather than collectively and contact between residents and 
RBMs largely individual. By contrast, RBMs in Liverpool, for example, were more answerable to 
tenants in the form of a formal group (i. e., the HRTG), the members of which were themselves 
accountable to their blocks. In this respect, however, an advantage of the Partnership meetings 
- 
unlike 
Liverpool's HRTG or Walthun Forest's ESGs 
- 
was that they were open meetings, which any resident 
could attend. Residents, however, attended those meetings as individuals and tended to bring individual 
problems to the meetings. For a short time, to address resident's individual problems, surgeries were 
held with RBMs. An RBM (NHHAT 10,1997) explained how, despite being held in different 
locations, attendance was very poor and the arrangements were changed: "... we had the surgery an 
hour or so before the Partnership meetings. 77te first one was so busy I had to call in the other 
resident board members to come and help me out. That worked f ne but only for two meetings 
- 
it 
sort of f zzled out, but it had probably come to a natural end anyway. ". 
By early 1997, theca was further debate about the Partnerships' role and finction. Many of the houses 
had been improved, tenants, had Chosen Chair new landlords and for many to ants the HAT had largely 
disappeared. In Mardi 1997, it was decided to combine the Partnership meetings into a side meeting 
called the North Hull Community Alliance, which would occur e my six weelcs immediately prior to the 
HAT board meeting. 
5.3.3 COMMENTARY 
As a consequence of actions by the HAT together with the RPWG's input, by late 1994 the HAT 
was arriving at a situation of resident representative structures that Waltham Forest and Liverpool 
had had from the start. Although the initial thrust was top-down, it had met with a bottom-up 
response from a group of active tenants, such that new structures for resident involverrat were 
negotiated. Although the RWPG's recommendations were never fully implemented, the subsequent 
structures and systems were better focused and more effective in communicating between tenants 
and the HAT. By then, however, the opportunity for influence had largely passed, much of the 
refurbishment was either in progress or completed and most of the major decisions had been taken. 
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One of the RPWG's founding members (NHHAT 12,1998) felt the group had largely achieved what it 
set out to do: 
- 
the board membership was changed and was no longer automatically the RA chair 
and secretary; there was an additional RBM and the role of the Neigjibouihood Par ships had been 
athanoed and after it had achieved those objectives, it effectively disbanded. By the end of the HAT, the 
RA had been marginalised and had become primarily a `social' rather than a `political' organisation; 
its political role having been taken over by the Partnerships. The Partnerships themselves, despite 
playing a very useful role within the HAT as a level of organisation that could represent tenants' 
amte and collective views, never became formally elected and, in this respect, differed from the 
ESGs at Waltham Forest and the HRTG at Liverpool. In 1997, the three Partnerships had become 
the North Hull Community Alliance but its post HAT future was uncertain. 
As well as being less involved in the run-up to the HAT, residents were less active within the HAT 
than at Waltham Forest or Liverpool. In terms of resident involvement, residents' main frame of 
reference was their own immediate and prior experience. Furthermore, residents regarded the 
council's attitude to resident involvement as unhelpful. A HAT officer/resident (NHHAT 14,1998) 
argued that Hull did not a tradition of active tenants: "The council never encouraged tenants' 
groups 
- 
at least not those that question what the council does. ". A HAT participation officer 
(NHRAT 11,1997) suggested that the council lacked a `basic belief in resident involvement: 
"There is a distrust of the motives of tenants who get involved. - `tenants only get involved to snoop 
on other tenants. ". Although the council's attitude - and arguably the council's influence within 
the HAT 
- 
coloured the HAT's approach, a resident (NHHAT 2,1994) stated that tenant 
involvement in the HAT was a `lot better than the council' and the HAT was more open and able to 
talk to people'. It is, nevertheless, dear that extensive involvement did not happen at the North Hull 
HAT. This could be explained in two ways: first, the activities of the HAT fitted in with 
- 
or did 
not (sufficiently) conflict with 
- 
tenants' own aims and aspirations and, hence, there was no 
necessity for tenants to get involved further. Second, the target groups lacked sufficient 
organisation to be an articulate and potent constituency group and, thereby, to enable significant 
bottom-up input to shape and inform the HAT's work. 
5.4 EXIT OPTIONS 
As HATs were limited-life agencies, at some point tenants would be required to make landlord 
choices. Tenure diversification was a statutory object: Section 63 of the 1988 Act, required HATs 
to "... encourage diversity in the interests by virtue of which housing accommodation in the area 
was occupied and, in the ewe of accommodation occupied under tenancies, diversity in the 
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identity of landlords. ". In February 1993, the DoE produced interim guidance on exit strategy for 
HATs, which emphasised tenure diversification and the necessity of providing tenants with a full 
range of options for the purchase of their homes or for selecting their future landlords. It also stated 
that a HAT would need to demonstrate that any disposals prior to its being wound up would not 
restrict its ability to effectively mange the residual stock, nor hinder its ability to achieve its 
statutory objectives. Given the estate's pre-HAT tenure structure (86% local authority tenure), 
extensive diversification would 
- 
in effect 
-- 
mean as few tenants as possible returning to the local 
authority. The HAT did not, however, have targets 
-- 
either of its own or from the Government 
-- 
for tenure diversification. As a consequence of the life-time costs exercise, it did, however, have a 
planning assumption that about two-thirds would return to the council (NHHAT 4,1994). 
5.4.1 THE EXIT OPTIONS 
For each HAT, a major influence on the possible exit options was the type of housing and the nature 
of its development programme. In North Hull, the majority of tenants remained within their homes, 
which were individually refurbished. Tenants therefore exercised their landlord choice individually. 
Early in its life, the HAT set up a landlord choice working party involving residents, HAs, the 
council and others. In its 1993/94 Annual Report (NHHAT 1994, p. 10), the HAT identified the 
following as possible landlord choice options: 
- 
returning to the council; exercising RTB; developing 
various shared ownership schemes; forming and transferring to a tenant co-operative; forming and 
transferring to a new community HA; and transferring to existing HAs. 
The local authority 
Given its strong commitment to public sector housing and having actively sought a HAT, the 
council was keen to ensure that a significant proportion of tenants returned to it and vigorously 
campaigned to enoouraga tenants to do so. A teert (NHHÄT 5,1994) also noted that, although it 
should have been an independent body to work for residents, the RA had decided "... to actively 
encourage people to go back to the council 
- 
rather than to empower people through information 
and choice. ". Some tenants considered the council's motives to have been dear from the outset: 
"The way in which the HAT was sold to the tenants, any option other than a return to the council 
would have been unthinkable. " (NH HAT 5,1994). A common expression prior to the ballot was 
that the council would only be lending the houses to the HAT in order to have them refurbished and 
tenants could quicidy return to their pro-HAT status (NHHAT 4,1994). This suggests a lack of 
commitment on the council's part to the possibility of alternative exits; although, conversely, the 
ability to return to the council can be seen as a safety net, which mayor may not be used, while 
- 
in 
a competitive envira nment 
- 
the council might legitimately consider itself to be the best option. The 
council's Feasibility 3. however, had stated that, although prior to the HAT there had been "... 
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no indication of tenants favouring transfer to an alternative landlord 
... 
tenant's opinions might 
be expected to be changed by the experience of the HAT. ". Tenants were nevertheless uspicious of 
the council's motives; a teiiartt (NHHAT 14,1998) argued that it had wanted HAT tenants to retum to 
dien as soon as possible because the langer they were away from the council, the more dance there was 
they would not go back The HAT, however, resisted pressure from the council by recommending 
that tenants take time to consider and, where possible, try out other alternatives before making their 
choice (NHHAT 4,1994). 
Housing associations 
The main rented alternatives to a return to the council were two HAs: Housemartin and Harbour 
Farm Community Housing. Established in 1979, Housemartin was Humberside's largest local HA 
and well-established in the North Hull area. In August 1996, it merged with a much larger HA, 
Sanctuary 
, 
and, although it continued under the Housemardn name, the take-over adversely affbated its 
`local' credentials (NHHAT 9,1997). Harbour Farm Community Housing was intended to be an 
expressly local tenant-controlled HA. The HAT's landlord choice working party had initiated 
research into the prospects for alternative landlords, such as a community-based housing association 
(CBHA) (NHHAT, Annual Rauort 1991/92. p. 14) and, in 1993, housing consultants, Chapman 
Handy, produced a report on a CBHA's financial viability. The report argued inner alia that financial 
viability would be a key criteria for any HA seed g to register with the Housing Corporation and that a 
CBHA needed a critical mass of properties (minimum 250 propafies), which would take time to be build 
up. If tenants made individual diolces to transfer to a CBHA, then it would be uncertain whether theree 
would ultimately be sufficient transfers to make it viable. Furthermore; as it would take time to be set up, 
if tenants made landlord choices before it was established, it would jeopardise the prospects of a viable 
CBHA. A CBHA would also face a Catch 22: to be viable, it needed properties (i. e., tenants); to attract 
terms (i. e., properties), it needed to be viable. 
Although an independent consultancy (PIEDA) identified `no groundswell' for tenant management 
(NHHAT 4,1994), a tenant- led HA 
-- 
Harbour Farm Community Housing 
- 
was developed with 
support from the HAT and NBAA. Tenants had various reasons for becoming involved with 
Harbour Farm, including, first, a strong commitment to the local area; a tenant (NHHAT 5,1994) 
closely involved with Harbour Farm stated that: "As a resident on the estate, I am going to outlive 
the HAT. Therefore ]have to have an interest in the future of dw estate. -. Second, to have more 
control over their housing and its managanart. Three members äF the steering committee were 
HAT workers, one of whom stated she would not have got involved if the council had been more 
willing for tenant management: "Councillor John Black had said at a public meeting that tenants 
were not capable of managing properties. They would get into a muss and dien the council would 
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have to bail them out. " (NHHAT 5,1994) 30 Third, to offer alternatives and choice for tenants. 
A tenant involved in Harbour Farm (NHHAT 5,1994) considered that tenants found it hard to 
distinguish between potential landlords, particularly between different non local authority landlords. 
As many tenants had originally come from private landlords, the name was deliberate, stressing that 
it was Harbour Farm Community Housing. Furthermore, as many tenants still saw HAs as `the 
unknown' and as `private landlords', Harbour Farm tried to convey two messages: - that it was not a 
private landlord and, second, that tenants had a iigt to have a say ( THAT 14,1998). Another tenant 
(NHHAT 5,1994) argued that: "Everyone accepts that most people will go back to the council. 
But as people get more information and knowledge, then fewer people will go back to the council. 
They will have doubts about the council being the best option. The threat from Harbour Farm is 
to prove that tenants can do it. ". The first problem for Harbour Farm, however, was to achieve a 
minimum number of properties and as with other HAs, but unlike the council, it had to purchase 
Properties from the HAT. 
The right-to-buy 
Tenants could also exercise RTB. Tenants retained their RTB even if they transferred to HAs 
(known as the `protected' RTB). For RTB sales, the price was determined in terms of a cost floor, 
which took into account the value of the improvements (but not repairs or external works) carried 
out within the previous eight years. Although to ai1s were still entitled to their disoamts, the selling 
price could not be lower than the cost floor, whirls at North Hull was typically £15,000 to £20,000 and 
could be higher if the property had been extended. 
5.4.2 THE LANDLORD CHOICE PROCESS 
As some properties were refurbished ahead of the first phase of the main improvement programme, 
landlord choices initially occurred on a tricide basis. Initially it took a year from completion to 
transfer back to the local authority, which fuelled tenants' lingering doubts regarding the 
Government's assurances about returning to the local authority. The completion of the first return 
transfer therefore had symbolic importance. The HAT also had a learning curve about landlord choice, 
while the system laid dam in the Act proved cumbersome in practice. To streamline the process, gain 
30 The council seemed reluctant to support Harbour Farm. When first established, Harbour Farm had 
invited it to nominate a list of possible councillors to sit on the steering committee. Harbour Farm wanted 
to vet who sat on the steering committee, but the council produced a list of one. Harbour Farm (reluctantly) 
accepted that person, who 
- 
in the event 
-- 
did not attend any meetings. (NHRAT 5,1994). Furthermore, 
rent-setting by a', '-awrolled HA had been questioned. "Borne people, including city cor rwillom, said that 
tents xrnddn't be about to set their own rents and that Hmy'd simply set n too low We blow that if w+s did 
set ow rents too low, w 'd simply go out of buWness and d w+efare we take the mobility serious'ly. " (NHHAT 
14,1998). 
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economies of scale and permit all landlords to present themselves to tenants, landlord choices were 
subsequently held in tranches after the completion of each improvement phase. The first 
consultation exercise took place between August and November 1994. The process was intended to 
enable tenants to make more informed choices and involved distributing information to tenants 
individually, with potential landlords `door stepping' on a rota. Landlords had an agreed Accord 
and Code of Conduct enabling than to promote their own interests but not to denigrate other 
options. Landlords produced their own literature, which was scrutinised by the HAT. There were 
also independent advisors who dealt with tenant queries and provided an information service. Prior 
to each tranche, there were also `Tenure Fairs' where potential landlords promoted themselves to 
taunts. Although it had to remain neutral between landlords and tenures, the HAT promoted RTB 
so that all options were represented. 3' Tenants were also advised they could defer their choice and 
remain with the HAT until its closure (when they would be compelled to make a landlord choice). 32 
As tenants became eligible to make dheir landlord choice decisions, it was apparent that to opt for an HA 
was a step into `the unknown' and that tenants would be cautious abort making irreversible choices. 
Furflenn ore, if too many teiarts returned to the council early in the HAT's life, it would reduce the 
potential for a viable CBHA being established. To address diese issues, the HAT secured an agreeme t 
with the Government o permit a trial manag nart period with HAs. Thus, alongside the choice of 
returning to the local awhority, tenants would be given the opportunity of a trial period with HAs, after 
which they would again have an open twice of landlord. Both Hasenattin and Harbour Fann offered 
trial mac rah periods. Although the HAT had a managt agreernat with each HA, it did not 
enforce particular standards so that tenants experienced the quality of the landlord's managan lt. The 
first 18-month trial mar rat periods started in January 1996. Although a majority of tenants (261) 
opted to return to the local auAhority, fifty-five opted to pioneer the trial mane nit. 
For tenants to have a real dice of landlords, the HAT considered that a `level playing field' was needed 
in tarns of remis offered by compehng landlords. HAs intending to offer themselves as exit alternatives 
would often be in an iaioomperitive position when it came to rat levels vlv-d -vis the oaunW. For tenants 
to have a real dioioe, rents at the time of exit would need to be similar whoever the landlord. Prior to the 
improvement of their properties, HAT tenants had had their rent frozen at the level it was an the 
31 The fact that transfers to HAs earn the HAT a capital receipt while transfers to the local authority are at 
zero-cost suggests HATs had a financial incentive to favour one option over another. 
32 The HAT itself was a popular landlord. A HAT officer (NHHAT 11,1997), for example, observed that 
"A lot of people are pretty happy with the HAT. Some were deferring their landlord choice in order to 
stay with the HAT. They're happy to stay with the HAT far years ". Another HAT officer (NHRAT 9, 
1997) noted that: "Given a choice people would stay with the HAT. One of the reasons is that the housing 
management is good; that's an implicit indictment of local authority management. We've recruited the 
right staff with good attitudes; more than half of them are tenants themselves. ". 
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date of transfer. In accordance with the pre-HAT agreament, rents for improved properties were 
pegged to council rents plus a 15% premium reflecting their `higher-than-average' standards. It was 
also agreed that the new rents would be phased in. Although council rails were rising, the pledge 
meant that the valuation for tratisfers to HAs would have to be lower than odhwise expected (Bright, 
1994, p. 11). Fully modernised at a cost in the order of £30,000 each, the HAT properties would attract a 
substantial valuation even as tenanted stock it was initially expected HAs would have to buy than at this 
value, which would affect their rents. In contrast, the council would gain the properties back at no cost to 
itself. The housing miuster, Sir George Young, however, was flexible regarding the valuation of 
properties on transfer to HAs, which inter alia suited the Government's desire for tenure diversification. 
The agreed system for assessing transfer values was based on social housing as a business and on 
future income from 
- 
rather than historic cost of 
- 
that housing. As the sale price might be lower 
than the cost of improvements undertaken, the Government was therefore providing a subsidy to the 
HAs buying the stock. 33 
The ` level playing field' idea meant that 
- 
at the time of twofer 
- 
the rent for all landlords would be 
the same as that for the council. Without this, the council's rents would have been significantly lower 
than those of HAs. A HAT board member (NHHAT 13,1998) argued that the HAT had the ore 
provided `real' dwices: "We've meats it a level playing field on r+eras.... It wm1d be urifair if the city 
cowtcil rents were lower d those of the housing osociationr. ". Although fixed at the point of exit, 
rats could change post-e dt. Housenkvtin guaranteed that its rats would always be lower than the 
equivalent council rent for similar stock while Harbour Farm gave a five year guarantee on rags, during 
which rats would only increase by the rats of inflation. I! he t*x tainty for taunts making d1eir landlord 
choice was whether HA rats or cmicil rats would increase faster. Furthermore, all landlords would 
have to balance their rat levels against the quality of service provided. 
5.4.3 THE DELAY IN THE EXIT 
Although it was intended that tenants would make their landlord choice after reffirbishmart, it was 
not clear precisely when the choice should be made. Until 1996, landlord choice decisions were taken 
six maihs after the aocrpletion of each improvenient phase. During 1996, however, the GGovemmart's 
requirement for HATS to determine (and reduce) the lifetime costs, necessitated a theme in this 
procedure. In May 1996, the HAT board decided that, although the remaining tenants could make 
their landlord choice, they would actually not transfer wrtil the and of the HAT's operational life in 
1998. The decision was primarily for financial reasons and to enable the HAT to stay within its 
lifetime cost budget (NHHAT 9,1997). Delaying transfers until the and of its life meant the HAT 
33 This subsidy could be thought of as similar to those paid through HAG for HAs to build social housing. 
144 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPUMU NTATION OF HOIYSING ACTION TROST POLICY 
would receive the rental income. The decision was a major die of policy and the HAT had "... to 
come clean on this immediately otherwise rumours would circulate. We wrote to every tenant to tell 
them. There ways no bac h They were happy with the HAT by then " (NEHiAT 9,1997). 
The delay appeared to break some of the assurances given when the HAT was set up and added 
substance to claims that the Govemmert could not be trusted (NHRAT 8,1996). The council 
leader, Paddy Doyle (from Mason, 1996, p. 13), commented that it was `disappointing' because it 
created "... anxiety among tenants, many of whom are elderly and have been council tenants for 
many years. They want to get back with us as soon as possible. ". The decision also meant that 
some of the cost fell on the council. Doyle (from Mason, 1996, p. 13) accepted that the HAT was 
determined that tenants in later phases did not Set a poorer quality refurbishmont than those at the 
begiirnning, "... but we will be asking the minister to give the HAT enough money to finish the job 
... 
We will also be pointing out the loss of income to the council, which has produced its budget 
plans on the basis of the quite considerable rent income we were expected to get from returned 
tenants. ". The decision also exposed some of the inherent tensions within the HAT board and had 
resulted in `battles' on the board. Council members had their credibility with the Labour group to 
maintain and wanted to avoid oilier councillors being able to say. `We told you so - and you'll see, now 
of the buggers will come back to the comxyl. ' (NHHAT 9,19974 In effect, councillors were caught by 
their dual roles as councillors and HAT board members' 
5.4.4 OTHER EXITS 
As well as tenants exiting from the public sector, there were also a number of vacant prop«ties - both 
improved and ununprovved 
- 
that were exited. The HAT's comn umalt was to refurbish all dwelling and 
to provide refiubished homes for all sec re tenants at the time of the ballot. If a secure tenant vacated a 
property, the HAT was not obliged to re-let it to a segue tenant and could sell or otherwise dispose 
of the property. Properties became vacated for a wide variety of reasons, including tenants choosing 
to move into die new homes provided in partnership with HAs, dying or moving away to another 
area or to sheltered housing. As a result, the HAT was in the position of having surplus 
properties " Some vacated properties were offered to people on the council's waiting list. Although 
I This issue of dual roles more obviously acted tenants. A ten ad (NHHAT 12,1998), for fie, argued 
that the RBMs were told "... they're board me nbers first and 
tenants second 
- 
althrngh they're there to 
represent tenants. [But] who do the city councillors reposent? They're there to rep ent the city council but the 
tenants are not there to represent te tenants. ". 
35 This contrasts with the situation in Waltham Forest HAT, where the redevelopment plans involved 
building fewer properties than the number of tenanted properties fired to the HAT. The situation in 
Liverpool was different again. In Liverpool, the HAT was only required to m%rbish or build new 
properties for tenants with secure tenancies at the time of transfer. Furthermore, as in general the 
Liverpool HAT worked in partnership with HAs, any additional properties accrued to the HA rather than to 
the HAT. 
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it did not have a statutory obligation to house people from the local authority's waiting list, the HAT 
had agreed to offer 50% of vacant properties for the council to nominate tenants. 
As the HAT had more properties than secure tenants and, consistent with its objects, it could 
explore different ways of disposing of than. In addition to the main exits, which were for tenants 
and properties, there was a range of exits for the HAT's surplus properties. First, a `Homesteading' 
scheme, intended to help people with local connections (i. e., within postal area HU6) become first- 
time homeowners and, thel+eby, in ase home ownership on the estate. Properties that had only been 
externally renovated by the HAT were sold at a discounted price, with the buyer receiving a HAT 
grant to carry out certain specified improvements within one year. The proposals for homesteading 
(i. e., `not letting or improving certain properties, just selling than off) had initially been 
controversial among tenants and had not been raised as a possibility prior to the ballot (NHHAT 6, 
1994). The HAT also reached agreement with the TSB bank and Yorkshire Building Society for 
them to support and make loans available to suitable purchasers. The scheme was introduced in 
February 1995, with the first sale completed in July 1995. In 1996/97, the scheme was opened up 
to a wider area, including those living in Hull, having family in or other connections with the city, 
and those on the council's waiting list. Second, a transfer-and-buy (TAB) scheme 
-- 
a variant of 
RTB 
- 
which was an attempt to increase the amount of home ownership within the HAT area and to 
provide an exit scheme for both HAT properties and council tenants from other estates in Hull. 
Under this scheme, council tenants from the wider north Hull area and the Gypsyville regeneration 
area could transfer their RTB discounts to a house of similar size on the North Hull estate, provided 
they agreed to buy it. Third, in conjunction with NBHA, the HAT developed a shared ownership 
purchase scheme. Based on Do-It-Yourself Shared Ownership (DIYSO), the scheme involved HAT 
properties that could be bought by NBHA. NBHA would then sell a share of the property to a 
resident taking part in the scheme. 
The HAT also sold some of the properties surplus to its requirements. Only HAs were permitted to 
buy these properties and, to assist Harbour Farm build up its stock of properties and become more 
viable, the HAT sold it the first fifty available properties in October 1995 (NHHAT, Annual ort 
1994/95, p. 14). Further sales were prompted as a response to the life-time costs exercise and the 
shortfall in the HAT's funding. During the financial years 1996/97 and 1997/98, more than two 
hundred properties were sold to NBHA on condition ownership would be transferred to Harbour 
Farm should it become a registered HA. The HAT retained 100% nomination rights on these 
properties. Sales were also made to Housernattin, the HAT also retained 100'/o nomination rights on all 
these properties. The various trendies oon rnsed both fully mid partially improved properties. A DETR 
report (DETR LAS, 1998, s26) noted that, althoi every trandie of mixed properties produced a positive 
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value overall, individual partially improved properties often had negative values. In some instances HAs 
had been paid dowries to take properties: in 1996/97, for eacample, the HAT had negotiated with NBHA 
to take over rrineteen partially improved properties and although NBHA agreed to invest about £20,000 in 
each house, the HAT had to contribute a dowry of £2000 per property to facilitate the disposal. 
It was predicted that sales of properties to HAs, together with the TAB and Homesteading schemes, 
would not enable the HAT to dispose of all its properties, especially partially improved properties, 
and a small number of such properties remained as the HAT neared the end of its operational life. 
Although initially offered to the council, the HAT felt the council would be unable to improve the 
properties within an appropriate time-scale (i. e., before the end of the HAT's operational life). It 
therefore proposed to sell than on the open market, subject to certain restrictions on any subsequent 
purchaser, including commitments to refurbish than to HAT standard and to use than for social 
housing. Two bids were received. The first offered to buy than at £1 each (for either re-sale or 
rent). The second, from Wyke Developments, offered £93,000 for the eighteen houses then offered 
for sale and proposed to use the housing for social renting. Thus, in early 1998, the HAT entered 
into a partnership agreement with Wyke Developments to secure the improvement of any partially 
refurbished properties that became vacant before the end of the HAT's operational life. The 
properties would be owned by Wyke Developments, who would improve them to full HAT standard 
and, once improved, they would be managed and let by Housetnartin at affordable rents. The HAT 
retained 50% nomination rights. (NHHAT, Annual Review 1997/98. p. 18). While it was the 
potential for property deals of apparently similar nature to this that had concerned Opposition MPs 
during the 1988 Act's committee stages, there are several distinctions. First, the properties had been 
offered to the council who did not have the funds available to refurbish the properties within a time 
period acceptable to the HAT. Second, the sale was of vacant rather than tenanted properties. 
Third, while the selling price appears low (approximately E5,000 per property), this was still higher 
than for similar sales where properties actually had a negative value. Fourth and most important, 
this was an exceptional act by the HAT as it neared the end of its operational life rather than its 
normal modus operandi (i. e., it was a means of dealing with a limited number of outstanding 
properes) 36 
5.4.5 THE OUTCOME OF LANDLORD CHOICE 
The ovuall outcome of the landlord dioice in terms of properties (rather than tenants) is shown in 
Table 5.3. The fate of the original 2083 properties was as follows: 
- 
' These points were brought out in the DETR's audit of the sale (DO R IAS, 1998), prompted by media 
attention given to the sale because the deputy Prime Minister's son was an employee of Wyke 
Developments. 
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TENURE TYPE Pre-HAT Post-HAT 
Number % Number °/. 
LOCAL AUTHORITY RENTED 
" Kingston upon Hull city council 2083 86% 1281 48% 
Total 2083 86% 1281 48% 
SOCIAL RENTED (non-local authority) 
" NBHA 0 
- 
152 6% 
" Sanctuary (Housemaltin) 0 
- 
183 7% 
" Harbour Farm Community Housing 0 
- 
416 15% 
" Picketing & Ferens 0 
- 
148 6% 
Total 0 
- 
899 33% 
PRIVATE OWNER-OCCUPIER 
" Homed 0 
- 
29 1% 
" RTB 338 14% 417 16% 
" Etton Grove (private sale) 0 
- 
25 1% 
" Outright sales 0 
- 
10 0% 
Total 338 14% 481 18% 
PRIVATE RENTED 
" PSPI (Wyke Developments) 0 
- 
25 1% 
Total 0 
- 
25 1% 
TOTAL 2421 100% 2686 100% 
TABLE 5.3 
- 
OUTCOME OF LANDLORD CHOICE/ 
TENURE DIVERSIFICATION AT NORTH HULL HAT 
(Souroe: NHHAT, 1998) 
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" 1281 properties returned to the local authority (about 61 % of those transferred) (the f mal 
transfer was on 14 September 1998). 
" 601 properties transferred to HAs (416 of which were transferred to Harbour Farm) (the final 
transfer was on 21 September 1998); 
" 118 became owner-occupied (including 29 under the homesteading scheme, 79 RTB/TABs and 
10 outright sales); and 
" 58 properties demolished. 
The majority of tenants opted to retum to the local authority 
. 
In partial explanation of this pattern, a 
resident. (NHAT 12,1998) recognised an `underlying loyalty' to the council, while another felt "... n1a, y 
older people feel loyalty 
- 
an obligation 
- 
to the council, because it um the council that got diem out of 
pth'ate sector slums in the first place and grave them indoor toilets aid ba*wnis. " (NHHAT 14, 
1998). In Hull, tenants would also return to a local authority that 
- 
at least in terms of its housing 
management 
- 
was broadly similar to the one they had left up to six-and-a-half-years previously. 
Relatively few tenants exercised RTB. 
Of the 210 properties transferred flnugh landlord diotce to HAS, the split between 
Housemactin/Sanctuary and Harbour Farn/ NBHA was equal (105 each). Although Harbour Farm had 
eocpected to gain most of its properties through landlord choice, more than two-thirds came from sales of 
vacant property by the HAT. HAT staff had been surprised that, despite going on the trial period, more 
tenants than had been expected were opting to retum to the local au ity: "No great numbers but more 
dim expected We drought if they opt d/or the dial period they were likely to go with that kv hont  
(N HAT 9,1997). The Harbour Farm chair (NHHAT 14,1998) felt ere were a number of reasons for 
this, including uncertainty and fear of the unknown. The main source of uncertainty was with regard to 
Harbour Farm's registry icn with the Housing Coiporatian. A tamt (NHHAT 12,1998), then, 
undergoing a trial managenmt period, stated that she would reluctantly So bads to the local audwrity. 
"We would Iike to stay with them but I'm womsd that if they don't get set up ca CBHA dran ww'Il get 
passed over to North British Housing Associa m who ari the parent cowry. " 
By late 1997, Harbour Farm was managing nearly 400 Douses. As an unrvgista+ad HA, it was acting as 
nuriong agent for NBHA until it becarne registered m its own right It had, however, nut into 
diffiaaltiec with the Housing C, orpoiadan, which was unwilling to register it. There were two principal 
dif ficailties: the tenant majority an the board and the HA's lag-term financial viability. With regard to 
the former, the provisions of the 1996 g Act meant that no single party could hold a majority 
interest on a landlord's board. Harbour Farm aimed to be a trient-controlled HA with a majority of 
taiails m its board. In November 1997, the housing Corporation agreed that Harbour Fami could 
register but only as a patt of NBHA radier than in its awn right.. The arranganst kWved a detailed 
Wemat with NBHA to uantee maximum autawmy for Harbour Farn, in which it had to modify its 
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constitution from a tenant majority to 49% tenants and 51% odws - it was agreed, however, that the 
chair would always be a tenant. The arrangement was also financially advantageous for Harbour Farm, 
because NBHA could borrow at a rower rate of inst. Nevertheless, the new relationship damaged 
Harbour Farm's relation with tenants as it had explicitly presented itself as a `community-based' HA and 
yet had become part of a mainstream HA. 
until a late stage in the HAT's life, Harbour Farm intended to register with the Housing 
Corporation in its own right and would continue its relation with NBHA as an affiliate rather than 
as a subsidiary. Ultimately, however, it decided not to become registered and to remain as a TMO 
for NBHA. Although NBHA would own the organisation's properties, residents would manage the 
day-to-day services such as allocations, rent collections and basic repairs and maintenance. Long 
term financial projections showed that, as an HA, it would have problems with corporation tax and, 
as a result, it had looked at alternatives and had decided that the TMO was the best option 
(Northern Star, August, 1998, p. 5). Those tenants who had chosen Harbour Farm were consulted 
but very few decided to change landlords. Harbour Farm's guarantee limiting reist rises over the 
next five years would remain in place; after which, rents would come into line with NBHA's rent 
policies. 
5.4.6 COMMENTARY 
The outcome of the landlord choice was broadly in line with the HAT's planning figure for the number 
likely to return to the coiaixxl. While 2083 properties had transferred to the HAT, fearer than two4hirds 
returned to the council and, henM more than a third were privatised. This should, however, be 
distirguished from the same number of tenants choosing to exit fron the public sector. Nearly two irds 
of the properties transferred to HAs were the result of sales of vacant properties rather than dumigh 
teinants' landlord choices. In addition, about two hundred secure tenants had opted to move to one of the 
new developments undertaken in pattrership with HAs. Two of the HAT's policy decisions 
- 
the level 
playing field for rents at exit and the trial management periods 
- 
were likely to have been important 
in encouraging some diversification of landlords. Rather than merely an opportunity for choice, the 
former, for example, enhanced tenants' power of ol"oioe in the sense that making (i. e. lowering) HA 
reds competitive with local authority rants was equivalent to giving mal resources to tenants. 
in terms of the landlord choice, a councillor/HAT board member (NHHAT 13,1998) argued that Hull 
was the only HAT that had keep to its `original concept': "How real ns the oppor ty to return to the 
local authority at the other HATs? ': This observation was based on the original concept of tenants 
being able to return to the local authority, which 
- 
nay 
- 
that' were able to do. It is, however, a 
narrow conception of a HAT simply as a mechanism to improve local authority housing, Alternatively 
the return to the council was a `safety net' 
- 
to be used only if none of the alternatives was superior 
- 
and, 
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in the evert, for most tenants now of the options was superior. A tenant (NHAT 12,1998), however, 
argued that the `any her landlord business' was a `con': "The attitude was better the `devil you Anow 
At least you know where you stand 
-or at least you think you know where you stand ". It could also be 
argued that the HAT process had failed to challenge dependency on the local authority 
.A HAT 
afficer/residat (NHHAT 14,1998) argued that in encouraging tenants to make their landlord dioice, the 
HAT was in a position similar to a parent "... getting a child to leave the nest We W maie people rely 
on us too much instead of helping them to help themselves. One of the reasons why people choose to go 
back to the city council is because it's what they know. They know and they accept that they won't get 
their repairs done, but it's what's familiar. ". As consumer choice is dependent on competitim between 
suppliers/producers, it is important to consider what options were available. The Choice, however, was 
limited to the council and two HAs (including the tenant-led Harbour Farm). in the event, however, 
neither of the HAs presented a serious challenge to the local authority. Options other than the council 
remained `the unknown' and 
- 
despite the option of the trial period 
- 
the ` safety first' option was a return 
to the council. 
5.5 THE HAT'S WIDER ROLE 
Although this thesis concentrates primarily on the housing (tenure) issues associated with HATs, 
regeneration issues were an important part of the totality of HATs. The fourth statutory objective 
for HATs was a general one relating to securing or facilitating the improvement of the area's living 
and social conditions and its general environment (s63,1988 Act). The 1997 DoE monitoring 
handbook for HATs introduced a fifth objective: "... to bring about a sustainable and long-lasting 
improvement in the area ". In essence these added extra dimensions to the HAT's task and meant 
that HATS need to be considered not just as housing improvemart projects but as neighbourhood 
`regeneration' projects. For the purpose of indicating the HAT's wider rote, a brief overview of its 
economic development and successor organisations is gives here. 
Econoasic devdopmenat 
The aim of the HAT's community deveelopm t strategy was "... to complement the improved 
housing conditions on the estate by facilitating and promoting Initiatives which will lead to 
improved social and economic conditions. " (NHHAT, Annual Review 1991/92. p. 13). It was 
therefore intended to maximise the scope of the edier programme areas to develop residents' 
awareiess, skills and confidence. The economic development sub-programme was intended to 
create jobs and training opportunities for local residents through placements with the HAT, its 
contractors and consultants and local businesses, and to support the development of small 
i5S 
THE DEVELOPMENT £ ThIP'LEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
businesses and local community enterprise (ibid, p. 13). An area where the HAT could create 
opportunities for local people was through its own anployment. A HAT offiCM-I ida t (NHHAT 
14,1998), for example, stated that: "The HAT is good at employing tenants - those tenants have been 
able to have an input into and an influence on the HAT.... The HAT staff who are also tenants all tend 
to have strong characters and will push for things; we'vye made adf r+ence to the HAT from imfde. ". 
Fu more, more than half of Harbour Farm's managing committee were tenants employed by the 
HAT (NHRAT 4,1994). The HAT's main area of leverage for creating employment and training 
opportunities, however, was through its improvement programme. In Septamber 1993, to develop 
the relationship between the HAT and the local building industry, a `Local Firms hitiative' was 
launched, which provided further opportunities for local firms to compete for HAT improvement 
work (NHHAT, Annual Review 1993/94, p. 7). 
The HAT also worked in partnership with other agencies. One of its key partners was Orchard Park 
& North Hull Enterprises Ltd (OPNHE), a local economic initiative set up by the council and 
Humberside county council to provide training, employment and small business development and 
support and sponsored by both central and local government. In July 1993, to further the uptake of 
local jobs and as means of making tenants aware of employment opportunities, especially with 
contractors, the HAT opened a Job Shop on Greenwood Avenue, jointly sponsored by the HAT and 
OPN E, and operated in partnership with the Employment Service. The HAT also financed 
training through skills development agreements which inter alia provided training places at the 
council's Summergroves Training Scheme. During 1994/95, the HAT launched an initiative to 
increase the number of registered child-minders in the area to enable single parents and others to 
take up further education, training and employment (Annual Review 1994/95. p. 17). In June 1994, 
the HAT and OPNHE became founding members of `Partners for Jobs', a group set up to bid for 
public and private sector funding to create additional jobs and full-time training places in Hull. In 
addition to the HAT, the partnership involved the council, Humberside county council, Humberside 
TEC, Hull Chamber of Commerce & Shipping, and the Employment Service. Partners for Jobs 
attracted European funding and also made a significant contribution to Hull's successful SRBCF 
bid intended to create 2000 jobs and 300 training places in the North Hull and Orchard Park area 
(NHHAT 1,1994). Through Partners for Jobs a range of training, job creation, business startups 
and business development initiatives were established, including the Resident, Enn loyment and 
Career Training Project (REACT). 
The HAT also sought to increase residents' financial resources by ensuring the full take-up of 
benefit entitlements and by improving money manageznent. The Disability Rights Advisory Service 
and the Citizens Advice Bureau's money project, for example advised terms. Loan amub were a 
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particular problem and during 1994/95, with the backing of the HAT, a Credit Union was set up 
designed to help residents who would not otherwise have access to credit at reasonable rates of 
interest. 
Successor organisations 
The HAT's 1991 Interim Corporate Plan had identified the need "... to leave behind at the end of 
the HAT's active life, a community equipped for the long term with viable and sustainable 
housing, social and economic infrastructures. " (from Brindley & Arnold, 1992, p. 8). In September 
1998, the HAT came to the end of its operational life and was wound up in March 1999. In approaching 
the HAT's wind-down, succession arrangements were made for major projects through the SRBCF 
and Hull City Vision (Annual Review 1997/98, p. 14). One of the HAT's main successor 
organisations was a community development rust (CDT). The decision to set up a CDT came after 
an option appraisal by consultants. At the time, a HAT officer (NHHAT 9,1997) stated that the 
CDT would "... continue tenant voice and responsibility on the estate; but specifically what it will do, 
sv won't know until its been set up. ". In January 1998, Northern Hull Community Development 
Limited was established. Re-titled ` Unity In Community' (LTIC), it published its first business plan 
outlining its aims and initial plans in May 1998. The CDT was initially endowed with £250,000. It 
was also proposed that the HAT's former Neighbourhood HAT centres, would transfer to the CDT 
(NHHAT 9,1997) 37 A HAT officer (NHHAT 9,1997) commented that some councillors 
-- 
with 
an `old-fashioned paternalistic concept of local government' 
- 
saw the CDT as a threat and argued 
that the HAT should give the funds and facilities to the council. Similarly, a HAT participation 
officer (NHHAT 11,1997) noted conflict with the council over the CDT, with councillors saying: "Glut 
us the, acilities and the income. ". The HAT's Annual Report 1997/98 (NHHAT 1998, p. 10) stated 
that UiC's performance "... during its early few months of operation world be a key factor in the 
board's final decisions regarding long-term support. ". The guarded nature of this statement 
suggests the HAT was being prudently cautious in committing itself to transferring certain assets to 
an untested organisation and/or that there was still some disagreement as to whether USC should 
gain the assets or whether they should be transferred to the council. Subsequently, UIC acquired the 
two community buildings, while its initial endowment was increased to £1.45 million. 
in addition to the improved houses and the creation of Harbour Farre, the HAT's anduring legacy is 
likely to come from UIC and its potential to carry forward the regeneration of the estate and the 
surrounding area. In this respect, however, both HAT officers and residents felt the comnu y 
developmart programme came too lane. A taint (NHHAT 12,1998) stated that: "AA the #ff6ry is now 
37 The original idea was that the HAT's does watld also be bequeathed to the CDT. The Go ernmss" , 
however, regarded these as an asset hat could be sold to reduce the costs of the HAT (NHHAT 9,1997). 
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going into community development. 
... 
It's a bit late doing it now; it should have been done at the 
beginning when people wanted it ". A HAT ofica/residerrt (NHHAT 14,1998) argued that although 
the HAT had improved the estate physically, "... it hasn't solved the real problems 
- 
people are sick of 
drug dealing and loafs who are out of control. The HAT's commwiity development and tenant 
involvement programmes have come too late. It war bricks-&. mo,? ar first There's a big push on it 
now, but it could have been started three or, jour years ago and it would have been up and naming by 
now. 
. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The establishment of a HAT in Hull was the direct result of the local authority's willingness to 
penetrate the ideological `dustcloud' surrounding HAT policy, to realise the significance of the 
changes made during the legislative stages (i. e., from Mark I to Mark II) and to see a HAT as a 
means of dealing with the need to refurbish its housing stock. The council had no commitment to 
HAT policy 
- 
it had a problem with its housing and a HAT was a means of resolving it. It was 
therefore an astute move by the council, which identified and seized an opportunity to bring 
Govemment funding into north Hull. 
If considered in terms of the Government's argument that HATs were a response to exceptional 
conditions, the choice of the North Hull estate was particularly controversial. As Dwelly (1991b, 
p. 22) observed, despite the need for improvement, it was `hard to square' the estate's condition with 
the Government's assertion that HATs were mean to remedy Britain's `worst estates': "Driving 
through the area you could be forgiven for thinking you weren't on a council estate at all. ". As 
noted in Chapter Four, PIC/PMM (1989, p. 58) had argued the HAT programme would be `more 
coherent and logical', and `more widely accepted within the housing community' if it could be 
regarded as `an exceptional response to an exceptional situation'. According to Hull officers, North 
Hull was not the worst estate in Hull: John Black (Dwelly, 1991b, p. 22) admitted that it had been 
chosen purely because of its size: "We needed an area with the scale for a HAT. The council has 
to maximise investment and we believed £50 million was the minimum amount the DoE would look 
at under the HAT arrangements. ". The council also wanted an estate that would yield a capital 
receipt: Hogan stated the council would not have applied for a HAT on an estate with a `negative 
value' (ibid, p. 24). Tenants from Waltham Forest who visited the estate, declared that they would 
have been happy with the unimproved houses (NHHAT 7,1994). A HAT on the North Hull estate 
was therefore indicative of the bottom-up influence on HAT policy combined with the Govemme is 
need to find a local authority willing to consider and support the possibility of a HAT. In this 
respell, Hull undoubtedly benefited from being the first area to be established as a HAT. At the time and 
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given the outcome in the pilot HAT areas, Kam (1993, p. 86) concluded that the Govemme is aim 
was to have any HAT at all and the coherence of a HAT strategy was a `dispensable luxury'. 
Although the pro-HAT negotiations were conducted in secret, such secrecy was justified by the 
highly charged political climate of the period, if a HAT proposal had been announced too early, it 
might never have come to fruition. Nevertheless, by the time of the public announcement, tenants 
were relatively powerless to influence the nature of the HAT prior to the ballot. In contrast to Hull, 
at both Waltham Forest and Liverpool 
-- 
and previously at Southwark 
-- 
there were extensive 
negotiations that directly involved tenants. A compact or agreement had been negotiated at 
Southwark between the tenants (assisted by consultants), the local authority and the Government. It 
could 
- 
in limited terms 
-- 
be argued that such an agreement was less important at Hull 
. 
38 In genoral 
terms, it was clear what was going to be done 
- 
at least in terms of improving the properties 
-- 
and, 
once they had been improved, tenants could return to the local authority. A phrase current at the 
time of ballot, for example, was that the council was only `lending' the properties to the HAT 
(NHRAT 4,1994). As discussed in the next Chapter, Waltham Forest tenants had a strong sense of 
ownership because they had voted for it and had shaped the nature of the HAT. In Hull, the local 
authority vouched for the HAT and the Yes vote was a demonstration of loyalty and confidence in 
the local authority. 
Although HAT policy was designed to largely bypass local authorities, having been instrumental in 
establishing a HAT, the council was keen to retain an interest in 
- 
and influence an 
-- 
the HAT. Of 
the three case study HATs, Hull city council had the greatest amount of representation on the HAT 
board (three councillors as compared with one in each of the other loc ations). 39 It was further 
distinguished by those board members including prominent local politicians. The local authority 
was a more than interested third party and exerted a `sideways' influence on HAT. A HAT 
officer/tenant (NHHAT 14,1998) stated that at Liveepool tenants were `wry disgnnded with their 
local authority' and the local authority these had had ` less say in the HAT than at Hall': "7n Hull te 
tenants had to fi8k The city council was not prepared to give up boavri places for the tenants. D's a 
city council-led HAT. ". Similarly, a HAT participation officer ( HHAT 11,1997) argued that the HAT 
was "... a child of the counciL ". HAT officers (NHHAT 9,1997; NH AT 11,1997) also argued that, 
although the HAT was separate from the council, the council would always claim that anything positive 
the HAT achieved was the result of its influence on the board. Nevuthdess, the HAT had to manain a 
positive relation with the council, which had scope to dastnict the HAT's work if minded to. Thus, 
33 There had (presumably) been some form of agreement between the council and the Government in terms 
of how the HAT would operate; the council's consent to which would 
- 
in principle 
- 
be on behalf of its 
tenants. 
39 An issue open to speculation is why Hull was so keen to have so many councillors and so few tenants. 
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behind the scenes, it can be speculated that there was a constant power struggle as the city council 
sought to assert authority over the HAT. 
Arguably the local authority's more assertive role in the North Hull HAT can be interpreted as a 
function of 
- 
and compensation for 
- 
tenant weakness; had tenants been better organised into a 
more potent constituency, more able to `fight its own comer', then the local authority could have 
adopted a more `hand-of role. Although the HAT attempted to develop wider resident 
involvement, it did not become well established. A HAT officer **HAT 4,1994) stated, for 
example, that tenant expectations in Hull were about "... high quality refurbishment of housing 
rather than about empowerment, enablement and control. ". Resident involvement was primarily 
focused around the development programme rather than the HAT's wider activities. Residents themselves 
tended to see it as a housing improvemat project and 
- 
to some extent 
- 
were encouraged to see it that 
way. An ]LtBM (NHHAT 10,1997), for example, felt tenants tended to have a partial view of the 
HAT's activities and did not appreciate the `full picture'. The initial momatum mated by the 
CPWEs had not been sustained and neidw was the initial series repeated. A HAT officer (NHHAT 9, 
1997), for example, considered that the CPWEs were invaluable and had thrown up a number of 
innovative ideas: "... that approach should have been used again. They were evidence of what 
could be done. ". He also argued that community developmart should have been as in ortant as the 
improvement programme: `7n the early days, the pressure ways to get the improvement pmgmmme 
going there should have been similar pre. csxre to got the community dewlopraent pr, gramme going 
- 
because dim 's what takes time. " (NHHAT 9,19914 
In contrast to Waltham Forest and Liverpool, the average tenant at Hull was away from the local 
authority for a much shorter period. For many tenants, therdore, the HAT period was a relatively 
brief interlude 
-a period away from the council when their home was improved 
-- 
rather than a 
period of a more significant and fundamental change. In contrast, at Waltham Forest and 
- 
where 
redevelopment occurs 
- 
at Liverpool, the HAT period is likely to be a period of more significant and 
fundamental c3unge. In part, this will be the result of much more fundamental physical change 
-- 
the changing of the physical landscape being symbolic of wider change. Furthermore, while the 
estate's tenure was diversified, the council remained by far the largest landlord and, rather than 
through tenant's landlord choices, significant elements of the diversification came through the HAT 
selling its vacant properties to HAs (which was a consequence of the cap on the HAT's life-time 
budget) and through developments in partnership with HAs. Thus, ultimately, the HAT was unable 
to fully exploit the flexibility and potential in the legislation and the discretion available at the local 
level. Although it is difficult to account for this, one of the inhibiting factors was the local 
authority, which was wary of the HAT beconiu a rival or challenging its position. What is more 
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evident at Hull, and in contrast to the other two case study areas, is the 'sideways' influence on the 
HAT from the local authority. Hence, arguably the ability of target groups to beneficially influence 
the policy in their own interest was frustrated not just by their own passivity but perhaps also by the 
local authority acting ostensibly in their interest. 
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Chapter Six 
CASE STUDY II: 
THE WALTHAM FOREST HAT 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter is a case study of the Waltham Forest HAT, the second to be established. It is in five 
main parts. The first discusses the choice to establish a HAT. The second discusses tenant involvement. 
The third discusses the developmern programme. The fourth discusses landlord twice and exit 
opportunities. The fifth indicates the HAT's wider role. Table 6.1 is a chronology of the HAT. 
Appendix D is a summary of the Tenants' Expec rion Doaunmt ('IED). 
6.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HAT IN WALTHAM FOREST 
6.1.1 THE BACKGROUND TO THE HAT OFFER 
The Waltham Forest HAT is based on four estates (Boundary Road, Cathall Road, Chingford Hall 
and Oliver Close) and had a longer and more involved gestation than the North Hull HAT. Prior to 
the HAT of, the London Borough of Waltham Forest (LBWF) had spart £1 million devplaping 
sch for their redevelopment in consultation with tenants. Redevelopment plans originated in 1985 
when structural surveys indicated fui1l in-depth investigation was required and, in 1986, an estate 
improvemat team (E1T) was set up. Further structural investigations, coupled with fabric and social 
surveys, revealed both serious physical problems requiring capital investinent and high levels of talent 
dissatisfaction. The estimated cost of a full programme of reäurbishmat and improvement was £110 
million for three estates (Cathall Road, Ch ord Hall and Oliver Close). Although intended to give than 
a thirty-year life, it would still leave a heavy maintenance bill. Decanting tenants during the works also 
presented problems and, as there was no surplus housing elsewhere, open spaces on each estate were 
identified as sites for to orary housing. From flare, it was a short step to considering the feasibility of 
demolition and redevelopment! 
1 Originally LBWF wanted to redevelop all their large panel concrete estates, so Boundary Road, Avenue 
Road and two ftweanding blocks euere also included in the proposed redevelopment Apart from 
Boundary Road, these were later omitted when it became clear the sites had insufficient land to allow 
redevelopnent to take place within their existing boundaries. 
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October 1985 Structural surveys commissioned by L3WF 
1987 LBWF ads up as estate improvement team 
1987/1988 Proposal to ad up a joint tenants & camcil company. 
Mardi 1988 Secretary cf Stde ddmnmes'lmaebadc' aaaagnnmtno langer viable. 
Novanber 1988 Proposal fer councilto'se l' atdetotmant-ocubvE dHAa. BalldproposedforNovember 1989. 
September 1989 DoE blodc'dow iy' . th. 
November 1989 Secretary of State maces offer of a HAT to LBWF. 
February 1990 Following consultation with taunts' groups. LBWF agrees tonegotiations about designatim of HAT. 
February 1990 
- 
July 1991 TED negatiatima 
October 1990 Completion of Fejsjjj tv Study by Chapman Heady Associates. 
April 1991 Housing minute, George Yang, and chaird . ito sip the TED. 
July/August 1991 81% Yes vote m Wmout of 75%in HAT ballot. 
December 1991 Decimation Order to ad up WFHAT laid beforo Parliament. 
April 1992 Tramfe of estatestoHAT. 
April 1993 HAT berms to manager 9uhaaeing m bwae. 
May 1993 Trinity Bemass Skills Cadre opens, managed by LBWF TramngA®mcy under amtrad to the HAT. 
April 1993 Start of removal ofpodiums at Ca" Road 
June 1993 Satänaoova1 fpodhima Oki wAaee&Cä adHalL 
August 1993 Phase One wade begins m thef rt estate, Boundary Road. 
Novmber 1993 Career Advice & Placement Project (CAPP) launched 
Decanba 1993 HwaebmldmgbejisatBoundaryRoad. 
January 1994 Phase One wodca beta m C7 a+d Hall, Oliver Close & Calball Road. 
May 1994 House buiigbegios at Ce" Road, Ofiver Close & Qmad HaLL 
December 1994 HAT decides to paelpme Landlord Choice until aftermi&I998. 
Mich 1995 Hand over äfrat hauen completed as pad of Phase One to tenants on Ofiw Close & Boundary Roe& 
September 1995 Area Committees setup 
Mitch 1996 Aaasgse otwi9i9wPeabodyDmatimFundfarpewisimof150bomeareceivesTreeanyapprovaL 
April 1996 HAT canttadaavi8t WFCCBHAtoprovideitshe gmwoapmmd aavjoe. 
December 1996 Govern iaot's decision m plammgfgxro fa l fetime uaGii-aid (£ZZ7 million) and aeafinn tim of 
proposedwimd-up date of 2001-02 
Mardi 1997 Orient Regensäen Trust ad up 
August 1997 Tampas T trap far refammmi. Vale is 92%m favour m 35%tumo L 
January 1998 Phaem One & Two (673 props ties) ttamfared to WFCBHA 
2001 Proposed date for ballot oftmants m Sir 0landlords and amopldim of the Trust's wart. 
2002 Fadwbo-up date. 
TABLE ä1- DEVELOPMENT OF WALTHAM FOREST HAT 
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In 1987, Hunt Thompson Associates (HTA) were appointed as architects to investigate the 
feasibility of a phased redevelopment of the three estates? HTA demonstrated that a phased 
redevelopment was both possible and cost effective, and proposed phased demolition and the 
construction of low-rise houses and flats with gardens in a traditional street layout integrated with the 
surrounding areas. A five-phase programme was devised for each site, with new building preceding 
demolition in each phase to avoid double-decant. An assumption of the numbers of tenants likely to 
move away before the scheme was complete (5% per year) allowed the number of dwellings to be 
reduced. During 1988, an in-depth survey, covering 80% of households, found 95% of tenants 
wanted a front door on the street and a garden (HTA, 1993, p. 78). There was also a preference for 
small areas of open space rather than a single central space as originally proposed. The survey also 
showed that the vast majority of tenants supported the principles of redevelopment and greater 
tenant control. ' The subsequent design proposals recognised most tenants desire to live in a low-rise 
houses and flats. They also envisaged retaining and refurbishing four tower blocks for sale (two on 
Cathall Road and one each on Chingford Hall and Oliver Close). During the summer of 1988, 
tenants gave their views on the proposals and by early 1989 design panel meetings were being held 
with tenants to develop the designs in more detail. In early 1989, a planning application was 
submitted. 
Although redevelopment plans were being progressed, a significant problem remained regarding fin ding. 
Due to restrictions on local audxwity spend, innovative funding medods had to be pursued. In late 
1987 and early 1988, a proposal was developed to set up joint tenant and council companies. Ownership 
was to be transferred to tenants throes four non-profit companies and a mix of public and private sector 
finance used to carry out redevelopment. A non-profit company would take over etch estate, undertake 
the redevelopment and than lease the new properties to the council for a twenty-year period. 'ibe company 
would ohms the council market rants and the council would diar®e taunts rats comparable to those 
levied on its own stock; the diffeeaice would - it was proposed - be net by a Govenvnent subsidy. In 
Mardi 1988, however, the Secretary of State announced restrictions an this form of lease-back 
arr 
, 
making it no longer viable. Despite this setback, other forms of fiat were pursued and, 
in November 1988, it was proposed to set up a torah-controlled HA. The council would sell the estates 
to the HA, arguing that, as the estates had a negative value, it would provide a £100 million dowry. In 
addition to the dowry, redevelopmat costs would be met from rants, which would i crease from £20 to 
£35 and a further £75 million would be raised by the sale of 15-20% of the housing to the private sector. 
Initially the proposals met with the DoE's approval. On this basis, consultation continued with a view to 
ZA scheme for Boundary Road was also developed with the council's in-house architect's department. 3 At the time, redevelopment was considered vital as the intention was to create tenant-controlled HAa 
Without redevelopment there would be no advantage to tenants in the stock being transferred to them. 
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tenants voting on the proposals in November 1989. Prior to this ballot, tenants set up formal 
representation groups 
-estate steering groups (ESGs) - with fielding from LBWF. Outreach teams were 
also set up an each estate to facilitate information flow between the council and tenants. Although the 
scheue had considerable support on the estates, the Waltham Forest Tenants' Federation (WFTF), which 
represented all council tenants in the borough, was opposed it. It pointed Out that it was a form of 
privatisation, that now of the scheme's tenants would have secure tenancies, that rats would rise and that 
the redevelopment would mean 700 fewer properties available for rent (Bunting, 1989, p. 21). 
In September 1989, the DoE announced that only 25% of LBWF's capital receipts could be used to 
fund the dowry and effectively blocked the scheme. Until then new developments could be funded 
by `cascading forward' capital receipts, but the 1989 Act, operative from April 1990, would bring 
this to an end 4 Tenants were angry at the DoE's removal of their right -- as they saw it -- to decide 
their own future and organised a campaign to persuade the Secretary of State to allow the scheme to 
be funded as proposed. The DoE was further embarrassed because the proposals had attracted the 
prince of Wales' attention and in September 1989 - immediately before the DoE blocked the scheme 
- 
plans for Cathall Road had been included in his exhibition, A Vision of Britain, at the Victoria & 
Albert Museum. In the autumn of 1989, tenant demonstrations were held both outside the DoE and 
the V&A. The housing minister, Michael Howard, met with protesters and promised to look into the 
matter further with the Secretary of State, Chris Patten. 
In November 1989, Patten offered to fund a HAT. This was a politically astute move. It offered an 
option and got the Government out of the difficult position of having contributed to the raising of 
tenants' expectations and, second, it helped the flagging HAT programme. Furthennore, unlike the 
pilot HAT areas, where HATs were regarded as having bean imposed, the local authority was 
offered the opportunity to explore the possibility. In contrast to North Hull, tenants were 
immediately aware that a HAT had been offered. Rather than deciding itself, LBWF allowed 
tenants to choose whether the offer be pursued further. In doing so, it forwent its opportunity to 
veto the HAT proposal and, thereafter, its powers were only to influence tenants' decisions either 
during the negotiations or at the ballot itself. Following the offlar of a HAT, intensive consultation 
between the ESGs and the council began. The council gave tenant groups £20,000 to appoint independimt 
advisors. The council's recognition of the ESGs as the principal representative groups, however, incurred 
WFTF's wrath (Inside Housing. 19 January, 1991, p. 2). ' WFTF argued that the ESGs were unelected, 6 
4 DoE officials had been supportive of the scheme and had privately apologised for having previously given 
support (Bunting, 1989, p. 21). 
s At Chingford Hall, the TA was separate from but overlapped with the ESG. The TA covered the whole 
estate, while the ESG covered the high-rise elements included in the redevelopment proposals; the law6rise 
elements wate not included as the housing was considered to be satidactory. Although adminiaýatively the 
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that it should have been funded to appoint consultants and accused the council of providing biased advice. 
A council spokesman (ibid, p. 2) defaided the decision to fund the ESGs on the basis that they could 
represent tenant's views on the estates where the HAT was proposed, while the WFTF had to take a much 
wider view. He also disavowed suggestions of bias: "The money will allow tenants to get independent 
advice and we are now waiting for the tenants' response and dem before we go back to the 
Govemment ". As no other option appeared to exist, the four ESGs decided that the offer should not be 
rejected out of hand and should be examined in more detail (WFHAT, 1991a, p. 1). Given the prior 
history of the redevelopment, `do nodring' (i. e., no improvement to housing conditions) was no larger an 
option and a HAT amounted to `somsthing'. A tenant (WFHAT 13,1997) stated that: "When we were 
first offered the HAT, we didn't want to know. But we also knew that's all wie would get - so wie had to 
sit down and talk ". Thus, in February 1990, on tenants' behalf, LBWF agreed to n Tations with the 
In April 1990, the DoE commissioned Chapman Hendy Associates (CHA), who had also beo the 
tenants' independent consultants, to produce a Feasi '' Study on the possibility and suitability of 
a HAT. 7 Completed in October 1990, the report concluded that a HAT was feasible and met the 
criteria in the 1988 Act. It also showed that the estates required major capital expenditure to 
randy inherent defic encdes and suggested phased redevelopment would be a better and more cost- 
effective long-term solution than refurbishment. 
The four estates that subsequently made up the HAT were built in the period 1966-72 and consisted 
of system-built medium-rise slab blocks with some high-rise towers. At Cathall Road and 
Chingford Hall estates, pedestrian entry to the towers and blocks was from a first floor `podium', 
beneath which there were extensive (and largely unused) car parking areas. There were also more 
limited podiums to each tower block at Oliver Close. The borough was also polarised between a 
relatively prosperous and suburban North and a low income, multi-ethnic South with classic ` inner- 
city' characteristics (CHA, October, 1990f, p. 7). While three estates were in the southern part of 
the Borough, Chingford Hall was in the northern part and relatively isolated from the others. 
Profiles of each estate are given in Table 6.2. 
low-rise housing was part of the estate, it was of a ddbrent architectural idiom and low-rise tenants did not 
consider themselves part of the estate. The TA's most active members lived in the low-rise parts. The TA 
was also anti-HAT, which a TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) considered to be a `knee-jerk reaction'. 
Furthermore, she argued the TA representatives were "... not elected, were perceived to be overly 
politically-motivated and therefore not representative of the tenants " (WFHAT 11,1994). 
6 From late January 1990, the ESGs did have a formal constitution, including procedures for the formal 
election of members. The joint ESGs also had a formal constitution as the Joint Steering Group (JSG). 
'This is the only case study HAT when the Feasibility Stndv was undertaken by independent consultants. 
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ESTATE. HOUSING SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
ACCOMMODATION 
BOUNDARY ROAD Three 21-story blocks plus 9 3- This estate had the highest proportion of older 
storey blocks, consisting of 369 residents who tended to live in the lower-rise 
dwellings & 990 residents. blocks. 57% of households on the estate had 
children and 40% of all families were headed 
by single parents. 39% of households were of 
ethnic minority origin. Unemployment was 
34% of economically active adults. 16'/0 of 
households had been burgled in the previous 
two years & 10% had members who had been 
assaulted during that time. 
CATHALL ROAD Two 21-storey blocks & 51% of households had children of which 
fourteen linked 4-, 5- & 8- 9.9% had more than three children. 23.4% of 
storey blocks of flats, households were headed by single parents. 
consisting of 842 dwellings & 46% were of ethnic minority origin. 31% of 
2105 residents. economically active adults were unemployed. 
_. 
During the previous two years, 19% of 
households had been burgled & 18% had 
experienced an assault on members. 
CHINGFORD HALL Three 21-storey blocks & Chingford Hall had the highest child 
eleven 6-storey blocks, population (41%) & lowest pensioner 
consisting of 711 dwellings & population (3%) of all the estates. 65% of 
2061 residents. households had children & 31% had single 
parent heads of families. 36% of households 
were of ethnic minority origin & the 
unemploynmeat rate was estimated at 28%. 
During the preceding two years, 20% of 
households had been burgled & 9% reported 
assaults on members. 
OLIVER CLOSE Five 21-storey blocks, 561/9 of families had children; 39'/9 of these 
consisting of 500 dwellings & families were headed by single peso. 5% of 
1428 residents. residents were pensioners. 14% of residents 
were of ethnic minority origin & the 
unemployment rate was estimated at 24%. 
During the previous two years, over 20% of 
households had been burgled and 10% had had 
use Its on members. 
TABLE 6.2 
- 
PROFILE OF WALTHAM FOREST HAT ESTATES 
(Adapted from the Feasibility Study and the HAT 1991/92 Annual Report. p6-7) 
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6.1.2 THE PRE-HAT NEGOTIATIONS 
From the initial offer onwards, tenants were involved in negotiations and instnune tal in the decision to 
explore it finther. Furthermore, die were established structures for tenant representation. Although 
initially a construct of the local authority, over time the groups had established autonomy. To 
debate the offer, the four ESGs formed a Joint Steering Group (JSG), 8 which subsequently 
discussed the HAT proposals with the DoE and sought to obtain "... the best possible guarantees 
for the future of the estates and the rights of tenants. " (WFHAT, 1991a, p. 1). In contrast to Hull 
where the council led the negotiations, LBWF took a back seat. A HAT officer (WFHAT 17,1997) 
commented that during the run-up to the HAT, the local authority had come to realise it was dealing with 
a `very astute group of tenants' and was `very enlightened' to leave it to tenants. As well as being a 
product of `co-operation, widespread participation and determination', Owens (1992, p. 18) 
considered that the tenants' successes owed much to the council's attitude. Despite its small Labour 
majority, it had refused to support or denounce HATs and had instead decided to remain strictly 
neutral 
-- 
tenants respected it for this (WFHAT 11,1994). LBWF also provided practical support 
and assistance to tenants, with outreach workers being appointed to run information shops on each 
estate, while ESG members attended training days and residential courses at the council's exercise. 
Nevertheless, a tenant representative (WFHAT 13,1997) stated that, despite the local authority finding 
tenant groups, tenants had said: `We want you sitting on the fence. You're not the people who five here, 
we are. '. 
Detailed negotiations began in earnest in October 1990, when, following the completion of the 
Feasibility Study. Raynsford & Morris (later Raynsford & Dallinson) were appointed as tenant 
consultants with a view to a ballot in April/May 1991. In February 1991, John Chumrow was 
appointed as shadow chair. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) stated that tenants were `perfectly happy' 
with this and `could not have chosen better'. Another TBM (WFHAT 8,1994) fett Chumrow had 
effectively been invited to be chair by tenants who had known him as shadow chair at the abortive 
HAT in Southwark. 
The ballot itself was postponed several times, due primarily to the protracted negotiation of a 
Tenants' Expectations Doaamecrt (TED) (see Appendix D). The JSG drew up a detailed statemat 
of what tenants would expect of a HAT, covering: 
- 
tenant consultation and influence; tenancy 
agreements and rats; letting policy; redevelopment; financial issues; satting up the HAT; and the 
options that would exist at the end of the HAT's M. A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 4, 
SA TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) noted that at one time, the JSG had consisted of all the ESG members from 
the four individual estates, which had tended to favour the larger estam such as Cathall Road. It was 
subsequently changed ao that each estate had an equal number of members. 
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1994) stated that two issues were especially important: 
- 
the return to the local authority and 
retaining the original design proposals (the masterplan). Tenants' expectations were discussed in 
detail with the DoE, LBWF and the chair-designate leading ultimately to the TED's production in 
April 1991. A HAT officer (WFHAT 1,1994) stressed that tenants felt ownership of the TED and 
it subsequently became the base-line for the HAT's operation. 
A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 18,1998), who had been previously been involved as an 
outreach worker, argued that the tenants' negotiating strategy was "... to get the best possible deal 
but there was no commitment to accepting that. The acceptance would be shown at the ballot. ". 
He also felt that tenant negotiators (ESG/JSG) had "... sought to remain neutral and to negotiate 
the best deal if ultimately tenants voted for the HAT. They wanted people to make up their own 
minds 
- 
they didn't prescribe the way for people to vote. ". A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) singled 
out their consultants, who gave `fair and independent advice' despite their own personal and 
political convictions. ' In negotiating the TED, while the JSG sought certainty, the Government 
made it clear that beyond the existing statutory provisions there could not be ` cast iron' guarantees. 
Nevertheless, it would provide dear assurances. Assurances regarding the ability to return to the 
local authority were similar to those at Hull (i. e., the local authority agreed to accept all tenants 
back and the DoE agreed to require the HAT to dispose to the local authority if that was the tenant's 
choice). 
The negotiations provided a classic example of a veto paint wheae the ` top' had to negotiate with tatet 
and interest groups and where issues of possible apposition and difficulty had to be ardicipMed, feed into 
negotiations and resolved. As the proposed HAT in So ih wank had been decisively rejected at a ballot in 
October 1990, tenants felt that they had the DoE "... right over a banvL They were despenitefor a 
Lo, don HAT. " (WFHAT 8,1994; WFHAT 11,1994). Ten arts' power stermned from their formal 
ability to veto a HAT against the DoE's determination to establish a HAT. Tenants also used 
brinim>a ip tactics and because it would have conceded power in the negotiations were reluctant to 
predict the outcome of the ballot. As a TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) argued, the usual power relations were 
reversed: "The DoE thought 
- 
and tenants allowed them to Btink 
- 
that we might walk out at any 
time. ". Another taunt representative (WFHAT 13,1997) said: "We were close to telling the DoE to 
stick it 
- 
but we also Anew that wasn't the right attitue. The DoE wanted to have the ballot within a 
few months but we weulah't let them. ". Wendy Ciapman (fron Whitdaw, 1995, p iv), who 
subsequently became a TBM, stated that tenants realised the Goverment wanted a flagship project and 
... 
milked that situation, for all it thou worth. 
9 Nick Raynsford later became MP for Greenwich and, following the Labour party's victory in the 1997 
general election, a minister in the DETR. 
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In April 1991, the housing minister, Sir George Young visited the estates and signed the TED-10 The 
TED would be the basis on which he expected the HAT to act if tenants voted Yes. During his visit, the 
minister confirmed that there would be a ballot and that it would take place in the summer of 1991. In 
May 1991, a shadow HAT board was appointed to work with John Chumrow. As at Hull, it was agreed 
that members of the HAT board had to be mutually acceptable. A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 4, 
1994) stated that while these were the Secretary of State's appointments, his nominations were `endorsed 
by the JSG' and the possibility of the JSG making objections did not arise because those proposed had 
been acceptable. LBWF was later invited to nominate a candidate for appointment to the board. 
6.1.3 THE BALLOT 
In the summer of 1991, prior to the ballot a series of public meetings and exhibitions were held on 
each estate. Although public meetings had been held where tenants were `talked at' and had the 
opportunity to ask questions, something more interactive was needed and subsequently road shows 
were put on (WFHAT 4,1994). A tenant representative (WFHAT 15,1997) described how, prior to 
the ballot, there had been a 'funday' with lots of events for children: "There was also a portakabin with 
the architects in it and dw development proposals. Everyone who entered got a five raffle ticket 
- 
and 
there were some very good prizes. Once meide, however, they started to ark questions about the 
development proposals. ". The TED also formed patt of the ballot doc u entation. It was, however, 
effectively a memorandum of an agreement to co-operate rather than a memorandum of substantive 
agreement; a statement of positions by tenants and the DoE with additional comments by the shadow 
HAT chair. While it consisted of three separate statements that could be mutually contradictory and 
open to different interpretations, "... it deemed to be a. Lou jit statement " (WFHAT 18,1998). 
Seventeen supplementary leaflets, which made more specific statemarts, were also sat out as part of the 
pro-ballot publicity. 
Immediately prior to the ballot, tenant representatives asked LBWF to continue to remain neutral 
(WFHAT 8,1994). ESG members and the council's outreach workers also pledged to remain 
neutral. Part of this was a conscious desire to be realistic about what the HAT would and would not 
do and to encourage individual tenants to make up their own minds. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) 
stated that "... all the members of the JSG vowed to remain neutral and not to tell people how to 
vote. They agreed to provide information and let the other tenants makeup their own minds. The 
tenant representatives were also prepared to argue a counter case either way. ". This approach 
'o Tenants felt that Young was trying to determine whether there would be a Yes vote and, as the ballot had 
not been confirmed, that the Government was also using brinkmanship tactics. Although tenants felt a Yes 
vote was likely, they were reluctant to tell the minister this. (WFHAT 18,1998). 
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encouraged each tenant to take responsibility for their own vote -- not from a position of 
blind faith 
or trust but from an informed position. " Furthermore, if tenant representatives actively encouraged 
a Yes vote, they could subsequently be blamed for the HAT's shortcomings. The vote on each 
estate would also be counted separately to avoid situations where estates voting against were 
included in a HAT due to the strength of the Yes vote on the other estates. If some estates had voted 
Yes and some No, the Government would decide whether to set up a HAT. If there were over 1000 
homes in total on estates voting Yes, then a HAT could be justified. '2 If one or more estates voted 
Yes but there were not enough homes for a HAT to be set up, the Government would "... do its best 
to meet the wishes of the tenants in those estates for redevelopment. " (HAT Working Group, 
1991, No. 15). 13 
YES NO TURNOUT % OF THOSE 
VOTING, 
VOTING YES 
% OF 
ELIGIBLE 
TENANT'S 
VOTING YES 
Boundary Road 218 96 69% 73% 48% 
Cathsll Road 593 114 74% 84% 62% 
cww brd Hsll 525 111 77% 83% 64% 
Oliver Close 380 84 76% 81% 62% 
TOTAL 1716 405 75% 81% 60% 
TABLE 6.3 
- 
BALLOT RESULT ACROSS THE FOUR ESTATES 
The ballot was held in the last two weeks of July by postal ballot. The result was declared on 2nd 
August 1991; a day described by a TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) as a `great day'. Eighty-one per cent 
of tenants, on a 75% turnout, voted in favour of a HAT, with a majority in favour of a HAT on each 
of the estates (see Table 6.3). The smallest majority was at Boundary Road, where - in fact -- a 
majority of eligible tenants did not vote in favour of a HAT. The HAT was formally designated on 
9 December 1991 and John Chumrow, five non-resident members and the council's nominee were 
11 Although it is debatable how true this would be in practice, it contrasts with the situation in Hull, where 
the council effectively told tenants to trust it and to vote Yes. 
12 This issue had been unresolved at Southwark. 
13 There is a coercive element here because only those estates that voted Yes would be considered for 
redevelopment. 
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also formally appointed to the board. Following the ballot, each estate elected a nominee for 
appointment to the HAT board. The TBMs duly took up their appointments on 19 December 1991. 
Properties were transferred from the council to the HAT in April 1992 and, in September 1992, the 
DoE formally approved the HAT's Statement of Proposals. setting out the HAT's aims: 
- 
" to demolish most of the existing accommodation, redevelop the sites & re-house the existing 
secure tenants in low-rise housing, with building work on each estate being managed in five 
phases over an 8-10 year period; 
" to introduce a housing management system comparable with best practice elsewhere; 
" to encourage & provide the necessary support for tenants to become involved in the 
management of their estates; 
" to work in partnership with tenants and other bodies involved in social & economic 
regeneration, secure for tenants improvements in education, training & employment 
opportunities, & bring about improvements in their quality of life; and 
" to transfer its properties in accordance with tenants' choices, to achieve diverse & stable 
ownership & management of the estates, no later than 2002. 
6.1.4 COMMENTARY 
The establishment of a HAT in Waltham Forest can be considered in terms of choices by the local 
authority and tenants. In each case, and in contrast to the situation in the pilot HAT areas, the choice was 
to support the possibility of a HAT. Permitting tenants to choose whether to pursue the possibility of a 
HAT was a pragmatic decision by LBWF, which felt it had no her options to offer tenants. Although 
the local authority did not support HAT policy per se, it did see a HAT as a means of improving the 
housing stock. It had also been prepared to transfer the housing to tenant-controlled HAs to achieve the 
same end and, hence, retaining control over the housing was not a major issue for it. Following the ballot, 
LBWF's director of housing (Inside Housing 9 August, 1991, p. 3) argued tenants had faced a Hobson's 
choice: "73tis was not a vote in favour of a FIAT. Tenants were voting for redevelopment but 
recognising the only wary of achieving it is to vote for a HAT to get the money from the Government 
... 
If the tenants had been given the choice of the money going to the HAT or the council tenants would 
have voted to stay with the council. ". 
The decision for tenants was the balance between two considerations: the prospect of improvements 
to their homes and the strength of the assurance they could return to the local authority once their 
homes had been improved. In respect of the latter, the pre-HAT negotiations enabled tenants to 
negotiate and influence the type of HAT being created, while the existence of the TED gave tenants 
certainty. Hence, in contrast to the pilot HAT areas, sufficient support and trust in the proposed 
HAT had been built up to enable a Yes vote. The TED was regarded as a particularly important 
factor in outcome; a TBM (WFHAT 8,1994), for example, felt those areas that had rejected HATs 
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had ` insubstantial TEDs'. 14 In contrast to tenants at Hull, Waltham Forest tenants did not have to 
blindly trust the local authority to have safeguarded their interests. They would nevertheless have to 
trust the Government and the HAT to respect the commitments and assurances made in the TED. 
The first of the HAT's key result areas, however, was "... to safeguard the values outlined in the 
Tenants' Expectations Document. " (WFHAT, 1992). The prior history of the project is also 
important in explaining the Yes vote. Tenants hopes for a redevelopment had already been dashed 
more than once, while they had also previously demonstrated an interest in the principle of estate 
transfer (albeit to tenant-controlled HAs) as a means of achieving redevelopment. Nevertheless, 
while there was a positive and informed choice by tenants to have a HAT, it is debatable whether 
they had other options. 
6.2 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
This section discusses the various formal channels of communication between tenants (i. e., the 
target groups) and the HAT (i. e., the top's local agents). The channels could arise in several 
different ways: 
- 
the HAT could inherit those that already existed between tenants and the local 
authority; the HAT could create and impose new channels (i. e., top-down); while tenants could 
propose and lobby for certain channels (i. e., `bottom-up'). Through these channels, tenants' 
preferences and opinions could be feed into the decision-making process. A major difference between 
the Wal ham Forest and Hull HATs was the adoption in the former of a comprehensive community 
development programme at an earlier stage. The impetus for this came from tenants. A HAT officer 
(WFHAT 17,1997), for example, stated that tenants had `pushed for a wider project' and had 
emphasised the community development and economic development dimensions of the HAT. 
Furthermore, tenants had argued for economic and community development o be included separate 
from and additional to housing management. There had also been strong tenant pressure to make 
community development a director-level responsibility (WFHAT 2,1994). " Furthermore, tenant 
involvement was not the sole responsibility of the Community & Economic Development Depattmart but 
was an integral part of all the HAT's operating divisions. 
As outlined in its Annual Report 1992/93 (WFHAT 1993, p. 2. ), the HAT's community 
development strategy had four objectives: 
- 
14 In contrast to the relative isolation of tenants at Hull, Waltham Forest tenants seemed very aware of 
developments in other HAT areas 
- 
and especially Southwark 
- 
and seemed therefore to have benefited 
from their experience. 
13 A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 14,1997) stated tht "This HAT planned to involve the tenants When 
people f om Hull visited here, there um nearly a not when they realised whet the HAT was doing. One of the 
primary reacais for that involvement war the HA T's community development writ ". 
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" to utilise the process and energy of the physical development of the estates to achieve 
sustainable improvements in levels of economic activity, social well-being and community 
participation; 
" to provide specific training opportunities, to enable all tenants to take advantage of employmont 
opportunities created through the HAT's work or through other opportunities relevant to the 
local economy; 
" to promote and support the creation of new tenant led businesses; and 
" to ensure that the ESGs were sufficiently resourced and supported to enable them to achieve 
their aims and objectives most effectively. 
The first three can be regarded as `economic' development (discussed later); the fourth is discussed 
here. Before discussing tenant involvement further, it is appropriate to briefly outline the 
arrangements for housing management to provide context. Prior to the HAT establishing its own 
housing management team, it negotiated an interim agreement with LBWF for it to act as managing 
agent for the initial twelve months. Under the HAT itself, housing management was decentralised to 
each estate and its housing management was considered to be much better than that of the local authority 
(WFHAT 15,1997). Prior to the HAT's establishment, local authority housing staff and tenants had 
been at loggerheads. A TBM (WFHAT 16,1997) noted that the HAT housing management staff were 
very different from local authority staff: "The real dif rence is how they treat people. The HAT has a 
code of conduct for its staff. The local authority staff can be made and condescenckng 
-if HAT staff 
behaved like that they'd be sacked 
... 
In past, there had been an 'anti-tenant' culture in the 
council's estate officers. This has now changed Many tenants are working in the HAT estate 
offices. ". In May 1996, all of the HAT's management functions were transferred to a newly 
founded CBHA (discussed below). 
6.2.1 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
The JSG & ESGs 
Inheriting the JSG and ESGs, both of which had grown to maturity during the redevelopment 
proposals and the TED negotiations, the HAT took over and made use of the already established 
channels and links, including both informal and formal points of contact (WFHAT 2,1994). While 
the primary mechanism for consultation had been the JSG, as the agenda changed from pan HAT 
issues to individual estates the emphasis moved towards the ESGs. The ESGs therefore formed the 
primary consultation link between the HAT and tenants. The size of the ESGs varied; each estate 
had an ESG member for every 55 units (e. g., Cathall Road had fifteen members, while Boundary 
Road had seven). ESG members were not block representatives, represented the estate as a whole 
rather than any particular part of it and were elected annually. A tenant representative (WFHAT 2, 
1994) argued that the ESL's democratic credentials provided a mandate and a source of power, 
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which by comparison the HAT did not have. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994), however, commented 
that this claim was stronger in theory than in practice, because very few more than the required 
complement of the ESG actually stood for election and, hence, there was not a real election 
campaign, a `certain amount of apathy' and a `willingness to let other people stand'. Following the 
ESG elections, the HAT held planning days for the new ESGs attended by all HAT directors, the 
chief executive and the HAT chair, to review project progress, induct new members into HAT 
structures and set priorities for the year (WFHAT, October 1997, p. 9). Despite suffering `peaks and 
troughs', each of the ESGs played important roles within the HAT. A HAT report (WFHAT, October 
1997, p. 9), for example, stated that at their worst, they had "... become vehicles for individuals 
with large egos but not much interest in being representative, or they become moribund talking 
shops, very inward looking and unhelpful. ". Conversely, at their best, they had been "... quite 
splendid partners, providing a range of valuable views to the HAT, supporting tenant involvement 
on the estates, and, most importantly, acting as a channel for individuals to gain confidence and 
move onto formal training and employment. " (ibid, p. 9). 16 
As much of the consultation was focused through the ESGs, power tended to concentrate in the 
ESGs. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) felt the ESGs had an `established culture': "... knowledge is 
power and the ESG uses a terminology and jargon which can exclude people. ESGs should use 
that knowledge to empower others. ". A tenant representative from Liverpool (LHAT 3,1994) 
stated that when they visited Waltham Forest HAT, they seemed to keep seeing the `same people 
wearing different hats': "There seemed to be an inner corpus of tenants, mainly the ESGs, who 
were involved in everything. I wondered how much they actually represent the wider body of 
tenants. ". A tenant (WFHAT 16,1997) suggested that there was a reluctance for people to put 
themselves forward: "If you would do the job if no one else would, then you ended up doing it. 
Thus, the same people tend to get the jobs. ". It was, however, felt that people had had many 
opportunities to become more involved and, hence, it was their choice whether to become involved 
or not (WFHAT 13,1997). Furthermore, as most of the involvement was voluntary, it imposed 
costs on representatives, which could be a deterrent to greater involvement. Some tenants, for 
example, felt there was too much information given to them and too much time expected from tenant 
representatives: "Sometimes the HAT is too-tenant fixated Sometimes there is too much 
consultation 
- 
representatives are given piles of papers to go through.... At Cathall Road, many 
16 There was also a gender dimension to involvement and the ESGs were typically women-led and women dominated (WFHAT 11,1994). Furthermonk women tended to get involved, stay involved and aid every 
meeting, while male members tended to pick and choose (WFHAT 14,1997). A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) 
noted the wider effect of the HAT experience on women: `Involvement in the tenants' organisation has 
also ended bad marriages with battered wives. ". She also noted that a husband who had battered his wife had said `7f you want to lose your wife, let her join the ESG ". 
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of the ESG members are unemployed and can sit in the office all day. But at Boundary Road, 
many are working so they have less time to attend to the issues. " (WFHAT 7,1994). 
The HAT's structures 
The HAT board was the key forum for policy-making within the HAT and, during the TED 
negotiations, tenants had requested a tenant majority. In reply, the DoE had argued that members of 
the board needed "... to bring professional expertise in key management areas. " (sA2). Failing a 
majority, tenants were prepared to accept a minimum of four members, one from each estate. The 
board's full complement was four tenants, one local authority nominee, five from the private sector, 
plus the chair. At the chair's insistence, the vice-chair was a TBM (WFHAT 8,1994). Board 
meetings were held every six weeks to give time for consultation with ESGs and other working 
groups involving the HAT and tenants. Board papers were circulated to the ESGs prior to the 
meeting and tenants' comments included in the report presented to the board. '? A decision to open 
up the board as a public meeting was taken within the first three months and by 1993, the HAT was 
holding the meetings on the estates rather that at the HAT offices. A TBM (WFHAT 8,1994) 
noted that there was an important symbolism in having open meetings, because tenants "... were 
reassured that decisions were not being decided behind closed doors. ". Initially board meetings 
had had observers, but this had fallen away because 
-- 
a TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) argued 
-- 
the 
board "... had won the tenants' confidence. ". A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) stressed the importance 
of issues not going to a vote, which was symbolic of an emphasis on debate and achieving 
consensus, while another TBM (WFHAT 8,1994) took pride in the fact that the board had only had 
to vote once. '8 
As in the other HATs, board members had three-year terms of office. TBMs were elected from the 
outset and the HAT was keen to encourage competitive elections to enhance the TBMs' credentials 
- 
- 
the elections needed to be respected in the community and successful candidates seen to have a 
popular mandate to represent tenants (WFHAT 1,1994). Despite elections, the members showed little 
change. By 1998 and after three sets of elections, dm had been just six TBMs. Cathall Road and 
Chingford Hall had each had the same member fluvighotit (Simon Bartlett and Jacky Flanders). Oliver 
Close had initially had Howard May (1991-1994) and then Andy Healey (1994-1997 and 1997 onwards). 
Boundary Road had had change. the most Wendy Chapman was the first TBM (1991-1994), then 
Howard May (1994-1997) (who had changed estates) and subsequently Coralie Francis (1997 onwards). 
"A tenant representative (WFHAT 15,1997) stated that when the Hull tenants came, one of the key issues 
was board papers: "They got them a very short time before the meeting. The Waltham Forest tenants were 
telling them how to do things. They didn't realise they were 'allowed' to do this or that. ". is This had been on the issue of the principle of obtaining more private sector The vote, hoa+ever, was more to establish 
funding ýýý below). 
Positions rather than to malm the decision (WFHAT 16,1997). 
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In addition to the main HAT board, there was also a series of functional committees to oversee the work 
of the HAT's three operating divisions (redevelopment, community development and housing 
management). These were sub-committees of the HAT board and were chaired by non-reside t board 
members. Membership comprised tenants and non-resident board members, while ESGs acted as 
observers but could also be invited to feed in comments. As the HAT progressed its development 
programme, issues were increasingly estate-focused and pan-HAT structures were less appropriate, and, 
in September 1995, the HAT changed the organisation of its sub-committees and created four Area 
Committees. The committees were chaired by the TBM for that estate, and included four narTBMs and 
four tenants. Tenant members of the Area Committees were elected by virtue of ESG elections and all 
members were given training and induction onto the conuniäee (WFHAT 12,1996). The committees 
increased the empowermeit of to ants' groups; as stated i the HAT's Annual ort 1995/96 (WFHAT 
1996, p. 9): "Under the old system the ESGs exercised their influence through consultation; the new 
system gives them a 7wwk-on'role in policy and decision-making. ". The committees also became the 
main decision-making groups outside the main HAT board, a HAT participation officer (WFHAT 14, 
1997) asserted that: "No decision made at the Area Committee has ever been ovepmn, ed by the HAT 
boý ". 
As the development programme proceeded and the estates became a mix of new build housing and partial 
estates awaiting demolition, the unifying factors (e. g., housing conditions and the possibility of 
redevelopment) that had initially coalesced the JSG and ESGs began to than 
. 
Although tenants in the 
older housing still had the same priorities, the situation had changed for those in the new housing. A 
Cathall Road tenant (WFHAT 13,1997) predicted that involvement would abate once people had moved 
into their new homes: "They ire got to get settled in and there's less need to be inw vac ". In early 
1997, the Cathall Road ESG folded. Two of the most alive members had passed away in the previous 
year, while several ether members had been re Aed in the first phases of redevelopment. '9 Its demise 
provoked a questioning of the role and firture of ESGs. A TBM (WFHAT 16,1997), however, feit the 
HAT had invested a lot in Cathall Road ESG. Thus, once it had folded, there was a danger the HAT 
could `fall into the trap of disregarding ESGs' and a concern that the Cathall Road experience mitt be 
applied to the other estates without appreciating that local factors may be have been involved. 
In 1997, the HAT stook a major review of its consultation structures and initiated a dialogue about 
future arran_ mfts/struchu+es including the post HAT period. It reoo$pised that the estates were no 
19 Although the loss of the Cathall Road ESG had created a void in terms of consultation, there was a panel 
on the estate, composed of former ESG members, that continued in a representative role (WFHAT 17, 
1997). 
170 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
longer discrete estates and were becoming parts of the local neighbouthood and, furthermore, that the 
HAT was no longer the central point of contact. The focus had also broadened beyond the immediate 
issues of redevelopment and as the redevelopment progressed, issues of `community' and `quality of life' 
ina+easingly came to the fore. Following consultation with tenant representatives, it was agreed that the 
Area Committee structure was becoming increasingly less appropriate for the new roles and new contexts. 
Residerrts had a growing number of service providers with whom they needed to consult and negotiate. 
The HAT was also in the process of externalising many of its functions and had, for example, transferred 
its housing mit function to the Waltham Forest Community-Based Housing Association 
(CBHA). As a result, new representative structures were being developed. In late 1998, although the 
precise form of these had not been det mind, it was lik ly that they would talge slightly different forms 
on each estate. While the main focus would be an housing, the structures, were likely to include 
representatives of other local agencies, such as the HAT's successor orgnisations: the CBHA and a new 
community development trust, O-Regen. links would also be formalised with the council, the police, the 
Health Authority and East Irandon TEC. These changes complemented the physical transformation of the 
estates and reflected flee wider change from socially excluded estates. FuutheCnwre, they would introduce 
a new local democratic structure that complemented 
- 
and to some eactal redressed deficiencies in 
- 
the 
existing local govanmat structure. 11 new boards would also shift the emphasis away from the HAT; 
a move encouraged by the HAT in preparation for its own exit. 
Training for tenants 
In addition to opportunities for involvement, the HAT also helped develop tenants' abilities to 
exercise those opportunities. In its 1992/93 Annual Report (WFHAT 1993, p. 4), the HAT 
recognised that tenants would only be "... able to play a fill role in the design or management of 
their estates and in the development of their communities if they are `empowered' to do so. ". This 
would involve not just including tenants in the management arrangemcnts for the estates, but also 
ensuring they had the "... necessary skills, knowledge and support to enable them to contribute to 
the management process, to exercise choices and contribute to policy making in all aspects of the 
Trust's activities. ". It therefore noted that the training of TBMs, ESG members and others was 
critical to the HAT's success. The HAT provided tenants with a full training programme, initially to 
ensure meetings happened propedy mid were recor&d, including team building and group work skills, 
equal opportunities, community representation skills, presentation skills, fund-raising, newsletter 
production, communication, etc. (WFHAT 14,1997). As well as training, the HAT provided Section 
71 funding and on each estate there was a community development officer. The ESGs also had a 
small annual budget available for independent advice as and when required. Empowered tenants wane 
a challenge for the HAT: a HAT participation officer (WFHAT 14,1997), for example, acknowledged 
that empowering tenants made it more difficult for officers and that it was not "... an eary h; je or an easy 
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road to travel 
- 
but it's better at the end of the dray. ". Similarly, a tenant (WFHAT 13,1997) stressed 
that: "You've got to have this willingness to ask and willingness to question things, not simply to accept 
them as they are.... We've been empowered to feel that we can ark for things. ". Similarly anodes 
tenant (WFHAT 15,1997) stated that tenants felt able to say `We're not sure we want that' and could 
propose alternatives. 
6.2.4 COMMENTARY 
Although there had been some lingering mistrust and reservations about a HAT, over time it earned 
tenants' trust. A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 14,1997), for example, felt that "... in the early 
days, the ESGs had to battle with the HAT. Nov that battle is over. The ESGs work in partnership with 
the HAT.... The HAT is not seen as a threat any more.... Previously more people were invohoed as it 
was more critical. ". Another HAT participation officer (WFHAT 4,1994) stated that although the 
HAT was under `close scrutiny', tenants had been able to argue their case and the HAT could not 
take them for granted nor could it be complacent in its dealings with tenants. At the local level and 
because of the negotiated and integrated nature of the consultative arrangements, the HAT and its tenants 
had 
- 
to some extait 
- 
fused. Nevertheless, although tenants 
- 
or, at least, tannt activists 
- 
had a strong 
sense of ownership of the HAT, it is an difficult to determine the extent to which tenants had retained their 
autonomy and the extent to which they had been co-opted into the HAT. A tenant representative 
(WFHAT 2,1994), however, considered that the ESGs had retained their independence and had not 
been `incorporated' into the HAT 20 As part of its exit stmt r, the HAT was also beginning to modify 
arrangements and to divest itself of organisational responsibilities, whereby it would no longer be the 
central body and the sustainability of the new structures would be pit to the test. 
6.3 THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
This part discusses the development programme, which would establish the physical context within 
which tenants would make their landlord choice. 
6.3.1 THE FEASIBILITY STUDY 
The four estates consisted of a combination of high-rise and medium-rise system built blocks. The 
Feasibility Study (CHA, 1990a f) updated the LBWF's costings for the refurbishment and 
redevelopment options and reassessed their merits of those options. The report (s3.1) idea ified 
extensive work required for a comprehensive rthubishmat. A physical survey of the estates (s2.3.4) 
20 At Cathall Road, for wie, in order to maintain a separate identity, the ESG initially decided that mannbare 
should not work for the HAT or any of their sib-condactors it lobar dncpned this policy. Other ESGs had iaitiauy decided that members could wodc for the HAT but not on their own em se. 
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concluded that to arrest various problems needed major works and as extmsive repairs were required 
immediately, the problem could not be tackled on an ad hoc basis. The LBWF refurbishmert proposals 
had estimated a nine-year programme and its costs were updated to enable a direct comparison with the 
redevelopmernt option (Table 6.4). In the HAT Feasibility, the analysis of the redevelopmal option 
was prefaced by the observation that physical and social surveys cmumssioned by LBWF m 1986 had 
shown that tenants were very dissatisfied with their surroundings, such that "... even if millions of powith 
are spent refurbishing the estates, veryflew tenanft would actually like to remain living there. " (s4.1). 
The estimated redevdopma t costs are shaven in Table 6.4.21 The provision of each unit was costed at 
£63,690 with the remaining £17,310 being for enabling works, piling and infrastructure costs, and other 
costs. 
REFURBISH INT REDEVELOPMENT 
UNTTS COST ON1TS COST 
total unit total unit 
Boundary Road 300 £19.5 m £65,000 314 £26.78 m £85,287 
Ca al Road Estate 842 £53.2 m £63,183 760 £56.48 m £74,316 
MCfard Hdt lbtaft 657 £54.4 m £82,801 601 £50.88 m £84,659 
Oliver Cbse Estate 500 £35.1 m £70,200 440 £37.23 m £84,614 
TOTAL 2299 £162.2 m £70,552 2115* £17137 m £81,000 
TABLE 6.4 
- 
COSTS OF REDEVELOPMENT & REFURBISHMENT 
* Includes 405 to be refurbished in high-rise blocks. 
Redevelopmer t was more expensive both in terms of overall cost (£171.37 million to £162.2 million) and 
unit cost (£81,000 to £70,552). The consultants (s5.1), however, noted that, for most tenants, the estates' 
inherent defects were sufficient to devalue repairs in their eyes and many had lost confidence in n being 
capable of improvement. By `alienating and brutalising' those who lived time, tower blocks were seen by 
tenants as a major corrtributor'to social and tenancy problems, while the features of podium and block 
won contributed significantly to tenants' sense of their environment as `hostile to nomnal life'. 
These problems would remain if the estates were refurbished. The consultants (s5.2.2) fiuther reported 
that at least nine out of ten' taunts favoured redevelopmert. Negative cmmmrts about redevelopmat 
21 These coefs eacclude the provision of community facilities (chiefly shops and community centres) and remedial 
works prior to demolition in latter phases. 
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were that some tower blocks were to be retained (in order to provide dwellings for sale) and the 
development period (6-8 years) was too long to wait (s5.2.2). The report therefore concluded the only 
significant advantages offered by refurbishment were the retention of the maximum number of dwellings 
and the option's (apparently) lower cost. The consultants (s6.2.5) questioned whether it actually 
represented value for money in the lord term for the following reasons: 
- 
" while the number of units retained was attractive, there was minimal scope for conversion or re- 
arrangement of the internal layout, perpetuating existing problems of family-sized housing let to 
people with children in tower blocks; 
" many of the essential problems of high-density tower block living would remain; and 
" there would continue to be a need for ongoing monitoring and further major investment in the 
longer term. 
By contrast and despite the higher capital outlay, redevelopment offered a number of advantages 
(s6.3.4). 
" The capital cost of meeting tenants' re-housing requirements would be included in the budget 
costs and within the curtilage of each redevelopment area, thereby reducing financial uncertainty 
and risk. 22 
" Higher quality building stock in terms of materials and design would be produced, thereby 
reducing the risk of subsequent failure and further capital expenditure requirements. 
" Housing suited to family occupation would be produced. 
" The irremediable design features of high-density towers and blocks would be eliminated. 
" 
Smaller scale grouping of dwellings and traditional design would be more conducive to 
diversification of tenure and ownership 23 
" 
As tenants preferred this option, it offered the best chance of ensuring their long-term 
commitment and participation. 
Although the Feasibility Study concluded that redevelopment was required, its recommendation was 
qualified by reservations about the commercial feasibility of retaining four tower blocks for sale and 
suggested this element be reviewed. In addition, as redevelopment would represent a loss of 712 
dwellings from the rented sector (405 being refurbished for sale and 307 being the difference 
between the number of new build units and those demolished), the proposals could only 
accommodate re-housing existing tenants if vacancies arose at the rate of 5% during the 
development period and remained un-let. The HAT's responsibility would be to re-house all secure 
tenants at the time of the ballot who remained on the estate. The F ibili Ski y estimated that the 
work at £171 million and, in accepting the study's conclusions and in progressing negotiations 
towards a ballot, the DoE was tacitly agreeing to incur the likely costs of a HAT. 
I The re ubishment costs did not include for costs associated with any decanting or re-housing tumm that 
might occur as a consequence of the wow. 
23 This factor vwuld enable the diversification aims of HAT policy to be achieved more readily. 
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6.3.2 THE MASTERPLAN 
Before the HAT had been established, the DoE indicated that it would acquire the redevelopment 
masterplan from LBWF. As reported in Building Design in April 1991, however, tenants were 
concerned that HTA - who had spent three years working with than on the redevelopment 
proposals 
-- 
would not be re-appointed. The DoE and the chair-designate, John Chumrow in his 
response in the TED (sD4) refused to guarantee the existing architects' services would be retained, 
while the DoE agreed only to commission them to continue design work until the ballot and warned 
that "... given the major scale of the project, other professional practices might need to become 
involved on a competitive basis in the implementation process. ". This `raised fears' among 
tenants and council officials that the DoE was prepared "... to abandon the community architecture 
principles of the scheme to find the cheapest architect. " (Building Design, 1991). The JSG 
secretary, Christine Lawman stated that tenants were fearful that, if the architects changed, the 
designs would also change; tenants' real concern, however, was to keep the mastecplan not necessarily 
the architects (WFHAT 16,1997). 24 In January 1992 to ensure continuity with design work already 
undertaken, the HAT re-negotiated HTA's appointment for three estates and LBWF's architects 
department for the fourth. At the same time and following tenant consultation, the HAT approved 
design briefs covering the masterplan for each estate and the Phase One design. 
During 1992, Tenant Development Groups (TDGs) were established and architect/tenant design 
meetings recommenced. A housing preferences survey was also undertaken by USER Research to 
check the acceptability of the underlying design principles established in the 1988 survey and to test 
a range of design options (HTA, 1992, p. 81-83). The HAT also undertook interim works to 
improve conditions on the estates; the most significant of which were the removal of podiums. 
Work started at Cathall Road in April 1993 and at Chingford Hall and Oliver Close in June 1993. 
At Cathall Road, new play spaces and childcare centres were created underneath the remaining 
podium and in the courtyard areas created by the removal of the remainder. The works were 
important for their symbolic and morale-raising value because, after more than five years, work was 
finally getting under way. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994), for example, emphasised that "... the day 
of the concrete cruncher was symbolic -- absolutely incredible. ". 
Phase One had been planned to statt in June 1993 and to be caupleted by June 1995. Building actually 
began at Boundary Road in January 1994 and in May 1994 at the ew three estates. The delay fuelled 
tenants' doubts whether the project would euer happen. A TBM (WFHAT 11,1994) stated that, afar the 
24 The HAT's emergence had become the subject of myth. A HAT officer (WFHAT 1,1994) commented 
that although the main architects, HTA, present themselves as having "... lead the community, the tenants 
don't see it that way. They feel that it was always them who were leading and it was they who got the HAT. 
The HAT therefore did not have to take over from the architects. ". 
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ballot, dime not involved furl experienced a period of disillusionment: "Many people expected things 
to happen immediately. The vote uaac in August and there xa wildly optimistic hope to start house 
building in January. ". In early Mardi 1995, tenants moved into the first new homes at Boundary Road. 
And later in the same month, the first tenants at Oliver Close moved into their new homes. Although the 
first phases were tangible evidence the project was real, some tenants worried that it could be cancelled at 
any moment: "Even seeing the new houses hasn't convinced them. Theyre warned that the money will 
run out before it gets to them. They've had several scares 
... 
There's a feeling that it har always been 
tenuous. 7 scares ripple out into the estate; the fear that at any moment the plug W/be pulled 
(WFHAT 16,1997). 
6.3.3 THE SHORTFALL 
The HAT was committed was to providing new homes for all those who had been secure tenants at 
the time of the ballot. When the redevelopment had been planned, the turnover of secure tenants 
was about 5% each year. It had been assumed that this rate would continue and, if the vacated 
properties were not re-let on secure tenancies, the population of secure tenants would decline. 
Hence, the number of tenants requiring re-housing would be lower than those transferring. In 
practice, this assumption proved erroneous and fewer tenants than predicted were moving away, 
leaving the HAT with more secure tenants than planned homes. By September 1993, the HAT was 
aware that the masterplan proposals would not provide sufficient homes. The Annual Report 
1992/93 (WFHAT 1993, p. 8) identified a shortfall in the number of properties planned and a need 
for an additional 300 properties: 2022 households had transferred, but the masterplan would only 
build 1710 new properties. In this respect, the HAT would later argue that it had been a `victim of 
its own success' (WFHAT, Annual Report 199495, p. 17), and that tenants were "... happier with 
conditions on the estates and seem to be prepared to stay put so that they get their new home. " 
(Chingford Hall News. February 1996, p. 3). 
The shortfall became apparel during Phase One, when the shortfall widin the Phase was 80 homes. By 
February 1996, the diortfall was 150 homes, 66 of than in Phase Two and the crest in later phases. The 
HAT also owed LBWF twaly-five secure tenancies where the Borough had housed HAT tomb in 
special needs. In particular, the redeve cpmern plans did not provide for enough new homes in Phases 
One and Two to meet the oonm>itmmt in the TED not to rehouse tenants temporarily (i. e., double 
decarO. To address the expelled shortfall, the HAT was permitted to introduce altemative rehousing 
schemes, including a Cash Inoerrtive Scheme (CIS), hinder which tenatrts were offered a gart of up to 
£20,000 to buy a home on the private market" The HAT also purchased twenty-two properties on the 
21 It was also cheaper for the HAT to give these grants than to build new homes. 
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private market (WFHAT 1995, Annual Report 1994-95, p. 17). As a temporary measure, tenants could 
also transfer to a later phase. Although there was a cash incentive for this, the disincentives were the 
delay in geüing into a new property, the necessity for a double decant and the risk that the project funding 
would either be reduced (resulting in poorer quality housing in later phases) or withdrawn altogether and 
the project abandoned. By March 1996, thirty-one tenants had opted to move back to later phases and 
104 had opted for schemes to move off the estates. The shortfall was not just in terms of planned 
housing but also of development land within the designated area. The HAT therefore began a search 
to identify and purchase (or otherwise obtain) additional sites on which to build more houses. 
6.3.4 THE HIGH RLSE BLOCKS 
Although most aspects of the mastplan had 
- 
at least in principle 
- 
been resolved at an early staff an 
outstanding issue was the retention of tower blocks. The original masterplan allowed for the 
reäurbishmat of four of the original tltirteai tower blocks: two at Cathall Road and one each at Chingford 
Hall and Oliver Close. The blocks were not, howwem, expected to be needed to re-house the HAT's 
secure tenants and were originally to be refurbished for sale, which 
-- 
in principle 
- 
would contribute to 
the HAT's ftinding M In September 1992, the HAT decided that the Chingford Hall and Oliver Close 
blocks were fly unsound and should be demolished. The Cathall Road blocks could stiff be 
refurbished, either by the HAT or anodw social landlord. In July 1995, the HAT re-appraised the 
options for those blocks. Although LBWF was concerned not to lose the social how, the HAT did not 
find any pates interested in refurbishing the blocks and, an fiuther investi on, there were not enough 
HAT tenants willing to take up the option to justify the blocks' retention. The HAT also ruled out the 
possibility of refurbishing the blocks to most its housing shortfall, because tenants did not wish to live 
thee and the flats did not meet the HAT's need for family accoaunodation (NAO, 1997, p. 35). Heroe, it 
was decided to demolish the blocks 2' A land swap would also take place, whereby LBWF would gain 
the laid when the blocks had stood and, in noun, the HAT would acquire the I anghome Hospital site 
from the local authority for the co tction of additional housing The HAT was, however, criticised by 
the NAO (1997, p. 35) for not undertaking a full option appraisal, including comparing the cost of 
rdu sl t against the costs of demolishing the blocks, disposing of the site and purchasing other land 
to build additional homes. 
6.3.5 PHASE TWO 
Although Phase Two had been planned to start in August 1994, it actually started m September 
26 It is, however, debatable how much they would have contributed given the cost of refurbishing tower 
blocks and the saleability of the resulting units. The experience of The Denes at Stockbridge Village is 
appropriatehere (see Appendix C). 
2 It is ant to note that, despite its need for housing units and the loss of units involved, the HAT 
was not stopped from doing this by the DoE. 
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1995. Following Phase One, the position of consultant architects was re-tendered. HTA and the 
LBWF's were replaced by Phippen Randall Parkes (PRP) in December 1994. PRP was appointed 
to review the redevelopment plans for each estate and to develop plans for Phase Two in detail 
28 
Phase One was reviewed in terms of both its design and the procurement strategy. As with Phase 
One, tenants played a key role in this process. Most of the critical feedback concerned the process 
of housing development, especially problems of delays. For Phase Two, Tenant Development 
Groups (TDGs) were set up in mid-1994, which met regularly with the consultants to look at the 
masterplans and agree house types for the second stage of redevelopment. Monthly public meetings 
and drop-in sessions were also held. PRP reviewed, modified and updated the masterplan. The 
initial masterplan provided for the re-housing of 1710 secure tenants in new homes. In the review of 
Phase One, it was found the redevelopment proposals had over-estimated the number of properties 
that could be built on the sites. Furthermore, the underlying demographic assumptions had not 
made sufficient allowance for changes in housing needs as tenants grew older and personal 
situations changed. As a result the initial plans included too many one-bedroom properties and too 
few family-sized houses. The HAT's revised development programme (1996), therefore, allowed 
for the building of 1570 new properties and its 1996 Corporate Plan estimated it would re-house a 
total of 1854 secure tenants (1570 in new properties and 284 through re-housing schemes). By this 
time, the HAT had identified and acquired some development sites adjacent to its designated area for 
additional housing. Phase Two, therefore, included 68 new homes on North Birkbeck Road, Birch 
Grove and the Langthorne Hospital site in South Leytonstone. Another shortfall site at Oliver Close 
provided a further twelve new homes on the site of the proposed community centre. Community 
facilities for the estate would be provided as part of the redevelopment of Leyton Orient Football 
Club's ground close to the estate. A shortfall remained at Boundary Road in the final phase, which 
would require the acquisition of small sites and/or street properties. As no suitable sites could be 
found around Chingford Hall, the estate's tenants were given priority for re-housing options. 
After appraising its approach to building proainsu t in Phase Onq the HAT dianged its approach. 29 
For Phase Two, instead of seeking fixed price design & build contrails for each estate as in Phase One, 
28 The change in the architects appears to have been relatively uncontroversial. Retaining the architects 
and their proposed masterplan had been one of the important elements of the pre-ballot negotiation and is 
mentioned in the TED (Section D4). Tenants had, however, been involved in the decision to select new 
architects and there had never been any explicit guarantee that the original architects would be retained 
post Phase One (WFHAT 12,1996). As a TBM (WFHAT 16,1997) argued, it was `no big deal' changing 
architects: "The rasterplan had been developed in consultation with the tenants and the tenants had had a 
lot of input into it.. ". 
29 The HAT's expenditure on consultants' foes for project and construction minnt for Phase One totalled 
14% of the cost of the contracts (NAO, 1997, p. 31) and attracted criticism fr it various quarters. (27 
October, 1995, p. 5), for example, commented that the HAT had came in for criticism "... for the platoons of 
consultants' it was ernployirgg. " Similarly, Spring (1995, p. 20) wrote: "... a loge chunk of the money has been 
used to pay a myriad of coruultants often with overlapping responsibilities ". 
178 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
the HAT employed Bovis Canstrudion Ltd as its construction manager across all four sites. The building 
work was organised into discrete work packages that were tendered separately. The change to individual 
work packages lead to major savings through ` efficiency gains'. It also led to more direct contact with 
coctractors and it became easier to persuade then to take on local people and for the HAT to meet and 
exceed its targets for local employment. 
6.3.6 LIFETIME COSTS 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the HAT programme had been started without calculation of its 
expected costs. In Waltham Forest, the Government had not agreed to any specific unit costs but, in 
accepting the Feasibility Study's conclusion and in progressing negotiations towards a ballot, had 
tacitly agreed to incur the likely costs of the subsequent HAT. Although the Feasibility Study had 
estimated the work at £171 million, the consultants had not been required to include the cost of the 
community development work, housing management costs in excess of rental income, nor the 
administration costs; neither was the estimate revised to take account of undertakings in the TED 
(NAO, 1997, p. 19). The HAT's estimate of its life-time costs increased as its work progressed. 
The HAT's 1995 Corporate Plan estimated that to address the shortfall in properties for secure 
tenants it would need to extend its development programme to 2005, which would cost nearly £300 
million (£298 million in 1995/96 prices) 
- 
although this figure excluded any income from the 
disposal of properties. The Government indicated this would be beyond the grant funding available. 
The HAT estimated that it could complete its work by 2001 using private finance, which would 
reduce the total grant-in-aid requirement to £265 million less any receipts from disposals (ibid, 
p. 19). Within this total cost, redevelopment work would account for £200 million in 1995/96 
prices, which compared with the Feasibility Study's estimate of £180 million in 1995/96 prices, 
including refurbishing four tower blocks for sale (ibid, p. 19). 
As all the HATs' estimates was steadily creeping up from what had been set out in the various feasibility 
studies, in March 1996 the Government sought to determine each HAT's lifetime costs. The DoE's 
indicative grant in-aid range for WFHAT was between £180 million and £260 million and the targi t date 
for completion 2001-2. The HAT's 1996 Corporate Plan estimated its total grant requirement to be £235 
million. From its 1995 estimate of £265 million, the HAT had identified savings of £22 million tht 
improved efficiency and adopting fundier re-housing options, together with an anticipated £18 million in 
capital receipts from transfers (NAO, 1997, p. 19-20). The planning figure was for 40% of tenants 
transferring to a landlord o her than LBWF, flureby, ge iecating a capital receipt. The HAT had also 
identified £10 million additional costs, comprising £5 million for financing costs for homes to be built 
under a private finance anon rat with the Peabody Trust (discussed below) and £5 million as an 
andowmut for a CDT (ibid, p. 19-20). In November 1996, the Governn t set a life-time grant-in-aid 
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ailing for the HAT at £227 million (see Table 5.2). As discussed in the previous Chapter, the lifetime 
costs cap had a number of implications for all HATs, including certainty in terms of the amount available 
and that those funds would be available, but also a transfer of responsibility to HATs to work within their 
life-time costs limit. The funding shortfall effectively compelled the HAT to seek a private finance 
6.3.7 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
Tenants were involved throughout the project's development. As a redevelopment, design issues at 
Waltham Forest were more complex than at Hull (although not as complex as those at Liverpool). 
A tenant representative (WFHAT 7,1994) felt there had been "... a good dialogue with the 
architects 
-- 
fill conversation and explanation. ". Attendance at design meetings was variable. 
Regarding the Tenant Development Group meetings and re-iterating the previously noted `free-rider 
issue, a tenant representative (WFHAT 15,1997) stated that: 
"Everybody was leafleted and told about the meetings. You would think if people were 
given the opportunity they'd come down and have their say. There were 100 but 
there was only me and one other person at the meetings; five architects and two 
tenants. There's a `can't be bothered' attitude. Some people still say: It's never going 
to happen. There's lethargy. Some people say: Give me my front door keys. Others 
say: WhW we say won't make any dif rence . Some Joey issues seem to bring people 
out When we had the meeting about allocations, there wm over eighty people down 
here 
- 
asking how many bedrooms would they get » 
A TBM (WFHAT 16,1997) felt t} e had been sufficient involvoni it in the developmeant programme 
and, if not, it was not for lack of opportunity. She also recognised the danger of tenants who were 
involved being made scapegoats and blamed for any failings of the new houses. Furtheamore, a tenant 
represerrtative (WFHAT 7,1994) argued that although there might be : certain problems with the new 
homes, "... wie were involved and we made the decisions so we feel responsible. ". This echoes the 
point made in Chapter One about choice as an element in policy implementation: if tenants are 
empowered to make decisions, those decisions are their decisions and, more importantly, the 
compromises are their compromises. 
Tenants were allocated their fiture home 8-12 months before moving in. Once their borne had been 
allocated, tenants could make individual Tenants' Choices regarding oartain features, materials, finishes 
and colours. Tenants were able to individualise their homes by dioosing from a range of intemal and 
final features, including- internal wall colours and covering; vinyl flooring colours; bathroom fitting 
and wall tiles; ldtdien units and wall tiles; carpet colours; wardrobes; internal and fruit door types and 
finishes; and door furniture. A New Homes Centre was opened on each site where samples of the finishes 
and features were available. There was also the, option of an enhanced range of finishes and feuures, 
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which tenants could pay extra for. Each estate was treated individually and, hence, differe tly. It also 
meant tenants could see things being done differently elsewhere, which inevitably raised issues of the 
`grass being greener'. The range of choices also needed to be restricted both for cost reasons and with 
regard to the long m maintenance of the properties, especially as the HAT would not be the longterm 
landlord. Tenants would also receive a disturbance allowance (intended to cover relocation costs and 
dependent on the tenant's individual circumstances) and a home loss allowance of £ 1500, which could be 
used to pay for the enhanced range. As at Hull, there was a rent freeze until tenants moved into new 
or improved properties. Unlike Hull, there was no attempt to create a level playing field in terms of 
rents. Although new rents were pegged to LBWF rents, they were not phased in and there was a 
sharp increase in rent from £39 per week to £62 per week in 1996 (NAO, 1997, p. 44), which could, 
for example, create a poverty trap for those in a position to seek employmerrt. 30 
6.3.8 COMMENTARY 
A TBM (WFHAT 16,1997) stated that the response to the new houses had been ` overwhelmingly 
positive' with only minor complaints about snagging. Tonanis were also aware that the now houses being 
built an the Avenues estate near to Cathall Road, funded under the SRBCF and managed by LBWF, were 
of a much lower standard than those for the HAT; the project was also less well-funded than the HAT. 
Fur pore, a HAT participation officer (WFHAT 14,1997) pointed to a nearby private sector 
developmart, which, by comparison with the HAT properties, was poor quality. Although the HAT 
properties were high quality, there was c iticism that this was an inappropriately high quality. During 
1996, the HAT was the subject of an NAO inspection, which was published in January 1997 (NAO, 
1997) and attracted headlines in national newspapers, including; `Watchdog counts £122,000 per family 
cost of homes facelift for tenants' (The Guardian. 29 January, 1997) and 1120,000 a family to rehouse 
imp city council tenants' (Da v Tdearaph. 29 January 1997). The newspapers, however, selectively 
repotted and were more critical of the HAT than the Govemna is failure to exercise budgetary control. " 
Although it was at the HAT's discretion (subject to consent or veto from above) to determine the 
appropriate quality level for its development work, there was no incentive (or necessity) on the 
HAT's part to balance cost against quality, which indicates a lack of hierarchical control over 
implementation. The NAO report (1997, p. 2) was especially critical of the Government's financial 
management and argued that the balance between cost and quality should have been determined at 
the outset with budgets based on targets for unit costs and bench-marked to those of other public 
30 Furthermore, in the new homes utility charges are billed directly to the occupants. The old estates had a 
district heating system where heating and water charges were based on the average consumption and 
included in the rent. The HAT had, however, endeavoured to minimise utility costs in the new properties 
by designing the dwellings to high energy efficiency standards. 
31 The HAT'S chief executive responded to the criticism in detail in an article in Inside F1outhnA (6 February, 
1997, p. 15). 
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sector bodies undertaking similar work. 
6.4 THE EXIT OPTIONS 
As HATs were expressly intended to be limited-life agencies, at some point in their life, tenants 
would be required to make landlord choices. Tenure/landlord diversification was a statutory 
objective. Given the estates had been almost 100% council tenancies, tenure diversification would 
inevitably involve as many as possible tenants not returning to the local authority. With the first 
new build houses being occupied from March 1995, the exit issues became real. As stated in the 
TED (sGl), the original intention was for tenants to make a landlord choice after each phase of 
development. As at the other HATs, the precise timing of this choice was significant. If tenants 
transferred before the HAT had completed its worlc, the HAT would not receive the rent from those 
properties 
- 
although it would receive a capital receipt from the sale. If tenants transferred at the end of 
the HAT's life, the HAT would receive the rat for the interim period. n The opportunity for Phase One 
tenants to make their landlord choice decision had been due in 1995/6 but was postponed. In 
December 1994, the HAT decided the landlord choice for Phase One and Two tenants would be 
combined and would occur in mid-1998; tenants would also be able to remain with the HAT until 
the end of its operational life. The landlord choice for those in the later phases would be 2001. The 
main reasons were, first, that LBWF would have to operate under CCT by 1997 and the effect of 
this would be known; second, that waiting until mid-1998 would give Phase One and Phase Two 
tenants more time to look at options for future landlords; third, as more tenants would have moved 
into their new homes, it would be more practical for tenants to make their choices in larger groups 
and tenants could also have stronger representation; and, fourth, that waiting until 1998 would give 
tenants in all phases more time to set up TMOs (from Cathall News, February 1995, p. 3). 
6.4.1 EARLY EXITS 
In contrast to the North Hull HAT, Waltham Forest HAT had more secure tenants than planned homes. 
Given the shortfall, there was a rumse of schemes to find alternate ways of rehousing tenants other than 
building new houses. These schemes gave tenants additional choice, the possibility of improving the 
quality of their housing at an earlier date and may also have suited tenants' aspirations and pr ces 
(i. e., to move closer to work or family). Each of the schemes involved secure tenants exiting from the 
public sector, becoming eil an owner-occupier or an assured tenant with an HA. There were two main 
schemes. A Cash Incentive Scheme (CIS), introduced in February 1994, trough which secure tenants 
32 Unlike in Hull, LBWF had not, in fact, planned on any tenants returning until the end of the HAT (WFHAT 19,1998). It was also pursing the CCT of its housing service and preferred to delay tenants 
returning to them until the details of this had been resolved (WFHAT 12,1996). 
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could be given a cash inne hive towards the purchase of a property. To be eligible fbr the incentive, 
tenants had to be able to obtain a mortgege, have a clear rent account, be a secure tenant for at least two 
years and agree to give up their tenacicy as soon as they had bought the new home. By March 1998, the 
scheme had re-housed 147 households at an average cost of £19,367 per unit (WFHAT, Annual Rehort 
1997/98, p. 10). The second scheme was a Tenant Home Finder scheme desired to help tenants find a 
home of their own choice, which 
- 
subject to certain conditions 
- 
an HA would buy and rent to than. 
The HAT made agreemetts with three HAs 
- 
Waltham Forest Community-Based Housing Association 
(WFCBHA), London & Quadrant and East Thames HA 
- 
to act as pates on this sd ne. By late 
1998, it had readied verbal agreement with the Govemme t Office for Landon and about 200 tenants had 
registered interest in the scheme (WFHAT, Annual Report 1997/98). 33 
6.4.2 THE EXIT STRATEGY 
Although there was a complex phasing of the demolition and redevelopment cycle, the HAT's 
development task was relatively straightforward: existing flats would be progressively demolished 
and new low-rise housing built. Tenants would transfer from a collectivised to an individual form of 
housing and could, therefore, make individual decisions about their future tenure. In the case of flats 
and sheltered housing units, it would be an the basis of a majority vote. The development of the HAT's 
exit strategy was tenant-initiated and the working party (ESWP) was a tenant-led committee. While 
there would be a standard exit package, including a return to the local authority, transfers to HAs 
and RTB, the ESWP wanted to expand choice. The HAT also wanted to offer a tenant-led option. 
Funding was provided for consultants to investigate tenant management strategies and various exit 
options, including: 
- 
a return to the local authority, disposal to existing HAs; disposal to a new 
CBHA, disposal to a new non-community-based HA; disposal to a new housing company, and 
establishing TMOs. The ESWP argued that a TMO would give HAT tenants greater control over 
day-to-day management of their homes and surrounding environment (Cathall News, February 
1995, p. 3. ). It further argued that if tenants set up effective TMOs, future landlords would be 
required to negotiate with tenants over housing management decisions (ibid, p. 3. ). A more 
ambitious development on TMOs, however, was to develop a fully-fledged CBHA, registered with 
the Housing Corporation. The idea was long standing, going back to the tenant-led company schemes 
of the late 1980s. 
In 1993, the ESWP and the HAT board agreed that the working party should investigate setting up 
a CBHA, with a tenant majority on the management committee, to run alongside the HAT. Various 
33 A Do-It Yourself Shared Ownership (DIYSO) scheme was also established but failed to aft= interest. During 
Phase I to address the housing shorUall, the HAT purchased 22 street properties, which were refurbished and 
managed by the HAT. These iamanI s had similar exit options to the other tom. The HAT did not continue tl 
option as the costs outweighed the bets. 
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reports were produced on the issues raised. As the essence of a CBHA was that it would be tenant- 
controlled and identified with a local community, a key issue was whether there should be one for 
each estate, one covering a group of estates or a single CBHA covering all four estates. 
Alternatively a single umbrella CBHA could be set up, which might later separate into estate-based 
organisations. As at Hull, a fundamental issue was the minimum critical mass needed for a viable 
CBHA. The consultants (HACAS, 1993) considered a minimum of 250 properties was needed. 
Given the phased redevelopment programme, the report also recognised the necessity of phasing in 
CBHAs as the first phases on each estate might not produce the minimum numbers required for 
viable CBHAs. 
In March 1995, the HAT decided to set up a single CBHA to cover all four estates, intended to be a 
separate organisation from the HAT, with a board consisting of fourteen members, ten of whom 
were tenants, including the chair and vice-chair; Chingford Hall and Cathall Road had three 
members each, Boundary Road and Oliver Close two members each. The other four members were 
non-residents and included a local councillor who was also a serving member of the HAT board. 
Another non-resident HAT board member served initially but later stood down. Although board 
members were initially nominated by the ESGs, it was agreed they would subsequently be elected. 
All of the tenant members had been involved in various estate-based community groups and 
organisations and three were serving HAT TBMs. 
During 1995, it was proposed to contract out the HAT's housing management. Although a number 
of parties (mainly HAs) expressed an interest, these were not taken up because of a subsequent 
decision to incorporate the housing management contract within a development agreement for the 
provision of an additional 150 homes to help meet the housing shortfall (NAO, 1997, p. 29). Apart 
from the CBHA (backed by the Peabody Trust), the other HAs were reluctant to provide these 
homes with the level of risk transfer involved (ibid, p. 29). Thus, a proposal for the new CBHA to 
run the HAT's housing management services was approved m February 1996 and, in May, it 
became the HAT's managing agent. The HAT remained the landlord and there were no major 
changes for tenants on a day-to-day basis. As diem to the CBHA, the HAT would also continue to 
monitor performance and would be accountable to tenant representatives. Housing managane it 
staff directly employed by the HAT also transferred to the CBHA. The arrangemont also meant 
tenants would have the opportunity to experience the CBHA before they made their landlord choice. 
6.4.3 THE PRIVATE FINANCE DEAL 
The integration of the housing managemait coctrad with a devdopmer t agmemern meant the 
development of a TMO/CBHA became integrated with other developmenu, whidi were responses to 
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the HAT's interrelated problems of housing and financial shortfalls. In early 1996, the HAT agreed 
a private finance deal with the Peabody Trust. One of London's largest charitable HAs and 
managing nearly 14,000 homes, Peabody agreed to finance additional housing through a subsidiary 
HA and to enable this, the fledging CBHA became that subsidiary. The additional housing would 
consist of 150 new homes to be built on the Langthorne Hospital site, close to Cathall Road Estate. 
in addition, Peabody's loan would increase the cash flow and enable the HAT to speed up its 
redevelopment programme, thereby, shortening the HAT's life and saving an estimated £50 million 
in grant funding (WFHAT Press Release, March 1996). 4 
At that time the Housing Corporation was unwilling to register a tenant-controlled HA and, hence, it 
was necessary that the CBHA become a subsidiary of another HA to enable it to register. Tenants 
sought assurances that the parent HA would safeguard a tenant majority and tenant control 
(Chinaford Hall News, February 1996). ESGs took an active role in the negotiations and also took 
independent advice from consultants (CHA). As noted above, the negotiations resulted in the 
CBHA becoming a subsidiary of Peabody, which also indicated its willingness "... to grant the 
tenant majority on the CBHA management board maximum responsibility and control. " (WFHAT 
Press Release, 28 March 1996). The CBHA board was expanded to include a Peabody nominee, 
who would also have a veto to be used only in exceptional circumstances (e. g., financial 
mismanagement) (Zitron, 1997, p. 45). As the Labour Government elected in May 1997 was more 
willing to permit tenant led social landlords, the CBHA subsequently became an RSL in November 
1997. 
Once it had built the additional homes, the CBHA would make than available to the HAT to rent to 
its secure tenants. The HAT would pay rat to the CBHA for the lease and the CBHA, in turn, 
3" At this time the expected completion date was 2005 and its expected cost was £300 million. Another 
scheme involving private finance had been proposed earlier in the HAT's life. In September 1993, a board 
paper (WFHAT, September 1993) had been presented outlining an option to speed up and, thereby, reduce 
the project's cost. The proposal involved the establishment of a parallel company, with a board 
membership consisting of four HAT board members, four tenant members and four independent 
representatives. Unlike the HAT, the company would be able to borrow money without it counting as 
public expenditure. The security for the money borrowed would be a twenty-one year lease on the HAT 
property. The company would undertake the redevelopment and would be paid back by using a mix of 
capital receipts and rental income. Transfers to HAs would pay back the loan; transfers to local authorities 
would not and the company would therefore have to be repaid by rental income, surpluses from sales to 
HAs and any other income earned by the HAT. The major implication for tenants was that there would be 
a delay in any return to the local authority because the company's financial obligations would have to be 
discharged first. Consultation with ESGs showed tenants were wholly opposed to the scheme and 
consequently the HAT board rejected it. It is, nevertheless, very curious that the DoE allowed the HAT the 
latitude to make a decision of this nature, particularly when HATs had been proposed as a means of 
encouraging private sector investment. What is also significant is that the scheme is not dissimilar to the 
subsequent arrangement for the temporary transfer to the CBHA. That the Peabody proposal was more 
acceptable to tenants may have been because 
- 
in the interim 
-- 
the HAT had won tenants' trust and was 
trusted to act in tenants' interests (WFHAT 12,1996). 
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would pay Peabody. After five years, Peabody would have recouped 50% of its investment. The 
other 50% was structured on risk/reward terms based on a ratchet formula linked to tenants' 
landlord choices and capital receipts generated. In this respect, the Peabody Trust was taking a 
calculated risk. Once the tenants' landlord choice had been completed, the HAT would use the 
capital receipts from transfers to HAs to repay the Peabody Trust. The consequences for the 
Peabody Trust were as follows: 
- 
" If fewer than 30% of tenants chose HAs, the HAT would not have sufficient funds and Peabody 
would lose money. 
" 
If between 30% and 60% of tenants decided to transfer to the CBHA (or another HA), then 
Peabody would recoup all of its money. 
" 
If more than 60% of tenants voted to transfer to the CBHA, then Peabody would get back more 
money than it had lent. Peabody, however, had stated that it did not want to make a profit and 
would be prepared to plough the money back to the CBHA or a local development trust 
(Chingford Hall News. February 1996, p. 3). 35 
It was therefore in Peabody's interest to gain tenants' trust, since the more confidence tenants had in 
the CBHA, the greater the probability they would choose it as their future landlord. Similarly, the 
CBHA would have to ensure it provided a good housing management service. 
6.4.4 THE TEMPORARY TRANSFER 
Although the PFI deal with Peabody had been brokered before the outcome of the lifetime costs exercise 
had been announced, the funds made available became unnecessary as a different option was pursued, 
involving a temporary transfer of completed properties from the HAT to the CBIM This transfet was 
another means to overcome the funding shortfall by bringing forward capital receipts from the disposal of 
the properties so that they could be used within the development programme. In confronting the 
funding shortfall following the lifetime costs exercise, five options had been considered. First, seeking 
more money from the Govem me t, but the Government had already set an upper limit on the fiends 
available. Second, transferring the later phases of the housing to another HA, who would than complete 
the redevelopmert. 36 This was rejected because tenants would lose their landlord choice, probably have 
higher rants and a lower standard of redevelopment. Third, to cut costs in the ram of the 
redevelopment. The HAT, however, considered that it inequitable for tenants in later Phases to have a 
lower standard of redevelopment than in Phases One and Two. Fourth, to carry on with the original plan 
to give all those in Phases One and Two the right to choose their new landlord in 1998. This was 
considered too risky. If too many tenants voted to return to the council, the HAT would not have enough 
funds to continue the development. It was also felt this would be putting undue pressure an tenants when 
35 The terms of this risk were amended later. 
36 The HAT's intention was to complete the redevelopment work itself, rather than to work in partnership 
with other providers of social housing. 
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making their landlord choices. Fifth, to temporarily transfer all the new homes to the CBHA, thereby 
yielding a capital receipt for the HAT, which could be used to offset its projected shortfall in terms 
of finance. By transferring the new homes at an average estimated TMV of around £30,000, the 
HAT would raise in the region of £45 million over its remaining life-time. The decision date for the 
landlord choice would be put back from mid-1998 for Phases One and Two to 2001 for all phases 
and the HAT would repurchase the homes of those voting to return to LBWF in 2001 for onward 
transfer. It would also mean that the HAT would not need to utilise any of the £15 million private 
finance facility arranged through Peabody (WFHAT, Annual R ort 1996/97, p. 18). The transfer 
of risk continued for Peabody continued: if the HAT did not earn enough capital receipts then 
Peabody would lose money because the HAT would not be able to buy the properties back. The 
HAT would only purchase those it had budgeted for and any extra would transfer at zero cost.; ' 
Apart fmm the first, all the options 
- 
including the temporary transfer 
- 
broke or challenged agreements 
made in the TED. Although the TED stated there would be a phase-by-phase ballot for landlords, 
temporary transfer meant delaying the ballot until the end of the pes. 
Although the HAT board's preferred solution was to negotiate a temporary transfer (WFHAT 
Annual Report 1996/97, p. 5), the final decision was put to a referendum of tenants. While a referendum 
was not required, the HAT considered it wrong to proceed without tenants' dear support. To prepare for 
the referendum, the HAT undertook research to identify and address tenants' key conaenns. Tenants also 
had a Tenants' Friend (Paddington Churdies HA) to help than understand the implications. The CBHA 
made two guarantees to tenants: 
- 
rent increases would be hided to the level of inflation until 2001 
and, although they would become assured tenants, many of the iig is of secure tenancies would be 
restored on a contractual basis. The initial idea was to inform tenants and not to recommend how to vote, 
but after a board discussion, the HAT decided to recommend a Yes «e (WFHAT 17,1997). A tenant 
representative (WFHAT 15,1997) noted that everyone had been positively in favour of it, including the 
HAT chair, the CBHA chair and even the local authority; IxnM the message was: `You're not voting for 
the temporary transfer, you're voting for the redevelopment to continue. '. similarly, a TBM/CBHA chair 
(WFHAT 16,1997) stated that: "It was presented ca a choice, but in reality there icxs no choice. The 
vote ww to legitimise the course of action. ". Importance was, however, attached to the scale of VW% to 
indicate popular support for the transfer. All tenants had a vote, aldwugh, in principle, the transfer would 
only materially affect tenants in later phases, who 
- 
in the event of a No vote 
- 
could have poorer quality 
37 The terms of the HAT's private finance arrangement with Peabody Trust were that the Peabody would 
reduce the HAT's financial risk if the vast majority of tenants returned to the local authority. The HAT 
would also share the financial surpluses with Peabody if the vast majority of tenants chose an HA as their 
landlord. If all tenants chose to return to the local authority, Peabody would pay the HAT a sum of £7.5 
million that would mitigate the loss of capital receipts to the HAT. It on the other hand, 90% or more 
tenants chose an HA, Peabody would be paid a £7.5 million `bonus', of which it had promised to invest up 
to £5 million in LB Waltham Forest for community benefit. (WFHAT, 1998, p. 18). 
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housing. The result was a 92% Yes vote on a 55% turnout and, in January 1998, the first tranche of 
673 new homes was transferred to the CBHA. 
6.4.5 EXIT OPTIONS 
The options for tenants in the landlord choice are likely to be: - returning to the local authority; 
transferr ing to the CBHA, (possibly) the option of transferring to another HA; and RTB. 
- 
return to the local authority 
The 1996 planning figure of 60% returning to the local authority was cautious (WFHAT 14,1997). 
A 1993 poll of tenants conducted by MORI (1993a) showed 49% (with 20% as don't knows) 
expected to return to the local authority (Table 5.5). Tenants' attitudes were changing, however: 
"... the main aim in the early days was to get re-housed and to go back to the council. The change has 
been due to the HAT experience and all the opportunities that tenants have had, training and the new 
facilities. " (WFHAT 13,1998). The same tenant felt the local authority had not moved on: "Going back 
to the local authority means going back to being told what to do and having to accept it With te HAT 
we've been able to negotiate and make suggestions. " (WFHAT 13,1997). Similarly and more 
colourfully, a tenant representative (WFHAT 15,1997) said that: "Anyone going back to the local 
authority needs their head tested They'd be a complete moron. People have short memories of 
how bad it was. The majority would stay with the FIAT if that was an option. ". Surveys in 1998 
indicated that only 22% (albeit with 46% don't knows) were likely to return to LBWF and in the 
1998 Corporate Plan (WFHAT, 1998) the planning figure for tenants retuning to the local 
authority had been reduced to 40%. 
- 
housing associations 
The main alternative to the local authority was the CBHA. As a result of the temporary transfer, 
properties had already transferred to an organisation that was a potential landlord. Transfers at the 
end of the HAT would, therefore, be transfers away from the CBHA rather than away from a 
limited-life body and, hence, a `no-change' option would be available for tenants. At Hull, a similar 
option was not available except for those tenants who had opted for the trial management period 
with HAs. The CBHA had therefore become the premier exit option -- the `known', while the local 
authority and the other options were `the unknown'. In addition, the local authority may be changed 
to an unknown extent by such factors as CCT and ERCF. Furthermore, if and when tenants return 
to the local authority in 2001, they would have been under other landlords for nearly ten years 
(under HAT management for three years and the CBHA for seven years). The use of the CBHA as 
a managing agent and then the temporary transfer was therefore equivalent to the trial management 
periods at Huff with the important exception that all tenants were experiencing it. The temporary 
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transfer also placed an onus on the CBHA to consolidate its position as the premier exit option for 
1993 MORI 1997 1998 
Aware of Landlord Choice in 2001/2002 n/a n/a 72 
Likely to buy new home in new home or future home n/a 29 26 
Who vwuld most like their fidure landlord to be: 
- 
" 
WF CBHA (HA controlled by tenants) 14 25 29 
" WF council 49 26 22 
" Another HA (exis ing HAs) 12 15 3 
" (Tenants' oo. operativee) 4 n1a n/a 
" (Private landlord) 1 n/a n/a 
" Don't know (Don't know/ opinion) 20 32 46 
% Intending to stay in the area n/a 75 83 
TABLE 6.5 
- 
OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
(Sources: Mori (1993a); WFHAT 1998, Annual Report 1997/98, p. 19) 
NB n/a = not asked; responses in brackets refer to MORI questions. 
Apart from the CBHA, other HAs have yet to play a major role in the HAT, although the landlord 
choice is still three years away. The opportunity for other HAs would be to offer an alternative to 
the CBHA and their prospects would be enhanced if the CBHA faltered in any way (provided the 
reasons were not inherent failings of HAs). Unlike at Hull, however, tenants are unlikely to have a 
trial management period with other HAs. As it would be important for tenants to have stability and 
continuity of service, the HAT would need to vet prospective HAs. It would therefore be likely that 
transfers will be to well-established HAs with substantial housing stocks (i. e., more than 2000 
properties). A 1998 survey, however, indicated that only 18% wanted a third choice and that most 
tenants would be happy with a choice between the council and the CBHA (WFHAT, 1998, p. 19). 
- 
right to-buy 
The temporary transfer also had aonsequenaes with regard to RTB. For the period of the temporary, 
transfer, the cost floor was no longer the property's construction cost (i. e., £70,000) but the transfer cost 
(i. e., approximately £30,000). Tenants wishing to buy could dire receive their full discount 
eritlemerc Tenants (WFHAT 13,1997; WFHAT 16,1997) felt there would be 'strong interest, in and 
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a large take-up of RTB: "People are now in employment or have been through training. The right-to- 
buy is a genuine option; people have a choice and it's a real choice. ". The HAT's 1998 Corporate Plan 
reported interest m the RTB was `growing quite significantly' and predicted twenty RTBs per year for the 
next three years, with a `more likely scenario' being around 10% of tenants purchasing their properties 
through RTB over the next five years. 
6.4.6 COMMENTARY 
Due to the postponement of the landlord choice ballots, by the end of 1998, Waltham Forest HAT 
was not as advanced in terms of its individual tenant exits as either North Hull or Liverpool HAT. 
The HAT's exit strategy had, however, been progressed in other ways. Its main operating divisions 
had all been transferred to organisations that, in principle, were permanent rather than limited life, 
while all the new build properties had been transferred to the CBHA (who in addition managed all 
the properties). Any transfers at the end of the HAT's life would, therefore, be transfers away from 
the CBHA rather than away from a limited life body 
- 
and, hence, the CBHA was the premier exit 
option for tenants. Nevertheless, if 
-- 
as is possible 
-- 
the final landlord choice is between the 
CBHA and the local authority, then tenants will not have much choice. Should either be obviously 
weaker or superior to the other, then there will not be any effective competition and tenants will not 
be empowered as consumers. A HAT participation officer (WFHAT 18,1998) noted that tenants 
were reluctant to predict their future landlord choice and understood the power of not making a 
choice until the last minute. A further factor that may be particularly important in the landlord 
choice decisions is the shorter period of arrears before eviction for assured tenants compared to 
secure tenants. In a low income area, the arrears are a form of credit and a third of the HAT's 
tenants had more than thirteen weeks of rent arrears (WFHAT, 1997/98 Annum, p. 20). 38 
6.5 THE HAT'S WIDER ROLE 
Although this thesis concentrates on housing (tenure) issues, regeneration issues are an important 
part of the totality of HATs, making it a (neighbourhood) `regeneration' project rather than simply a 
housing `redevelopment' project. To indicate the range of the HAT's regeneration activity, an 
overview of the HAT's economic development activity and the succession arrangements is presented 
below. 
Economic development 
In the HAT's 1993/94 Annual R ort (WFHAT, 1994, p. 2) the HAT chair, John Chumrow, argued 
311 An important consideration in the pre-HAT negotiations, for example, was to ensure that the local 
authority could not refuse to accept back those tenants with high outstanding arrears. 
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it would be through the Community Development Programme "... that the majority of tenants will 
be empowered to control their own future. ". More specifically he stated that it was training and 
jobs, which tenants had specified as a priority in the TED, and "... through access to a higher 
income that tenants will be really free to make choices and the HAT will know the investment in 
new homes has been safeguarded. ". The HAT aimed to strengthen the economic health of the 
estates and the surrounding area and to raise income levels by getting tenants into jobs. Although 
the HAT had some leverage through its own employment, including administration, housing 
management and repairs & maintenance, its main leverage was through the development 
programme. The HAT had policies for local procurement and local employment and set contractors 
targets for employing tenants as part of their contractual obligations. Local anploymeirt clauses were, 
however, difficult to enforce. For Phase One, contractors met the HAT's employmat targets for trainees 
to account for 10% of their workforce (16% achieved) but failed to meet the 20% target of skilled workers 
to be recruited locally (18% achieved) and the 20% target of the contract price to be procured locally 
(18% achieved) (NAO, 1997, p. 44). Following changes to the procurement strategy and the introduction 
of work packages from Phase Two onwards, the employment of local people increased and during 1997- 
98, an average of 25% to 30% of the site workforce were residents (Armual Review 1997/98, p. 7). 
The principal mechanism for connecting tenants with employment and training opportunities was the 
Careers Advice & Placement Project (CAPP), launched during 1993/94, which provided a focus 
both for tenants seeking employment or training and for contractors recruiting their workforce. 
CAPP set up a variety of programmes, worked closely with contractors and local employers to 
produce tailor-made recruitment packages and to establish longer term links. During 1993/94, to 
develop training opportunities and enhance tenants' employment prospects, two training c nitres 
were set up in partnership with other agents: 
-- 
the Trinity Business Skills Centre and the Langthome 
Constructions Skills Centre. Trinity Business Skills Centre, near Chingford Hall, provided training 
in business administration and information technology. The second training centre was at 
Langthome Road, near Cathall Road, which delivered training on construction skills with direct 
links to the HAT contractors. The Langthome Training Centre was funded by LBWF, the HAT and 
the local TEC, and operated by Bovis. h was closed in July 1997, however, when its site was 
needed for new housing. Following its closure, a second dedicated training base, Colchester 
Training Centre, offered training opportunities to tenants. There was also an economic 
empowerment through the provision of childcare, which enabled HAT tenants, particularly lone 
parents, to take advantage of HAT-sponsored training courses and employment opportunities. 
(Annual ort 1993/94). The HAT also sought to encourage unregistered chips to register 
and supported than with advice and training. Support was also provided support for tenants to 
establish their own businesses. 
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Successor organisations 
By 1998, the HAT had substantially completed a programme of externalising its major functions, 
such that it was increasingly becoming a `residual' body functioning primarily as a monitoring and 
quality assurance agency and as a funding conduit. The strategy was an explicit response to the 
HAT's status as a limited-life organisation and, in principle, meant it could withdraw with minimal 
impact on the local area. Each of the HAT's major operating divisions had been transferred to a 
separate organisation: - the development department became a part of the consultants Dearle & 
Henderson Regeneration; housing management had transferred to the CBHA, while the community 
development department had transferred to a new CDT, the Orient Regeneration Trust (known as 0- 
Regen). Constituted in March 1997, O-Regen became responsible not only for the HAT's 
community and economic development programmes, but also to extend similar community-based 
regeneration initiatives to other priority neighbourhoods within LB Waltham Forest (WFHAT, 
Annual Report 1996/97, p. 23). Its board consisted of three from LBWF; three from the HAT; one 
from the CBHA, one from voluntary action; one from the Tenants' Federation; two from the private 
sector and four co-opted members. The number of HAT members would decrease in the nm-up to 
the HAT's exit in 2002; by which time, the CBHA would have an additional member. The HAT's 
intention was to provide O-Regen with a £5 million endowment to provide it with financial stability. 
The capital itself would not be sperrt but would generate interest to offset revenue costs. In march 
1997, the Government Office for London had a £2 million underspend from the SRBCF, which it 
transferred to the HAT as an initial endowment for O-Regten (WFHAT 17,1997). " 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Although established in 1991, the Waltham Forest HAT's origins go back to the mid- to labe 1980s when 
a significant amount of dev elopmerit work had been undertaken. It t fore pre-dates HAT policy. Once 
a HAT was offered, both tenants and the local authority were quick to appreciate the opportunity and, 
given the Government's willir s to negotiate, there was significant bottom-up influence in date mining 
the detail of the proposed HAT. Rather than seeking a HAT specifically, at the time, LBWF and its 
tenants had been seeking a means of fiaxhlg the redeaetopmet of their estates. The HAT can, therefore, 
39 In late 1998, there was some debate regarding whether O-Regen would actually got the remainder of the 
endowment. The HAT's original plan was for a endowment of £S million for the CDT. This was intended 
to come from Peabody's bonus of £7.5 million, which was dependent on the outcome of the landlord choice 
ballots. The HAT's had agreed with Peabody that up to £S million would be made available for the benefit 
of residents in LBWF in consultation with WFCBHA. The DETR's £2 million endowment to 0-ReW was 
subject to the condition that if it received monies up to that amount arising from the landlord choice 
process then the DETR might require O-Regen to repay the money. In discussion with Peabody and the 
CBHA, the HAT had concluded that there was some reluctance to pay the money to O-Regem if it would in 
effect be paid to the DETR. (WHAT, 1998, p. 19). 
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be interpreted as a continuation of a local initiative. While there had been some debate Whether the 
conditions on Nords Hull estate warranted a HAT approach, this was less ooatentious at Wal ham Forest. 
This was also apparent to tlwse tenants who visited other areas: "HATS are not appropriate in all areas. 
Hull um not appropriate for a HAT. The housing conditions there are nowhere near as despemte as 
Welthain Forest" (WFHAT 11,1994). 
The HAT also had the advantage of well-established and well-org3nised tenant groups, who had been 
c it ally involved in determining the nature of the HAT to be established. Tenants had also been closely 
involved in the decision to explore the possibility of a HAT for their estates, and their expectations we 
given a high degree of certainty by the existaice of the TED. These factors helped create a strong sense of 
identity with the HAT among tenants, who felt they had earned the right to have their estates redeveloped. 
A tenet representative (WFHAT 2,1994), for exannplee, stated that there was "... a strong sense of 
rnmership because the HAT had been created by the tenants. ". The HAT was also strongly cormi iced 
to continuing tenant input into decision-making. Furthermore and in cast to Hu H city ooiaicil, LBWF 
lardy took a bade seat once the HAT had been established. 
Althoff iniýy delayed, by We 1998 the development Progrimm was subdanWAy underway and 
about a third of tenants had moved mto their new homes. The HAT had also largely resolved its related 
problems of funding and housing shortfalls through the acquisition of additional building sites and rep- 
housing options for tenants (i. e., the early exits) and througl1 the temporary transfer of its ao npleeed 
properties to the CBHA. It still, however, faced a continual juggling ad to balance the number of seem 
tenants to be re-housed, the number of houses built and the take-up of r&housirg options, while staying 
within its lifetime costs cap. The CBAA had become the pr nner exit option in the landlord choice. The 
HAT had worked hard to develop the CBHA and in some respects had privileged it over edier options. It 
is, mess, bolt a tenant-controlled organisation and indepeadant of" HAT. Although the landlord 
choice was delayed until the and of the HAT's operational W the HAT had eked in a significant 
amount of planning for its own exit and in cuing new asganisations to make its impact more 
sustainable. Fu thermoce, the simple fad of the estat 's redeveiopme * would also result in a significant 
physical dung. The new housing would also have certain social impacts. One of the objectives of the 
masterplan, for example, was to reintegrate the estates into the su rcucding area, so that they were no 
longer perceived as isolated and Wised estates (i. e., to convert the estates into iahe W pans of the 
local neWibaufiood). The physical won was also breaking down the stigma attached to the 
estates. Hence, as a result of the whole HAT process, tenants are likely to have experienced more 
ftaxdalnental die and the HAT period will be regarded as sigiufcant watershed. 
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Chapter Seven 
CASE STUDY III: 
THE LIVERPOOL HAT 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter is a case study of the Liverpool HAT, the third to be established. It is in five main 
parts. The first discusses the ch ce to establish a HAT. The secaad discusses taunot involven j The 
third discusses the unc y re aa& the developm it prgp=ma The fob discusses the resulting 
devdapmart prcgrmiui and the landlord dmice. The fifth Mates the wider activities of the HAT. 
Table 7.1 is a dm mdogy cftheHAT. Appm& E is a summary cfthe bat Statenart. 
7.1 THE ESTABLISBMENT OF A HAT IN LIVERPOOL 
7.1.1 THE HAT OFFER 
The emergence of a HAT in Liverpool in 1992 must be placed in the context of the city's local 
politics in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1970s were diaracterised by constantly hung councils, 
minority and coalition administrations (Parkinson, 198v, p. 112). The Liberals (supported by the 
Conservatives), however, held the balance of power between 1973 and 1983 and had two major 
ply goals. The first was to ale the large municipal housing stock built up Bering the 1950s 
and 1960s and, anticipating 1980s Conservative housing policies, they encouraged the private and 
voluntary sector in housing and largely abandoned council house building (Parkinson, 1985, p. 130). 
Housing co-operatives were also vigorously supported; as Clapham & Kintrea (1992, p. 92) argue, 
although quite small (about 2000 dwellings in total), these were widely regarded as a 'significant 
departure' from traditional forms of housing provision. ' The liberal's second policy goal was to 
restrict council expenditure and reduce local rates. Hence, in contrast to most authotities of the 
1970s, Liyrpcol was a law-spending local authority and its services and expenditure did not grow 
as much as many other cities during the period. The city also acquired high levels of long-term 
capital debt. As part of its is strategy, the 1979 Conservative Govemmmt was 
determined to reduce the size of the local state and local authority expeulitu e and, despite 
Liverpool having limited its expenditure during the 1970s, it was asked to further reduce its 
i HAs that developed during this period would also subsequently bent from the HAT's establishment 
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April 1991 Harry Rimmer, leader of Liverpool city council, agrees to discussions about the 
possibility of a HAT in Liverpool 
June 1991 City council recommends that a Feasibility Study be carried out on the 
possibility of a HAT for its high-rise housing stock High-rise tenants asked 
their views on the possibility of a HAT 
July-October 1991 Feasibility Study. 
October 1991 
- 
April Discussion & negotiation of Joint Statement. 
1992 
May 1992 General election victory for Conservatives. 
July 1992 City council recommends that tenants vote Yes. 
August 1992 83% Yes vote on 78.7% turnout in HAT ballot 
February 1993 Designation Order to set up Liverpool HAT is laid before Parliament 
October 1993 Transfer of the properties from Liverpool city council to the HAT. Start of 
housing managing agents' contracts. 
January 1994 Start of catch-up repair programme 
March 1994 Three board members resign (one private sector member, one city councillor & 
one RBM) 
June 1994 Draft development strategy produced 
October 1994 Following consultation, final Development Strategy sent to DoE for approval. 
October 1995 DoE rejects 100% HAT fended development project. First new build housing 
scheme opened ('hens Corner) 
April 1996 Managing wants contracts extended for additional 12-months 
December 1996 DoE's decision on life-time grant-in-aid (£260 million) & wind-up date of 
2004-05. 
April 1997 New housing management contracts start; creation of North & South Liverpool 
Advisory Groups. 
May 1997 General election victory by Labour 
June 1997 RBM elections (Jack Bowers returned) 
Nov 1997 RBM election (Joe Power elected) 
2004-5 Winding up date 
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expenditure. Liverpool's particular problem - so the council argued -- was to reduce its expenditure 
from a much lower base than other cities. 
in 1983, and under an increasing influence from Militant Tendency, 2 Labour took control of the 
council. Housing was at the heart of the new council's plans. Furthermore, since Labour might 
only be in power for a short time, the programme had to be rapidly implemented and, because 
resources were limited, they were concentrated in public sector housing (Parkinson, 1985, p. 131). 
Council house building would also be a potent symbol of the council's opposition to -- and contrast 
with 
-- 
the Government's housing policy. Concentrating on seventeen designated areas (later 
increased to twenty-two), and with the aid of creative accounting, extensive borrowing and receipts 
from the sale of the council-owned property, the council undertook an Urban Regeneration Strategy 
(URS) intended to last five years. Between 1983 and 1986, it built more than 4000 dwellings and 
refurbished another 8000 (Parkinson, 1990, p. 250). The programme was controversial and critics 
argued that it had several weaknesses: - the pace of the change was too dramatic; too many 
recoverable properties were demolished; community and residential preferences were neglected; too 
much low-rise family housing in the inner city was provided despite a need for more diverse 
provision; the strategy was also highly centralised and could not be properly managed by the 
housing department (Parkinson, 1985, p. 131). As the URS concentrated resources upon a limited 
area of the city, other areas deteriorated. Furthermore, as the bulk of resources was allocated to 
capital works, existing tenants received a poor maintenance service (Parkinson, 1990, p. 250). 3 
Objections were also made to the council's housing philosophy. The strategy rejected alternative 
forms of tenure (such as HAs), involved extensive municipalisation, and fiercely opposed the sale of 
council houses. The council was particularly opposed to the use of public funds to support housing 
co-ops, which were seen as `elitist, exclusive and discriminatory' (Couch, 1990, p. 172). Despite 
manifesto pledges to support them, the new council immediately municipalised six co-ops which 
were to be council-funded. It also refused planning permission to all HAG funded schemes on the 
grounds of planning standards, and blocked all land release to housing co-ops and HAs (Clapham & 
Kintrea, 1992, p. 96). ' 
Under Militant's influence, the council also embarked on a policy of opposition to central 
2 Militant Tendency was a Trotsykist Faction, which, despite being a minority in the Liverpool Labour 
party, exploited its organisational superiority to take control of the party leadership and shape its policies 
(Parkinson, 1990, p. 248). 
3 See Mars (1987) for a more positive account of the achievements of the URS. 
4 As well as cutting the ßmding to Liverpool city council for housing, to redress the balance and to bypass 
the council, the Government increased allocations to Merseyside through the Housing Corporation. 
s Many of those HAs refused planning permission were subsequently granted permission on appeal. 
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Government. By refusing to cut its expenditure, the council used its financial problems to confront 
the Government. During the mid-1980s, the city went through a series of financial and fiscal crises. 
In the financial years 1984/85 and 1985/86, the council threatened to bankrupt the city if the 
Government did not give it more money. In both years, the council eventually abandoned its threat 
after elaborate `creative' accounting. In each case, it delayed setting its rate until several months 
into the financial year during which the city teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. For the financial 
year 1984/85, the Government provided some additional funding but the local and national Labour 
parties' triumphalism stiffened the Government's resolve for the following year. In September 
1985, the council was forced to issue redundancy notices to its 31,000 employees; they would lose 
their jobs in December 1985 and be reinstated in the new financial year (1986/87) four months later 
(Parkinson, 1988, p. 120). Since the city had spent beyond its 1985/86 target, for the following 
financial year it was rate-capped by the Government at £274 million (ibid, p. 121). Although the 
Labour council seta rate on time, it fixed its expenditure 137 million higher than its income. For 
several months, the city again hovered on the brink of financial collapse. In July 1986 the council 
revealed a deferred payment arrangement with a Japanese bank, which allowed the fiscal crisis to be 
postponed for another year (ibid, p. 111). 
The council had been hoping for the return of a Labour Government. Before then, it had become 
dear its campaign had failed. In June 1985, forty-seven Labour councillors 
-- 
many of whom were 
associated with Militant 
- 
were surcharged and disqualified from office for failing to set a legal rate 
(although they remained in office pending appeal). Furthermore, the Labour Party's national 
executive committee suspended the Liverpool party in 1985 and, in 1986, several leading members 
were expelled for membership of the by-now proscribed Militant Tendency (Parkinson, 1988, 
p. 111). In 1987, the House of Lords confirmed the district auditor's judgement that the councillors 
had failed to protect the council's financial interests and disqualified them from office. 
Following a brief period of Liberal control, tabour was returned to office in 1987 with an increased 
majority. The elections to replace the disqualified councillors also provided the opportunity for 
other groups to emerge within the party and a new era of local politics commenced. In May 1989, 
Harry Rimmer became leader and continued the changes in the council's approach. At the 1990 
Labour group AGM, he told the council's Labour group: "We must use our political skills to get 
the best possible deal for the city from this Conse, vauve Government " (LHAT 15,1998). With 
significance for the subsequent HAT, Rimmer was a high-rise tenant. 
By the late 1980s, the quality of housing and the housing service within Liverpool was very poor; 
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Rimmer (LHAT 15,1998) described the position: 
"The tenants said that the city was probably the worst landlord in the North of 
England 
-- 
and I suppose I'd have to agree with that. It wasn't all the council's 
fault, however. The city was heavily over-staffed The district offices weren't 
easily accessed There was a district management system that was remote from 
the tenants. It wasn't something to be desired There were economic difficulties 
for the city and for tenants and there were very heavy arrears -- some people have 
argued that the city was encouraging people to run up arrears. Then there was 
the Thatcher Government's squeeze on the budget. This meant that we quickly 
had rundown stock and a mounting repairs backlog. All this explained the title of 
the 'Worst landlord. There was also a constant build up of properties which, 
when they became vacant, quickly became vandalised and uninhabitable. Then, 
there were also defects. The city council did not have the resources to remedy 
these. There were 5000 properties that the city council couldn't let. That's why 
" we went for the HAT 
- 
in desperation. 6 
The possibility of a HAT in Liverpool was first discussed at a meeting between Rimmer (as leader 
of the city council) and Michael Heseltine early in 1991. In December 1990, Heseltine had become 
Secretary of State for the Environment for a second time. During his first term in 1980-8 1, he had 
been dubbed the Minister for Merseyside' and "... seemed to develop an affection for the city. " 
(LHAT 15,1998). ' Shortly after Heseltine's appointment, Rimmer invited him to re-visit 
Liverpool. At the ensuing meeting, Heseltine sounded out a variety of ideas, including a HAT: "He 
knew it wouldn't be well received but he said there was a lot of money there " (LHAT 15,1998). 
Rimmer replied that the council would look at it but -- in the then model of HATs -- there did not 
seem much of a role for local authorities. The council was aware, however, that Hull was in 
negotiations about a HAT and the two councils metg At about the same time, the council carried 
out a condition survey of its housing stock, which estimated the cost of renovating the stock to 
minimum standards to be £1 billion. Rimmer (LHAT 15,1998) felt it was a `totally impossible 
situation' and told the Labour group that the Government was not going to give Liverpool any 
special grants, that they would have to negotiate on what it offered and that he wanted to explore the 
possibility of a HAT. Having discussed HATs with Hull, the council had a further meeting with 
Heseltine: "We said that ewe could negotiate with you and modify it a bit, then we can probably 
do business. " (LHAT 15,1998). The council's willingness to countenance a HAT symbolised the 
change in its political culture; it had asked for a HAT "... to show it was a new `moderate' Labour 
local authority and to make a symbolic distinction from the Militant part. " (LHAT 1,1994). 
6 One of the Labour council's policies had been to keep council rents low and not increasing rents had 
become a political totem for the council. Council rents were eventually increased by 45% in August 1990 
- 
- 
the first rent increase for eight years 
- 
followed by another substantial rise the following year. 
7 One of the projects had been the Stockbridge Village initiative (see Appendix B). 
8 Hull had announced the possibility of a HAT in November 1990. At this time, it was preparing for the 
ballot 
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7.1.2 THE HAT AREA 
Following a second meeting with Heseltine, the city's housing department undertook an initial 
assessment of its housing stock to identify a possible HAT area. Rimmer (LHAT 15,1998) felt the 
Government wanted a `different kind of HAT': "By the time that Liverpool came around, it was 
known that there wouldn't be a HAT in every town and city; it was realised that it was just an 
experiment. 
... 
They had a single estate-type HAT in Hull and they wanted something different in 
Liverpool. ". Rimmer therefore suggested the high-rise blocks to see what the reaction would be: 
"The beauty of it was that 
-- 
if the tenants agreed 
-- 
then there would be HAT activities all over 
the city. " (LHAT 15,1998). Due to the council's housing policies during the 1980s, high-rise 
housing had been neglected. In June 1991, the council agreed that a Feasibility Stud* be undertaken 
on all its high-rise stock to determine whether a HAT was appropriate. Later that month, the 
council set up a dedicated team to provide an information/consultation service for high-rise tenants. 
The FeasibilitStudy (LCC, 1991, p. 12) reported that officers had been briefed to "... provide a 
balanced view of the role of a HAT and its implications using the Hull model. ". In late June, high- 
rise tenants received letters from the council asking their views on the possibility of a HAT. 
Although the initial liaison process showed much interest in the HAT concept, it also noted a 
number of worries, including: 
-- 
concerns about a `backdoor privatisation'; reit levels; time-scale; 
and membership of the HAT board (LCC, 1991, p. 3). 
Undertaken between July and October 1991, the Feasibility Shy focused on 71 high-rise housing 
blocks, consisting of nearly 5,500 dwellings of which approximately 88% were occupied and 37 
(0.7%) were owner-occupied (LCC, 1991, p. 2). There was some debate over whether to exclude the 
better blocks from the proposed HAT; Wide Housing (28 June, 1991, p. 1), for example, reported 
that twenty blocks had `reasonable letting potial' and could have been excluded from the 
proposed HAT. The Feasibility Study (LCC, 1991, p. 3) confirmed that a major programme of 
improvements to all blocks was urgently required and estimated that £128 million was required to 
put them into a reasonable condition. It concluded that, because of financial restrictions on the 
council, a HAT was the only `practical mechanism' (ibid, p. 4). 
The Feasibility Study also found the proposed HAT area had a high degree of social deprivation, 
including: 
- 
a population older than the city average, with over 60% of residents being retired; a 
very high proportion of lone pensioners; a very low proportion of households with children and very 
few lone parent households; an ageing population; 60% of tenants who had lived in the blocks for 10 
years or more and only 6% for less than a year; had 61% of tenants claiming housing benefit; and 
in 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
86% of households with no economically active members (LCC, 1991, p. 4). The demographic, 
social and economic context of the proposed HAT was the result of letting policies that had skewed 
the population structure. As the council recognised the difficulties faced by families with children 
living in flats, multi-storey accommodation was not offered to young childless couples or families 
with children under the age of 15 years. The council also had a no letting policy to those under 25. 
If tenants did subsequently have children, there was a policy of transferring them out of the tower 
blocks. 
A later MORI (1993b) survey found the HAT's population to be slightly different from that 
recorded in the Feasibi i Study (LHAT 7,1994). The population was about 45% under 60, 
mostly in the 25-55 years age group, and also overwhelmingly male because women were offered 
alternative housing options. The other 55% were over 60 years. The HAT also found a lot of single 
men and divorced men had their children at weekends and, in some cases, there was a significant 
weekend child population requiring facilities and play space. Furthermore, for the ten years or so 
prior to the HAT, the council had had a policy of putting people from the homeless register 
- 
including people fresh out of prison and mental institutions 
-- 
into the high-rise blocks. As a HAT 
officer (LHAT 7,1994) commented, alongside the elderly, this produced a stark contrast of 
populations: "It's a bizarre community mix 
- 
almost all tenants are very vulnerable individuals. ". 
The Feasib' ' Study (LCC, 1991, p. 13) also identified some of the consequences of the letting 
policy: 
"Many tenants complained about the council's letting policy which allowed 
'undesirables', 'scum, 'low-life' etc., to live in the blocks alongside tenants, 
many of whom are elderly, who take a prick in their homes. There is a suggestion 
in some blocks, of tenants living in abject misery and feeling persecuted by the 
activities of some of their neighbours. Many complaints referred to the presence 
of drug addicts and 'iocturnal' tenants partying and being rowdy in the early 
hours. In some cases tenants said they would only vote to return to the council if 
there was greater control over future lettings. ". 
7.1.3 THE PRE-HAT NEGOTIATIONS 
In promoting the possibility of a HAT, the council had to change tenants' attic to HATs. As at 
Hull, `voluntary' was appended to the term HAT to emphasise the council had asked for a HAT and 
it was not being imposed on the council. Nevertheless, as a high-rise tenant, Bill McWilliams (from 
Black, 1993, p. 20) commented, the Labour party had repeatedly told than "... not to trust the 
Tories with our education, or the economy, or our hospitals, but now the party in Liverpool is 
telling us to trust the Tories with our homes. It makes no sense. ". 
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in the wake of the 1988 Act, the council had set up and supported tenant bodies, including a 
Tenants' Forum, a Tenants' Federation and various TAs. Set up in 1990, the Tenants' Federation 
focused on city-wide issues, while the Tenants' Forum focused on local issues. To fund tenant 
involvement and organisations, there was a 10p levy on council rats: 30% of which was retained 
centrally, the remainder being returned to tenant organisations, for staff and premises. The most 
important tenant organisation in the run-up to the ballot was the High-Rise Tenants' Group 
(HRTG), which grew out of a special interest group within the Tenants' Forum. The HRTG 
became established as an independent organisation in 1991 with its own written constitution and 
became better organised in the run up to the ballot. Prior to the ballot, the council made funds 
available for the HRTG to employ independent tenants' advisors (Tenants' Friends). One 
consultant 
-- 
Priority Estates Project (PEP) 
-- 
and three HAS 
- 
Merseyside Improved Housing 
(MlII); Co-operative Development Services (CDS) and the Liverpool Housing Trust (LHT) 
-- 
were 
chosen. Each was allocated an area with LHT becoming team leaders. 
As at Hull and Waltham Forest, a shadow HAT board was established to present the case for a 
HAT to tenants and answer questions. As at Waltham Forest, an agreemont about the future HAT's 
policies and procedures was agreed by the shadow HAT board, the council, the HRTG and the DoE. 
A HAT consultation doc um t described the resulting Joint Stateýne t9 as the ` social contract' between 
the HAT and its tenants and noted that it had been the HAT's `manifesto' for the ballot. Echoing similar 
coamnents at Waltham Forest, a HAT officer (LHAT 2,1994) argued that its credibility was more 
important than its legal standing and the HAT would run into 'credibility problems' if it went back 
on it. Unlike the Waltham Forest TED, which was a series of separate statements by three parties, 
the Liverpool document was a joint statement. Its negotiation delayed the ballot. Inside Housing 
(28 June, 1991, p. 1) reported that the council was anxious to move quiddy towards a ballot in the 
hope of securing any remaining funds in the HAT budget; while the city's director of housing, Mike 
Maunder, was quoted as stating that a lot of authorities were "... cling the sane pot of gold ". '0 
In November, Inside Housing (1 November, 1991, p. 3) reported that the council was preparing to 
ask the Governmeft for a ballot in January 1992. Although originally scheduled for January, it was 
put back to April and then finally to August 1992; an RBM (CHAT 4,1994) felt that "... we 
couldn't defer any further because then we would have lost all credibility. ". " 
9Appendix E is a summary of the Joint Statement. 
10 The statement is itself indicative of the change from local authorities fending off the imposition of HATs 
to local authorities chasing pots of gold. The possibility of HATs in Birmingham (Castle Vale), Tower 
Hamlets and Brent (Stonebridge Park) had been announced in December 1991 and, at the time, a ballot in 
Tower Hamlets was anticipated in January/February of 1992. 
" At Hall, the council was very keen to have a quick ballot, while at Waltham Forest the negotiation of the 
TED delayed the ballot. 
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7.1.4 THE BALLOT 
At the simplest level, the ballot terms were that -- if established -- a HAT would take over housing 
management; refurbish each tenant's flat and the blocks they were in; rents would be frozen we 
their homes were refurbished; following refurbishment, new rents would be pegged to equivalent 
council rents, and on completion, tenants would have a choice of landlord that would include the 
local authority. Each of the groups involved in the pre-HAT negotiation - the council, the shadow 
HAT board, and the HRTG 
- 
recommended tenants to vote Yes. During the pre-HAT negotiations 
the council had been agnostic and it was only just before the ballot, that it recommended a Yes vote. 
This can be seen as abrinkmanship tactic: had it done so earlier, for example, it would have reduced 
its negotiating power. On 24 June 1992, the council's housing & community services committee 
agreed to recommend a Yes vote in the ballot and on 1 July, the council itself decided to recommend 
a Yes vote. The HRTG also recommended a Yes vote, although a tenant representative (LHAT 3, 
1994) described how, in the run-up to the ballot, "... some people were pushing to get a vote 
- 
others were pushing to getting an informed electorate. The tenant representatives tried to be 
neutral. ". Tenant representatives were also advised by Tenants' Friends to remain neutral, with the 
warning: "Don't let the people point the finger at you afterwards and hold you to blame for the 
HAT. " (CHAT 4,1994). As at Waltham Forest, this suggested a desire for tenants to take 
responsibility for the way they voted and 
- 
in aggregate 
- 
for the outcome of the ballot. 
The turnout for the ballot was high (nearly 80%), with 82% voting Yes. The ballot was on a site- 
by-site basis rather than a simple majority of all blocks and sites. Hence, those blocks/sites in which 
a majority of tenants voted No would not be included in the HAT. Sixty-seven blocks voted Yes. 
The fact that some blocks voted No suggests a real choice for tenants and those blocks 
- 
Willowdene, Mllview, Marwood Tower & Baden House 
- 
were not included in the HAT. The 
Feasibility Study (LCC, 1991, p. 55 & p. 79) had noted that in two of the blocks (Millview & Baden 
House), there was strong opposition to the HAT proposal. An RBM (LHAT 16,1998) also noted 
that Marwood had been very anti-HAT. Tenant representatives (LHAT 3,1994) also felt there 
were problems of caretakers not passing material on, `politically militant' caretakers and the threat 
posed by the possibility of a HAT to caretakers, many of whom had second jobs. In Millview (a 
sheltered housing block) for example, a caretaker may have persuaded residents to vote against the 
proposal, because he was against `anything not to do with the council' (LHAT 4,1994; LHAT 16, 
1998). At Willowdene, another sheltered housing block, the No vote won by just two votes and it 
was felt that many tenants - thinking that it would be a foregone conclusion 
- 
had not bothered to 
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vote (LHAT 16,1998). 12 
7.1.5 COMMENTARY 
The establishment of a HAT in Liverpool can be considered in terms of a choice by the local 
authority and subsequernly by tenants. The council's decision to pursue a HAT was pragmatic. 
While it could not 
- 
or did not want to 
- 
admit it, it would benefit from transferring the housing to a 
HAT. The stock was all high-rise blocks that were difficult-to-let, in poor condition (that was likely 
to get worse), made a not loss on the HRA and had to be subsidised from low-rise stock. 
Nevertheless, as a HAT officer (LHAT 13,1998) argued, there were other less issues: "It's like 
cutting Samson's hair taking away Liverpool's housing stock Housing mattered to the 
politicians. However practical and logical it might be to give away the responsibility of housing 
provision 
... 
there's still a loss of patronage and 
-I suppose - power. ". An RBM (LHAT 16, 
1998) stated that, just after the ballot, a city councillor had told tenants that there would not have 
been a HAT "... if we'd have wanted to keep the blocks, but we didn't want them. ". Nevertheless, 
the council was keen to emphasis that it had been a Hobson's choice. The director of housing, Mike 
Maunder (from Black, 1992, p. 20), stated that a HAT was "... purely a mechanism for bringing 
money into the city. I don't think anyone supports the actual concept of HATs. ". Similarly, the 
chair of housing, Margaret Clarke (ibid, p. 20) declared: "It's called desperation. The whole thing 
pains me greatly, but we have to be honest with the tenants. We have to live in the real world and 
swallow our ideological principles if we want to get the wo, * done. ". 
The council's support for a HAT was, however, an important factor in the Yes vote. An RBM 
(LHAT 4,1994), for example, felt the `final push towards the HAT' came with the council's 
admission that tenants would be better off in a HAT. A HAT officer (LHAT 13,1998) felt tenants 
had a loyalty to the council and speculated how many would have voted for the HAT if the council 
had opposed it: "The council did say vote for it, but without that it might have been seen as 
`disloyal' to the council 
- 
no matter how much it was in their self-interest to vote for the HAT. I 
don't know what would have happened had the city council opposed it and fought it tooth-and- 
nail. ". Nevertheless, a HAT participation officer (CHAT 9,1998), who had worked in both areas, 
compared Hull with Liverpool: `In Hull, when they voted for the HAT it was a case of loyalty 
- 
the 
city council said. - `H'e'll look after you. In Liverpool, it was a case of neglect. The council had 
so neglected the tenants, they were glad for a way out. ". 
12 The council later ofted to transfer the block to the HAT but 
- 
because it would not have gained any 
additional funds to deal with it - the HAT declined to take it. 
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In principle, the decision for tenants was the balance between two considerations: 
- 
the prospect of 
the improvement and repair of their homes and the strength of assurances they could return to the 
local authority once their home had been improved. In respect of the latter, the Joint Stateme is 
existence as a formal document created greater certainty. Nevertheless, an RBM (LHAT 4,1994) 
stated that there was concern about leaving the council: "A feeling that this was the thin end of a 
wedge of enforced privatisation. Although the Joint Statement said that tenants could return to 
the council, at the time it was not guaranteed by legislation. People did not trust the 
Government. ". He also doubted that the right to return had been such a `big factor' in the ballot, 
leaving the council was less important because it was considered to be a very poor landlord. Of 
more significance was the fact that "... here was an organisation backed by the Government that 
would refurbish the blocks. " (LHAT 16,1998). Hence, the more important and positive factor in 
favour of a HAT was the poor conditions and the possibility of refurbishment. In that respect, 
tenants had had a Hobson's choice: a tenant representative (LHAT 11,1998) felt tenants knew "... 
they had no choice but to go to the HAT. They knew in what conditions they were living. If we'd 
stayed with the city council, the blocks would have simply fallen down. Harry Rimmer went to 
central Government and asked for a HAT and then said. `Vote for it . It's probably the only time 
that the council has been honest with people. ". 13 
The incentives for tenants to vote in favour of a HAT in Liverpool are more closely related to the 
Govemmet is original thinking (i. e., tenants in poor housing conditions with poor quality housing 
management, desperate for a way out) than either of the situations at Hull or Waltham Forest. The 
ability to rauen to the local authority was, nevertheless, an important safety net; tenants would be 
able to return to the local authority unless a better alternative presented itself. Given the council's 
previous housing management performance, the safety net was much less attractive than at Hull. 
7.2 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
This section discusses the various formal channels of communication between tenants and the HAT 
The channels of communication could arise in several different ways: 
- 
the HAT could simply 
inherit the channels that had previously existed between tenants and the local authority; the HAT 
could create new channels, such as the HAT board including tenantheside t membership of that 
board (these can be thought of as top-down); or tenants could propose and lobby for certain 
channels of communication; these actions can be thought of as 'bottom-up'. As at Waltham Forest 
`s This statement reflects another made in Hull where a resident (NSHAT 2,1994) stated: "The ballot was 
a straight fssue of 14*ether you wanted your house done up to five years or twenty years. ". 
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and in contrast to Hull, the Liverpool HAT had the benefit of established tenants orgsnisatians and 
suuctures. Before discussing tenant involveanent further, housing managemeirt will be discussed 
because this assists the chronological narrative. 
7.2.1 HOUSING MANAGEMENT 
The Joint Statesnerrt (s6.1) recognised that the HAT would face a housing management challenge 
`unique' among social landlords in this country: "... 71 tower blocks, widely dispersec4 many of 
them standing alone and all requiring intensive, responsive management. ". Both the HRTG and 
the HAT were aware of the potential problems of a landlord remote both from tenants and the 
dwellings it managed. To this and, the HAT's management arrangements were devised with regard 
to the advantages of local management offices; delegated authority to those local management 
offices; a central office that co-ordinated and supported local managers but was as small as possible 
and did not unduly interfere with day-to-day management; local arrangements for ordering repairs 
and inspections and for dealing with empty dwellings; convene t rent collection facilities and money 
advice; resident caretaking; 24-hour concierge/ security services; adequate staff/tenant ratios; and a 
commitment to customer care. 
One of the HAT's first major decisions was to tender out its housing managemerrt. 14 There were a 
number of interrelated reasons for this, including, the timetable for transfer of the housing (housing 
management teams had to be in post by the October 4th transfer); the HAT having just begun its 
work and having a skeleton staff; and the poor quality of the council's housing management, which 
might otherwise have been the only alternative. The decision was controversial. It was a change 
from the ballot and affected tenants' expectations and aspirations; tenants had voted to have their 
flats managed and refurbished by the HAT, and suspected it was "... the thin end of the 
privatisation wedge. " (LHAT 4,1994). A HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) acknowledged the 
`negative symbolism' of bringing in the private sector but argued this was tempered by their 
performance. Rather than using a Tightly-drawn specification, the HAT chose an open tender 
process. This was a pragmatic decision because of the limited information available to tenderers 
and a policy framework still being developed (LHAT, 1993/94 Annual Report. p. 7). More 
positively, it permitted a `cross-utilisation' between tenants' expectations, tenderers' proposals and 
the eventual specification of services and standards (ibid, p. 7). At a late hour, the managing agents 
were also asked to manage a programme of catch-up repairs (discussed below). 
14 In the other two case study HAT areas, local authorities continued to maaagýe the housing for the HAT on 
an agency basin for the first twelve mouths. 
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The thirty-five HAT sites were divided into nine areas, eight of which would be managed by 
managing agents and the ninth by an in-house team. To encourage a wider range of managers, it 
was agreed that no agent would have more than two areas. Areas ranged in size from 300-800 
properties, with an initial contract period of two and a half years. Competition was more intense in 
some areas than in others. In Sefton Park and Wootton, for example, there were several bidders 
(fourteen in Wootton and nine in Sefton Park), but in Evertor only two 
- 
the council and one other 
(LHAT 16,1998). A HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) considered it useful for the HAT to try a range 
of agents to test out different approaches, in which there could be local responses to local contexts, 
and for agents to devise local solutions. A further benefit for tenants was the experience of different 
housing managers; although, because the HAT would still be responsible for ensuring managing 
agents met certain standards, it would not be a full trial management. Monitoring was through Area 
Panels, which met every six weeks and consisted of block representatives, designated staff (wardens 
or caretakers from the area), the managing agent, a HAT board member, the HAT housing services 
officer, plus consultants as appropriate. 
in addition to the in-house team, there were five HAs (NIIH had two areas) and two private sector 
managing agents. Some of the HAs had acted as Tenants' Friends and, to be eligible to be 
managing agents, had had to withdraw from the role. Despite tendering for all areas, the council 
failed to get any, which damaged its relationship with the HAT (LHAT 5,1994). The HAT's chief 
executive (Inside Housing, 9 July, 1993, p. 3) argued that the `history of the HAT' made it important 
to break away from the council: "The conditions were partly caused by under-resourcing, but also 
by poor management and neglect from the council. ". In response, the council's chair of housing, 
Margaret Clarke 
- 
at that time a HAT board member 
- 
argued it had been "... prejudged on its 
recora4 not on its bid 
... 
We cannot get away from our past, but this bid way a fully-developed 
business plan based on our excellent recent work in Estate Action areas. I am devastated; and 
will be asking my colleagues to reconsider the council's membership of the HAT. " (ibid, p. 3). " 
As tenants had experienced the council's management and a panel including tenants had interviewed 
all tenderers, tenants were influential in the decision not to award contracts to the council. Although 
the council was proposing to set up a special organisation to manage the HAT housing, "... there 
was no way that tena could believe that " (LHAT 16,1998). 
One of the HAT's management problems was vacant flats. Vacancy levels when the HAT took over 
averaged about 14% with much higher levels in some blocks. Vacant units were a problem because 
they tended to become bunt out or abused in other ways, prompting tenants either side to want to 
13 Margaret Clarke resigned from the HAT board in March 1994. 
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move, thereby, spreading and concentrating the problem. The HAT's population was also declining 
by between 5 and 11% per year (LHAT 1994b, s3.3), which meant that over its life - and in the 
absence of new lettings -- the level of vacancy would increase. The distribution of vacancies also 
had implications for the development programme. The optimum distribution would be for some 
blocks to be vacant and for the remainder to be fully occupied. Caicentrating voids would, 
mess, involve decanting and emptying or `mothballing' certain blocks for subsequent sale, 
demolition or refurbishment. All of which was controversial and unsettling for those tenants who 
thought it might involve their block Given these problems, the HAT would mainly have to work 
around the existing distribution of tenants with tenants only moving voluntarily or where necessary 
for the purposes of the development programme. As tenants had suffered from the council's letting 
policies, new lettings were a particularly sensitive issue. 16 The HAT initially had a moratorium on 
new lettings; the only re-lettings were internal transfer between blocks. Once the HAT had 
determined its development strategy, however, it was keen to reduce the problems caused by voids 
and to increase its rental income through increasing lettings, which would reduce its lifetime costs. " 
Although rents for new lettings would be higher than frozen rents, the HAT's new rents were 
pegged to the equivalent in the council's stock. As properties were needed for decanting to facilitate 
the development programme, new lettings were limited. 
7.2.2 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
As noted previously, the Liverpool HAT had the busfit of established tenant organisations and structures. 
The main structures for tenant involvement in the HAT were the HRTG, the HRTG Steering 
Committee (HRSC), the HAT board, the HAT/HRTG Advisory Groups and Area Panels, and, at a 
later date, the North Strategy Group and the South Advisory Group and the Neighbourhood Panels. 
The HRTG 
The HRTG consisted of the block representatives of each block within the HAT. Membership had 
initially been one representative per block plus a deputy, which was later changed to two per 
block. "' Each HRTG member (i. e., block representative) served a two-year term with phased 
elections so that for each block the terms overlapped. Although there were formal elections, tenant 
16 Under the council, for example, tenants felt they had got the `dregs of society' coming to live next to 
them (LHAT 13,1998). 
" As in the other HAT areas, rent levels were frozen until the tenants' homes were refurbished or they 
moved into new properties. As a consequence of the rent äeeae, the HAT made what was described as a 
`crashing loos' on rents (LHAT 13,1998). In 1996, for example, the deficit was more than £3 million per 
year (LHAT, Annual Reocýt 1995/96, p. 1). 
"A tenant representative (THAT 10,1998) was critical, of the HRTG's democratic credentials: `It's two 
reps per block no matter how many people them are actually in the block You might have only two people 
in a block and it still gets two block reps 
... 
that's notfair 
- 
it should be on the basis of occupied units. ". 
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representatives (LHAT 3,1994) stated that there was little competition for the positions and 
turnouts were generally quite low. An RBM (LHAT 4,1994) stated that members were 
disheartened by the apathy of those in the block, although he also suggested that the apathy could be 
"... a backhanded compliment -- if the representatives were really doing a bad job then other 
people would be motivated to get involved and to do it better. ". 19 There were also issues of block 
representatives not being representative of the blocks' population. Representatives tended to come 
from a `narrow and predictable sector of tenants' and predominantly from those who had lived in the 
blocks from new, who chose to live in the blocks and remembered the `good old days' (LHAT 3, 
1994; LHAT 7,1994). By contrast, the young male population rarely attended meetings and, in 
part, were 'fromm out' by the dominance of the elderly. 
The HRSC met fortnightly to propose and develop policy, although the decision-making body 
remained the HRTG itself (which meet monthly). The HRSC consisted of two representatives for 
each of the housing management areas elected by that area's block representatives with annual 
elections. There were also a series of Advisory Groups related to the HAT's main areas of 
operation: 
-
a development advisory group (DAG); a community & economic development group 
(CAEG); and a housing managment advisory group (HMAG). Each Advisory Group consisted of 
two HAT board members and nine tenant representatives together with HAT staff, consultants and 
tenant advisors plus any co-opted members. RBMs could not serve on the Advisory Groups except 
as co-optees. 
The HAT board 
The council was assigned five positions for its nominees on the HAT board and initially proposed to 
give two to tenants. It eventually gave tenants tree and subsequently - when it did not take up its 
second position -a fourth position-20 The first council member was Harry Rimmer, leader of the 
council, who was also deputy chair and a high-rise tenant. Rimmer, however, resigted early in the 
HAT's life and was replaced by the council's chair of housing, Margaret Clark. She subsequently 
resigned in March 1994 and another councillor (Joe Devaney) took over. The subsequent lack of 
high-profile local politicians (i. e., the leader of the council or a committee chair) is also indicative of 
the council's apparent loss of interest in the HAT. By contrast, the council representative an the 
MDC board 
- 
once the council had taken up the position 
- 
had always the leader of the council? ' A 
19 His statement reiterates and supports the argument made about collective involvement and free-riders in 
Chapter One. 
20 At the time, there was a hung council and the two seats would have meant members coming from two 
different parties. It was therefore agreed that, as it was the largest party, a Labour councillor would take up 
one of the seats and the other would be offered to the tenants. (LHAT 14,1998). 
21 Itimmer (LHAT 15,1992) felt Sir George Young had been keen for the leader of the council to be seen to 
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private sector member, Mike Appleton, became deputy chair. He resigned in March 1994 and 
subsequently another private sector member, Rodney Dykes, became deputy chair. 
Board members had three-year terms, with RBMs having to stand for re-election. The HRTG were 
the electorate for RBMs because, given the size of the HAT, block representatives were more likely 
to know candidates than tenants (LHAT 16,1998). All tenants and leaseholders were eligible to 
stand. Each candidate was required to prepare a written statement, make a presentation and answer 
questions from block representatives. Although candidates did not have to be block representatives, 
as an RBM (LHAT 16,1998) noted, the first question would be: `Why not? '. The first RBM 
elections were held in October 1992 just after the HAT ballot. There was no geographical basis for 
representation and 
-- 
in theory 
- 
they could all come from the same area; an RBM (LHAT 4,1994) 
recognised the need for members to "... coruciously avoid any parochialism. ". 22 Until 1994, the 
RBMs came from just two areas (two each from Areas E and F). An RBM from Area E resigned in 
1994 and the new member came from Area H. An RBM (LHAT 4,1994) felt the HRTG were 
conscious of the `turf' issue. Despite elections, there has been relatively little turnover of RBMs; 
three of the original four board members having served continuously. The fourth resigned in 1994 
on the grounds of ill-health; Jack Bowers 
- 
at that time HRTG chair 
-- 
was elected and 
subsequently re-elected in 1997. Bowers unfortunately died in office and Joe Power was 
subsequently elected-23 
Initially board meetings were held monthly, but, from 1994, the HAT changed to a six-week cycle of 
board meetings. To liaise between the HRTG and the HAT, meetings were held between RBMs and 
HAT officers on the Tuesday prior to the board meeting on the Friday. Papers for the forthcoming 
board meeting were also circulated for this meeting. The HRSC also discussed board papers with 
RBMs prior to the meetings and, following the board meeting, RBMs reported back to the HRSC. 
The meetings were open but the number of observers limited. Board members have a primary duty 
of care to the interests of the HAT and, while they may be nominated or elected by an organisation 
or constituency, they cannot be mandated to act against the interests of the organisation on whose 
board they sit. Some tenants did not appreciate this; a tenant representative (LHAT 10,1998), for 
example, stated that the HAT chair had "... said they're board members. The tenant bit is just 
tacked on to Pacify tenants. They're salary-paid members of dw board ". The issue of RBMs 
being leaseholders 
- 
as one was 
- 
was a more difficult one: "It's obnoxious and amoral for 
be part of the HAT. 
22 This is similar to Hull but a contrast with Waltham Forest where each TBM comes from is elected by 
and, therefore, represents an estate. 
2' With the change to North and South Manvg=ent Areas, three of the RBMB came from the South area. 
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[leaseholders] to represent tenants. I question their legitimacy to make decisions. " (LHAT 10, 
1998). ' 
In strict terms, RBMs were council nominees and, in 1994, a tenant representative (LHAT 3,1994) 
had presciently warned that the council could "... still put its foot down and demand its power of 
nomination. ". In early 1997, one of the RBM places was due for re-election and the council wanted 
to reclaim the place it had originally given up. In retrospect, a city councillor (LHAT 14,1998) 
stated that the council had been `disappointed' with the performance of its member and had decided 
to take its second seat back The council tried to nominate its own candidate and wont straight to 
the DoE, bypassing the HRTG and the HAT. The move was just prior to the May 1997 general 
election and it was felt that, anticipating a change of Government, the council expected a major 
review of HATs and, as they had been created by a Conservative Government, for a new Labour 
Government to disband them. Nevertheless, tenants "... rose with one voice against them 
- 
even 
those who had previously been pro-city council. " (LHAT 13,1998). The HRTG sought backing 
from the HAT board for the position to be confirmed as a resident member. The HAT board, 
however, was perceived as `not wholeheartedly' backing tenants: "... they didn't want to upset the 
council 
- 
because there were a lot of land and property deals in the offing and other issues 
surrounding the landlord choice. " (LHAT 9,1998). The HRTG wrote to the housing minister, 
Angela Eagle, arguing the council's action was out of order and, while it did not object to more 
council representation, it should be through enlarging the board. The minister supported the tenants. 
In the ensuing election, the RBM (Jack Bowers) was re-elected. He died later in the year and there 
was another election. Despite concerns the council would try to get involved again, it did not. 
When their existing member's position carne up for renewal in August 1997, the council took the 
opportunity to change its board member (from Joe Devaney to Bill Craig, deputy chair of housing). 
Support for tenant involvement 
As the HAT was spread across thirty-five separate sites, the main tenant resource c are was the 
HAT Chat Shop, located in the city centre (mid in the same building as Age Concern), which served 
as the focus for information, advice, support and training for tenants. The HAT had its offices in 
the Cunard Building on the Piethead. There had been some debate regarding the Chat Shop's 
2" At Hull, the owner-occupiers did not get a vote in the HAT ballot. At Liverpool, owner-occupiers did get 
a vote and there were sections On owner-occupiers in the Joint Statement (s6.35-6.41). At Liverpool, the 
development programme would materially and financially affect the owner-occupiers; at Hall, they would 
be affected more indirectly. Although there were only about 40 leaseholders at Liverpool, very particular 
issues concerned them. Where demolition was proposed, leaseholders would receive the market value of 
their property or an equivalent financial stake in the now development. Where refurbishment was 
proposed, leaseholders would have the option of having works carried out to the interior of their flats at an 
agreed price. Werks necessary for the whole block would be free of charge. (CHAT, June 1994, x6.19). 2S 
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location. As the Cunard Building was off all the main bus routes, it was less accessible than the city 
centre. While it might have been more efficient to have the tenant resource centre in the Cunard 
Building, as tenant representatives and Tenants' Friends could have ready access to HAT officers, 
the HRTG wanted it to reanain separate and distinct from the HAT. Its location, therefore, enhanced 
the `symbolic separation' from the HAT. 
After the ballot, it was intended Tenants' Friends would be replaced by the HAT's community 
services department. The creation of the latter was delayed and posts were not advertised until early 
August 1994. Prior to its establishment, its functions were covered in other ways. With funding 
from the HAT, the HRTG appointed DOME as its independent adviser. DOME appointed three 
consultants and, subsequently, the HRTG employed than directly. A HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) 
considered this arrangement had created an `us-and-hem' situation, while another HAT officer 
(LHAT 7,1994) felt the Tenants' Friends tended to do things for rather than with tenants and had 
'inadvertently' created a culture of dependency. Once the HAT's community services department 
was fully established, the funding of Tenants' Friends was stopped and their function carried out by 
a HAT employee. As at Waltham Forest, a small budget (£5,000 per year) was retained for tenants 
to seek independent advice on particular issues as and when necessary. Tenants did not have 
ultimate control over how the money was spent as the HAT retained a veto 
. 
26 
New structures for resident involvement 
After a few years of the initial structures for tenant involvement, a new set of structures evolved 
primarily in response to the development programme. While tenant consultation had initially been for 
`pan HAT' issues, the development strategy had more individual and personal implications and 
consultation needed to be carried through to individual block and sites. As a result, Project Advisory 
Groups (PAGs) were introduced. The development programme also set new housing management 
challenges. At the start of 1996, with managing agents' contracts expiring in April, the HAT 
reviewed its housing management arrangements. The service was re-tendered in 1996/97 in two 
contract packages, North and South Liverpool. To allow for re-tendering, the first set of contracts 
was extended to March 1997. In January 1997, the contract for North Live pool was awarded to 
CDS Housing and the South Liverpool contract to Anchor Trust. The new service started in April 
1997. In parallel with the switch to two new housing contracts and the increasing momentuni of the 
development programme, there was a review of tenant consultation arrangements at the local level, 
23 Tenant representatives (CHAT 3,1994) suggested the delay was because the DoE tried to impose 10VAr 
salaries than elsewhere because the Liverpool area is one of high unemployment. 
26 Just prior to the second set of interviews, the budget was stopped (LHAT 9,1998; LHAT 10,1998). A 
tenant representative (LHAT 10,1998) argued that tenants still needed this budget because they would not 
know whether it was needed until it was needed. 
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which led to the nine Area Panels being replaced by thirteen Neighbourhood Panels, based on the 
development project areas. The Neighbourhood Panels would deal not only with housing 
management issues, but also with community and physical development issues. At the same time, 
two area-based Strategy Groups 
- 
one for the North and one for the South contract area 
- 
were set 
up, replacing the Advisory Groups and involving tenants and board members, and serviced by HAT 
staff. These reported directly to the board, and received minutes and issues from the Neighbourhood 
Panels in their areas. Concurrently, the HRTG changed its internal structures in response to these 
other changes. A Central Executive was established, which was similar to 
- 
and replaced 
- 
the 
HRSC. In addition, the Central Executive became the decision-making body, although the full 
membership was still consulted for major decisions. The Central Executive included two block 
representatives from each of the Neighbourhood Areas. The HRTG also split into a North and a 
South group to complement the new housing management areas. 
7.2.3 COMMENTARY 
While tenants had been involved in the pro-ballot negotiations, they had not developed the sense of 
ownership that was apparent at Waltham Forest. A HAT officer (LHAT 7,1994) felt tenants were 
used to a culture of conflict 
- 
of `them-and-us' 
- 
radier than one of collaboration. The tenant 
attitude, however, was to test authority rather than to passively accept it or actively undermine it. 
An RBM (LHAT 4,1994), for example, argued that the `Liverpool attitude' was always to 
challenge authority, but once that authority had "... won its spurs, then people will go through 
brick walls for it ". Similarly, another tenant (LHAT 15,1998) argued that: "Scourers are a 
bolshie lot but once they're fully informed 
- 
once they know there's no hidden agendas 
- 
then 
they'll go along with things. ". While not necessarily being unco-operative, tenants wanted to retain 
their independence, resist co-optation and maintain a clear distinction from the HAT. The Chat 
Shop not being in same building as the HAT offices was indicative of this attitude. More generally, 
however, a HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) argued that, due to the difference in the age structure, 
tenants might not want to be as empowered or as involved as those at, for example, Waltham Forest. 
Similarly, given that two-thirds of tenants were pensioners, an RBM (LHAT 2,1994) questioned 
where "... the energy cable from for accepting dw potential for making a choice? ". 
7.3 UNCERTAINTY 
The HAT's initial years were cloaked in uncertainty with regard to both its development programme 
and the amount of Government funds available. The two issues were inter linked: the development 
programme would determine the funding required, while funds available would determine the 
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development programme. Some of the uncertainty stemmed from the council's Feasibility Study, 
which can be considered a politically expedient document - its purpose being to justify a HAT without 
raising too many unpalatable problems at that stage - and the Government's response to it. This part 
discusses those areas of uncertainty. Before discussing these, it is necessary to briefly review the 
Feasibility Study. 27 
7.3.1 THE FEASIBIMY STUDY 
The Feasibility Study (LCC, July-October 1991, s3.6) included an appraisal iderrifying four development 
options and their comparative costs. 
Option One: Repairs & muörbc x only by the city comaa7 
This option considered the situation if only a repairs and maintenance programme could be tu d takai. It 
concluded that the block's problems would increase as their condition deteriorated, blocks would become 
unpopular and difficult to ManW with social problems (drugs, crime, vandalism, etc. ) likely to increase. 
Levels of vacant fiats would nose and tos' quality of life would deteriorate fuither. Although tivire 
would be little or no capital costs involved, the revalue costs of managing and maintaining the flats would 
continue to rise (s3.6.3). Hand, the option would lead to a serious decline. 
Option Two: Comps improvement 
This option provided for all blocks and associated low-rise dwellings to be fully improved, enabling all 
5, the dwellings to become available for letting. The improvann1s to be undertak n would indude: 
- 
raiewal of all lifts; replacana t of all windows providing UPVC double Slating; rewn ng; cladding 
repairs & installation; renewal & improvanat of heating systems; improved energy efficiency measures; 
renewal of bathroom & kitdhen ßtd ; upgrading of erviremner: tal facilities; increased security 
provision; and upgrading of communal area. Assuining doe would not be any rehousing implications 
dining the period of improvement (i. e., it would be an in-situ refiubishmat), the option was costed at 
approximately £128 million (an aveia unit cost of £22,988). The report anticipated an eight to ten year 
phased programme would be required. On completion, the option would provide the maximum number of 
dwellings, while future maintenance and improvana* costs would also be substantially reduced. 
Option Three: Re-ho & iudewdopmeut 
This opbm examined ne-houwg tewts drough the damol on of all blodcs and the provision of new 
27 The iq 'ty Study lacked credibility among tonants. An RBM (L, HAT 4,1994), for exampie, stated that 
it had been "... done 1th a pair of b1nooutars firont a car. ". Tam mp_eeente ivee (LAAT 3,1994) described it 
as baying been "... dare 1 ds lwn wvekr fm wtdhin a car. It wwa vvy superficial inspection using outdated 
informatiar. The Feasibility Study evert had the wrong nwnber of floors an sous bloc/at 
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housing. The option was posted at £216.7 million, consisting of £15 million for demolition, £191.7 
million for new build and £10 million for home loss and rem mal expenses (based on an allowance of 
£2,000 per team). The figure for new build was based on providing accommodation that reflected the 
high level of elderly taunts living in the blocks: - 25 sheltered blocks providing a total of 1,000 units; 
1,700 two-bedroom bungalows; 2,000 two-bedroom houses; and 100 three-bedroom houses, making a 
total provision of 4,800 units. The time-scale was estimated to be ten to fifteen years depending on the 
availability of land and progress in meeting a very large demand for wing. Other difficulties with 
this option were recognised. As sites made available through demolition would only make a limited 
contribution in redevelopment, thore would be problems due to the shortage of housing land available 
locally, while many tenants wished to remain in their blocks and would not be happy to be rehoused. 
Option Four. 1 devdopmeDOt 
The fourth option provided for a mature of selective demolition, now build and full improvements. For 
assessment purposes nine blocks were selected for demolition on the basis of their unpopularity with new 
build units to be built on the sites. The remaining high-rise blocks were considered for full improvement 
as set out in Option Two. The option would yield 5,201 units on completion. The estimated time-scale of 
eight to ten years and the estimated total costs at £128 million were both similar to Option Two (£128.4 
million), al hough, because fewer dwellings would be available for letting on completion, the average unit 
cost would be higher (£24,610 compared to £22,988 for Option Tw+o). 1 
In oandusicn, the report rejected Option One because the blocks' condition and tenants' quality of life 
would continue to dedine. Option Tree would be very difficult and ei cpensive to adueve, but "... more 
import-#*, it would not meet the needs of nvu y of the teiw who prefer to live in high-rise 
accommodation " (s3.6.14). 29 The report fl +efore concluded that Options Two and Four could be 
recommended for fattier consideration. It noted, however, that "..., feather caneideration of these optioru 
must be bared on, , fäll coneul&7don with the residents. " (s3.6.15). The report noted that if the council 
was to undertake Option Two or Four and if annual capital allocations continued at their pre ant rate, it 
would take dirty years to complete the strategy (s3.6.17). 8 tbereiore sy ted tha ta HAT could attiacx 
the resources necessaryto enable the work to be undertaken widin an eight to ten-year period. 
21 It is curious that the proportion of ref utishmat to new build was shewod heavily towards nfinbishnieft A 
greater pn, portion of new build v. tuld, however, have made the comparison between Options Two and Four more 
urhvo uabie to Option Four. 
11 This applied to most areas but had particular resonance in the more `up market' areas, such as Sefton 
Park and Woolton. From the re earch interviews, three principal attractions to high rise housing could be 
identified- first, the high-rise blocks were tenants' has and it was, therefore, an allegiance to that 
home; second, an alleer to the blocks because of the nature of high-rise housing in terms of, for 
example, providing views and/or a sense of safety and security, and third, an allegiance to the area 
- 
if the 
block was demolished, there might be no guarantee that the tenants would be able to stay in that area. 
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7.3.2 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The Feasibility Study had emphasised tenants' views in its apparent recommendation of an in-situ 
refurbishment without undue attention being given to the potential problems of that deveiopmatt 
programme. As the HAT set about its task, however, the cost, value and merits of refurbishing the 
blocks were increasingly questioned. At the time of the review and reappraisal of the development 
programme, a HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) stated that the new findings were likely to be very 
different from those tenants had signed up and keys parts of the Joint Statement were `challenged by 
reality': "We are now trying to get people to think more broadly in their choice of housing.... 
many of the tenants can only see the option to go back to the council, even through the council 
gave such a poor housing service. ". It was also evident that the Feasibility Study was a highly 
- 
and, perhaps, necessarily given limitations of time 
- 
simplistic exercise and ignored a number of 
crucial issues which the HAT had to confront. Three key issues were: 
- 
in-situ refurbishment & 
decanting; costs; and strategic considerations. 
- 
in-situ refurbishment & decanting 
The Feasi i itv Study had proposed an in-situ reäurbisi mat Although d was practical experience of 
such räiubishment from other locations 
- 
which inter alia showed it was possible 
- 
that experience also 
served to higtilight problems and emphasised the distinct advantage of vacated blocks. The alternative to 
an in-situ refurbishment was for tenants temporarily decanting to another property, for their 
flat/block to be refurbished and for them to move back to their original flat (i. e., a double decant). 
Tenants had not, however, contemplated decanting and had real fears about it: "774 stress could kill 
some older people, but, equally, living through a refurbishment could do the same. " (LHAT 2, 
1994). Decanting also raised doubts about whether tenants would be able to get back into their old 
flats. Moreover, however, once the prospect of moving was raised and appeared inevitable, tenants 
were more willing to consider alternatives that would not involve a double decant. 
- 
coats 
At the time of the ballot, tenants had been informed a HAT would manage and refurbish the blocks. 
The Feasibility Rudv estimated a cost of about £23,000 per unit to refurbish the blocks, giving an 
overall cost of about £130 million. 30 Surveys and preliminary studies, however, indicated an 
average unit cost of just raider £90,000. ' The revised cots raised issues regarft whether there 
30 It Voss also suggested that the estimate Voss "... jtct a guess as to riss the DoE would swallow. The cowcil 
employees were dy4ng to figm oat>e an ow ttirnuld be acceptable. "(LHAT 3,19944): 
31 Tenants suggested that the HAT had hiked up costs of telubishment either to `gild lily' in favour of new build argument or became the HAT wau bidding for resources from the Government, wanted to got as a largie a budget as powible and "... didn't expect to get it all. " (LIiAT 16,1998). 
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would be in-situ refurbishment (i. e., whether there would be decantkW and whether there would be new 
build instead of re urbishme t. It also put other options on the agenda, such as reduced specification 
refurbishment and demolition and redevelopment. Tenants were also concerned about witedw the 
Government would actually be prepared to find what had been promised. During the pre-HAT 
negc Tations, they had asked whether the initial budget figure was set in stone. The housing minister, Sir 
George Young, had replied that enough money would be made available to refurbish the flats to a liveable 
standard ;a HAT officer (LHAT 13,1998) also noted that some tenants regarded the minister's 
statement as a blank cheque. Young's statement in the Joint Stateme t (s7.5) was quite careful; the 
Government promising only that "... sufficient funding will be made available to make the HAT a 
success. ". The HAT rapidly concluded that to do the job as originally defined would be very 
expensive and 
-- 
under whatever Government 
-- 
that level of funding would not be available (LHAT 
7,1994). The situation had, however, been anticipated in the Joint Statement (s7.5), which noted that 
"... following further feasibility studies, structural studies and consultation, the improvement 
proposals for individual sites and blocks may be different to those outlined in the city council's 
Feasibility Studv. ". 
- 
strategic considerations 
As f indame tal as the short-tam considerations were longer-term considerations of the type of (social) 
housing Liverpool would need, which would require a balance to be shuck between the existing group of 
tenants' needs and those of fi ure tenants. A particular consideration was the value of refurbished high- 
rise housing once the current oohoit of tenants had passed away. As higii-rise housing was regarded as 
unsuitable for families, low-rise housing would offer more options in terms of possible ooappwts. 
Emphasising the need to consider the strategic issues, a HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994) outlined a 
series of questions regarding the city's long-term interests: "Does the HAT leave fifty part- 
refurbished blocks or more low-rise accommodation, which is cheaper to run, and more flexible? 
How much public sector housing does a city with a declining population need? Should the blocks 
actually become sheltered housing units? Who will live in the tower blocks in the future? ". To 
compound matters, the HAT was also operating in a st ategic vacuum due to a lack of planning/policy by 
those responsible for strategic policy making. 32 
Realisation of the Feasib' ' Study's shortcomings radically altered the premise upon which the HAT 
had been designated and upon which tenants had voted. A tenant representative (LHAT 3,1994) felt 
that in the Joint Statement tenants had got a `reasonably sound deal', but expectations were "... 
" Ala labor dada. Ea fie, the HAT funded a city-wide hang needs suzvq beawse it needed it to develop 
its own progranme. 
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slipping because they weren't feasible. ". The HAT was also intrinsically more complex and 
involved than tenants had initially imagined. An RBM (LHAT 16,1998), for example, stated that: 
"Tenants looked at their own blocks 
- 
they didn't look at 71 blocks 
- 
and expected it to be done 
in two years 
- 
not ten years. No one imagined a phased programme of works.... Tenants had no 
concept of the sheer scale or what the options would be - or that the blocks might be 
demolished ". 
7.3.3 THE CATCH-UP REPAIRS PROGRAMME 
Before the HAT could really reappraise its development programme, it was realised that the blocks' 
condition was worse than previously thought. In December 1992, problems were identified that 
could not be left for the main development works (LHAT, June 1994, s2.8) and a major programme 
of priority or `-up' repairs -- costing approximately £20 million -- was planned to be 
implemented before the main development programme. The legacy of repairs resulted fron poor 
construction but also from poor maintenance. The HAT, however, had a legal obligation to undertake the 
required works because as landlord it could be liable in the event of accident or fire. Furthermore, until 
repairs were started, it was not realised how bad the problems were, a risk assessment study, for example, 
found the blocks to be uninsurable and the Treasury had to underwrite the repair works (LHAT 7,1994). 
The repairs programme also had to be brought in at the last moment so that the money could be 
spent within the financial year. Hence, at the eleventh hour, and although they had not tendered for 
it, managing agents were asked to manage the programme. " For symbolic purposes (i. e., as a 
contrast to the previous regime), it was also important for the catch-up repairs programmes to start 
promptly. Although most of the repairs were for health and safety reasons and did not directly affect 
tenants' homes, they generated hostility from tenants. The repairs also created other problems, 
including fires, floods and power cuts, and were very disruptive, while the programme's scale and 
concentrated nature overheated the local construction industry, resulting in poor standards of work. 
It was also undertaken in a compressed time-scale with poor information and without the HAT being 
able to properly vet the quality of the work. A HAT officer (LHAT 7,1994) observed that there 
had been uproar over the works and the HAT would have to `rebuild its credibility' in the 
development programme. 
7.3.4 RE-THINKING THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The initial result of the reappraisal of the development programme was a discussion document, 
Addressing the Problems: A Framework for Development issued in June 1994, based on surveys, 
33 The also had a vlanmd ri pp pog p, whkh w p[opwed in consultation with 
t' nts to derive the priorities. In terms of looant app ec iation and in contrast to the c ch-up repairs Programme, 
the day-today repairs wane more success iil and, in psstiadar, wens a marked contrast to the cumcil's DLO (LHAT 2,1994). 
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inspections and meetings with tenants of every block. It also set out the approach to consultation about 
the development programme to be undertaken over the summer of 1994. The report (LHAT, June 1994, 
s9.2.7) stated that a central tercet of the development strategy would be a range of physical options, which 
would involve tenants and oilier interested parties wonting up appropriate options with consultants, 
evaluating diem, and determining which options would best meet "... the HAT's objectivees, the nee* of 
the city and the neighbourhood and best provide long-term value for money for Government, future 
landlordr a>g not level, the tenants. ". The physical options for each block were (varying levels of) 
refurbishment or demolition and new build (s9.3.1). To explore the implications, a detailed pilot 
study had been carried out at Winterbum Heights, which exhibited a range of physical 
characteristics and problems typical of other HAT sites (s9.3.5-9.3.6). To explore options, a 
Project Advisory Group (PAG) was established, with tenant representatives from the blocks and 
elsewhere in the HAT, consultants and HAT officers, together with caretakers and staff from the 
managing agents (s9.3.7). In addition, two `mini-pilot studies' involving detailed option studies of 
the two other most common block types were carried out (s9.3.9). Four key physical options were 
evaluated: - 
refurbishment to provide a thirty-year life (i. e., full i+efurbishment); 
" refurbishment to a lower specification; 
" partial reäurbishment, where some major elements would be left for replacement at a later stage by the 
new landlord, and 
" 
demolition & new build (s9.5.1). 
The lWort was also informed by a survey of taumb uniertaIca by MORI (MORI, 1993b). Based an a 
review of expenaice elsewhere, the report expressed reservations about räurbishing the blocks, especially 
with respect to in-situ refwbislunent (s9.3.2). In addition to physical problems, there were also problems 
related to the blocks' future as cost-efficient housing provision. 
The development programme can be viewed in terms of three principal interest groups: 
- 
the Government, 
future landlords and tonorale. While the interests of each group would overlap, they would also differ. 
The Govumnaes prefixince would be for the least cost solution offering the best value for public money 
and, although mindful of the lo term, its focus would be on short-term cost. Due to taunts' right to 
return, the HAT's challenge was to find and encourage a range of alternative landlords, who would 
- 
in turn 
- 
be ccnc need about vAndw the housing would be a viable business proposition. In the shoit 
term, taints would be cons need about disruption and the possibility of de dng (i. e., the ability to stay 
in and/or return to their own flat) and, in the law turn, abort the quality of the accommodation relative 
to rent and services chafes. Trance, as a necessary part of umdectaldrig its developmet programme, the 
HAT would be involved in decisions that would trade-off shot-germ savi (which would benefit the 
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Govemma t) against long-term costs (which would impact on future landlords and an taiarts). There 
were therefore four intersecting areas of con m: - cost; viable business proposition; dish an & 
decanwig; and rents & service dhagp. 
- 
cost 
in terms of construction costs, new build was found to be cheaper than full refurbisinnent: an average 
inclusive cost of 165,500 per unit (range £56,000 
-186,000) compared to an average of £90,000 per unit 
for full refurbishment (range £76,000 
- 
£123,000) (LHAT 1994b, s7.5). M The report (s5.3) noted that 
these costs could be reduced if rather than carrying out development i self, the HAT was able to pursue 
- 
or sponsor through HAs 
- 
purchases of existing houses and flats from the private sector or if, second, 
lower standard or partial refurbishment was taken. 
- 
viable business proposition 
The HAT placed a strong emphasis on the need for tenants to have a meaningful choice of future 
landlords. For tenants to have a choice, the housing had to be an attractive business proposition to a 
range of landlords. The report (sl l. l. l-11.1.8) outlined the aim and the challenge for the HAT's 
development programme to provide for tenants to choose from the `optimum range' of landlords and 
ownership options. The HAT therefore had to produce a product "... which will be sought after by 
both tenants and future landlords. ". It also stated that: "In principle to create a fair choice, a 
'level playing field' should be created between landlords. " (s 11.1.8). The attractiveness to future 
landlords would be dependent in the short-term on the acquisition cost (i. e., the selling price) and, in 
the longer term, costs in use (i. e., management and maintenance costs) that would determine future 
rent levels. 's The report (s9.5.4) found that new build would be cheaper to manage and maintain than 
either full or partial refurbishment. It also noted that ` reduced specification' refurbishment options would 
mean maintenance costs would be hier and, as a result, the accommodation less attractive and harder to 
let than frill refurbishment (s9.5.9). 
Regarding tenure diversity, the report argued bode new build and refurbishment might attract a 
variety of landlords for tenants to choose from, but choice was unlikely for partial refurbishment. If 
blocks were partially refiubished, tenants could expect continuous disruption, nuisance, damage to 
property and potential health risks, as elements not replaced or refurbished deteriorated and services 
34 Not only was reftubishnt found to be more expensive than new build but also the expectations of 
recouping some of that cost in the form of Capital receipts wes lower. Due to lower market rents and higher 
maintenance and service costs, the TMV of refurbished Bats, based on the DoE's Guidelines for Voluntary 
Stock Transfers was "... around one quarter of the value of new build dwellings. " (LHAT 1994b, s7.6). 
ss There was an inherent imbalance among landlords because the local authority vwuld acquire the 
properties at zero cost. 
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broke down. Furthermore, as future landlords would find partially refurbished blocks harder to let, 
they would be less interested in acquiring than (s9.5.8) 36 As tenants had a legal right to return to 
the council (and the council would have to accept than), the council could be the only taker for 
partially refurbished blocks and, unless the DoE was prepared to provide a dowry to offset negative 
values, future landlords could be restricted to the local authority (s9.5.6). By contrast, new build 
provided greater scope for other tenure options, such as owner-occupation and shared ownership. 
With respect to RTB, the report (s9.5.7) noted that while new build was likely to attract mortgages, 
neither refurbishment option was particularly mortgageable. 
- 
disruption & deconting 
The report recognised tenants' desires to remain in their own flats and, if not, to return to their flat 
once it had been refurbished. 37 With respect to re Iubist ma*, however, the report (s9.6.2) concluded 
that decatting was inevitable as the work needed was "... so extensiv that temporary or permanent re- 
housing [was] almost the only p tcal option for all tenants. ". The consultants' considered view 
was that, whichever development option was chosen (including new build), temporary or permanent 
re-housing would be extremely desirable and in most cases essmal. The key reasons being: - 
" cost 
- 
where tenants did not move, the additional cost of disruption per unit would be in the region of 
£7-10,000; 
" time - delays of 4-6 weeks per unit and 4-6 months per block; and 
" 
disruption and claims due to the physical implications and difficulties of working around tenants (e. g., 
services might be disconnected for long periods) while - in any case - removal of asbestos and oder 
contaminants could make `staying pnt' legally impossible. 
Furiheimore, due to the likely disniptian, individual tenants with a reasonable grievance regarding noise, 
dust, dim etc., would be able to bring work to a halt, through environmental health legislation, 
causing `huge and almost insuperable' programming Problems. Scope for claims against the HAT or its 
co tractors by tenants would also be considerable (s9.6.5) 38 A fwther issue was to ants' a profiile. 
The report recognised that to live-in th ouo a refurbishmat would be ` difficult ate' for a young mid 
helft houselaid but the HAT's population was largely elderly, with many disabled people and people 
36 At this time, the assumption was that landlords would become involved after the development 
programme. The report was therefore anticipating future landlords' views. If, as subsequently happened, 
landlords were involved at an earlier stage, they could have a valuable input and specify more precisely the 
terms on which they would be prepared to accept partially redbifiished blocks. 
31 At Hull, there was an individual reu tishment, where 
- 
for the most part 
- 
the reßubishment works 
would only affect the dwelling itself. At Liverpool, the refurbishment works in any particular flat could 
also materially affect the whole block (for example, to replace the windows in any one flat would 
necessitate scafibiding surround the whole block, obstructing daylight and creating security problems). 
This would mean that tenants would be disrupted not just while their flat was being refurbished but also 
- 
to a lesser extent 
- 
while each flat in the block was refurbished. 
38 Although in practice, tenants might be willing to put up with certain amount of disruption to stay in their own 
home, the HAT would have to avoid exposing itself to IeW claims. 
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suffering longue illness. Nevertheless, it also argued that this had to be weighed against "... the 
prospect of up to eighteen months of continuous noise, dust, curtailed semces, inoperative lift,, and 
several weeks of having to move from room to room within a, flat. " (s9.6.6). Furthermore, while the 
catch-up repairs Programme had been very disruptive for some tenants, it was minimal work compared to 
full refurbishment. 
- 
rents & service charges 
Future rent was a key issue for tenants and would have an important bearing on landlord choices. 
For HAs, rents would be a function of acquisition and ongoing management and maintenance costs. 
An additional issue for high-rise blocks was service charges. Although local authorities often 
choose to cross-subsidise between high-rise and low-rise housing to minimise differences in rents, 
HAs generally charge high-rise tenants directly for services used. Thus, while HAs would seek to 
offer `affordable' rents, high-rise blocks would be expensive for than and, consequently, overall 
rent levels would be high. Furthermore, non-high rise tenants would be unlikely to be attracted to 
HAs that subsidised high-rise rents by higher low-rise rents. As a result, HAs would be unlikely to 
buy high-rise housing. In addition, service charges in partially refurbished blocks were likely to be 
higher than for fully refurbished blocks. Hence, the development strategy's executive summary 
(LHAT 1994, s7.12) concluded that, in terms of revenue costs, new build was likely to be the most 
cost effective option for most blocks. 
The report concluded that, in S®neral, demolition and new build provided better value for money (s9.1.2). 
Neverdweless, it also recognised that this option was "... likely to be leant preien ed by many of the HAT's 
existing ternmts. " (s9.1.3). The report's overall conclusion was that, although many tenants were 
opposed to demolition and redevýlapirrerit, partial and minimal specification re£urbishinut would 
- 
in 
practice 
- 
be of limited use. In addition, they would not provide lautern solutions, and would either 
limit the dioice of future landlord to the local authority, or require stock trans&r to be accompanied by a 
dowry to offset a negative value. On the other hand, wholesale demolition would require the HAT to 
acquire an additional 254 was of residential land, while co4xXW% people dose to their preferred 
location would produce unachievable demands for land in certain areas (e g., Sefton Park and Wooltan). 
Thus, afthotqO the HAT night be able to ro-iwuse a number of its residents and tenants by enabling 
purchase of private stock, shortage of development land was WW y to mean that rthirbishmai would be 
the only tenable option for a number of blocks (s9.7.1-9.7.9). The re-appraisal had therefore revealed a 
series of practical and financial problems concerning the HAT's task. Revised costings suggested 
comprehensive refurbishment would greatly exceed the Feasibility Study's estimates and there were 
serious concerns about the practical issues of managing large-scale in-situ refurbishments. Kerwe, 
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the original option 
- 
on which tenants thought they had voted 
- 
was challenged for a number of reasons 
and the HAT had the task of initiating a dialogue about alternatives. Although mentioned in the Joint 
Statement, tenants had not regarded demolition and redevelopment as the likely option. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the development reappraisal, the emphasis seemed to be on new build 
where possible, with refurbishment only where new build was not possible. In itself, this exposed 
inherent tensions between the HAT's willingness to meet tenants' moons and aspirations and its 
need to achieve its statutory objects within its finding limits.. 
7.3.5 UNCERTAINTY ABOUT GOVERNMENT FUNDING LEVELS 
The second area of uncertainty concerned the level of Government funding. The Feasibility Study 
had estimated £23,000 per unit to refurbish the tower blocks, giving an overall cost of about £130 
million. Closer examination of the blocks revealed many of the blocks supposedly in a good condition 
were not. 39 The HAT's initial estimate was about £90,000 per flat, which translated into an overall figure 
between £300 and £400 million. At Hull and Waltham Forest, there had been uncertainty about the 
precise funding levels. At Liverpool, it was the magnitude of the discrepancy between estimates of 
funding deemed necessary and the amount the Government had (tacitly) agreed to as a result of the 
Feasibility Study. Another factor that would charge over tim and affect the project's cost was the 
HAT's declining population, which created additional unceitair ty regarding how many units would need 
to be build. As at Waltham Forest, the HAT's remit was to refurbish the existing housing or provide now 
housing for each secure tenant at the time of the ballot rather than to provide the same amount (and type) 
of housing40 Due to the proportion of elderly in the HAT's population, there was some uncertainty 
about the type of housing required. 
A further issue was whether the HAT would be fully public funded 
-- 
or rather the degree to which 
it would need to secure private sector contributions. Althou* HATs were not permitted to use private 
finance directly, they could use private finance throui joint va*ures. The HAT anticipated Govemmait 
fiords would be limited and was aware that a way of is asing finds was dmx* private finance. A 
HAT officer (LHAT 5,1994), for example, argued that there would inevitably be a cost limit on 
refurbishmait imposed by the Treasury 
. 
fftenants made a landlord choice to transfer to a particular 
HA then the funds available for that block's refurbishment would be the Govemment cost limit 
(paid as a grant from the HAT to the HA) plus the HA's own contribution. Private finance would, 
however, have certain std attached and tenants affected mig it not have a final landlord choice because 
39 None äthe blodas, ho m, needed to be demolished because äa physical kalt that could not be overcome. 
In all oases, albeit at considerable cost, a 30 ye& life was poeak (L AT 1994b, s4.4). 40 The HAT would also need 10 plan Ra an 01 of andar on of die new build units initially because a high pivportion of its tenancies (93%) was one or two 1- an n households (LHAT 1994b, s3.8). Once that 
generation had died c$ the housing units needed to be capable cf aooommodating a wider rattle of households. 
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it would be de rmined by the joint venture. The HAT would also need to preset this option to tenants 
suspicious of a `back-door' privatisation. 
The HAT's deliberations were overtaken by the implications of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
introduced in Autumn 1994, which required private finance to be used in all major public sector 
projects. The implications for the HAT became apparent when, having completed its development 
strategy consultation, the HAT sought approval for its first major project in August 1995 -- an £8 
million scheme for 131 homes in Everton; described as a `symbol of the HAT's promises to tenants' 
by the HAT chair, Paula Ridley (CHAT, Annual Romort 1995/96, p. 1). In a major surprise to the 
HAT and its tenants, the Government refused approval for the scheme to be 100% HAT-financed 
and required a private sector contribution. 1 As a consequence of the PF1, the funding arrangement 
for the Liverpool HAT (and those following it) would fundamentally differ from those in Hull and 
Waltham Forest. As an immediate consequence, the project in Everton had to be re-considered in 
terms of what was affordable under the new funding regime. The situation had damaged the HTA's 
relationship with tenants: the project was delayed by nine months as the HAT developed a new 
scheme that both included private finance and was acceptable to the tenants (LHAT 13,1998). 
A more fundamental consequence was that the HAT's approach to its development programme had 
to be radically re-thought. The HAT could not undertake development on its own and would need 
development partners who could contribute private funding. If the development partner was to be a 
fiture landlord, then it would have to be a social landlord. Regarding development partners, the 
HAT chair wrote in the Annual Report 1995/96 (LHAT, 1996, p.! ) that the `only likely' partners 
would be HAs, which would combine the roles of developer and future landlord. A partnership 
arrangement with HAs would work out cheaper for the Government because HAs would be funded 
at a rate lower than 100%, with private finance providing the remainder of the project costs. The 
new development approach also did the status of tenants' right to return. The right to return 
established by the 1993 Act applied only to properties let under secure tenancies. Due to the 
procurement process, at no point would the new housing be either owned by the HAT or let under 
secure tenancies. It would have been built by HAs using HAT grant, on land owned by the HAs 
(having been sold it by the HAT) and would be owned by the HAs "2 Tenants moving into them 
would do so as assured tenants and would not, therefore, have a legal right to return because Section 
41 More precisely, it refused to fiord the scheme to the extent of 100% in advance. Even prior to the PFI, 
HATs would not be 100"/e funded because capital receipts fron transfers (except those to the local 
authority) would - in principle - recoup some of the public finding 
42 This is the same as the HAT-sponsored evelopments at Hull. At Waltham Forest, the HAT built the 
properties and let them under secure tenancies until the temporary transfer to the WFCBHA, whereby 
tenants' rights to return were protected by contractual agreement between the HAT and the WFCBHA. 
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84A of the 1988 Act would not apply. 43 The HAT, however, felt it had a moral obligation to 
preserve tenants' ability to return to the local authority and decided that -- while it could afford to do 
so 
- 
it would allow tenants to return and, furthermore, properties would continue to transfer to the 
local authority at zero cost. Due to the need to increase certainty for the HAT and because HAs "... 
and their lenders are unwilling to take the risk of significant numbers of tenants returning to the 
council" (LHAT, Annual Report 1995/96, p. 1), the choice of landlord would have to be decided at 
the beginning rather than at the end of the process; a change contrary to the Joint Statement. 
Tenants' landlord choices would still affect the project's funding. If a tenant opted to return to the 
council, the HAT would pay 100% of the cost of refurbishing or building that unit. If a tenant 
chose to transfer to an HA, then the HAT would pay a negotiated percentage of the total cost in the 
form of HAT grant, with the HA making up the remainder. In aggregate, this would affect the 
overall cost to the HAT (and the Government). If 100% of tenants opted to return to the local 
authority, then there would be no private finance contribution; the issue, therefore, was the point at 
which the proportion opting to return to the local authority jeopardised the project's 
-- 
and/or the 
HAT's overall 
-- 
funding. " 
As part of the HAT's financial planning, its programme was costed an basis that the overall landlord 
dhoiae would be X% transfirs to HAs and Y% transfers to the council (where X+Y= 100). 45 The 
figures varied over time and the HAT had to perform a constant juggling ad to stay within its funding 
cap. If ultimately more than Y% of tenants 
- 
or if it appeared lik ly that more than Y% 
- 
returned to the 
local a verity, the HAT would either exceed its lifetime costs figure or would need to make cuts or 
char (i. e., to reduce quality) in its later phases. Each project was also costed on the basis of X% to 
HAs and Y'/o to the council. If, for example ntore than Y% plus voted to tretuni to the council, the 
sdiame would have to be reconsidered because the HAT would not 
- 
in principle 
- 
be able to fund the 
rest of the programme. A tatet representative (LHAT 10,1998) suspected that "... if 30% or more of 
tenants vie to go back to the local audwrity, then the scheme ºrwuld be rejected by the DoE as too 
expensive. ". Have, if too many tenants chose to return to the local authority, the project could be ruled 
out on costs gourds. 
43 The complication arises because HAT legislation was designed primarily for housing refurbishment (where tenants would stay in 
- 
or at least return to 
- 
their original properties) rather than for new build 
and, second, beciam it did not envisage HATS Sponsoring HAs to build houses for its tenants. 
"4 At Waltham Forest, one of the Justifications for the temporary transfer was to avoid putting inappropriate 
pressure on tenants in their landlord choice. Without a temporary transfer, landlord choices in earlier 
phases could have repercussions in terms of quality for those tenants in later phases. 
43 This tends to favour the exit from the public sector, since, if too many tenants elected to return to the city 
council, the prone would not be affordshle. 
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Uncertainty also remained regarding the HAT's overall budget. As discussed in Chapter Five, in 
March 1996, the Government asked each HAT to determine its lifetime costs. When announced in 
December 1996, the HAT appreciated the end to the uncertainty; the HAT chair, Paul Ridley 
(CHAT, Annual Report 1996/97, p. 2) wrote: "... our life-time costs allocation was to be £260 
million, roughly twice what we started out with. Though we can argue (and we did) that to do the 
job as we would really like would cost more than that, we are nevertheless relieved that we are 
now within shouting distance of a sensible figure with which to work and plan. ". 
7.3.6 COMMENTARY 
Due to the impact of the PH in particular, the later HATs (i. e., Liverpool onwards) differ from the 
earlier HATs (i. e., Hull and Waltham Forest). At Hull and Waltham Forest, the impact of the PFI 
was felt after the detail of the development programme had been determined and agreed. In each 
case, the development programme was known (and with greater certainty regarding costs) at the 
time of the ballot. The Liverpool HAT, however, was caught between the two groups because it had 
made "... all the same sorts of promises that the first two HATS had made and yet it suddenly 
became subject to the implications of the PFI. The latter HATS were subject to the PH but at 
least they knew about it at an earlier stage. " (LHAT 13,1998). The PH also affected the way in 
which the HAT had to manage its business. Although HATs had been created as hands-on agencies, 
which would bypass local authorities, as a result of the PH the later HATs had become `hands-of 
agencies with executive responsibility falling to their development partners (in most cases HAs). 
The HAT had therefore incurred its own implementation problems and control deficits; a HAT 
officer (LHAT 13,1998), for example, considered that it had to operate like a `puppet-master'. 
7.4 THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & EXIT OPTIONS 
One consequence of the PH was to link developmeit choices with landlord choices, which, at the 
other case study locations, could be progressed separately. As HATs were limited-life agencies, at 
some point, tenants would be required to malte landlord dioices. The development reappraisal 
report (CHAT, June 1994, s 1l. 3.1) proposed the following principles for the HAT's exit strategy: 
-- 
" the optimum range of alternative landlords and ownership options should be made available to 
tenants; 
" disposals of improved or redeveloped homes should not damage the service given to the 
remaining tenants or the options available to them; 
" 
disposal should not be detrimental to the HAT's ability to achieve its objects; 
" as far as possible there should be a `level playing field' for alternative landlords, particularly as far as rents and service dhangies were wed, 
" tenants should be given the fullest possible information, and adequate time for consultation, 
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before deciding their future landlord; 
" RTB for tenants transferring from the HAT should be retained; 
" tenants should be able to choose a landlord at the start of the refurbishment or redevelopment 
process, if they so wish, and where this was of benefit to them; " 
" 
future landlords should provide an undertaking to support and facilitate tenant involvement in 
management, such as EMBs or TMCs, and potentially collective ownership by tenants of 
transferred properties; and 
" exit routes should ensure appropriate and sustainable, longterm arrangements are made for 
non-housing facilities (e. g, community centres and communal facilities). 
7.4.1 CONSULTATION ON DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS 
The development reappraisal report reoogt ised that the discussion of development options would create a 
shit in the way each tenant saw their immediate future and would mean different things to different 
tenants. lt noted, however, that a `successful process' would result in tenants "... interested and looking 
forward to decisions about their future ", while failure would result in "... resentful andhaarfad tenants, 
reluctant to take part and unwilling to co-oper e. " (CHAT, hale 1994, s l4.1.2.6-2.7). The report 
pledged that no development decision would be made "... without the of cted tenants having been 
consulted their opinions sought and their wishes considered " (s14.1.1-14.1.8). A fifteen-week 
consultation programme, titled ` Going Loral', started in July 1994 and continued throughout the sue, 
with HAT staff visiting every site to explain in detail the HAT's draft approach to developme t. 
Prior to the development programme, tenant involvement structures were primarily for local management 
and for pan-HAT issues. With the develapmeat programmk tigre was a need to Set site specific with 
individual consultation. At the collective level, Project Advisory Groups (PAGs) were set up to create a 
framework to enable taiant consultation and participation in the development programme 
. 
Tenants would 
have the opportunity to influence and be consulted about the queen chosen for evaluation and, once the 
basic option had been closed, the detailed proposals and plans for their block or site (s14.1.1-14.1.8). 
The HAT also sought to involve tenants individually and, in particular, stressed that collective housing 
did not mean collective choices and that there could be individual choices. Mum was also an implicit 
recognition that assumptions about collective prof roes may not accurately neglect or be congruent with 
individual choices and that tenant representatives could not represent all the individual prefer res. As a 
result, it was a judge nait call when to involve tenants collectively via their ropresecrtatives and when to 
involve than individually (LHAT 5,1994). In particular, once the prospect of moving to enable 
re 'urbislmat or redwdopment had been eoiecnplated, a series of individual exit options was available: 
- 
moving to low-rise accommodation an the site; 
" moving to accommodation another site; 
"a Tenant Home Finder scharre, Where subject o sire and price restrictions the tenant could find a 
property with an HA or another landlord willing to talge than and the HAT would pay for than to 
46 The report was pmdmd prior to the PH. 
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transfer; 
"a Mobility Incentive Scheme (MIS) (similar to the CIS at Waltham Forest HAT), under which secure 
tenants required to move permane dy from their homes would have the option of receiving an 
incentive payment to help purchase a new home; and 
"a Do-It Yourself Home Ownership (DIYSO) scheme, which enabled HAT taunts to purchase a 
share in the ownership of a property, provided it fell within eligible price limits, and for an HA to 
purchase the remainder. Tenants would pay rat on the proportion of the property owned by the HA. 
Although development options and tenants' exit options are inter-linked, they can be seen as a series 
of choices, some of which are individual and some collective. The main choices were as follows: 
- 
the choice of development option; detailed design choices; and the choice of landlord. 
7.4.2 THE CHOICE OF DEVELOPMENT OPTION 
The first choice was that of the development option for the site and, in essence, was between 
(varying levels of) refurbishment and new build. This was a collective choice and the HAT's approach 
was to work with the collective body of tenants weil a preferred option was known. The development 
reappraisal report had proposed that the HAT would provide tenants with details for comparable 
and affordable rents, and service charges, for each physical option, to enable them to make an 
informed choice of development option and future landlord (LHAT, June 1994, s11.1.1-11.1.8). As 
noted previously, tenants could also make an individual choice to move from the block, which would 
involve forsaking their loyalty/commitment to the site or immediate neighbourhood. The HAT was 
careful to spell out the tenants' permitted discretion in terms of the decision on the development 
option for their site or block The development reappraisal report (s14.5.1), for example, emphasised 
that the HAT would have to "... takte a broader and longer term view than the wishes of the existing 
tenants of a particular block 
... 
am! that, although tenants' views on options will be c seal this 
will be only one factor 
- 
important though it is 
- 
which will be tall en into accoraL ". Herne, while 
tenants' views and prefamces would be talmn into account, the HAT board 
- 
and, in respect of financial 
approvals, the Government 
- 
would be the decision-maker. The report also stressed that a final decision 
would be made on the basis of `best value for money', which would "... not necessarily result in the 
option preferred by the existing tenmrts. " (s14.1.1-14.1.8). The report therefore emphasised that 
-if 
tenants were not to be misled and become disillusioned 
- 
the extent to which they could participate in 
decision-making had to be made explicit (s14.5.1-14.5.6). 
Refarbiahment or demolition & redevelopment 
The choice between refurbishment and demolition and new build would be constrained by different 
physical factors in each location. Tenants' preferences and, where necessary, costs associated wich 
ding had also to be considered. Scope for demolition and redevalcpmayt varied because the level of 
occupancy of each block and the degree of each tenant's allegiance to that site or nýighbouthood would 
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determine how many low-rise units needed to be built on each site. If the number required could not be 
built on the land available following demolition, then additional land would be needed. Further 
considerations would include the demolition costs and the loss of units. The HAT argued that it would be 
socially irresponsible to reduce the amount of social housing in areas wlaee demand was high. Although 
there were areas of the city with high demand for social housing, demand was falling in the Norde of 
England. By the late 1990s, Liverpool city council had stopped nominating to HAs. The HAT therefore 
had to identify those areas of the city that had sustainable housing demand, once the current cohort of 
teacarts had passed away. 47 Them were also issues as to whether there could be a rolling programme of 
demolition and redevelopment whereby tenants could stay on the site and move directly in their new 
homes; if this was not possible then some form of decanting would be required, either within the site or 
temporarily (and pimps ply) off the site. To a limited exte t, tenants might be willing to 
trade-off disturbance and upheaval: for example, a more limited refurbishment involving a few 
weeks of intense disturbance might be preferred to a full refurbishment entailing a twelve-month 
decant. At Rydecroft Tower 
- 
the first block to be refurbished 
- 
tenants were putting up with a lot 
of noise and disruption: "People will put up with a certain amount to stay in their own homes. 
People can go out for the day and then come back once the working day is finished and that's how 
they manage. They don't want to decant because that means a double decant 
- 
once out of their 
flat and then a second time back into their, flat. " (LHAT 16,1998). 
As many of the physical constraints on refurbishment could be overcome by more funding, the 
major constraint on refurbishment as a development option was funding. Detailed financial 
appraisals were made of each development option. The HAT had to take into account such factors 
as: 
- 
project costs, projected rental streams, capital costs, future rents, service charges, local 
population characteristics and projections, the likely housing need/demand in the firture, etc., while 
the actual choice had to be within the Government's funding limits and with the knowledge that it 
would tend to favour the least cost option offering the best value (LHAT 12,1998). The 
availability of funding would itself be considered with respect to the subsequent value of the 
development. Thus, if the preferred option was ref rbishment, this could either be ruled out due to 
excessive cost or the level of refurbish t reduced in respect of the available funding. In this 
respect, there was potential for a conflict of interest between tenants' and the Government's aims 
and aspirations, with the HAT caught between the two. The HAT therefore attempted to inform 
tenants of the implications of refurbishment (e. g., the problems of in-situ refurbishment, the 
problems of 
- 
possibly double 
- 
decanting cost implications that may entail a reduced specification, 
" At Altbridge Park, for example, the HAT had a moratorium on redevelopment because there was no 
sustainable demand for social housing in that part of the city 
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implications in terms of rast and service charge levels, etc. ) and to get than either to make a better 
informed choice of refurbishment or to choose an alternative development option. The HAT's 
concern was to ensure tenants understood why a particular option was not possible/viable rather than 
simply being informed it was not possibleMable. A HAT officer (CHAT 5,1994) argued that although 
the DoE may want all tenants to make individual choices to move out to low-rise or redevelopmecrt low- 
rise, the HAT wanted tenants to "... come to duzt decision 
- 
if indeed they do cone to that decision 
- 
for themselves. ". Similarly, a tenant representative (LHAT 10,1998) felt that "... if people know all 
the facts then they'd make a reasonably sensible decision. But if they didn't know, well then it's 
manipulative. ". 
- 
demolition & redevelopment 
Where demolition was possible, most of the PAGs resulted in recommendations for demolition and 
redevelopment. 49 The HAT's first development projects all involved demolition and redevelopment. 
Its first major scheme at Everton, for example, involved demolishing seven blocks and building 130 
units, while a second phase involved demolishing five blocks and the development of 162 low-rise 
dwellings; each of which consisted of a set of small developments across a series of sites. In early 
1998, work started on two major flagship developments at Childwall and Storrington Heys 49 Each 
scheme was designed with special emphasis on provision for frail and vulnerable old people (LHAT, 
1997, p. 2). At Childwall, more than 50% of tenants were over 70 years and a quarter over 80 
years, while at Storrington Heys, 45% were over 70 years and 17% over 80 years. The schemes 
therefore included special provision for the elderly, including housing with care (HWC) schemes, 
where the aim was to provide an alternative to residential care for frailer residents (p. 12), and 
'independent housing for old people' schemes where less frail residents could choose from a wider 
range of accommodation (LHAT, Annual Report 1997/98. p. 12). The Childwall scheme involved 
demolishing six blocks and replacing than with 172 low-rise units, planned so that tenants would 
only move once and for the frailest tenants to move first. The scheme would be undertaken in three 
phases with the first phase programmed for completion by September 1999 and the third by 
December 2002. The Storrington Heys scheme involved the demolition of five blocks and their 
replacement with 220 low-rise units, also planned so that tenants would only move once. The 
scheme was in three phases with the first programmed for completion by March 1999 and the third 
by March 2001. 
48 In some blocks, there remained opposition to this. In Seaoombe Tower in Everton, for example, an 
action group was formed to oppose the demolition (HAT News North. August 1997, p. 1). In August 1998, 
the HAT was also reviewing the proposed demolition of Bispham House and Aldington House in Vauxhall. 49 Detailed design work was also underway at Shell Park, where three blocks (Linea Close, Kenley Close 
and Pendine Close) were to be demolished and 220 new dwelling built. 
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For each contract, the HAT set out a series of expectations of the landlord/ developer. Regarding 
housing management, for example, it stated that as an `integral part of the HAT's philosophy' was 
to manage its stock in partnership with its tenants, there was a 'clear expectation' of the new 
landlord (LHAT, 1997, p. 4). Regarding employment and training, it expected the successful 
tenderer to "... demonstrate a clear commitment to the HAT's programme of securing employment 
and training on the construction site for HAT tenants. " (ibid. p. 4). The HAT would, however, 
provide wage subsidies and on-site training costs to ensure a minimum number of HAT-nominated 
trainee placements on the sites. 
The tender documents also gave estimates of the development costs so that landlords/developers 
could calculate the grant required from the HAT. Due to their size and the additional obligations 
placed on them, there was concern that HAs might not be interested in tendering. One of 
Liverpool's largest HAs felt unable to bid for either contract, while another would only tender for 
one. The projects, nevertheless, represented a major opportunity for HAs. Following landlord 
choice ballots, the development contract for Storrington Heys was awarded to the Liverpool 
Housing Trust (LHT) and that for Childwall to Anchor Trust. Each HA would also work with the 
HAT to finalise 
- 
on its respective sites 
- 
the detailed management and funding of the HWC scheme 
and for the funding of community centres via dowries from the HAT. 
- 
refurbishment 
As the cost implications would seem to rule out refurbishme t, some tenants felt discussion of 
refurbishment was raising expectations that could not be met. In Sefton Park, for example, a tenant 
(LHAT 10,1998) argued that, despite being costed at £101,000 per unit for refurbishment, the 
HAT was "... letting people drink there's a chance of refurbishment there. No Government in its 
right mind is going to let them do that [refurbish the block]. It's crazy not to knock them down. ". 
Nevertheless, the HAT's 1995/96 Annual Report (LHAT, 1996, p. 10) reported `optimistic results' 
from a detailed study of Brompton House in Sefton Park, by three HAs (MN LHT and CDS). The 
study showed that HAs would be prepared to refurbish some blocks 
- 
to a `good standard' 
- 
and, 
thereby, opened up the possibility of partial refurbishments, which the HAT had previously ruled 
out. Partial refurbishments were subsequently included in option appraisals at Sefton Park and 
Woolton. SO In these locations, the HAT also involved prospective landlords at an earlier stage. 
Social landlords/developers would be asked to bid in terms of grant required on the basis that there 
were X blocks; Y properties were needed to re-house secure tenants; and the HA would be free to do 
'0 Sefton Park and Woolton had also been identified as areas where refurbishment was likely/possible in the 
conclusion to the development reappraisal report, 
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as it wished with any surplus properties (LHAT 12,1998). For the option appraisal at Brompton 
House, for example, there were six options on the list ranging from doing nothing to demolition. As it was 
a conservation area and there was no land available for building, demolition and new build would produce 
fewer units than secure tenants. As tenants wanted to stay in the area, the preferred option was full 
refurbishment. Tenants accepted that a full refurbishment would not be possible, however, and that there 
would be a partial refurbishment encompassing the items requested in the Joint Statsment. 
51 
At both Woolton and Sefton Park, blocks would be retained and refurbished. By August 1998, six 
of the eight blocks at Sefton Park had been approved for refurbishment and decisions on the other 
two blocks (Belem Tower and Merebank) deferred pending further studies. At Belem Tower, the 
HAT's project managers' preferred option was for the block to be demolished and for a four-storey 
block of flats built. Tenants, however, were opposed to this. At Merebanlc the HAT was in 
discussion with an HA to take over the block. The HAT had also wanted to demolish Valeview in 
Woolton but, as there was opposition, it was exploring the possibility and implications of 
undertaking a refurbishment. 
The outcome of the development options choice 
The HAT's development strategy (LHAT 1994b, s10.2) had predicted the ratio of refurbishmer t to 
new build at between 1: 2 and 2: 1. This was a cautious estimate and it is likely that fewer than a 
third of blocks will be refurbished. By August 1998, thirteen had been demolished or were in the 
process of being demolished. A further twenty-seven had been approved for demolition. Eleven 
were to be refurbished. For three blocks, the HAT was in the process of seeking 
landlord/developers with the possibility of the blocks being refurbished 
- 
tenants having opposed 
demolition. For the other thirteen blocks no decisions had been made (see Tables 7.2 & 7.3). 52 
7.4.3 DESIGN CHOICES 
The second set of choices was in teens of the detailed design of the refurbishmuit or the new 
development. Once the development option had been diosan, within the collect of the agreed mix, 
overall HAT policies and standards and project budgets, tenants would be encouraged to exercise as much 
control over design decisions as was practical (LHAT, June 1994, s14.5.1-6). While at Hull it was 
51 The Joint Statement (s7.2) had listed the following as 'of the highest priority': 
- 
roof repair/ replacement; 
window replacement; security enhancement; heating replacement to affordable standards; lift replacement/ 
refiubishment; and upgrading of communal areas. The following were listed as `secondary but still 
important': 
- 
replacement of kitchen and bathroom fittings; re-wiring; insulation; plumbing modifications 
(communal); and environmental enhancement (s7.3) (see Appendix G). 
52 In all the outstanding decisions, the issues surrounding the integration of the HAT's proposals with 
wider regeneration concerns were `unusually complex' (LHAT, Annual Report 1997/98, p. 3). 
239 
TEE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
SOUTH BLOCKS DEVELOPMENT 
Woolton Linkview Tower Decision not yet made 
Lymecroft Tower Refurbishmart 
Rydecroft Refurbishme t 
Dealcrof 
D ft 
Refurbishment 
overcro 
Valeview Tower 
Refurbishment 
Proposal sought 
Olive Mount Olive Mount Heights (3 blocks) Refiubish one block demolition two 
blocks 
Claldwall Valley Childwall (3 blocks) Demolish all ft m blocks 
Hartsboume (3 blocks) Demolish all three blocks (1 
demolished) 
Ash Grange Ash Grange (2"blodcs) Decision not yet made 
Sefton Park Mere Bank 
Bud am House 
Proposal sort 
Refurbishment 
Rueland Hause 
York House 
Refiubistnnerýt 
Reiurbislunart 
Sydaiam House RäLýishmat 
Bromplan House Refurbishment 
Belem Tower Proposal sauet 
Heysmoor Heights Refiubishina 
Riverview RiverviewHei (2 blocks) Decision not yet made 
TABLE 7.2 
- 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRA1 lME AT LIVERPOOL HAT (SOUTH) 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IDKKEMENTATiON OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
NORTH BLOCKS DEVELOPMENT 
Cro3te& Stoningt n Heys (5 blocks) Demolish all blocks 
Sceptre Tower Demolition (demolished) 
Sh Pint I3nosa Close Demolition 
Kenley Close Demolition 
Pardee Close Demolition (demolished) 
Norris Green/ Joe Morgen HeWft (Europan) Demolition (de olished) 
Fahey L of re Haies (Europan) Decision not yet made 
Attridge Park (3 blocks) Decision not yet made 
VmdmWC ty An House Demolition (under review) 
Bispham House Demolition (under review) 
John F Kennedy Heights (3 blocks) Decision not yet made 
Wdem HeadxM Ijom D tim 
Hdhedow Towers (2 blocks) One block to be demolished 
1 block to be re'u bished 
Wiaberbam (West Wrnterburn Heights (3 blocks) Demolish all three blocks (all 
may) daindidied) 
Everton Rockview Demolition 
Corinth Tower Demolition 
Seacon*e Tower * Demolition 
Edinburgh Tower Demolition 
Ellison Tower Demolition 
St Georges Hoights Danoiitian 
Bnoalmmor Tower Demolition 
* Athen Grasp is this block to 
resist demolition 
TABLE 7.3 
- 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AT LIVERPOOL HAT (NORTE) 
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largely the same development ask carried out to all dwellings and, at Waltham Forest, a similar 
developmont task carried out on four estates, at Liverpool, there were at least twelve or thirteen different 
development projects. The PAGs also operated in a similar manner to the tenant development groups 
at Waltham Forest and the neighbourhood groups at North Hull. Design choices would be made 
individually and collectively. The layout of any new housing would, for example, necessarily be a 
collective choice, while the choice of internal fixtures and fittings would generally be an individual 
choice. As in the other HAT areas, tenants would got a choice of a range of internal fittings, 
finishes and colours. There were also extras which tenants could pay for, such as extra telephone 
points and extra wall lights. This was similar to the approach employed at Waltham Forest, 
although it was not as sophisticated as the menu-based system at Hull. For refurbishments, the 
detail of communal areas and facilities and the standard (quality) of refurbishment would generally 
be collective choices, while the choice of internal fixtures and fittings within the flat will generally 
be an individual choice. Tenants' choices in both instances would be constrained, first, by the 
willingness of the HAT and its consultants to involve tenants and, second, by the project's budget 
constraints. " 
7.4.4 THE CHOICE OF LANDLORD 
The third set of choices was the choice of landlord. There were separate landlord choices for each 
development project. For low-rise properties, it was an individual choice and tenants would got the 
landlord they voted for. For refurbished high-rise blocks, it would be a majority vote, with the 
block's ownership transferring to the landlord the majority of taunts voted for. The Secretary of 
State, however, had discretion to permit the transfer of any individual flat to the local authority. 
Winterbum Heights, one of the first development projects, provides an illustrative example of the 
landlord choice process. On this site, there were three tower blocks (Winterburn Heights) nineteen 
maisonettes (Deyburn Walk) and six me-bed, low-rise flats (Winterburn Crescent). The low-rise 
flats were refurbished with all six tenants voting to return to the council. The maisonettes were 
demolished with tenants all choosing to transfer to some nearby former MoD property purchased by 
an HA 
-- 
the Liverpool Housing Trust (LHI) 
-- 
with a grant from the HAT. Although the high-rise 
tenants had originally wanted a refurbishment, the development option agreed was for the blocks to 
be demolished and low-rise dwellings built. Tenants were keen to remain on the site: "... the HAT 
wanted to move us down the road, but we fought and got our wary. " (LHAT 11,1998). To 
facilitate redevelopment, tenants from two of the blocks were decanted into the third, these were 
53 One of the consequences of a partial refwbishment was that, although the flats would be re-wired, the 
new wiring would be surface-mounted. Tenants would not be expecting this and an RBM (LHAT 16, 
1998) recognised the partial reßubishment could ultimately be a great disappointment. 
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demolished and low-rise housing built. The new houses would re-house the existing tenants and 
provide a small number of additional units, which would become the HA's. The HAT would retain 
nomination rights, but any HAT tenant moving in would lose their landlord choice and become an 
HA tenant. Once built, tenants would move into the new housing, the remaining block would be 
demolished and its site redeveloped. For tenants from the first two blocks this would involve double 
decants. Double decanting, however, made other options more attractive. As a result (and despite 
each block containing 74 flats), the third block had only thirty-one tenancies during the 
redevelopment period. 4 A HAT participation officer (LHAT 9,1998) argued that, although 
decanting was going to be a big issue, once tenants considered the reality of developments, they had 
accepted the need for decanting. " At Winterbum Heights, for example, tenants had raised no strong 
objections to decanting. 
A panel including tenants interviewed interested landlords. Although the process involved the 
identification of a preferred HA from among those competing, the final landlord choice, was 
between the council and the preferred HA; the HAT having pledged that the city council would 
always be one of the choices for tenants, thereby preserving their right to return. 56 A Tenants' 
Expectations Charter was produced in 1996, prepared under the HAT's budget for tenants to obtain 
independent advice, which outlined the issues and was intended to protect tenants' rig ts. Tenants 
were also provided with guidance in terms of questions to ask prospective landlords (such as rent 
levels; service delivery; commitment to tenant support; tenant involvement and their long tam 
commitments to the housing) and the kind of answers they should expect. Once Riverside (formerly 
MIfi) had been selected as the preferred HA, tenants had a choice between it and the council. " The 
tenant (LHAT 11,1998) noted that the council had "... offered very low rents (such as f, 20 per 
week) to get people to go back to them. ". Of fifty tenants, nine voted to go back to the council. 
Tenants had not been that worried about not going back to the local authority: "Tire reality is that 
people didn't want to go back anyway. They just wanted it as an option. " (LHAT 11,1998). The 
tenant also suspected those tenants who had voted to return to the council had done so as a protest 
vote: they had also thought that as the majority vote would be binding on all voters, they could vote 
for a return to the council as a means of showing loyaky to the council and opposition to the move 
to private landlords, while not actually being required to go back to the council. Instead, however, it 
'4 The blocks also had a high incidence of vacancy prior to the redevelopment programme. 
ss On the next development site, tenants objected and the HAT introduced a policy of paying tenants £500 
in compensation. The policy was not made retrospective and tenants at Winterburn Heights would not get it 
(LHAT 11,1998). Tenants were also compensated for their loss of home (£1500). 
'6 The council subsequently withdrew from landlord choice in 1998. 
"A tenant (LHAT 11,1998) felt the final decision was a Hobson's choice: "We really ended up with the 
least worst housing association.... They'd been the managing agents for the site and 
- 
to be honest 
- 
wie 
hadn't liked them at all. There were two others wie could have chosen from but they were worse really. ". 
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was an individual vote and tenants got the landlord they voted for. She also argued that those 
tenants "... regret their decision already but there's no going back ". 
Rents & bench-marling 
After the first five sets of landlord choices, the HAT introduced a policy of bench-mark rents. This 
policy had two main objectives. First, to phase in reit increases: although the Joint Stateme t 
(s5.17) suggested phased rent increases to soften the impact of rent increases, there was no explicit 
commitment to this. The gap between the frozen rents and council or HA rents was steadily 
increasing, presenting tenants with problems. By 1997, for example, rent levels of HAT tenants 
were on average £14 per week lower than their counterparts in blocks retained by the council 
(LHAT, September 1997). The key commitment in the Joint Statement (s5.17) was 
`comparability': after work had been carried out rents would rise to a "... level equivalent to the 
average of those rents charged by local authorities in the Merseyside region. ". This assurance 
would only apply while properties were held by the HAT, after which rents would be determined by 
the new landlord. The HAT was also committed to ensuring rents remained affordable. Second, the 
bench-marking proposal was an attempt to create a `level playing field' between -possible landlords 
by addressing problems created by the combination of different funding regimes for local authorities 
and HAs, the increasing need to use private finance in HAT development projects, and the `rules' 
that permitted refurbished or new properties to be transferred to the council at zero cost (LHAT, 
September 1997). These factors had `distorted' rent offers made in landlord choice ballots, 
including the council exploiting its power to cross-subsidise among its housing stock and offering 
"... ridiculous rents and guaranteeing them for the next five years. " (LHAT 10,1998). '8 For 
Brockmore Tower, for example, the council had offered initial rents of £21 per week 
-- 
£7 less than 
the frozen rents dating from 1993 
-- 
rising to about £40 after five years; a figure lower than the 
current equivalent rents for council properties (LHAT 12,1998). This raised various issues of 
equity between tenants; a tenant representative (LHAT 10,1998) considered it `immoral' because 
the council was "... subsidising good quality housing with poor quality housing. » 
Benchmark rents were proposed as a way of overcoming some of these problems. Prospective 
landlords would be required to offer rents matching a series of `bendnnarks' set by the HAT. 
Tenants would therefore be able to decide between landlords "... on the basis of the quality of 
housing services offered and any balue added' elements including extra services and community 
development initiatives. " (LHAT September 1997). The HAT could use the data from previous 
ss As discussed in Chapter Five, North Hull HAT had tried to avoid this by introducing a `level playing 
field' for landlords, whereby the rents at the time of exit were the same regardless of the landlord 
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landlord choice ballots to determine appropriate standards. In particular, the benchmark rent 
proposal had to take account of rent levels charged by HAs, which in turn reflected the rate of grant 
available and the cost of repaying any private loan. As noted in Chapter Three, when competing for 
HAG, HAs could trade off HAG levels against rent levels. To address this issue for new projects in 
1998/99, the Housing Corporation had produced its own `benchmark rents' for each local authority 
area that would be used as guidelines against which to judge HA bids for corporation funding 
(LHAT September 1997). These were also fed into the bench-marking setting exercise. 39 The 
system comprised the following elements: 
- 
prospective landlords would offer initial Year One and 
final Year Five rents matching the benchmarks and the phasing of rents in the intervening years to 
be for the landlord to decide. Year One rents would be set at levels slightly below existing council 
rents, while Year Five rents would match Housing Corporation benchmark rents for 1998/99 
(LHAT September 1997). During the Autumn of 1997, the system was piloted at Childwall and 
Storrington Heys. 
The scheme described above applied to new build only. The setting of benchmark rents for 
refurbishment was more complex due to service charges and, in particular, the differences between 
local authorities and HAs. As noted previously, HAs would be unlikely to subsidise high-rise 
service charges by increasing rents on low-rise properties. As the council did not impose service 
charges, it placed them at an advantage in any landlord choice ballot. The key elements of the 
system for high-rise blocks were: 
- 
first, that rents for full refurbishment would be based on rent 
levels for new build properties, but would be between £3 and £4 per week lower as new build 
properties would generally be higher standard; and second, landlords would be limited to a 
maximum service charge of £15 per week in Year One (excluding any heating charge), which would 
be adjusted for inflation (RPI+1%) each year for the duration of the five-year benchmark rent 
period. 6° The minimum level at which benchmark rants would apply was refurbishment to the 
standards outlined in the Joint Statement. The HAT's benchmark rant would only operate for a 
five-year period, after which rents would normally be adjusted in line with the landlord's own rent 
setting system (LHAT, February 1998). 
The outcome of Landlord Choice 
A 1993 survey of tenants (MORI, 1993b) showed only 30% of tenants expected to return to the 
council, although 
-- 
as 42% of tenants were `don't knows' 
- 
this was just over half of those 
s' An additional benefit was that, once rent levels were fixed, HAs would compete on grant rates (rather 
than a combination of rents and grant levels) which could help to reduce development costs (LHAT 
September 1997). 
60 In this respect, the council still had an advantage over other landlords due to its significantly larger stock 
and its willingness 
- 
or its necessity 
- 
to cross-subsidise among that stock. 
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indicating a definite preference (see Table 7.4). The first landlord choice ballots resulted in very 
few tenants voting to return to the local authority (Table 7.5). The potential problem of too many 
tenants voting to return to the local authority and, thereby, jeopardising the development 
programme's funding had therefore not arisen. 
TENURE % 
Liverpool city council 30% 
An existing housing association 14% 
A new community housing association controlled by tenants 90/0 
Tenants co-operative 5% 
Private landlord 1% 
Don't know 42% 
TABLE 7.4 
- 
LANDLORD CHOICES IN MORI POLL 
(Source: MORI, 1993b, p. 76) 
The significance of tenants actually having a dioice was stressed: `People wow to have a choice. They 
need to have the choice to go back to the city council, even if they don't it to use. If it's removed 
then all hell would break lase. " (LHAT 13,1998). The importance of the choice being the power to 
threaten to go to a different landlord (i. e., in the sense that competition between producers empowers the 
consumer) and, second 
- 
and at least in principle 
- 
the local aihority being a safety net where cetain 
mirrimum moans would be met and, if not, dien e would be a mechanism for redress t rough 
local councillors. The latter was dhalle ged 
- 
as, indeed, the New Right had argued 
- 
on at least two 
grounds: 
- 
first, the accountability of councils to dwir electorate through ward oo llors had proven to 
be an imperfect medzanism: "At least with the council, you have a councillor who can We up the 
cudgels on your behalf- but tenants have had thirty yews of experience and brow that that's not true.  
(LHAT 16,1998). Second, the council's housing nunagement performance had shown it was a very low 
safety net. Thus, although the 'right-to-return' to the local authority was a key factor in the establishma t 
of HATs, the exercise of that fight, by tenants appeared to be less co troversial. An RBM's states t 
(LHAT 16,1998) was revealing in terms of taunts' ambivalence to exiting f omn the public sector: 
`People had said `No' to private landlordr wid that they'd prefer to be under the council wnbrell4 but 
it's an umbrella that's fall of holes. ". The RBM (CHAT 16,1998) also felt that tenants did not want to 
go back to the council: `People say they want to be with the council They see housing associations ca 
private landlords andpr wate landlo dr are not to be dusted 
... 
The council can say this and that, and 
dos things up in this and that garb 
- 
but we don't frort them. '
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S1TE (landlord) HAs City Cam & 
Pro-benchmark rents 
Winterburn Crescent 0 6 
Everton sites 117 14 
Winterbum Heights 41 9 
Brockmoor Tower* 8 5 
Joseph Morgan Heights 12 0 
Post benchmark rents 
Temhall Way 12 0 
Childwall 157 1 
Storrington 220 0 
TOTAL 567 35 
* At this site, the council offered very low projected rents. 
TABLE 7.5 
- 
OUTCOME OF LANDLORD CHOICE 
Figures are for properties & include some instances of collective housing where 
transfer is on the basis of a majority vote. (Source: LHAT, 1998) 
An additional factor that would tend to work against the council in the landlord choice decisions was 
uncertainty about the council's continuing role as a landlord. By the late 1990s, as well as some 
estates sales to HAs, the Labour council was exploring the possibility of a local housing company 
(LHC) (Bright, 1997, p. 3). The council had calculated that it needed to spend £250 million an 
catch-up repairs and £500 million on modernisation and an LHC would enable such funds to be 
raised. The plans envisaged a whole-stock transfer (45,000 units) to a `parent' holding company, in 
which the council retained a minority interest. Although the proposed transfer conflicted with rules 
restricting the size of transfers, the council argued that only through a single whole-stock transfer 
(rather than a break-up into partial transfers) could positive value stock in one area be used as 
security for loans to fund the refurbishmwt of poor value stock elsewhere (, Social Housing. 1997, 
p. 1). The housing minister (Hillary Annstrong) expressed reservations that it was not suitably 
distant from the council. In the May 1998 local elections, the Lib-Dams took control of the council 
and subsequently announced its intention by 2003 to have no stock under local authority 
manageinait or ownership, which 
- 
in principle 
- 
would hasten plans to transfer the housing stock. 
it would therefore no langer accept HAT tenants and withdrew from the commitments made under 
the Joint Statement. including the landlord choice 61 The Lib-Deins argued that the council had 
61 Given the pattern of the landlord choice ballots and prior to the council withdrawing from the landlord 
choice, the HAT had been considering whether the local authority should automatically be one of the 
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invested resources into the landlord choice but the number of tenants returning had not made it 
worthwhile. As the new ruling group, the Lib-Dens also wanted a representative on the HAT 
board, which was expanded to accommodate a new member; the existing Labour councillor would 
serve the rest of his term but his contract would not be renewed and the board will return to eleven 
members. 
Other exit options 
By March 1998,342 tenants had taken advantage of HAT-sponsored initiatives to move from the 
high-rise blocks, such as the MIS and the Tenant Homefinder Scheme. RTB was also an option for 
all tenants; tenant's RTB would also continue once they had transferred to the HAs. 62 If tenants 
transferred back to the local authority, the purchase price would be based on the cost floor 
- 
the 
value of improvements undertaken to the dwelling in the previous eight years. Tenants would not be 
able to discount the purchase price below the actual cost of those improvements. The cost floor 
would, therefore, tend to inhibit RTBs. If, however, tenants transferred to an HA and sought to 
exercise their RTB, the cost floor would be the price the landlord paid for the property (normally 
TMV). 
The necessity for the HAT to use HAs as development partners required HAs to be well-established 
and financially secure, which militated against the development of either taunts' co-operatives or a 
CBHA. A small co-operative was, however, devreloped with tenants from Storringbon Heys and 
Sceptre Tower. Continuing Liverpool's tradition of co-operative development, twenty low-rise 
dwellings would be constructed by the co-operative on a site near Sceptre Tower (HAT News 
N*WL August, 1997, p. 2). 
7.4.5 COMMENTARY 
In terms of progressing its landlord choice, by 1998 the Liverpool HAT was more advanced than the 
Waltham Forest HAT, although not as advanced as the North Hull HAT. In principle, a choice by 
sip¢ýificant tenants to return to the council would have created a crisis in the HAT's funding. That 
this had not happened can 
- 
in part 
- 
be attributed to the council's failure to present a credible 
alternative, which, in turn, was attributed to its past performance in managing the high-rise housing; 
tenants had had a bad experience of the local authority, did not want to return to it and were 
therefore more willing to consider other alternatives. In part, this stets that the Thatcher 
landlord choice for new build properties and, in addition, whether it should receive new build properties at 
zero cost (LHAT 16,1998). Furthermore as then SUMmmo was not a legally-binding document, the 
council was also able to withdraw from it. 
62 The HAT negotiated this as a contractual right for tenants. 
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Government's assumptions and assertions about local authority housing management were not 
entirely misconceived. '3 Following the local authority's withdrawal from the landlord choice, the 
Liverpool HAT will be the most efficient exit mechanisms of the first three HATs. 
7.5 THE HAT'S WIDER ROLE 
As noted in the previous two Chapters, HATs are regeneration agencies. For the purpose of 
indicating the wider activities of HATs, an indicative overview of the HAT's economic development 
and successor organisations is given below. 
Economic development 
The HAT recognised that it had an important economic role to play in the city in various ways: 
- 
as 
a direct employer of staff; as a purchaser of services; and as a development agency. One of its 
objectives was to ensure that its investment secured longterm strengthening of the local economy 
(LHAT, Annual Report 1993/94, p. 10). The HAT's own population was also deprived: in 1994, 
for example, only 10% of the HAT population was in full or part-time permanent employment. A 
MORI (MORI, 1993b) survey also identified nearly 1400 tenants who would benefit from training 
and/or access to employment opportunities. During its first year, in par nership with three o her 
development agencies 
- 
the council, the City Challenge and the MDC 
- 
the HAT, with Merseyside 
TEC, funded a new Local Labour in Construction scheme to provide quality jobs and training 
opportunities for local people. The HAT also inserted training and employment clauses into 
construction contracts and targeted placements to its own tenants. It also opened discussions with 
the Employment Service, the Community College and the council's Economic Initiatives Unit to 
explore how it could support and promote opportunities for tenants seeking work or training 
(LHAT, Amual port 1993/94, p. 10). The resulting projects were focused in three areas. First, 
maximising the take-up of benefits to which tenants were entitled. A Welfare Benefits Outreach 
Team, for example, was set up in 1995 and, subsequently, a credit union was also established. 
Second, training and access to employment opportunities, where an Adult Guidance Project 
- 
the 
GROW project 
- 
was established in partnership with the council to provide careers and training 
advice, provide job application and interview support training, establish and maintain a skills 
register, and refer tenants to training courses and job opportunities. Third, to provide support for 
63 In this respect, it can be speculated what might have happened in Liverpool if tenants had a more 
positive view of the local authority's housing management (i. e., similar to that at Hull). Or, indeed, what 
might have happened in North Hull had similar fending arrangements applied from a much earlier date. 
In each case, the project would have been likely to breech its lifetime costs budgw fiorcing the budgets to be 
renegodated upwards, standards and quality to be cut severely or the project to be abandoned. 
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the establishment of tenant businesses and self-employment opportunities. 
Given the age profile of its tenants, however, there was less need for access to employme t and 
training schemes than at the other two case study HATs and arrangements and initiatives were less 
extensive. As well as containing 55% elderly people, the HAT's population also contained a 
significantly higher proportion of longterm sick and disabled (45%) than for the city as a whole 
(16%) (LHAT 1994b, s2.2). Given the vulnerability of so many of its tenants, the HAT held 
discussions with a range of care service providers and anti poverty initiatives to assess the scope for 
improving and extending existing services into the HAT's blocks. Partnerships were also developed 
with the major voluntary sector agencies, such as Age Concern, Liverpool Personal Social Services 
and statutory providers of health and social services (LHAT, Annual Report 1993/94, p. 10). 
Successor organisations 
As limited-life agencies, at some point HATs will be wound up. Due to the need for significant 
amounts of private funding, the Liverpool HAT had to achieve its objects by working through HAs. 
As an `enabling' HAT, however, it could more easily become, first, a `residual' HAT with a 
monitoring and funding role, and subsequently withdraw altogether without jeopardising its 
achievement. Once it had put in place the remainder of its development programme, the HAT would 
have a monitoring and quality assurance role prior to winding up in 2004-2005. HAs were, 
therefore, the HAT's de facto successor organisations. Nevertheless, while HATs are intrinsically 
(housing-led) regeneration agencies, HAs are more purely housing agencies. In its development 
projects, the HAT required HAs to embrace a wider role rather than simply providing and managing 
housing, which 
- 
in effect 
- 
was a Housing Plus (HP) approach. In the Storringtan Heys and 
Childwall development briefs, for example, it set out certain expectations regarding training and 
employment, care for the elderly, tenant involvement generally, and tenant involvement in 
management. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
Given the city's recent political history, the Goverment was particularly lasen to establish a HAT in 
Liverpool. in contrast to Hull, which had actively sought a HAT, Liverpool city council was more 
reluctant to embrace a HAT and subsequently tolerated it as a necessary evil. The objection to 
HATs was at an ideological and symbolic level: the council saw public sector housing as a 
necessary response to housing need and did not want to publicly admit to its own shortcomings. The 
Government was not too partiailar about where in the city a HAT was located and, furthermore, the 
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inclusion of all the city's high-rise housing (including the better quality stock) was not controversial. 
Due to its multi-sited nature, the subsequent HAT was intimately concerned with city-wide strategic 
policies and plans and the HAT inherently had a more strategic role than the HATs at either Hull or 
Waltham Forest. The relationship between the HAT and the local authority was therefore more 
important both to the HAT and to the local authority than at either of the other case study locations. 
The local authority's relationship with the HAT and the local authority fluctuated between active 
zerrt and disengagement. Initially the HAT had prominent local politicians on its board (the 
council leader and then the chair of housing) but following the resignations of Harry Rimmer and, 
subsequently, the chair of housing, it became a `back bench' councillor. A HAT officer (LHAT 13, 
1998), for example, felt the council had managed to `get shot' of 5,000 of its properties in the very 
worst condition to the HAT "... and after that it wasn't really bothered about them. ". Prior to the 
1997 general election, however, the council tried to assert itself by increasing its membership of the 
HAT board, but its efforts were rebuffed. Prior to this, however, and in contrast to Hull, the council 
resigned itself to not getting the stock back. It was speculated, however, that had the HAT covered 
three or four low-rise estates, the council might have been keener to have the properties back 
(LHAT 13,1998). With control of the council changing to the Lib-Deins in mid-1998, the council 
withdrew from commitments made in the Joint Statement and from the landlord dwice. 6' The city 
council would therefore no longer have a direct interest in being a future landlord for any of the 
HAT tenants. It would, however, continue to have an interest in the HAT's activities as a 
consequence of its role as an enabler of housing provision and, more generally, due to the HAT's 
major role in the regeneration of the city. 
Tenants in the Liverpool HAT had the most traumatic and uncertain period of any of the three case 
study HATs; nevertheless, it would appear that they have keep faith with the HAT; although, 
equally, they would appear to have few other choices. Due to the uncertainty regarding the 
development programme and finding issues, including the necessity for private funding, the HAT's 
relation with its tenants was severely tested. Tenants had voted 
- 
or thougi t they had voted 
- 
to 
stay in their own homes and have their flats refurbished with the likelihood of retuning to the 
council afterwards. For most tenants, however, the probability is they will become HA tenants in 
low-rise dwellings. The changes came about gradually and both the HAT and tenants had been 
compelled to respond to forces and factors beyond their control or influence. Although the TA 
St ter was based on the Feasibility Study, the HAT had to re-negotiate the development 
proposals almost from first principles. Tenants were initially unsure and felt this was the start of a 
6' As this happened very late in the research period, it was not possible to explore its implications through 
the research interviews. 
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series of broken promises. Had the HAT appeared to be secretive, then there would have been 
greater mistrust and suspicion of hidden agendas. Providing information, consulting and involving 
tenants therefore reduced that sense of suspicion and helped build and retain support. Tenants 
seemed to have a fatalistic attitude and considered that whatever the HAT did, it was still better than 
the city council. 
Although the landlord choice ballots that had happened were strongly in favour of HAs irathix than 
the local authority, that choice will no longer be available for future ballots. Furthermore, as only 
tenants of refurbished high-rise have a legal right to return to the local authority, the volume of new 
build effectively means that most tenants will have to accept a HA as their landlord; for those 
tenants, the HAT has become a de facto privatisation. It also means that the HAT will be the most 
effective exit mechanism of the case study HATs. There had always been some doubt about the 
ability to return; a tenant (LHAT 10,1998), for example, stated: "The `right-to-return'? Well, 
everyone thought it was bit of a con anyway. ". This contrasts with Hullwhere a tenant (NHHAT 
12,1998) commented that the `any other landlord business' was a `con'. More positively, the 
Liverpool HAT has also had greater competition between prospective landlords that the other case 
study areas. In part, this was a famction of the number of existing and well-established HAS in the 
city due to encouragement of HAs and tenant co-operatives by the Liberal councils of the 1970s and 
the Government channelling funding through the Housing Corporation during the 1980s. 
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Chapter Eight 
CONCLUSIONS 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has presented a chronological narrative and commentary on the background, 
development and implementation of HAT policy, including three case studies. There were two 
research questions. The first focused on the impI mentation of HAT policy and, in particular, on 
understanding why HAT policy failed to be implenrated m the pilot areas and how it subsequently came 
to be implemented in oder areas. The second focused on the concept of choice and how it informed the 
development and implementation of HAT policy. This Chapter is in four parts. Each of the first two 
parts concentrates on one of the research questions. The third part discusses the legacy of HAT 
policy, while the final part provides an overall summary. 
8.1 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HAT POLICY 
Ths part addresses the first research question: `Why did HAT policy fail to be implana ted in the pilot 
HAT areas and haw and why was it subsequently implanarted in oder areas? '. Chapter Four discussed 
HAT policy and the failure of its irrpl an in the pilot HAT areas. Chapters Five, Six and Saum 
discussed the establishni it of HATs in three case study areas. As HATs failed to be established m the 
first seven areas proposed, it is necessary both to consider the factors that led to their establishma t in the 
twee case study areas and to analyse the implanaýtatian of HAT policy as a whole. This will be 
undertaken using Sababier & Maunarian's framework outlined in Chapter One and related to HAT policy 
in chapter Four. Table 8.1 gives a summary of the key elements dolle analysis. 
&1.1 CLEAR & CONSISTENT OBJECI'1VES 
Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) argued that clear and consistent legal objectives provided both a 
standard of evaluation and an important legal resource to implementing officials. For 
methodological reasons, they emphasised the importance of distinguishing the objectives contained 
in the legal documents (i. e., the statute) from both the political rhetoric surrounding policy 
formulation and what critics or evaluators might (mistakenly) perceive to be its objectives. In 
discussing the implementation of HAT policy, it is also necessary to be cognisant of the distinction 
between HAT policy as a whole (i. e., the HAT programme) and the features of the HATs 
established. 
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CONDITION ONE 
paar & emistua oysd[vss For HAT policy, the lack of apecfiia aims re g, im particular, the an & scale c (HAT 
pros : meant it was di c" to evaluate its success. 
For HATs four clear objectives ad out in dab" which ad out broad framework for HATS. 
Objectives broadly oca idamt, mutually supportive a id could be ptogieeaed mdapendedly. HAT 
pafaananoe was monitarod under each objective bot no targds ad by central Oov«nin 
. 
In all 
come study areas, the objectives ware achieved (Broabteas of objectives, however, means 
technically difficult to actually fail). 
CONDITIONTV. V 
Adegmb cmud t6sory Theory was dear. Theory was partially undermined by p moiltag rdum to local authority. 
Diffiaakto test in thatttam audt etest will be whdher (or how gWWy) estates revmt to farmer 
state aim HAT period ends. 
OONDMONTHREE 
Appropd is policy tsoh Asa vdhide fa miproving nmdavn estates, it was a very pawedW and feeble mslmmul. Broad 
ad Ipowas to take over 
, 
mm®e and improve local authority housing and, then to rdeaee Q to a 
variety of tanares and landlords. 
Adpoeotle ss aösgc 
7 
Specific delivery agmcias were aedcd which would idwrea try give the objectives high priority. 
system Pdi y reduced licks & veto points in the inplemmntation structure by bypassing local authorities & 
ith fewvelo paimis & adequate creating arm's la** Quango, smglepwpoas agencies. Incentives were funding for impzovementt 
IoosaQwd sasdloas for & trot Seem, while sanctions were no funds for impmvanait & coutmwRion of cdsting living 
oos4pisýw conditions. Underffiis condition. 9repravisioa of a faunal veto pmt for tmm4 was the Achilles 
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was issued bVIone ate s given siguifiosot disadion to operate wA do. their statutory objectives 
and subject to S 's veto, Primacy cooshadt was fm 
S. ducts. 'ass Resouroeadgmndmtmpolßical&Vpaak HATswareflsgdiipamfralGovammetprojectsand 
ware relatively weII-reecarced. Cats weaknesses in central control over resources which created 
impleme tatimproblematthelocal level. 
OOND]rMNFOUR 
Cossaitewa! & idlI of 9ksl. pwposs, hiaarddmUy Wgr#ed agmoy aoomWahle to Seaoatary cf States Harem 
implawasa eg adds board appointed bout Secretary of State subject to limited qualifiostiaos. Ca and and dull of 
inplem oim in xit" ova+oamiog impleamtation dMwkics while maidsionng m pat of 
two SMUPML 
OONDITIONFIVE 
Pein to sstsilsYn nt Unaatai ty due to fleadbiity mffitates agsrod tmeA/ mmaest group sappoR. Althoughmtandedto 
Supporte[-or aas osbaar bypas local a0 orkies, reoüs m dut local authority soppmt or benign neutrality was amential. 
-isrw+ast ýaegp lI ss Existence of a formal vdo point for tenants neunt proposals had to appeal to tenants and obtain 
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TABLE &1- THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HAT POLICY (SUMMARY) 
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The HAT programme 
The 1988 Act created enabling legislation with the designation of specific HATs under subordinate 
legislation. While HATs had specific legal objectives, the objectives of HAT policy were never set down 
in legislation, remain somewhat vague and can therefore only be discussed in terms of the ggeneral policy 
statements (e. g., the White Paper and the HAT discussion paper). Three general points can be made 
about the ` success' (or of wise) of HAT policy. First, although no precise statements were made about 
the proposed scale of the HAT prune, it is clear that it was not implemented on the scale originally 
implied. As only six HATs were ever established 
- 
the three case studies plus Castle Vale, Tower 
Hamlets and Stonebridde HATs 
- 
HAT policy failed to be bode Ridley's 'cutting edge' of the 
Goveirunent's urban regeneration drive and the `vital elect' of the Government's housing policies 
envisaged by the 1987 White Paper. In practice, therefore, HATs were marginal to the mainstream 
development of housing policy. Second, although conceived as a meins of privatising local au hority 
housing stock, during the legislative stage it dhangied fron its original formulation (i. e., it permitted a 
return to local audIority landlordship) in ways which reduced its effectiveness as an exit medhanism. 
Thrd, HATs were originally intended to be an exceptional response to conditions on the very worst 
estate. Despite consultants in the pilot HAT areas arguing that the programme would be ` more Coherent 
and logical' if confined to situations that were `an exceptional response to an exceptional situation' 
(PIGPMM, 1993, p. 58), the location of the HATs established owed more to a combination of local and 
political factors than to housing conditions. The Secretary of State had powers to permit a ballot of 
tenants in areas as he thought fit and more precise criteria, which m*t have limited his discretion, were 
never set out. In this respect, Hull undoubtedly benefited from being the first area to be established as a 
HAT. While there is less doubt about the areas in Waltham Forest and Liverpool meriting HAT status, 
HAT policy did not target the worst estates and the final HAT locations indicate the bottom-up influence 
on its is leinýacýtaüan. 
The HATS established 
HATs had four legal objectives: 
- 
housing improvement; housing management; encouraging 
diversity of tenure and landlords; and improvement of the area's living and social conditions and its 
general environmat. While broadly consistent and mutually supportive, the objectives could also 
be progressed independently. In the legislative stage, the relation between improvement and 
privatisation (i. e., exit) had been controversial and it had been speculated that improvanent was 
simply a means to enable privatisation. For reasons noted below, however, exit and improvement 
became uncoupled. As the Government did not tuen the legal objectives into precise targets, any 
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judgement of each HAT's success must be related to the local context and circumstances. ' Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven indicate that the case study HATs largely succeeded in achieving their legal 
objectives. Each HAT had effected significant change in its designated areas both in terms of 
managing and improving the housing and area. The objective of tenure and landlord diversification 
is more complex and requires further comment. Although established within an overall policy 
framework of demwricipalising local authority housing stock, rather than to privatise local authority 
housing, the legal objective was to introduce tenure diversity and `diversity in the identity of landlords of 
rented accommodation'. The distinction between HATs as an exit mechanism (i. e., as a means to 
privatise local authority housing stock) and HATs as a means of diversifying tenure/landlords in a 
given locality must therefore be recognised. Demwricipalisation of council housing would be achieved 
wheel or not a greater variety of landlords operated. As noted previously, permitting tenants to 
return to the local authority undermined HATs efficiency as exit mechanisms. Before the possibility 
of tenants returning to the local authority had been conceded, any HATs established would have 
resulted in a complete demunicipalisation of that housing stock. The ability to return to the local 
authority therefore opened up the possibility that there would degrees of demunieipalisation rather 
than a total demunicipalisation. LSVTs and ERCF transfers, by contrast, typically involve a 
collective transfer to a single exit destination (i. e., they simply transfer an estate from one landlord 
to another) and result in demwnicipalisation but not necessarily in a greater diversity of landlords. 
Furthermore, the choice both to exit and of the exit destination is a collective rather than an 
individual choice. By contrast, HATs offered a range 
- 
albeit a limited range 
- 
of exit destinations. 
As in most cases it is an individual choice, it also enhanced the possibility of achieving a greater 
diversity of landlords. Table &2 is a comparison of the various exit mechanisms. 
In 1997 a fifth objective was added relating to the sustainability of the HAT's work. HATs were 
expressly limited-life agencies and at some point would be wound up. As well as the physical 
changes, the sustainability of the HATs' impact would be dependant upon the capacity 
- 
both 
economic and political 
- 
built in local people and the institutional capacity generated in the area. In 
September 1998, the North Hull HAT came to the end of its operational life and was wound up in 
'Each HAT's performance was separately monitored against the statutory objects. During 1996, however, 
it was agreed that all HATs should report in the same way on 27 core performance measures. From 
1997/98 onwards, all HATs reported their progress against these measures in their annual reports. HATs 
have, however, been careful to point out that care should be taken in comparing data between different 
trusts and that "... even were the data is collected on the same basis, demographic and other local factors 
mean that it can be difficult to make direct, meaningful comparisons between different organisations. " (NHHAT, 1997/98 Annual Report. p. 49). For a number of reasons, it is extremely difficult to meaningfully 
compare the HATs against one another using these performance measures. Under the indicator of tenant 
involvement, for example, the Waltham Forest HAT gave a figure of 6% (approximately 100 tenants), 
North Hull HAT gave a Apre of 619 tenants (approximately 301A), vMe Liverpool gave a figure of 1676 
tenants (approximately 70%). The difference is more likely to be explained by different methods of 
calculation than by performance. Appendix A lists the performance measures. 
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initiation Individual or Tenant ballot Creates diversity Demunicip- 
Collective exit alisfidon 
RTB Individual 
tenant 
Individual Not necessary 
- 
Full 
Tenant's Tenant or new Individual or Yes, with No Full 
Choice landlord collective individoal veto 
HATs Central Individual or Yes to establish Yes Partial 
Government Collective HAT (in principle) 
(or local 
awwrity) 
ISVT Existing Collective Yes, without No Full 
landlord but individual veto (but limits on size 
requires co- of transfer to 
operation of single landlord) 
new landlord. 
ERCF Existing Collective Yes, without No Fall 
landlord but individual veto (but limits on size 
requires co- of treashr to 
operation of single landlord) 
new landlord. 
TABLE 8.2 
- 
COMPARISON OF DII+TýERENT EXIT MECHANISMS 
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March 1999. The HAT's main successor organisation is a CDT, Unity-in-Community. Harbour 
Farm is also a successor organisation 
- 
albeit as a TMO for NBHA rather than as a fully-fledged 
RSL. Although not due to end until 2001-2, by 1998 Waltham Forest HAT had undertaken a 
programme of `externalising' its major functions and was increasingly a `residual' body functioning 
as a monitoring agency and as a funding conduit. The HAT will therefore be able to withdraw with 
minimal impact on the local area. This exit strategy has also been put in place earlier in the HAT's 
life than at Hull; the advantage being that the new organisations (WFCBHA and O-Regen) will have 
time to mature while the HAT remains in existence. Due to the need for private funding, Liverpool 
HAT had to achieve its objectives by working in partnership with HAs, which 
- 
in contrast to the 
HAT 
- 
were not limited-fife agencies. The benefit, however, was that 
-- 
as an `enabling' HAT 
- 
it 
could more easily become a `residual' HAT and subsequently withdraw altoge her. Hence, while 
North Hull and Waltham Forest HATs had to create new orgnisatians, existing HAs were the 
Liverpool HAT's de facto successor organisations. 
&1.2 ADEQUATE CAUSAL THEORY 
Sabatier & Mannanian (1979) argued that policy interventions into porate an implicit theory about haw 
to effectuate social Change and pointed to the adequacy of the legal and policy levers given to 
implenstecs as a means of acting an the causal assunn lion and factors. As outlined in Table 4.6 and 
seal fron a particular ideological perspective, the original rationale for HAT policy was, first, there were 
nm-down local authority housing estates in which poor physical and awunnmgntal conditions interacted 
with social and econonic problems. Second, for political masons, local atdhoiities were diarging rents 
insufficient o enable the proper ntamtenance of the prgceities and the estate. Thiel, local authoaities were 
inevitably poor landlords and because there was no effiective Dompetition, they had few rocs ves to 
improve the quality of that servioq while that customs had no option but to accept the service as 
provided. Fourth, limited-life agenxres (i. e., a IHAT" would talge oder and marmw the estates tanporarily. 
At the same times it would rapidly effect a s4ificaat `bum around' in the estate's social, econonric and 
aLYMA mortal qualities using public and private funds, thereby, making it aäradive to a range of oder 
landlords and purchasers. Fib, having improved the properties, HATs would transfer diem to other (i. e., 
private) landlords who would have grater inou tives bath to manage the lousing `properly' (i. e., with a 
cocjumer ethos and is a prudent aoasnermal and bu in ss Lilie m er) and to charge ruts that would 
enable them to maw the long-wm asset value of the properties and the quality of the estate as a whole. 
Sixth, after disposing of its properties, the HAT would be wand up. Although, in the short-term, the 
validity of this theory cannot be ascertained, HATs were given sufficient and appropriate powers to put it 
into effect (i. e., powers to acquire local authority housi nage and improve it and release it to other 
landlords). 
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The policy also rested on two basic assumptions: that local authority were inherently poor housing 
managers (and implicitly therefore that private landlords were better landlords because they operated 
under market conditions and disciplines) and that tenants were greatly dissatisfied with local authority 
landlords and would welcome the opportunity to transfer to a better landlord. Even if they were not so 
dissatisfied with their housing services, it was also assumed tenants would vote for a HAT simply for 
funding for improvements to their housing, whidi together with the rent freeze provided incentives to 
support the policy. While these were incentives, the sanction was that if tenants or local authorities 
refused a HAT, no doer fiords would be made available. As discussed in Chapter Four, uncertainty 
surrounding HATs and tenants' lack of traut in the assurances and commitments made by the Government 
caused than to oppose and - where the opportunity preseled itself - veto the pilot HAT proposals. 
Tenants were not willing to exit into the unknown and needed a safety not whereby mir welfare would not 
drop below its existing level (i. e., the possibility of reaming to the staff quo ante - at least in terms of 
tenure 
- 
after the HAT). Furthertnom if tenants were to transfer to landlords other than the local 
authority, they needed to be offered what they regarded as a better deal than they would receive from 
local authority 
. 
With these assurances, they might be more willing to consider other options. Table 4.7 
outlined the changes from the Mark I `Ridley' to the Mark 11 `Waldegrave' HAT. Based on the HATs 
established at North Hull and Waltham Forest, a Mark III `Sir George Yaang' HAT can be added (Table 
8.3). Although the changes between Marks U and III were less significant than those between Marks I 
and II, they nevertheless increased certainty, added safeguards and were important in ensuring the HATs 
weit ahead. The principal changes were with regard to the certainty of the ability to retum2 and tann 
and local authority wilWngiess to accept that degree of certainty.; Furthermore, as the changes were 
through mimstenal assurances rather than legislation (with the subsequent exception of the right to return 
in the 1993 Acct), they illustrate the Sec rotary of State using the discretion available to him. One 
significant aspect ofthis discretion, which helped make HATs more at vve to local authorities, was the 
determination of the financial terms of transfe. In addition, although the d as further undermined 
HATs as a means of privatising local authority housin& this was a trade-off the Gova neat was 
prepared to make in order to ensure that (some) HATs want ahead. 
8.1.3 APPROPRIATE POLICY TOOLS & SUmCILNr RESOURCES 
Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979) emphasised particular aspects of the design of the policy, including 
2 The local authority agreed to accept tenants back, while the Government agreed that where tenants 
expressed awish to return to the local authority, the HAT would be directed to dispose of properties to the 
local authority. 
3 In this respect, it remains mystifying why tenants in Southwark chose to reject a HAT. Arguably it has to 
be seen in terms of the mood of opposition that had developed on the estate (i. e., tenants had made up their 
minds at an early stake that a HAT was not acceptable and t> er were reluctant to reconsider) and, 
second, that they were strongly influenced by the local authority's active opposition to a HAT. 
Significantly, LB Southwark's opposition was not based on the pre-ballot negotiations but on its reluctance 
to trust the (conservative) Government. 
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MARK IQ 
`SIR GEORGE YOUNG' 
North Hall HAT 
Wal ham Forest HAT 
Creation of a HAT 
Rest lk 
As Mack II 
AsMaskII 
Board 
. wsbenw As Muir It lit niiniduial u mwe 8ht 
couoaillms aad tmmta can makeup hvf of 
the plam en to baud (not äwhxhogthe 
cuir). All bond members Lave to be 
me aump" 
Tief fwý 
]Wt epdoat 
Pesibiäty "f. +dw 
aI. almom ty 
Trsu*rs of 
property to a HAT 
Traufen of 
property to LA 
from a HAT 
Mark 11 
AsMackII 
Mmistaial Assurance that if secure tenants 
want toratumtoLAthenHATmust 
dispose of properties in accordance with 
tents' wished. 
Fach LA agreed that if tenants wished to 
return than it would accept them back. 
Stabstory right to ream for secure tmmts 
established in 1993 
As. 
AsMukU 
As govcrmm oot had agreed to enable Los to 
rapivthue HAT propaetier, to 
procedures then rst bans world be a 
Ioc 
As Mark IL HAD have discretion/ 
s. c sd to leak private fing 
MARK IV 
'POST-PFI' 
Liverpool HAT 
(Castle Vale, Tower Hamleb 
& Sto rlife HATS) 
As Mark III 
As Mark M. Individual HATs (e. g., Castle 
Vale & Tower Hamlets) have negotiated 
rent increases with their tenants. 
As Mark III 
As Mark III 
As Mark III 
For rdinbished properties, statutory right to 
radon remains. 
For new build projects developed in 
pasUmAip with HAs, no statutory right to 
return for secure tenants. Given pro-ballot 
agreements contractual rights to return may 
be negotiated. 
As Mart III 
For rdiirbished properties as Mark III 
For now build properties, Seca of 
property beck to LA subject to n on 
on, price (At Liverpool, it was zero cost to 
LA). 
As consequence of PFI, HATs obliged to 
seek private funding. Haws, HATs need 
development partners (typically HAs). 
HAT provides rant to HAs to carry out 
development in rdum for nomination rights. 
HATS tharafore become more 'facilitative'. 
TABLE &3 
- 
MARK III & MARK IV HATS 
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appropriate policy tools and the need for sufficient resources. 
Appropriate policy tools 
Sabatier & Maunanian's framework emphasised the importance of selecting delivery agencies 
supportive of the new policy and who would give it high priority, and furthermore suggested the 
creation of new agencies as a specific strategy. The later was precisely what the HAT legislation 
did. Once established, HATs were a very flexible instrument, having both broad objectives and, as 
noted above, substantial powers to put the causal theory into effect. While there was significant 
hierarchical control up until establishment, once established the Government effectively changed to a 
'hands-off approach. Although the HAT legislation provided `room for manoeuvre' for the 
ministers and 
- 
in principle 
-- 
potential to act in a highly authoritarian manner, ministers chose not 
to use their powers of intervention and control over the HATs. The lack of Section 72 guidance, for 
example, reduced top-down diktat and enabled HATs to interpret directly from the legislation, 
giving din a large measure of autonomy to determine their own `style of operation' and respond 
flexibly to the local context. Provided they operated in pursuit of their statutory objectives and 
within their funding limits, HATs were permitted substantial discretion to respond to local contexts 
and opportunities. The primary limit on a HAT's discretion was therefore financial. 
Sufficient resources 
Although control of resources is a primary means of exerting hierarchical control, HATs were 
trusted to operate as responsible public bodies with an onus placed on them to justify their actions 
and costs (i. e., the Govern et was prepared to trust the body it had set up). The financial control 
was therefore similar to that for UDCs 
- 
which were also accountable to coral Government 
- 
and 
in contrast to EA projects, which were managed by local authorities and when budgets were tightly 
controlled. The HAT Corporate Plans were negotiated with the DoE's regional office, with 
approval effectively giving the Gove nmeat's consent to the HAT's activities. Funding for HATs 
was approved on an incremental basis, with HATs periodically required to bid for resources for 
certain periods of time (usually three years). The amount of funding to be provided was then 
determined by the Government and allocated each year. This year-by-year funding did, however, 
create implementation problems by making each HAT's finding stream appear precarious and 
plagued by uncertainty. Furthermore, it was not until 1996 that the HATs were given a measure of 
certainty regarding their lifetime costs. As noted below, the DoE may have been reluctant to 
provide an expected lifetime cost for the HAT programme until specifically required to by the 
Treasury. 
Although HATs wine flagship projects for central Gmemn*t and relatively wdl resourced, the 
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programme could not be an opon-onded commitment. The programme had been started with a broad 
budget but without specific costs or a calculation of its expected overall costs. Although estimates 
had been given in the various feasibility studies, in practice these proved to significantly underestimate the 
actual costs (reasons for this are suggested later). A tenable hypothesis is that, while the DoE was aware 
of the likely costs, it preferred - in the short term - not to let the Treasury to know the likely 
amount. It was therefore reluctant to calculate the overall cost until the HATs were properly 
established and the Government irreversibly committed to them. Sooner or later, however, the 
Treasury would need to know the magnitude of the Govemment's commitments in the HAT areas 
and m December 1996 (more than five years after the Yes vote at North Hull), the Government 
announced both the HAT programme's and each HAT's lifetime costs. The NAO (1997, p. 2) 
report on Waltham Forest HAT was particularly critical of the Government's failure to set lifetime 
grant-in-aid budgets at the start of the project. Under subsequent questioning from the House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts (1998) about its apparent laxity in the financial control of 
Waltham Forest HAT, the DoE argued that, although in principle the public funds available should 
be made dear at the start, it would wish for `flexibility' to "... vary the sums allocated up or 
down, in response to new evidence about a project's needs and in the light of its progress and 
performance. ". It also argued that this was particularly important for longer term projects "... 
where the full extent of the problea t to be ndd essed may not be known at the outset and where 
new options and opportunities for tackling these problemis emerge during a project's lame. ". 
Nevertheless, while the DoE's `hands-ate mana8em t was modelled on UDCs, there was less need for 
`flexibility' with regrd to HATs. UDCs undertook a wide range of activities and responded to 
opportunities as they arose and in response to 9uduating market conditions. For HATs, once the 
development programme was determined, expected costs could be calculated with greater certainty as 
muds of the work would be repetitive Beodnnark costs could therefore be established or detem m ed in 
advanee. ° Due to the repetitive nature and eommibnarts to 
- 
and subsequently tenants' expectations of 
- 
quaiity, there was also less flexibility for HATs to reduce costs once their devdopme it programmes were 
underway. By ooc arisen, UDCs could 
- 
if necessary 
- 
delay, modify or cancel projects without 
necessarily aäfeding their overall pt+q rnae. As noted in the case study Chapters, the uncertainty 
regarding finding caused imple neslaüon problems in each area. 
The life-time costs caps antwunced in December 1996 had a number of implications for all the 
HATs, including certainty in terms of the amount available and more explicit transfer of 
responsibility to HATs to work within their lifetime costs limit. While North Hull HAT has 
completed its work, both Waltham Forest and Liverpool HATs are jugging the number of secure 
4 Dne to the large number Of diiferent sites involved, proposition is less applicable to Liverpool. 
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tenants and possible return rates to the local authority in order to stay within their funding limits. In 
the latter case, the local authority's withdrawal from the landlord choice will simplify the HAT's 
task. At North Hull HAT, the funding shortfall meant that while the quality of work to the 
dwellings was maintained, the quality of environmental works was reduced. Transfers following 
tenants' landlord choices were also delayed and vacant properties sold as a means to earn capital 
receipts. Although the Waltham Forest HAT had initially been able to reject the option of private 
funding, the lifetime costs cap resulted in a temporary transfer, which yielded capital receipts at an 
earlier point in its life than would otherwise have happened. ' As was discussed in Chapter Seven, 
Liverpool HAT was affected not just by the life'-time costs exercise but also by the PH at a 
formative stage in its development programme. 
U. 4 COMMITMENT & SKILL OF IMPLEMENTERS 
Recognising their unavoidable discretion, Sabatier & Maananian (1979) argued that the commitment of 
implanelers to policy objectives and skill in utilising the available resources were critical. This 
condition is difficult both to isolate and assess, while the case studies did not provide explicit 
evidence on this condition. The salary level and incentives available in terms of job satisfaction 
would indicate that HATs would be able to attract appropriate and high-quality staff. The Secretary 
of State also had powers to attract and appoint appropriate people with relevant expertise, skill and 
commitment to the HAT board. Furthermore, given the nature of the challenge in each location and 
the progress made in terms of adrieving the statutory objectives, it can be inferred that the skill and 
commitment of the HAT board and the HAT staff was very important. This is particularly the can 
in Liverpool where, within its first years, the HAT was confronted with what appeared to be an 
insurmountable and intractable set of problems: 
- 
thirty-five different sites scattered over a city with 
no critical mass in any one area; housing conditions much worse than anticipated; projected funding 
levels between one-quarter and one-third of those estimated to be needed; a development progranime 
that tenants thought they had voted for but which was not practical or desirable given the housing 
conditions; the practicality of undertaking in-situ refurbishment in tenanted blocks and the long-term 
demand for social housing in the city, the need for large amounts of private finance and 
consequently private sector partners, which in turn changed the understanding of the tenants right to 
return; an ageing population with increasing demand for care facilities; etc., and all of these 
problems simultaneously combined with the new to retain support among tenants in the midst of 
change and uncertainty, at a time when they often wanted peace and quiet to live out the remainder 
of their lives. 
I In finding terms, sales to HAs at and of the HAT process can be regarded as being equivalent to HAs 
being development payers at an earlier stage. At Waltham Forest, the properties were constructed for an 
awe coot of about £86,000 but were transferred at a TMV of £30,000, which is equivalent to a grant rate 
of 66% 
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&l. 5 SUPPORT OF ENTEM&ST GROUPS & SOVEREIGNS 
Although the ballot provided the formal mechanism, as discussed m Chapter Four, this was the 
implanaýtaýian condition that laigelY explained the failure to establish HATs in the pilot HAT areas. 
Even without going to ballots, the Govnunart had decided to wit raw HAT proposals in four of the 
areas and prior to that in Huhne. The principal ißt groups we the local authority and the taants. 
Sabatier & Maanaman's framework also hi& lig 0 the need for support from policy sovet+ am (i. e., the 
Treasury, the DoE, and Governm rat ministers). The support of iiLat+ast groups and policy sovereigns was 
important at two staff in the impletnaýtatian of HAT policy prior to the establishme it of the HAT and 
than subsequently during the period of the HAT (i. e., their continuing support). 
Support prior to &. hM. 1 meat 
- 
target & interest groups 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the provision for a ballot of tenants in the HAT legislation introduced 
a formal veto point for target groups and was the Achilles' heel of the Government's initial attempts 
to establish HATs. The necessity of a Yes vote in a ballot meant that proposals had to appeal to 
target groups and could not simply be imposed. The Government therefore had to understand tenant 
(if not local authority) resistance and opposition to HATs, seek to overcome it through negotiation 
and accommodation of tenant priorities and preferences and, thereby, avoid the vetoing of the policy. 
Furdermore, although HATs were an attempt to bypass local authorities, the overarching lesson 
from Southwark was that HATs could not be established in a context of active local authority 
opposition. While in theory the process of implementing HATs need only involve central 
Government and tenants, positive support 
- 
or at least benign neutrality 
- 
from the local authority 
was essential; a factor also emphasised in the consultants' reports in the pilot HAT areas. As 
shown in the case st dy Chapters, the first three HATs established were characterised by 
pragmatism and expediency by ceclral Government, local authorities and tenants. in the successful 
HAT areas, local authorities sought or were offaýe'the possibility of a HAT subject to a ballot of tames 
and, in pri xiples there were two choices: - the choice by the local authority to entertain the possibility of a 
HAT and the choice by tenants to approve raker than veto a HAT. 
With a softening of the Government's rhetoric about HATs being imposed to remedy the 
shortcomings of local authoritiet, 6 local authorities became more willing to consider a HAT where it 
suited local agendas and priorities. Furthermore, with continuing restrictions on local authority 
6 This had begun to hsppem when Chas Fettee replaced Nick Ridley as Secretafy of State for the 
Environment in July 1989. 
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expenditure, the incentive of Government funding maintained the interest of (some) local 
authorities. ' Once the Government had involved the local authority in discussing the possibility of a 
HAT in its area, the initial choice (i. e., to enter negotiations about the possibility of a HAT) would 
be made by the council (or the ruling group within the council), which could reject it without putting 
it to tenants. Attracting a HAT to Hull was a local initiative as astute local politicians spotted and then 
acted on an opportunity. Although in Waltham Forest, the Government made an offer of a HAT as a 
response to its vetoing of a proposal for a voluntary transfer, as discussed in Chapter Six, the HAT can 
also be seen as a continuation of a local initiative. In Liverpool, although the local authority had not 
actively souglit a HAT, the idea was presented as a means of providing funding to improve some of its 
housing stock. Part of the local authority's choice in pursuing the possibility of a HAT was to 
influence where it was established. We at Waltham Forest and Hull, the estates were known from 
the outset, in Liverpool, the local authority had some discretion regarding the HAT's location. 
Table &4 summarises the background to the establishment of HATs in each of the case study areas. 
As the designation criteria were now precisely defined, is remained the Secretary of State's decision 
wliedw or not to allow HAT proposals to be developed to the ballot stage. Although the HAT feasibility 
studies were required to make a defensible case for designation, it can also be suggested that they had two 
additional objectives. The first was to obtain the C urrent's coal both to the possibility of a HAT 
and to the funding of that HAT. In both Hull and Iiveupod, the feasibility st dies were undertaken by the 
local authority and, in each case, the costs set out were significantly lower than the costs Wkly to be 
incurred in uridertaking the proposed redevelopment programne (see Table &5). A speculation is that, if 
the full costs had been known at the outset, the HATs would not have Sane ahead. Dozing the research 
interviews in Liverpool, for example, tenants suggested that the Fly Study had involved gnessing 
what would be acceptable to the Gomm At Waltham Forest, the feasibility study was by 
independent consultants and, fib, redevdcpn had been costed prior to the possibility of it 
being t taken by a HAT. The second objective was to help adieus a Yes vote in the ballot. As 
tenants had to consent to a HAT being established, it would have been counter-productive to recommend a
development programme to whidi they a** object. H the feasibility studies recommended in-situ 
refurbishments at Hull and Livverpool and redevelopment at Waltham Forest. If, as at Liverpool, the 
development programme proposed was not feasible, that was a problem to be dealt aloe the Govecnmerd 
was committed to the HAT (i. e., after the ballot). 'ibis does, however, imply collusion between local 
aidhorities, civil servants and perhaps politicians. The civil servants might be considered to be been 
either to see HATs being established or, more generally, to see local authority housing being improved. 
The subsequent description of HAT funding as `pots of gold' in Liverpool in November 1991, for 
example, was indicative oä the changing implementation context. 
' Tower Hamlets and Stonebridge HATS were also established as responses to situations where proposals 
for voluntary transfers had broken down. 
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As is suggested below, there may have been divisions within the Government between the DoE and 
the Treasury: the DoE wanting to use the funds for housing purpose, the Treasury for other 
purposes. Tenants at Waltham Forest, for mcample, suspect that there were some `radical' bureaucrats in 
the DoE who felt guilty at abandoning the previous sthanes and were therefore keen to see a HAT 
established there (WFHAT 17,1998). 
The decision by to s effectively collapsed two choices into one. The first was whether they waited 
their properties and living conditions improved, the second, whether - as a consequence of having that 
homes improved 
- 
they would be prepared to change landlords (at least targorarily). Related to the latter 
was the risk of losing their home as a consequence of, for example, reduced security of tenure, the 
irnprovana t process or the inability to pay higher rents. The response to both dioilces had to be positive 
for a HAT to SD ahead. In the pilot HAT areas, them was sufficient doubt and uncertainty for the answer 
to the second to be positive. The second thrice, however, gradually became less critical because the 
Govemunait permitted a return to the local authority. This was not an absolute right local authorities still 
had discretion to refuse to accept tenants, while the HAT did not have to dispose of properties in 
accordance with tenants' wishes. Thus, in the pre-HAT nepodations at Hull and Waltham Forest, the 
assurances required from the Coverimot were concerned with reducing uncertainty regard tenants' ri
ability to return to the local authority (i. e., assurances that the local authority would be one of the landlord 
Choices). As the subsequent assurances reduced the significance of the second choice, it became a more 
straightforward dxive rung whether tenants wanted that housing improved; hence, the popular 
saying in Hull that the council was only `lending' the properties to the HAT. The separation of exit issues 
from improvement effectively took the but out of the aactme sy about HATs. In allthree case study 
areas, once sufficient assurances about the ability to return had been given and as no other sources of 
finding for improvement were available, tenants effectively had little dioice but to accept a HAT. 
A fiuther fader in the Yes votes was a Swe al die in ooamcil twar1s' stitudea to transfers that had 
be-Sm to occur in the early 1990s. The nom radar in this shit, induded: 
- 
local autiaides initiating 
voluntary trams, whidi inducted taunt ballots; diäec+a c between assured and secure tenmxia 
narrowing as a Tent's Guarantee, was introduced and 
- 
whore tenants wee able to negotiate 
- 
some of 
the rj is of secure tenancies being given to assured tenants on a axtractual basis; and less uncertainty 
and concern about HAs as they be== e better known. In consequence, Forrest (1993, p. 42) noted that the 
period aller 1988 saw the "... prog same broddmmof wry nrsis ae to femme iraorcftr. , "' The use of 
9 Although transfers are oocuning, there we still instances of tenants voting against transfer. One such 
case was reported in Inside Housin¢ (16 October, 1998, p. 1), where tenants on ten estates in LB Tower 
Hamlets (including two of the pilot HAT estates) voted against plans to bander 2300 properties to the 
Cityside Housing & Ramon Community Association. While the result has to be respected as a 
statement of tenant preferences, there are few options for estates that vote No. 
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the word `arty' to qualify the degree of resistance is too evading but the g ral proposition is correct. 
Furdhamore, the tams `diversification' and `transfer' were wally used rater than the more anotivve 
`privatisation'. 
- 
sovereigns 
Given the choices made by local authorities and tenants, a third choice should also be discussed 
- 
the choice by the Government to persevere with a HAT programme despite its experience in the pilot 
HAT areas. Following the No votes in Sunderland (April 1990) and Southwark (October 1990), the 
Government could have abandoned the HAT programme. The negotiations by then occurring in 
Hull 
- 
which were still secret 
- 
and Waltham Forest could, for example, have been turned into EA 
projects. Nevertheless it chose not to abandon it, although it did announce that it would no longer 
select areas and, instead, invited local authorities to propose areas; local authorities proposing areas 
could be assumed to support the initiative. Hence, there was a significant change from a `coercive' 
(i. e., where HATs would be imposed) policy to a `permissive' (i. e., where local authorities could 
request a HAT be established in their area) policy, in fad, there had always been this permissive 
demerit but no local authority had taken up the opportunity. At this time, however, more 
fundamental changes were happening within the Government. During November 1990, there was a 
challenge to Margaret Thatcher's leadership and, in late November, she was replaced as Prime 
Minister by John Major. Thus, at this crucial point for the HAT programme, there was a significant 
change of policy sovereigns. 
Major's first cabinet resulted in Michael Heseitine becoming Secretary of State for the Fmiro nt for 
the second time. Heseltine's first spell at the DoE had seen the introduction of UDCs and the Stockbridge 
Village Project. In potent contrast to Nick Ridley, Heseltine favoured more interverrtionist projects. 
Hence, it can be speculated that H, eseltine saw HATs as a means of making things happen. ' At the same 
time, Sir George Young became housing minister. The appointment was greeted positively m the housing 
press: Inside Housma (7 December 1990, p. 2), for ale, conuneted Out Young had showed a `keen 
interest' in housing, was respected for his 'willingness to listen to people's concerns' and the appointment 
was "... one of the most welcome decisions in recent times ". It can therefore be reasonably surmised 
that both Heseltine and Young would be si pportive of a HAT programme. At this time, however, it was 
also speculated Out there were divisions within Govercunant with the Treasury seeking to abandon the 
HAT programme, while nrinAers and civil servants in the DoE wanted to retain the funding for housing 
Purposes and, since it had been allocated for HATS, it had to be spat an HATs. A Hull city councillor 
(NHHAT 13,1998) described the situation: "There i: - £500 million earmarked for HATS and tJ 
'o As noted in Cttiapmer Seaem. 'of example, Heeoltine vas 0beaquctly ii rwmntal in initiating a HAT in 
Liw p". 
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Treasury wood the money back Young knew it would be best to keep it for HATS because if it went 
back to the Trearury, it would be last to housing. ". Alder, to some extant, this helps explain why the 
Government continued with a HAT programme, it did not place din in a position of complete weakness 
in teams of negotiating with local authorities and tenants. Although tenants had a veto, so did the 
Government (i. e., it could refuse to progress events to a ballot) and both sides could use brinkmanship 
tactics. Hence, while tenants at Waltham Forest, for example, might consider that they had the DoE 
`over a barrel', the negotiations were not simply a win/lose situation with tenants winning and the 
DoE losing. If the situation had not had elements of win/win, the DoE would simply have broken 
off the negotiations. 
Following the political dam, the first Yes vote in a HAT ballot was achieved at Hull in April 1991 
with John Major as Prime Minister, Heseltine as Secretary of State and Young as housing minister. 
Following the vote in Hull, a more collaborative and negotiative approach to implementation was 
made official in July 1991. In issuing new guidelines, Young (CD, 10 July 1991, col. 960) declared 
that the Government was `anxious' to ensure that, where HATs were proposed, it was on the `basis 
of collaboration and partnership': "We do not want any of the adversarial politics that, sadly, were 
injected into some of the earlier proposals, mainly by people who were politically dogmatic and 
committed against HATS. ". Young (ibid, col. 957) also emphasised that future HAT schemes 
would be for areas that were `so severely run down and present such exceptional problems' that they 
were "... beyond the resources and capacity of the local authority, even with the support of the 
Estate Action and other programmes. ". The shift was also reflected in the Government again 
inviting approaches from local authorities willing to consider the establishment of a HAT in its area. 
confindng si port after eab"dam . 
- 
target groups & interest groups 
Local accountability of HATs had been an important issue in the committee stage discussions of the 
1988 Act and was frequently contrasted with the accountability of local authorities. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the New Right had been sceptical of the merits of political democracy. HATs, 
however, had to create new or adapt existing forms of local accountability and bottom-up input, 
involvematt and representation to ensure the continuing support of target and interest groups (see 
Table 84). Unlike some of the UDCs, HATs did not adopt an autocratic approach. Although the 
legislation permitted the possibility, those implementing the policy (both cerrtre and local) chose not 
- 
or did not need 
- 
to exploit it. Furthermore, in the pre-ballot agreements, various commitments 
and assurances had been given in respect of these issues. There was to be significant local authority 
and tenant representation on the HATs boards and all appointments had to be mutually acceptable 
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to the main interest groups. In each of the case studies, the initial board membership consisted of 
the chair and tea other members; half of which were local authority or tenant members. As noted in 
Chapter Four, the Opposition had tried unsuccessfully to have this board composition written into 
the legislation. In Waltham Forest, there were four estates and, hence, four TBMs and one local 
authority representative. No similar logic applied at Hull, where there were three local authority 
members and two RBMs (later increased to three). Coming slightly later than the first two HATs, 
Liverpool followed the Waltham Forest precedent by having four RBMs. As well as having more 
local authority members on the HAT board, Hull was further distinguished by those board members 
including prominent local politicians (i. e., the deputy council leader/chair of housing and the deputy 
chair of housing). Liverpool initially had prominent local politicians (the council leader and then the 
chair of housing) but subsequently it became a `back bench' councillor. As discussed in the case 
study Chapters, the HATs had varying relations with their local authorities. In Waltham Forest, the 
local authority largely left the HAT alone. At Liverpool, the local authority's relation with the HAT 
varied from positive engagement o almost total disen rent, culminating 
- 
after a charge of 
ruling group 
- 
with its withdrawal from the commitments made in the Joint Stateanent. At Hull, the 
council was very keen to exert control ovver/mflue oe within the HAT; Kam (1993, p. 86), for 
example, described it as a `local authority' HAT. Although this could be debated, it could not be 
applied to either the Liverpool or Waltham Forest HATs. 
During committee, the Government Witted HATs to creating tenant fora to provide a focus for 
conununic sting with tenants beyond representation on the HAT board. Although provisions were 
not included in the legislation, HATs were encouraged to establish structures to involve tenants. At 
Waltham Forest and Liverpool, the HAT inherited established and organised tenant groups, while 
consultation arrangements had been agreed during the pre-HAT negotiations. Fu t there, the more 
intensive and prolonged involvement of the ESGs and the HRTG in those negatialions meant they had 
both matured and becom more Sauaus and had earned the respect, rust and support of tenants. In 
both instances, the groups were subsequently integrated into the HAT's structure and its 
consultative mechanisms, allowing the HAT to communicate ffectively with target groups, to 
integrate their views into decision and policies and retain their support for the initiative. At Hull, the 
HAT did not start with similar advantages. It did, however, inherit a newly 
-founded RA and tried to 
introduced better channels of com unication through Neighbourhood Partnerships. In doing so, it 
meet with a constructive response from a group of tenants. Aim the subsequent structures and 
systems were better focused and more effective in communicating between tenants and the HAT, the 
opportunity for influencehad largely passed asmany of the major decisions had already been tak ri. 
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- 
savers 
Sabotier & Maunanian (1979) emphasised the need to maintain political support from the policy 
sovereigns. in late 1990, the Government had anno nced that it would no loW identify areas for 
inclusion in the HAT programme and invited local authorities to propose areas. Until 1993, following 
the establishment of the first three HATs, the Government indicated local authorities could consider 
the possibility of a HAT. As the level of resources available was limited, proposals would only be 
successful in exceptional circumstances (DoE, 1993b, s52). Two HAT ballots were held in 
March/April 1993 and resulted in Yes votes: the first at Castle Vale, east of Birmingham, and the 
second in the Bow neighbourhood of Tower Hamlets. " Following a ballot in March 1994, the sixth 
and final HAT was established at Stonebridge in July 1994. 
Although never officially ainounced, it is likely that the HAT programme was curtailed due to projections 
of the Wkly costs. HATs were perceived as a very expensive way of improving local authority housing 
(especially as there was no certainty that it would be released to the private sector). Given that public 
resources are scarce, there is inevitably cancan regarding for value for money and the opportunity cost of 
not using those funds for anod'ier purpose. The Government could exert control over the scale of the HAT 
programme both duough the allocation of funds to individual HATs and by restricting the number of 
HATS that migjit be established. The initial resource allocated for the HAT programme was £125 million 
over three years in six areas. While e xpectatians of private sector funding were never spelt out, this was - 
in retrospect 
-a very conservative estimate. The consultants' reports in Mardi 1989, for example, 
estimated that more than £600 million was needed in the same six areas. In 1996, the lifetime cost of the 
HAT p nme was capped at £1095 mil ion for six areas over thirteen years (see Table &2). 
Financial resources for the HATS that were established have already been discussed. Before date run g 
those lifetime costs, however, the Treasury had effectively limited the scale of the HAT programme. In 
this respect, the magnitude of the difference between the unit costs of public expenditure of the HAT 
programme and, for example, of the ERCF programme indicates the relative cost of the former. In 
admittedly crude fignucs, '2 about 17,000 properties were transferred to HATs and the overall cost of the 
programme was £1095 million (a unit cost of £65,000). thder the ERCF 
- 
if tenants voted to transfer 
- 
11 The HAT covered a different set of estates to those in the aborted pilot HAT area. 
'2 Due to the magnitude of the difference the calculation's crudeness does not invalidate the argument. 
Some of the factors that should also be considered, however, are: 
- 
first, HAT areas consisted entirely of 
poor quality stock rather than packaging better quality stock with poorer quality stock; second, HAT 
properties were ostensibly in poorer condition and a greater amount of demolition was required; third, 
HATS were a broader project and involved a more comprehensive range of regeneration issues; fourth, 
HATs were a central Government-sponsored flagship project and might therefore be expected to have a 
more generous funding regime; and ßäh, the ERCF dowry was expected to be the minimum necessary to 
facilitate transfers and new landlords wie also expected to raise funds to improve the dwellings (some 
might be SHG but more typically would be private funds 
- 
private finance would also serve to lower the 
unit cost in the HAT calculation). 
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63,000 units would be transferred at a total cost of £564 million (a unit cost of £9,000). The amount of 
funding required also made it politically difficult for the Govemmart to proclaim any `success' in the 
HAT programme because the level of finding would simultaneously demonstrate the finds needed to 
re acts certain parts of the local authority stoat. As HAT policy focused a large amount of resources 
on a relatively small number of estates, there was also some resertnat of the apparent `featherbedding' 
of HAT tenants and about HAT policy in equity terms, raising questions as to why some estates should be 
favoured by this flagship type policy. Nevertheless, a Liverpool HAT officer (LHAT 13,1998) argued 
timit, while civil servants appreciated HATs were eocpensivve "... their view is drat dose wre meant to be 
cramplas of how to do job properly. T yre looking to the Im "nn test of 25 to 30 years time 
and whether the FIAT process stcmcä that test of time. ". 
Mazmanian & Sabatier also noted that policies could be displaced or undermined by subsequent 
policies and programmes. Of the three exit mechanisms introduced in the mid- and late 1980s, 
Tenants' Choice and HATs were both unsuccessful as laige-scale exit medhrisms. Fewer than 1000 
dwellings transferred under Tenants' Choice before it was abandoned in 1995, while the six HATs 
established accounted for a transfer of fewer than 17000 dwellings 
- 
some of which could still return to 
the public sector. By contrast, by 1995,223,000 dwellings had transferred under voluntary transfers 
(Pearl, 1997, p. 176). Thus, as exit mechanisms for local authority housing, HATs were initially 
overshadowed by voluntary transfers but latterly and more particularly by the ERCF - which also 
combined housing improvement with an exit mechanism. The 1996 Housing Act also provided a 
further option for transfers by creating a new exit destination 
- 
the local housing company (LHC) 
- 
which would be a non-profit social landlord providing housing at affordable rents and raising 
private finance. LHCs would be directly sponsored by councils and would thereby offer greater 
accountability than HAs or LSVT associations (Titron, 1997, p.! ). The real successor to HATS, 
however, is the New Deal for Comm unities (NDC) (see below). 
8.1.6 STABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXTS 
For Sabatier & Mazmanian (1979), this condition recognised that changes in socio-economic 
conditions could blow a policy off-course or cause it to be curtailed altogather. Apart from the 
general ups and downs of the economy, the most significant external factor m the development of 
HAT policy was the PFI. Table 8.3 identifies a Mark N or Post PFI HAT 
- 
the final major 
development in HAT policy within the research period. Although the initial Mark I HAT had linked 
ent and improvanart, in the Mark II and Mark III HATs they were largely uncoupled. In the Mark 
IV HAT, with respect to new build properties, exit and unprovement were again re-coupled. Hence, 
if HATs are considered as emit medumsm, the PFI's el ßCt was 
- 
somewhat surprisingly 
- 
to blow 
the policy bads an course. At Hull and Waltham Forest, the development programme and the 
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landlord choice processes could be progressed separately. At Liverpool, as a consequence of the 
PFI, the HAT was obliged to seek private funding and needed development partners (typically HAs). 
The new development process involved HATs providing grant to HAs to carry out development in 
return for nomination rights. As discussed in Chapter Seven, this changed the status of tenants' 
ability to return to the local authority as the statutory right-to-return only applied to properties let 
under secure tenancies. While the HAT could afford to - and until the local authority withdrew 
from the landlord choice process 
-- 
a right to-return for tenants was respected as a moral obligation 
or commitment to tenants. The PH also meant that the later HATs (i. e., Liverpool onwards) differ 
from the initial HATs at North Hull and Waltham Forest: in general terms, the earlier HATs can be 
regarded as (more) `executive' and the later HATs as (more) 'facilitative'. The later HATs 
therefore had to operate through other agencies, which also affects the third condition of Sabatier & 
Mazmanian's framework regarding selecting delivery agencies supportive of the programme and 
introduces new links into the implementation chain. The Mark IV HAT therefore lost some of the 
implementation advantages of a dedicated delivery agency. 
8.1.7 CONCLUSION 
Despite the initial prognosis made in Chapter Four about HATs having favourable implementation 
prospects (see Table 4.7), HAT policy had a distinctly chequered implernalation. At one level, it dearly 
failed. It was rejected or awn in all of the pilot areas and HATS were subsequently established in 
only a 1Mal of areas. Nevertheless it was implanated in six areas and, to judge from the three case 
studies, those HATs have adrieved their statutory objectives. In the initial ünpi martatian phase, the 
Govvemmant had dearly not anticipated the degree of opposition that HAT policy provoked and 
opposition it had anticipated it intended to comnaýt rather than accommodate. The Thatcher 
Gove me is co fidence and its conviction approach enabled it to believe it was acing in the public 
interest and could tl fore override the ` selfish conoems' of interest groups and did not need to seek their 
support. Thus, rather than the support of interest groups, HAT policy initially relied upon force and 
compulsion. The hiemrdhic al imposition of HATs was, however, thwarted by local authorities and 
tenants. More particularly, it was thwarted by tenants' use of a formal veto paint that had been inserted at 
a late step into the legFslatxm. 
The potential for tenants to veto the establishma t of a HAT provoked belated reoogiiticn on the 
Govemmal's part of the need to negotiation and compromise. Negotiation and compromise duth 
impfen alatioq however, might improve the policy but equally ni&1 fatally distort it. The account of its 
implementation evecthdess affirms Barred & Hill's (1984, p. 22) observation that the inplanentadan of 
y policies: 
- 
represents cýompmnrises between confiding values (e g, between housing provision by 
local authorities and housing provision by edier suppliers); involves oonproauses with key interests 
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within the irrpl an sure (eg., local authorities); and involves compromises with key interests 
upon whom irrplan on will have an impact (e g, taints). Furdiemore, the implementation of HAT 
policy 
- 
and particularly whom it was implecrated 
- 
was the result of not just decisions made at the top 
but also dioices made at the batten. It was also evident in each of the case studies that neither local 
authorities nor tenants were committed to HAT policy per se and, instead, saw it simply as a means of 
improving poor quality housing, albeit with certain st rags attached. 
Although Sabatier & Mazmanian's emphasise the crucial role of legal structuring in shaping 
implementation, instead of being prescriptive and tightly-Constrained, the HAT legislation had a 
very loose and broad structure with 
- 
in principle 
- 
significant scope for ministerial discretion (and, 
subject to the minister's consent, discretion for other parties). The legislation both set broad 
objectives for and gave broad powers to a new quango. It did not, however, specify what would be 
done nor how it would be done. Furthermore, although considerable discretion remained with the 
Secretary of State, the absence of ministerial imposition on HATS in practice gave the implementers 
(i. e., the street level bureaucrats) considerable discretion to create the detail of the policy. The 
implementers could develop, propose and implement policy at the local level 
- 
often in consultation 
with tenants 
- 
within the broad framework of the legal objectives and subject to the Secretary of 
State's consent or 
- 
more precisely as detailed policy proposals tended to come from the bottom up 
- 
his veto. This essential flexibility also meant that the implementation of HAT policy was 
crucially reliant on the individuals concerned (i. e., the ministers and civil servants at the centre, the 
HAT board members and staff at the local level and various other actors and agencies that might be 
involved), principally limited by funding constraints. Thus, within the same legal structure, HATs 
could have operated in radically different ways (i. e., in ways detrimental to the expressed 
preferences of tenants and in accordance with the ways that had concerned Opposition MPs during 
the debate in the Houses of Parliament). 
While flexibility was a strength once HATs were established, it was a weakness prior to that, 
creating uncertainty and requiring target and other interest groups to trust the delivery agency 
(which prior to the ballot did not exist, although in most cases shadow HAT boards were 
established) and/or the agency backing the delivery agency (i. e., the Government in the person of the 
Secretary of State). Target groups would also need assurances about the possible involveinertt 
- 
or 
noninvolvement 
-- 
of certain third parties (i. e., private landlords and developers). Without trust 
there would be suspicion and a reluctance to support the ünpleinantation of the policy. Hance, 
where this trust did not exist (i. e., in the pilot HAT areas), target groups used the opportunity of a 
veto point to reject the HAT proposals. Given the positive experience of the areas where HATS 
have been established, however, the rejection of the pilot HATs can only be fully understood in the 
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context of the highly-charged political milieu of the late 1980s, the conviction and confidence of the 
Government of this period, tenants' reluctance to trust it and the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
HAT policy. By contrast, in the case study areas, during the pro-ballot period, sufficient trust was 
built up and/or assurances given to enable Yes votes. 13 The ballot also mean t that the subsequent 
HAT would have the benefit of a popular nmandate. The implementation of HAT policy therefore 
emphasises the need for policy-makers to be aware of and accurately anticipate the needs and 
preferences of target groups and to recognise and appreciate their fears and concerns. It also 
highlights the importance of building both local support for a policy or initiative and trust in the 
delivery agency prior to implementation. 
Before dosing this part, it is appropriate to briefly consider whether the analysis suggests the necessity for 
modifications to Sabatier & Maananian's fiamework. It should also be noted, however, that the 
framework was used as a means to an aid (i. e., to explore the implementation of HAT policy) rather than 
as an end in itself (i. e., to develop imI I ... theory). As shown in this Chapter, the framework does 
help to structure an explanation as to why the policy had its particular outcome and helps h4bligi t the 
salient factors. It therefore suggests that the existing framework is relatively robust and does not 
particularly suggest any modifications to the framework are necessary. Although it is the totality of the 
conditions flat is important (i. e., the implemerýtarion chain is as strong as the weakest link), the condition 
of support from targo and n to st grips was the most firn t single condition in the impleýnentati in 
of HAT policy. It must also be noted that Sabatier & Mazam Ian's framework is based on a prderaii e 
for a relatively tight legal structuring (i. e., a strong stab ute approach). As discussed above, the HAT 
legislation had a relatively loose structure and, indeed, relatively broad objectives and powers, which 
pumit a wide range of possible outcomes, in which the actions of individuals operating within the legal 
structure may be crucially impoftmt in determining the particular outcome. This factor may also explain 
why in the case of HAT policy Sabatier & Maananian's framework is useful in as a moans of structuring 
ejplanation bit is less reliable as a tool to predict the likelihood of eäective implecnantarian. 
8.2 HAT POLICY & THE CONCEPT OF CHOICE 
This pact addresses the second research question: 'How did the concept of choice inform the 
derveiopment and implementation of HAT policy? '. It is divided into the two main components of 
choice: 
- 
as an intended outcome of policy and as an demerit in the implementation of policy choice. 
A third section draws some mal conclusions. 
" While in Hull tuts bad to trust the local authority, in Waltham Forest and Liveipoal, tenants could 
trust the proposal warded by the existence of formal document (the TED and the joint Statement). 
26S 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
8.2.1 CHOICE AS A POLICY OBJECTIVE 
Chapter Three discussed housing policy in the 1980s. In accordance with New Right ideas, the 
primary emphasis was on the development of exit mechanisms for local authority housing beginning 
with RTB and subsequently supplemented by three other mechanisms: 
-- 
voluntary transfers; 
Tenants' Choice and HATs. Chapter Three outlined the experience of voluntary transfers and 
Tenants' Choice, while Chapters Four to Seven discussed HATs. In contrast to the other 
mechanisms, however, HATS had a dual purpose: not only were they an exit mechanism, they were 
also a means to improve run-down local authority housing. Chapter Four discussed the changes to 
HATs introduced during the legislative stage and, in particular, noted the change from the Mark Ito 
the Mark U. The two most significant changes were the ballot and the possibility of tenants 
returning to local authority landlordship. While these changes increased opportunities for tenant 
choice, they also reduced the effectiveness of HATs as an exit mechanism in two main ways: 
- 
sufficient tenants might vote against the establishment of a HAT and, even where HATs were 
established, some tenants might opt to return to the local authority. Nevertheless, once a ballot had 
been introduced, the possibility of tenants returning to the local authority increased the probability 
that some HATS might be established. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the exit mechanisms contained a somewhat limited notion of 
`choice'. By permitting transfers into 
- 
as well as out of 
- 
the council sector, choice could have 
been extended to all sectors of the rented market. HATs gave this choice at the point of exit (i. e., 
the landlord choice), when tenants had 
- 
in principle 
-a choice between the local authority and 
various other options. In each location, tenants' perceptions of the comparative strengths and 
weakness of different sectors would therefore be tested. Table &7 summarises the landlord choice 
in each location. 
It can be speculated that a series of interrelated factors were 
- 
or will be 
-- 
influential in individual 
landlord choice decisions. First, rat levels: Although their precise influence on tenants' decision is 
not known, the existence of the `level playing field' at Hull and the benchmark rent system at 
Liverpool are 
- 
in principle 
- 
important factors. 14 At Liverpool, a board paper justified the system 
because it created "... a greater degree of fairness in the landlord choice process and [placed] 
greater empharis on te quality of services and any value added elements offered by landlords.  
(LHAT February 1998). The systems, however, created a level playing field in respect of only one 
dimension of the landlord choice 
-- 
albeit an important dimension 
- 
and, furthermore, distorted that 
choice (in favour of the HAs). Nevertheless, rather than merely an opportunity for choice, they 
" There is scope for fiuther research to identify the precise reasons for tenants making particular landlord 
choices. 
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NORTH HULL WALTRAM FOREST LIVERPOOL 
Tenants Positive Negative very negative 
attitudes to local 
auhority 
m ugnmt 
HAT Lousing In-house HAT housing In-house HAT housing Mimsgiog agents in 9 areas (one 
management i ig with estate msm8emmt with estate offwa. m-haue team, 5 HAs and 2 
offices. Tenants could opt for Later transbated to WFCBHA private sector). 
trial msnagemat period with who ad as HATs m naj g Later mseaging agents in 2 areas 
HA VVast. 
-bob RAs. 
Landlord/ Tenure ballots at end of euch Tenure choice ballots for first Landlord choice ballots belbre 
tenure choice phase wih properties phases plumed to be after each devdopme pnjeok 
ballots tramf rring to new landlords. compktian ofeich phase 
In 1996 all trsnsfas postponed Initially postponed until 1999, 
until end of HAT. then postponed mdil 2000. 
Main ask `Protected' RTB `Protected' RIB `Protected' or `catitradtal' RTB 
options LA LA LA 
HA HA HA 
CBHA/IMO (Harbour Fama) WFCBHA 
Individual e TAB (for HAT property) Tenants lnomtive Sc erne Mobility lo ve Scheme 
opdom D1YSO Tenants Hom ter Scheme D1YSO 
Remb 'Level playing field' between No scheme 
- 
abmpt switch Hin g clients 
landlords from fromm reds itroduced is first 5 Lndlasd 
Choice ballots. 
Outcome ARmxieabdy 61% rette to Choice not made yet. Almost all tmots choosing to 
LA. 48% cfhousingin HAT WFCBHAin I- ierpos"im ttaosIertoRAs. 
am in LA ownership. LA witbdrewf om LimdL d 
Choice in 1996 
Successor Development Trust Deeeiopmeat Trust HAs 
mganbsösns CBHA (Harbour Finn 
- 
local CBHA 
TMO forNBHA) 
TABLE 8.7 
- 
EXIT OPTIONS 
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enhanced tenants' power of choice in the sense that making HA rents competitive with local 
authority re is was equivalent to giving financial resources to tenants. Waltham Forest HAT does 
not have a similar scheme. Second, standards of housing management and the experience of other 
housing managers and, in particular, the quality of local authority management vis-ä-vis 
alternatives. Due to the contracting out of housing management (Waltham Forest and Liverpool) 
and the trial management arrangements (Hull), tenants could experience housing management by a 
non-local authority landlord 
- 
who was a potential future landlord 
- 
without making an irreversible 
choice to transfer to that landlord. If the housing management was not satisfactory, there was 
- 
in 
principle 
- 
the safety net option of returning to the local authority. The experience also increased 
tenants' information about the consequences of their landlord choice and would thereby enable a 
more informed choice of future landlord. Third, the length of time spent away from the local 
authority. As time passes, HAT management becomes the norm and the memory of local authority 
management recedes, making the local authority as much an unknown quality as some of the other 
management options. Hence, another factor might be the length of time away from the local 
authority. Due to the nature of the developmett programme, at Wal ham Forest and Liverpool most 
tenants will have a longer period away from local authority control than in Hull. At Waltham Forest, for 
example, prior to the landlord choice, tenants will have spent almost ten years away from the local 
authority. Fourth, changes in the local authority's housing services during the period of the HAT. 
Although the return to the local authority at the end of the HAT is 
- 
in principle 
-a return to the 
status quo ante, the local authority that tenants return to may be significantly different from the one 
they left in the early 1990s: tenants' direct experience of local authority management would also be 
frozen at the point of transfer to the HAT. With the prospect of an LHC 
- 
and until the local 
authority withdrew from landlord choice 
- 
this was the emerging situation at Liverpool. In 
Waltham Forest, the local authority has contracted out its housing management, while voluntary 
transfers within the borough are also possible. Finally, a range of other factors could also assume 
greater or lesser importance, such as the degree of tnist in the new landlords and factors such as 
differences between secure and assured tenancies. 
The efficacy of the landlord Choice is dependant on competition between providers/suppliers. The 
actual choice available for tenants was therefore d®penda t on the char introduced in the 1988 
and 1989 As (and subsequent legislation and policy initiatives) to create bode competition between 
landlords and opportunities for new landlords to emcee. The me of choice at each case study 
location, however, was limited (not last because the HATs vetted all potential landlords). At Hull, the 
choice was betwm the local authority and two HAs. At Waltham Forest, it is likely to be between the 
local authority, the WFCBHA and possibly amt her HA in each location, the HAT's support for 
WFCBHA and Harbour Farn was important in creaft dice for tmxft. At Iiverpod, cue to 
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competition between HAs to become the preferred HA in the final landlord choice, there was greater 
competition than in the other two case study locations. Until the local authority withdrew, however, the 
final landlord choice was between the local authority and an HA. Fiudamore, in each location, and as 
in each of the other exit mechanisms, the landlord choice was a one-off and irreversible choice. 
The landlord choice ballots that had occurred in each location were discussed in the case study 
Chapters. Given that the rented accommodation on each of the HAT estates was previously entirely 
in local authority tenure, the diversity of landlords will inevitably increase. Although the dominant 
tendency at Hull was for tenants to return to local authority control (80% of landlord choices) and 
nearly two-thirds of the properties transferred to the HAT subsequently retuned to the local 
authority, at the end of the HAT local authority-owned properties comprised only 48% of those in 
the HAT area (see Table 5 
. 
3). 15 In Liverpool (due initially to the PH and subsequently to the local 
authority withdrawing from the landlord choice) 
- 
and perhaps also in Waltham Forest 
-- 
there is 
likely to be substantial demunicipalisation. At Waltham Forest and Liverpool, rather than a 
compulsory exit, this will be the aggregate of (mostly) individual voluntary choices by tenants. An 
apparent irony is that despite the right to return having been an important issue, tenants in these 
locations are likely to choose to move to HAs (in Liverpool, due to the local authority withdrawing 
from the landlord choice, the choice with respect to new build accommodation will be between 
different HAs). In all cases, however, the choices provided were exclusively for those tenants who 
had been secure tenants at the time of the HAT ballot; there was very little choice for those who 
would (or might) have become local authority tenants on the HAT estates. 
8.2.2 CHOICE AS AN ELEMENT IN THE DRUM ENTATION OF POLICY 
As shown in the case study Chapters, there were various choices for tenants in the implemecrtatian 
of HAT policy (primarily, but not exclusively, related to the developmett programme). The most 
fundamental choice, however, was the ballot. Although, as has been shown in this thesis, HAT policy 
progressed through four distinct models, the most significant changes were those from Mark I to 
Mark II. The Mark II HAT permitted a tenant veto on the establishment of a HAT and the 
possibility that the landlord choice would include an option to return to the local authority 
- 
provided the local authority was both willing and able to pur&m the properties (and the HAT was 
willing to sell it the properties). By the Mark III HAT, tenants had further assurances and 
subsequently a legal right to return to the local authority. 
The possibility of tenants retuning to the local authority had tree major implications. First, the 
" Theoe are the HAT's figures and include the develo is und er in 
p 
ship with HAs scjaoent to 
- 
rather than within 
- 
the HAT area. 
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choice whether to go into a HAT would no longer be a coerced choice in the terms defined in 
Chapter One because tenants' welfare would either stay the same (i. e., a return to the status quo 
ante) or increase (a transfer to a superior landlord). A safety net was thereby created for tenants; 
without which it was unlikely that tenants would consent to a HAT. Second, the transfer to a HAT 
was no longer necessarily a de facto exit from the public sector and, in principle, the necessity for 
tenants to have a ballot to approve or veto a HAT became less important. Third, it reduced the 
controversy over tenure issues and meant that, as discussed previously, the choice in the ballot 
would be whether tenants wanted their homes and estates improved rather than whether they wanted 
them improved and privatised. Thus, as housing tenure issues were separated from housing 
improvement issues, it largely took the heat out of the controversy about HAT policy. HATs could 
thereafter be considered as examples of housing improvement (i. e., neighbourhood revitalisation) at 
the and of which tenants could return to the local authority or transfer to a range of other landlords 
or exercise RTB. 
Although once the ability to return to the local authority had been conceded, a ballot was no longer 
strictly necessary, it was fundamental to the subsequent development of HAT policy. By giving 
tenants a (collective) opportunity to veto a HAT, it sanctioned bottom-up discretion by the target 
group. As HATS could only be established with the popular support of target groups, tenant 
representatives were empowered to negotiate a `deal'. Furthermore, while they could be 
outmanoeuvred, out-negotiated or out-powered, if that deal was not acceptable to tenants, then the 
HAT would be vetoed. Provided parties negotiated in good faith, the desire or necessity of avoiding 
a tenant veto placed an onus on all parties to negotiate a deal that would be acceptable to all parties. 
The assurances given to (secure) tenants also meant that they would be stakeholders in the 
subsequent HAT. At Waltham Forest, for example, all secure tenants would be rehoused in the 
new development and, hence, they were protected from the threat of displacement. 
As noted in Chapter One, a ballot is only One of the stages of a collective choice and invdva t at 
the pro-ballot stages gives greater scope to effect a more desirable outcome. lt was important, 
therefore, that tenants could negotiate the details of that package (i. e., not just Yes or No but also 
the nature of the proposed HAT). At Hull, tenants were excluded from the first and second stages 
(i. e., agenda setting and negotiation) and were only involved in the third (the vote). Hance, they 
were relatively powerless to influence the nature of the HAT prior to the band and their dioice was 
either to accept the HAT as offered or to veto it. "' At Waltham Forest and Liverpool, tenant 
16 This was more significant in theory than in practice. Assurances regarding the ability to return to the 
local authority combined with the strong possibility that it would be a Labour council in Hull when 
landlord choice did occur, meant tenants had little to lose by voting in ftvm of a HAT. 
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representatives were directly involved in negotiations. Issues likely to provide grounds for 
opposition (and, thereby, increase the probability of a veto) could be identified and fed into the 
negotiation process. What was perhaps more unusual was the Government's willingness to 
negotiate, which contrasted with the situation in some of the pilot HAT areas and at Hulme, where 
tenants felt they were in the `lap of the gods' and decision-making power could not be `inquired of, 
challenged, or reasoned with' (Shaughnessy, 1989, p. 350). Tenant involvement, however, had 
different outcomes: in Waltham Forest, it resulted in tenants having a strong sense of ownership of 
the HAT, while at Liverpool a culture of `them-&-us' continued. At both locations, the negotiations 
resulted in formal documents -- the TED and the Joint Statement - that increased certainty for tenants 
and overcame the chi&en-&-egg problem that had arisen in the pilot HAT areas. While neither 
immutable nor legally-binding, they helped establish the nature of the subsequent HAT. Thus, although 
the provision for a ballot created the possibility -- and therefore increased the risk - of tenants using 
it to veto HAT proposals, the ensuing pre-ballot negotiations both improved the policy and increased 
the possibility of effective implementation once the HAT was established. 
&2.3 CONCLUSION 
Chapter One distinguished between choice as an integral element in the implementation of a policy 
(i. e., permitted discretion, which in the case of HAT policy refers to such issues as the tenant ballot 
and choice about the devedopment/improvemont programme) and choice as an intended outcome of a 
policy (i. e., consumers in a market, which in the case of HAT policy refers to the landlord choice). 
As discussed in Chapter Four, during discussion of the ballot and in order to highlight the 
Government's inconsistency, the Opposition had focused on the issue of dwice. 1he apparent 
inconsistency was that while the Government claimed to be increasing choice for tenants, it also 
appeared to be denying them a specific choice. Interpretation depends on what is mewt by the term 
choice: the ballot gave tenants discretion within the implementation of the policy, the choice referred 
to by the Government was an objective of the policy (i. e., to get tenants to a position where they 
would exercise markt choices). In this respect, thane was an iitheru tc lradicticn in the initial deli i 
of HAT policy because the Thatcher Govemmet was selective in its application of the concept of choice. 
While it sought to give tenants choice once the prog une had been implemented, it was reluctant to pgive 
tenants a choice that might obstruct or frustrate the implementation of the policy. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the Thatcher Govesnme t considered liiere were fwidamantal and structural defects 
in the council housing sector and souk radical refoun p tenants choice in the 
implementation might prevent that reform from occurring. Thus, in its original design and 
- 
if 
necessary 
- 
HATs coWd be imposed on recalcitrant tenants and local authorities and was therefore 
both authoritarian and paternalistic. Nevertheless, by enabling (or compelling) tenants to become 
market actors, they would have deice (i. e., the liberty, if not the power, of choice) in the 1onger 
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term. Whether it was a choice that tenants wanted or not was immaterial because the Government 
considered it was good for than because, for example, it would relieve them of their supposed 
dependency on the welfare state. Hence, as noted in Chapter Four, in July 1988 Ridley (from 
Ginsburg, 1989, p. 72) had argued "... if you are trying to help somebody 
... 
you don't want them 
to vote against that being done. ". It is nevertheless somewhat ironic that, in a Bill purporting to 
increase choice for tenants, the ballot 
- 
which had not been part of the proposed legislation 
- 
was 
crucially important in enabling discretion and choice for tenants and in creating the conditions of 
sufficient certainty and trust that ultimately allowed tenants to support the implementation of the 
policy (albeit in a modified form). 
8.3 THE LEGACY OF HAT POLICY 
Although there were expectations that HATs could be established in every town and city, the 
original scale of the HAT programme was never made public. After the failure of the pilot HAT 
areas, it was evident that only a few HATs would be established and that they would be 
experimental. The primary objectives of HATs were housing improvement and exit. Although 
neighbourhood repc ation issues have been referred to, this thesis has concentrated primarily on 
housing (tenure) issues. In so far as it was about housing, HAT policy was primarily directed at 
issues of housing tenure and it was the exit issues that attracted most criticism. Once the tenure 
issue had been neutralised by assurances about the right to return, HAT practice was less 
ideologically-charged: that somsthing needed to be done to improve conditions was accepted by atü 
parties. Thus, although their significance with regard to housing policy is marginal, AATs have 
become important examples of housing-led regeneration. As a result, the lessons HAT practice 
offers are primarily with regard to (housingled) regeneration rathir to housing. During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the main programme for housing led regeneration remained EA. During the 
early 1990s, there was also a move towards multi-agency and holistic approaches to neighbourhood 
regeneration as embodied in the City Challenge initiative launched in 1991 and the SRB Challenge 
Fund (SRBCF) launched in 1994; both of which offered the possibility of resources for housing-led 
or neighbourhood regerieration. l' The integration of EA into the SRB in 1994 most that, there was 
no longer an initiative dedicated to housing led regeneration, although both City Challenge and the 
SRBCF permitted schemes similar to EA. The emergence of the ERCF in December 1995 
permitted housing regeneration programmes integrated with frs to RSLs. 
" The refiubishment and redwelapweut of Holme, fair eocsmple, W binded under City Challenge; while 
the refurbishment and redevelopment of the Gloucester Gram and North Pam eetnet wao ßmWed 
under the SRBCF. 
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HATs have also provided an indirect lead to HAs developing Housing Plus (HP) initiatives. 
Formally launched in February 1995, HP is defined by the Housing Corporation (1997, from Evans, 
1998, p. 715) as "... an approach to management and development which consists of the creation 
and maintenance of sustainable social housing, obtaining added value from housing management 
and investment and building partnerships with stakeholders. ". Concern for HP arose because of 
the problems of poverty and social exclusion experienced by growing numbers of social housing 
tenants. As a result, social housing landlords were increasingly being encouraged 
- 
and 
simultaneously realising that it was in their own interests 
- 
to address these wider problems. As 
HATs saw themselves as housing led region agencies, HP type activities were an integral part 
of their role rather than being additional to it. HAs 
- 
with some notable exceptions 
- 
have 
traditionally seen themselves as housing providers and managers and, hence, HP is something 
additional to their usual role. 
For most of the 1990s, apart from ERCF (which was only a partial successor), it seemed HATs 
would have no direct policy successor. The new Labour Government, however, announced its 
intention to abolish ERCF. In a statement on housing and regeneration policy, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, John Prescott (1998, p. 3) outlined the new Government's intention to continue many of its 
predecessor's policies, including encouraging local authorities to separate their strategic and housing 
management functions by transferring housing stock to RSLs. The Government did not, however, 
intend to retain the ERCF because, if transfer was the best option and the stock had a negative 
value, it expected local authorities to use their capital receipts under HIP to cover this. It did note, 
however, that ERCF-type transfers could form part of packs within a new initiative 
- 
the New 
Deal for Communities (NDC). Announced in the late summer of 1998, the NDC is the initiative 
that effectively supersedes HATs. '8 The programme's aim was to offer `intensive help' to the most 
deprived neighbourhoods by bringing together regeneration and housing programmes at the local 
level, enhancing economic and employment opportunities and offering better neighbourhood 
management. Furthermore, Prescott (ibid, p. 7) stressed HATs had "... pioneered the approach of 
seeking to tackle the wider social and economic problems of deprivved neighbourhoods at the same 
time as improving the quality of the housing stock 
- 
an approach which will now be further 
developed under the New Deal for Communities Programme. ". 19 
If HATs are seen as mechanisms for neighbourhood regeneration, there are distinct parallels 
is It supersedes HATs as a mechanism for neighbourhood regeneration rather than as an exit mechanism. 
The NDC guidance took a relaxed view of tenure change, stating it might be considered where it provided 
an opportunity to raise funds outside public expenditure control. 1' Although Prescott rthrred to HATs in general, it is likely that it was the Walt1am Forest and Castle 
Vale HATS that were intended to be the main precedents. 
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between HAT practice and the proposals for NDC (see Table 8.8). The Government pledged that 
the NDC (DETR, 1998, p. 10) would: 
- 
be neighbourhood-based (tenure did not matter provided the 
housing formed a recognisable neighbourhood); work through local partnerships and promote and 
sustain community involvement; be delivered on the ground by a dedicated team; reward success; 
bring together other key national, regional and local services; and work in combination with other 
initiatives. The initiative would be `flexible and very local', with `complete flexibility' on what 
programmes could cover. The guidance (ibid, p. 11) therefore gave considerable discretion to local 
interests and stated that there were `no right or wrong answers' about what should be covered and 
that each neighbourhood had its `own particular problems that demand their own solutions'. The 
following were listed as a `guide to the lind of suggestions' that might be included in successful 
bids: 
- 
improving access to training, basic skills 8t employment opportunities; housing improvement 
(including improved managene t); 20 neighbourhood management; encouraging local enterprise; 
crime & drugs; education; health; access to services; families, young people & children; access to 
information; and community building (ibid, 1998, p. 11-1). The generalised experience of the case 
study HATs provides guidance to NDC partnerships in each of these areas. Seventeen areas were 
invited to be Pathfinders, including Hull and Liverpool. As well as local authorities, other bodies 
including HAs, the private sector and the voluntary organisations could lead regeneration 
programmes. 
8.4 CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
This thesis has shown how HAT policy was transfonned fluvj& its implem on and remade as a 
consequence of both top-dawn and beftwrup processes. Despite the changes and althomo the balance 
betwe HATs as exit and HATs as housing improvem t mechanisms has changed, it is 
recognisably the same policy. In its early versions, HATs had been anath na to the Labour patty and to 
many local authorities. By the late 1990s, however, HATs were being extolled by New Labour. 
Although, in part, the new Labour Govemmant has ` cherry picked' those aspects of HAT practice which 
have both been successful and suit its ideological priorities, between 1987 and 1998 other factors 
changed, including the general oaite kt for local authority housing with transoms of local authority housing 
to HAs becoming rune rather than exceptional events 21 HATs had also become primarily examples of 
neig bouzizood regeneration rather than housing privatisation. 
20 Under NDC, there was recognition that, in some cases, the only option might be to demolish some 
21 While developing their st begic and enabling role, moat aitborities have nought to continue as direct providers 
of saivioas such as housing Many audxci ies have therein e only been interested in the of housing (to 
LSVTs or LHCs) in so far as it presents as seam of a tm ing investment to meet priority housing needs (Z. tnm, 
1997, p. 27). 
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HOUSING ACTION TRUSTS NEW DEAL FOR 
(generalised experience ofNorth Hull, COMMUNITIES 
Waltham Font & Liverpool HATS) 
Establishment By negotiation between central and Invitation from central government to 
local government, subject o ballot of locality to put forward proposal. 
tenants. 
Approach Housing led neighbourhood Neighbourhood regeneration (holistic) 
regeneration (holistic) 
Management Board & delivery agency (quango). Partnership board & delivery agency 
Arm's length government agency. (similar to City Challenge & SRBCF) 
HATs have great deal of autonomy to 
achieve statutory objectives. 
Size North Hull 
- 
2100 dwellings 1000-4000 dwellings 
Waltham Forest 
- 
2400 dwellings 
Liverpool 
- 
5500 dwellings 
Funding Initially 100% government funding less Government core funding plus other 
subsequent capital receipts from sales. public and/or private funding. Amounts 
Poet PFI, private funding required. to vary in range £20.50 million. 
North Hull HAT 
- 
£115 million 
Waltham Forest 
- 
£227 million 
Liverpool 
- 
£260 million 
Lifespan As necessary Expectation 10 years with principal 
North Hull 
-7 years capital funding in first 5 years. 
Waltham Forest 
-11 years 
Liverpool 
-12 years 
Tenure Encourage diversification No details 
Exit Strategy Developed by each HAT. HATs are Clear exit strategy required from outset 
themselves becoming residual agencies 
with roles as funding conduits and for 
monitoring and quality control. 
TABLE &8 
- 
COMPARISON OF HATS & NEW DEAL FOR COAMUNiTIES 
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This thesis has also outlined the progression through four distinct models fron the Mark I Ridley HAT to 
the Mark N Post-PFI HAT. The most significant changes were those from Mark I to Mark II4 which 
included the tenant ballot and the possibility of tenants retuning to the local authority. In the Mark I 
HAT, tenants' choices were highly constrained; the HAT would be imposed upon thorn and they would 
have a cl ce of private sector landlords at the end of the HAT (i. e., all the choices were dirt forms of 
demunicipalisation). Exit and improvement were therefore coupled. During the legislative stage, as a 
result of opposition to the Mark I proposals, the Govercunont began to modify its policy and the Mark II 
HAT permitted tenant dioice in terms of whether HATs were established and the possibility that landlord 
choice would include an option to return to the local authority 
. 
Tenants therefore had choice at two 
crucial stages: 
- 
the (collective) choice to establish a HAT (and 
- 
in principle 
- 
through the power to veto 
it, to negotiate on the nature of the HAT) and (mostly) individual landlord choices, including the 
possibility of returning to the local authority. Exit and improvement were therefore uncoupled. 
Opposition by local authorities and tenants during the implemetrtatian phase, combined with the 
Government's inability to implement HATs in any of the pilot areas and the necessity of securing popular 
support among target groups resulted in the adoption of a more negotiative and conciliatory approach to 
implementation. Despite this diacge, HAT proposals were still vetoed in the two pilot HAT areas that 
went to ballot. By the Mark III HAT, tenants had further assurances and subsequently a legal right to 
return to the local authority. The important aspect of the landlord choice was that, if other options were 
not perceived to be superior, taunts could return to the status quo ante. In principle, the choice was a 
voluntary choice because their welfare (relative to their pro-HAT status) would eidhec increase or remain 
the same. Exit and unprovatnerot were therefore fuhr uncoupled; HATs would result in housing 
improvenerrt and might 
- 
and equally migjt not 
- 
result in a danunicipalisatian. Furthermore, alder 
the ballot raised the possibility of a veto by target groups, a Yes vote Save the arsuing HAT the benefit of 
a popular mandate and increased the probability of effective irrpl an. In the Mark IV HAT, by 
whidi point all the HATs that were likely to be established had been established, the situation diargad 
again. The necessity of obtain g private finance and partnership anqpmou with HAs charged the 
conditions of the right to return and meat that only taints of refurbished properties would have a le al 
right to return. Due to convnitma its made in pro-ballot agreements, `moral' rights and, where negotiated, 
contractual rights to return to the local authority might also exist. With respect to new build, exit and 
improvement were therefore re-coupled. 
This account of the implementation of HAT policy has demonstrated inter alia that while policies 
might be structured to provide a broad framework and flexibility for those at the top 
- 
and, in turn, 
flexibility for implementers to make the detail of policies within the framework 
- 
it has also 
highlighted the importance of building both local support for a policy or initiaüve and trust in the delivery 
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agency prior to irrpl an because the potential flexibility for the irrplan tens can equate to 
uncertainty and mistrust target groups. Support for a policy can be enhanced by p8 target 
groups opportunities to exercise choice and discretion in the development and iI-- Cation of that 
policy. A ballot requires policy makers to be aware of and accurately anticipate the needs and pre(u saes 
of target groups, while also recognising and appreciating their fears and concerns. Althot policies can 
be imposed, that is unlikely to harness the energy and cmmritinert of target groups and may simply lead 
to resentment, producing fiuther obstacles to effective implementation. 
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Appendix A 
COMMENTARY ON 
RESEARCH INTERVIEWS 
A. 0 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter Two, this thesis used a case study method. Two principal data collection 
techniques were utilised: 
- 
documentation and interviews. The primary purpose of the research 
interviews was to enable the researcher to `get closer' to those implementing the policy and the tauet 
groups and, as well as to gadw new information, to variously supplement, develop, understand and 
appreciate the information contained in the documentation. Throughout the irrterviews, much of the 
research effort was devoted to piecing together, understanding and subsequently explaining the 
`story' of the development and implementation of HAT policy and, hence, that `story' constitutes the 
research data. The interview programme had three elements: two sets of interviews with a raffe of 
differont actors and a final set of discussions with key informants. The first set of interviews was 
undertaken during 1994/95 and the second during 1997/98. Each interview lasted a minimum of one hour 
and frequently longer. As the final element in the process, the draft case study reports were reviewed by 
and discussed with key informants (in each case, a HAT officer) in each location during 
October/November 1998. The key infonnants also circulated the drafts to other actors, whose comments 
were fed into the discussion. This appendix provides a more detailed commentary and reflection on the 
research interviews. 
A. 1 THE FIRST SET OF INTERVIEWS 
In accordance with the qualitative research methods literature reviewed in Chapter Two, the research for 
this thesis was of an `unfolding' nature (Miles & Hubenman 1994; Punch, 1998). The first set of 
interviews was therefore intended to be exploratory and information gathering and, while there were 
certain issues of particular importance, the interviews were conducted in such a way as to permit the key 
issues in each location to arise. Tins was a pragmatic response to the expectation that diffcc+ent issues 
would be important at each location and, second, because it would be unknown precisely what those 
issues mitt be. Thus, in the interests of flexibility, semi-structured interviews were used. The 
interviews were structured by means of key themes and areas to be covered. In setting the key 
themes, the researcher must anticipate those issues likely to be important during the interviews. 
This should be undertaken with as much prior knowledge and information as possible, while also 
recognising that perfect information is an unattainable ideal and, furthermore, that the purpose of 
the interviews is to yield additional information. The key themes are shown in Table A.!. The first 
set was much more exploratory than the second set and can therefore be considered to be closer to an 
unstructured form of interview. Unstructured interviews are usually open-ended and typically used as a 
means of understanding the phenomena without imposing any a priori categorisation. This was 
particularly valuable because of the early realisation that each HAT had its own character and 
idiosyncrasies due to, for example, the circumstances of its creation, the role of the local authority 
as landlord and as a participant in the pre-HAT negotiations, the extent of tenant involvement in 
those negotiations, the physical and social context of the HAT areas, etc.. 
The first interviews were conducted at Waltham Forest and, in Smeral, the outline structure developed 
there was followed at the other two locations so that similar issues would be addressed and explored. The 
researcher, however, was alert and sensitive to differences between the cutext at Waltham Forest HAT 
and the context of the other two case studies. Thus, in each location, issues that had not been significant 
or had had less significance, at Waltham Forest were identified and their importance noted. Equally, the 
issues raised at Hull and Iiveqxool would contribute to a better understanding of the Waltham Forest case 
study and would provoke inquiry as to why, for example, important issues at one location were leas 
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important at another. At Hull, for example, it became apparent that the relation with the local 
authority was much more important than at Waltham Forest. At Liverpool, it was apparent that the 
physical context for the HAT was materially different from those in the other two locations. Thus, 
the interview structure continued to evolve throighout the course of the interviews. Fu more, while 
there was a broad schedule of issues, it was tailored in practice to reflect the interviewee's role within or 
man with the HAT. The interviews and the questions asked were open-ended and interviewees 
asked not only for the facts of the matter but also encouraged to express their opinions and insigj is about 
events. 
Based on the researcher's direction as to the type of interviewees required (i. e., tenatt board members, 
HAT participation officers, etc. ), the HAT information officers iderrtified specific individuals. While this 
gives rise to the potential for bias, the potential bias is 
- 
at least to some exteart 
- 
known and can be 
considered wlal intatproting the data. Details of the first interview in each locations are given in 
Tables A. 2, A. 3 and A. 4. As is apparent from the various tables, many of the ixffimnarits had more 
than one major role: some residents, for example, were also HAT officers, while tenant rep ves 
might also be board numbers of community housing associations that had developed uring the period of 
the HAT. It should also be acknowledged that all of the tenants interviewed were `activists'. 
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THEMES FOR FIRST SET OF INTERVIEWS AT WALTHAM FOREST 
The initiation of the HAT: 
- 
" estate context 
- 
social factors; sense of community, differences between the ; 
" the circumstances urrounding the initiation of the HAT; local authority and tenant attitudes to the prospect 
ofaHAT 
" the run up to the ballot; public meeting and road-shows; the Tenants Expectation Document; HAT staff 
morale; personal involvement; key actors 
" attitude to the HAT; relations with consultants; relations with the local authority, DoE and local politicians 
" the HAT's style of operation 
Tenant involvement- 
" tenant organisation 
- 
existing and pre-HAT structures; election or nomination of members; resourcing of 
tenant organisations; independence of tenant representatives; conflicts of roles (i. e., identities of HAT and 
tenant bodies) 
" HAT structures 
- 
HAT board; composition of board; election or nomination of members; information 
dissemination (i. e., newsletters, public meetings, etc. ) 
The development programme 
" oberplan and development of masterplan, tenant involvement in development of auerplan and detailed 
design; tenant relations with consultants; tenant choice in design of redevelopmen ; housing design issues. 
Exit issues 
" exit strategy 
- 
development and range of exit options (individual and collective) 
" empowerment of tenants; training for tenants; economic development; employment schemes. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERVIEWS AT NORTH HULL HAT 
" existence of owner-occupiers within the HAT area 
" lack of a Tenants' Expectation Document 
" relations with local authority 
" Resident Participation Working Group 
" different physical context (i. e., refurbishment of 1930s cottage estate); problems during the ref ubishment 
programme; tenant reaction to improvements; quality of construction suds 
" tenurWiandlord choice; flrture rent levels and impact an tenants choices; creation & development of new 
community landlords (i. e., Harbour Farm) 
" the fide e of the HAT (the estates after the HAT); future community structures & organisations 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERVIEWS AT LIVERPOOL HAT 
" development programme and costs (possiibility of using private finance and its implications); strategic issues (i. e., mismatch between existing housing needs and At= housing needs) 
" the importance and significance of the feasibility study (and subsequent reappraisal of bility study and 
consequent uncertainty) 
" legacy of city council housing policies (and tenants' attitude toward the local authority as landlord) 
" contracting out of housing management 
" catch up repairs IXOV amme 
" elect of I'M 'Physical context (i. e., tower blocke) 
" difficulties of in situ tower block r shment (i. e., issues of decanting) 
Table A. 1- TAMES FOR FIRST SET OF INTERVIEWS 
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INIFRVIEW 
REFFRBNCE 
DATE POSIITIONROLEOFINTFdtVýWEE(1 
WFBAT 1 Monday 25 July 1994 HAT OFFTCFR- C tiaosOffic 
WFBAT 2 Tuesday 26 July 1994 TENANT REPRESENTATIVE 
-ESG vi 4u* &l SFregy WodmgP ty dýair 
WFBAT 3 Tuaedsy 26 July 1994 HAT OFFICER 
-Liiu&ar, Lame Slily Cate 
WFHAT 4 Tumday 26 July 1994 HAT PARTICIPATIONOMCFit- Cammnäy Devdcpnmt Offioa 
TENANT REPRESENTATIVE 
-ESG th 
WFHAT 5 WedmaWay 27 July 1994 HAT OFPTCFR-Housing Offoar 
WFHAT 6 Wednaeday 27 July 1994 HAT OFFICffit 
- 
Cmetivahm Mmager 
WFEAT 7 Wedoeeday 27 Jnly 1994 TI VOM REPRESENTATIVE 
-E SG 3ecr y. 
WFHAT 8 We3ua*27 Jnly 1994 TENANT BOARD MEMBER 
WFHAT 9 lba* y 28 July 1994 HAT OFFICE 
-Fbmamic Davvdapmmt IAMAW 
WFHAT 10 T udry 28 July 1994 HAT PARTICIPATIONOFFICfl 
- 
CmimniyDevdapmmt Co 
WFHAT 11 Tlunsday 28 July 1994 TENANT BOARD ME1VI1 It 
Table A. 2 
- 
FIRST SET OF INTERVIEWS AT WALTRAM FOREST HAT 
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IN FRVIEW 
MNCB 
DATE PO ITIONJROLE OFINTERVIEWEE(l4) 
NNICHAT 1 Tuesday 9 Aug" 1994 HAT OFPiCZR 
-? of'amaim Miogcr 
NHBAT 2 Tuesday 9 Auge 1994 RESIDENT 
- 
OKaa6OOaVia &' äQro RPWG 
NII IAT3 Tumday9Au 1994 HAT OF1f! CZR-Drill pmmtQO'ioQ 
N®AT4 Tuaeday9AuguiL1994 HAT01gU2 RR-DäedaräHw®g3avioes(beaddit+ec#crmTmuroC wne& 
aägnüw> 
NHHAT 5 Weth day 10AUSU91994 REIDENT/HAT OPIUMR-CmmdiyHaugOffiocdtHaboicFans 
CanmmiyH«mingSWcdngCamaWimdur 
NUBAT6 Wcth daiy10Auguet1994 RESIDEN-MmdaäteRPW(3&fmnammoberifRA 
NHHAT 7 W« y 10August 1994 HAT PARTICIPATIONOFPi(ZR-x ua wedw 
Table A. 3 
- 
FIRST SET OF INTERVIEWS AT NORTH HULL HAT 
IRrERVIEW 
Rffi MNCZ 
DATE P09SITIONIROLEOFHfMMEWEE 
LHAT1 1b day5Se t« th 1994 HAT OPIUM 
-R gSwAmlAmaW 
LHAT2 Mmday33q athc1994 EM OPIUM 
-E5miftSwA=)JmmW 
HAT GMAKAGER-HamalGmWAndiaHA 
HATEK=NIGMANAGZR-Haigl4wu 
'. LNapoolHAT 
HATBDDBMMANAGZR-HHudogMm gins RCO 
IBAT3 Tu y6Sgtmobs1994 HAT PARTK3pATIOff0FADCBR-IodepmbdTauotsAdviea 
RBä9DBNTRZ PRffiH! 'A11VE-HRTGad gcfi, 
RZl83DB WWAZW 'ATM-BFZGttwmx. 
RffiDRIWIR ATM-BRTO=Wdmy 
LSAT 4 We&aedoy 7 Sgta be 
1994 
R JDE (r BOARD t 
LHAT 5 Thuraky 8 Sq*a tha 1994 HAT OF 
-a P ce e 
LHAT 6 lluud y9 SVbmi u 1994 HAT OPTUM- CmeultmtAdvieor 
LEAT7 Fäday98q ber1994 HATOFWZR-Dk** äC(umzmtyS vioa 
Talik A. 4 
- 
FIRS SET OF INTERVIEWS AT LIVERPOOL HAT 
AS 
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A. 2 THE SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS 
Based on a greater knowledge and understanding of the implementation context in each HAT area, 
the second set of interviews was approached with a more structured interview format. There were, 
nevertheless, a number of issues that had much greater significance than had been anticipated and, 
hence, the interview structure continued to evolve during the course of the interviews. In particular, 
during the interviews at Liverpool it became apparent that the irtrodudion of the PFI had been much 
more critical there than at the oilier locations. I Ws eventually led to the distinctions between a Mark III 
and a Mark N HAT and between `executive' and facilitative' HATs. The interview themes are given 
in Table A. S. In general, these interviews were longer and in greater depth than the first set of 
interviews. 
THEMES FOR SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS AT WALTHAM FOREST AND NORTH HULL 
The continuing development of the HAT: 
" 
Relations with the local authority and other local agencies; relations with central Government (i. e., the 
top); control and monitoring of the HAT 
" 
The life-time costs exercise and its implications 
Tenant inva- 
" 
Continuing tenant involvement; changes to structures for tenant involvement (and explanation/justification 
for those changes); Conflicts between the HAT and its tenants 
The development pm gramme 
" Initial outcomes of development programme; tenant involvement in design. 
Exit issues 
" 
Options for landlord choice; development of new community landlords; outcome of landlord choice 
(reasons and explanations for outcome); rents & level playing fields. 
" Training and economic daýapn Wýployýnent schemes 
" Exit strategies (including creation of community development tub) 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ARISING FROM INTERVIEWS AT LIVERPOOL 
" 
Interrelation between landlord choice and development options 
" Impact and consequences of the PFI 
Table A. 5 
- 
THEMES FOR SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS 
Details of the second set of interviews are given in Tables A. 6, A. 7 and A. S. In each location, there 
was an interim interview with a key informant before the main body of the interviews. The interim 
interview was used for reconnaissance purposes in order to appreciate the subsequent development 
of the HAT after the first set of interviews. While the first set of interviews was undertaken in 
discrete tranches at each location (between July 1994 and September 1994) involving a single visit 
to each location, the second was undertaken over a longer period of time (August 1997 to February 
1998) and involved multiple trips to each location. The period in which the interviews were 
undertaken at each location also overlapped. 
It was also apparent in the interviews that the HATs were evolving at different speeds and their 
expected lifetimes differed. Although this had been apparent in the first seit of interviews, it was 
more evident in the second set of interviews, where, for example, North Hull HAT was nearing the 
end of its life and exit issues were very prominent. Waltham Forest had just passed its mid-point 
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but was planning for its exit. Liverpool HAT had also just passed its mid point and, although 
tenant exit issues were being developed, there was less emphasis on the HAT's own exit and major 
development decisions were still to be made. During these interviews it also became apparent that 
there was a danger of information overload and a decision was subsequently taken to focus on the 
housing policy aspects rather than the neighbourhood revitalisation aspects. Some knowledge and 
understanding of the latter, however, was necessary to fully appreciate the impact of each HAT. 
INTERVIEW 
REMPJZNC'F 
DATE POEQTIONROLE OFINTFRVýWEE(3l) 
WFHAT 12 Thursday May 22 1997 HAT OPMCIR-Crs mk nsOffioar 
WHAT 13 Wedo day20Ai st1997 TENANT REPRFSENTATIVE-fcamwESGd &au 11ymooagrrofa 
oomnuofy omhentneEAT area 
WFHAT 14 Weth day 20 August 1997 HAT PARTICIPATIONO 1CER-CamonnhyDevdq*i t Officer 
WFHAT13 We3heeday20Auget1997 TENANT R ESENTAT1VE-ESGmmiba&CBHAboodntmoba. 
WHAT 16 Wethc day20AugLA 1997 TENANT BOARDMEMMER-CBHAdbair&ISWFCmwaiy 
De ekpmatOfoa'. 
WHAT 17 Wednaeday20August 1997 HATOFPTCER-Cmr imiaitia sOtws 
WFEAT18 Thursday 29thJanuary 1998 HAT PARTICIPATION OPPiMR-Cm isi yDcvekpmmtOffas 
WFHAT 19 Wahasday 25 Fehnay 1998 LOCAL AUT1MUff HAT BOARD MEMBER 
- 
C13HAboei$mmtber 
Table A. 6 
- 
SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS AT WALTHAM FOREST HAT 
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INTERVIEW 
RIMERENCE 
DATE POS1TIONROLEOFINTFRVýWEEýý 
NHHAT 8 Wedmeday 15 May 1996 HAT OFFICER-CammmfyHat®gl&KNW 
NBBAT 9 lleasday 28 August 1997 HAT OFFIC3ZR-Cmonanicatima OF'im 
NHEAT 10 Mmrs* 28Au0i 1997 IMEORNTBOARDMIEPABUt 
N HHAT 11 Tlpraday 29 Angaet 1997 HAT PARTICIPATION OJThz. K 
- 
Ntip ibambood Fammns Devvdapnut 
Wc*ka 
NHHAT 12 Mwday26. T iu y 1998 RESIDENT-fcmi RPWGn mmba 
NHEAT 13 Mmday 26 J®uwy 1998 LOCAL AMHGI 1TY HAT BOARD MZMMZR 
- 
Deity ch of HAT 
baotddtfaana duar afhwoB, HA city oaLIKA 
NHEAT 14 Monday 26 J iu y 1998 RffiIDENT/ HAT OFl 
- 
Cmmnaniy Housing Ma * Habaw Faun 
CommunityHoadmadudr 
Table A. 7 
- 
SECOND SET OF INTERVIEWS AT NORTH HULL HAT 
INTERVIEW 
IRIMWJMZ 
DATE PO&TIONAROLEOFI rilat EWES 
LHAT 8 Tuadoy 9 September 1997 HAT OFPTC R-b faauatim Offioa. 
IBAT 9 Thweday 22 Jana y 1998 HAT PARTI ATIONOP! I 
- 
Coomosmiiy Dav lamm office 
THAT 10 Thursday 22 Jau y 1998 RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE 
- 
HRTG I 
IHAT 11 Thursday 22 Juy 1998 R SIEENT REPRESENTATIVE 
- 
HRTG member 
IBA' 12 Friday 23 January 1998 HAT ONVIM- Senior Davdapmmt ProDanone Manager 
IBA' 13 Friday 23 January 1998 HAT OFF 
- 
Cmooaonäy Services Dire r. Lead dirodar an 1adlad 
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A. 3 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS & REFLECTIONS 
The following are some general observations and reflections on the practice of undertaking the 
research interviews for this thesis. 
First, as noted in Chapter Two, the irrterviews were conducted with regard to what Yin (1994, p. 56) 
considered `commonly required interviewer skills'. These can be coram ted on as follows: 
- 
- 
berg able to ask good gaesdons and intep w the answiersh+espoiues 
Given the exploratory nature of many of the interviews, it was important for the researcher to assimilate 
information and ideas quiddy (i. e., within the period of interview) and to develop appropriate questions 
from them. In most cases, it was also necessary to build up or establish a rapport with the interviewee so 
that sine felt relaxed rather than being unduly guarded or suspicious. Outlining the purpose of the 
research and what would be done with the material from the interview helped achieve this and the majority 
of interviewees were eatranely forthcoming and keen to discuss and reflect on their experience. It was 
also important to maintain the relationship both within the interview itself and subsequent o that 
interview. The latter so that the possibility of obtaining fur her information or darifications, perhaps even 
another interview, from that interviewee would remain available. 
- 
being agoodfiatw and not being bvffed by personal ideologies orpreconcepdons 
This was vital. There was a constant need to understand what irdormacrts were actually saying and to 
understand it from their point of view without "putting words into their mouths'. Problems could also 
arise if the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee breaks down in the course of the 
interview. Probing questions that challenge and test the interviewee are usually necessary 
, 
but the 
interviewer must also be prudent. It is often better to allow the interviewee to their opinion and/or 
interpretation of events and to oonflrm its validity or truth at a labet date with appropriate documentation 
and/or other interviewees; this does not, however, prevent the researcher being sceptical about the validity 
of an argument or claim. Erroneous or false perceptions or mis-quoting of facts are, of course, of interest 
and may provoke others lines of enquiry. 
- 
being add mndJkcd61e, so Mrat newly enaox reds can be mom as oppopwann 
The interview context was fly one of understanding and appreciating change and deriving a 
coherent understanding 
- 
and subsequently explanation 
- 
of both the fact of change and the reasons for 
that dharge. 
- 
kam al Biasp ofthe hwes being am" 
While a `firm grasp o£the issues' was hi ly desirable, it was inevitably clouded by limited knowledge of 
the details and local nuances of those issues, which would only become apparent over the course of a 
series of interviews. The interviews thereibre involved a process of 'making sense' of those issues: in 
terms of the researcher both u rstaniding the issues and appreciating the irforn rt's views and 
perceptions. 
- 
being unbiaod by p ossceiived nodons 
Ibis was perhaps the most impoitart issue in appreciating and synthesising the material from the 
interviews. As noted in Chapter Two, Yin (ibid, p. 85) wams that i terviews should be considered `veifial 
repo' only and, as such, are subject o problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate ar icy lafiion. A mdiwd of overcoming these problems is to mate and corroborate interview data bath with ol iris views and with won from other sources. As bias is inevitable, the researcher should be aware 
of ogee potential biases may lie. For the benefit of both the researcher and the reader, the (otherwise 
smarymous) interviewees were distinguithed into the follow*- tenants and tenant repnesentabves, 
tment or resident HAT board members; HAT officers and city coucx /HAT board mambas. These 
reflect the main areas of anticipated bias. 
Second, although detailed notes of interviews were taken and the interviews written up immediately 
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after the interview, there would have been some advantages to taping the interviews so that a full 
and complete record existed. Transcripts based on notes taken during the interview are inevitably 
selective. The value of some of the material may only be fully appreciated at a later date, possibly 
several years later. In spite of taking carefid notes, some important points may be missed or 
disregarded because their significance is not 
- 
at that time 
-- 
appreciated. Archiving of the 
interviews tapes also gives the opportunity to refer back to the material at a later date; the tape may 
also reveal certain nuances and emphasis in, for example, the tone of the informant's voice that are 
not apparent in a written transcript. Furthermore, tapes would also enable subsequent researchers 
to have direct access to the research resource. 
Third, there must be an explicit realisation that the researcher can never have complete information. 
During the interviews, there was a constant feeling that an external researcher could not appreciate 
the issues as fully as someone who was involved with a HAT on a day-to-day basis. Conversely, 
rather than having a particular role or perspective within the HAT, the external researcher has the 
advantage of distance and perspective across the HATs. The researcher will also tend to have a 
better developed understanding across the different case studies than the interviewees in each 
location. During the research, for example, the researcher was frequently asked 
-- 
both by HAT 
officers and by tenants 
- 
what the other HATs were doing in respect of this or that issue. 
Ultimately, the researcher must aim to reach a point (i. e., by undertaking a sufficient number of 
interviews) whereby each increment of additional information or perspective changes details and 
nuances of interpretation rather than changing the main thrust of that understanding and 
appreciation of issues. Furthermore, the data obtained from interviews can change over time. It 
was apparent, for example, that there was a certain amount of myth-making at Waltham Forest 
about the tenant's `struggle' to establish the HAT and the significance of the tenants' role in that 
struggle. This could result in 
- 
albeit probably not deliberately manipulative 
-- 
exaggeration and 
selective emphasis. This is, however, only a more prominent example of what is a more widespread 
phenomenon. 
Fourth, the range of interviews was limited to people directly involved with the three HATs and 
could have beneficially been extended to include important actors who were slightly further from the 
HAT's day-to-day operation, such as local authority officers and officials of the local Government 
Office. Furthermore, as well as interviewing the local authority and tenandresidant members of the 
HAT boards, it would also have been useful to have interviewed some of the private sector board 
members. Although contact was made with civil servants at the Central DoEJDETR. While such 
civil servants would answer factual queries and information requests and stressed that they were 
unable to comment on Govermnerit policy. Contact was also made with Sir George Young who had 
been housing minister at a particularly critical time when the first three HATs were established. 
Young, however, declined to be interviewed on the basis that the events were some years previous 
and he no longer had access to the relevant papers. Without this wider range of interviews, there is 
a danger of tending to see issues and interpreting data in each location from the HAT's perspective. 
Fifth, where a structure for interviews is evolving, the sequence of interviews can be important. 
New issues might be raised in the later interviews that might usefully have been discussed in the 
earlier interviews. There is often limited scope to go back to earlier informants and while many of 
the HAT officers, etc., could be contacted (by for example telephone), this was sometimes more 
difficult with tenants. Furthermore, going back to the informants at a later date is usually subject to 
time limitations and, thereby, limited to factual queries and limited opinions/reactions to reasonably 
specific questions. Many of the informants from the first set of interviews, however, were also 
interviewed in the second set. In part, this is a function of the researcher's ability to anticipate the 
important issues in advance of the interviews. Furthermore, while it would have been useful to 
progress the interviews simultaneously at all three locations, in practice and for logistical reasons, 
the interviews inevitably had to be progressed in series. 
Sixth, more generally with regard to case studies, the is a need to continuously balance the 
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advantages of a looser interview structure. On the one hand, a looser structure allows the researcher 
to be receptive to local idiosyncrasies, but -- on the other -- makes cross-case comparability harder 
and increases the danger of information overload. As the main thrust of the research was directed at 
the implementation of HAT policy as a housing policy, it was less important in the second set of 
interviews to focus in depth on the neighbourhood revitalisation dimensions. 
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Appendix B 
HAT POLICY DOCUMENTS 
B. 0 INTRODUCTION 
Tlüs apps x contains transcripts cf some of the most important Goverrunait doc umaits relating to HAT 
policy-. - 
" The 1987 Conservative lection manifesto (extract) 
" The 1987 White Paper (extrad) 
" The 1987 consultation paper on HATs 
" The Secretary of State's letter in the pilot HAT arcs (July 1988) (extract) 
" DoE Press Release (October 1988) 
" The minister's letter in the pilot HAT areas (October 1988) 
" The HAT core performance indicators (January 1997) 
B. 1 THE 1987 CONSERVATIVE ELECTION MANIFESTO 
Housing Action Trusts were mentioned in the 1987 Conservative election manifesto in a section 
titled `Wider Ownership and Greater Opportunity'. The section was divided into sub-sections; one 
of which was titled `Better Housing For All', which itself had three sub-sections: -- `Home 
Ownership'; `A Right to Rent' and `Rights for Council Tenants'. The text of the latter was as 
follows: 
- 
Rights for COMKil Taunts 
Many council estates built in the sixties and seventies are badly designed, vulnerable to crime and 
vandalism and in bad repair. In many areas, rent arrears are high. In all, over 110,000 council 
dwellings stand empty. Yet it is often difficult for tenants to move. If they are ever to enjoy the 
prospect of independence, municipal monopoly must be replaced by choice in renting. 
We will give groups of tenants the right to form tenant co-operatives, owning and running their 
management and budget for themselves. They will also have a the right to ask other institutions to 
take over their housing. Tenants who wish to remain with the local authority will be able to do so. 
We will give each council house tenants individually the right to transfer the ownership of his or her 
house to a housing association or other independent, approved landlord. 
In some areas more may be necessary. The success of Estate Action and Housing Action Area 
shows how a carefully targeted approach can transform an area of poor housing and give people 
there new hope. Our Urban Development Corporations have been successful in restoring derelict 
industrial areas. We believe that a similar approach could be adopted for housing in some places. 
We will take powers to create Housing Action Trusts 
- 
initially as a pilot scheme 
- 
to take over 
such housing, renovate it, and pass it on to differart tenures and ownerships, including housing 
associations, tenants co-operatives, owner-occupiers or approved social landlords. 
We will reform the structure of local authority housing accounts so that public funds are directed at 
the problems of repair and renovation; maintenance and management are improved; resources are 
directed to the areas where the problems are the greatest; rent arrears are reduced; and fewer houses 
are Idt empty. 
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B. 2 THE 1987 WHITE PAPER 
Chapter 6 of the 1987 White Paper, Housing 
- 
The Government's Proposals, dealt exclusively with 
the proposals for HATs. The text was as follows: 
- 
6.1 The previous Chapter set out a number of proposals for giving wider choice to local authority 
tenants, and for improving the circumstances of run-down council estates. Experience shows that 
arrangements of these kinds will often be effective, particularly on a relatively small scale. But 
there are some areas of local authority housing, particularly in some of the inner urban areas, where 
social problems and housing disrepair are so serious that in the Government's view more direct 
action 
- 
involving both public and private sectors 
- 
is needed to obtain improvements over a 
reasonable timescale. Unless major improvements can be made in the fabric and general 
environment of these areas it is unlikely that policies such as the right to transfer to other landlords 
would be successful there. 
The Urban Development Corporation Model 
6.2 There are several models to follow. The work of Estate Action, and the improvements that can 
be made by designation of General Improvements Area and Housing Action Areas, show that 
detailed problems of bad housing are not insoluble given the will and the mechanisms. On a larger 
scale, the Urban Development Corporations in London and Merseyside have shown the results that a 
body devoted to developing a run-down area can achieve. They have brought a new drive to their 
task and results have been achieved that the local authorities have not been able to achieve by 
themselves in the past. 
6.3 The Urban Development Corporation model is not wholly appropriate as it stands for the 
housing field. The housing problem being tackled concerns densely developed urban areas rather 
than largely derelict industrial areas in need of regeneration (though the two may overlap). 
Different kinds of expertise and people will be needed. Different statutory powers could well be 
necessary. The model needs adapting. The Government therefore proposes to take powers to 
establish analogous bodies in designated areas to take over responsibility for local authority 
housing, renovate it, and pass it on to different forms of management and ownership including 
housing associations, tenants' co-operatives and approved private landlords. The new bodies, to be 
known as Housing Action Trusts (HATs), will provide scope for tenants in these areas to have a 
diversity of and landlord and ownership. And as well as improving housing conditions, they will act 
as enablers and facilitators for provision of other community needs such as shops, workshops and 
advice centres, and for encouraging local enterprise. 
Operation of Housing Action Trosts 
6.4 The HATs will have a limited lifespan. Their remit will be to secure the improvement of the 
stock transferred to them in the area and then hand it over to other owners and managers. Through 
this process they will make use of both public and private sector resources; they will assist in the 
Government's aim of diversifying forms of management and ownership, in conjunction with other 
policies such as rut deregulation and right to transfer; and disposals by HATs will gRnerate extra 
funds which can be used elsewhere. 
6.5 It is too early to say how many HATs will initially be created, which areas they will tadle, or 
how large those areas might be. But the physical quality of the stock, the effectiveness of its 
management and the general environment of the area will be among the relevant considerations. 
Each HAT, like an Urban Development Corporation, will consist of a Chairman and members 
appointed by the Secretary of State; they will include people with direct experience of the area. 
6.6 It will be desirable for each HAT to carry out its task in close conjunction with local authorities 
concerned, and with the tenants of the properties transferred to it. The maximum co-operation is 
needed if problems are to be successfully tackled. Tenants' interests will be deeply involved, for 
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example in respect of refurbishment programmes and eventual disposal of property by the HAT. 
Future Programme 
6.7 The Govemment sees the concept of HATs as a vital part of their overall housing policy, and as 
a means of single-mindedly tackling some of the most difficult areas of local authority housing. 
Once statutory powers are available, the first HATs will be set up and the experience gained from 
them, and particularly their success in applying public and private sector resources to the 
improvement of housing and the widening of choice for local authority tenants, will provide the 
basis for further decisions. 
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B. 3 THE HAT CONSULTATION PAPER 
Transcript of the HATs consultation paper issued 6 October 1987: 
- 
Introduction 
1. Chapter 6 of the recast White Paper Housing 
- 
The Government's agRosals (Cm 214) described 
in broad terms the Government's intentions to establish a new kind of organisation 
- 
Housing 
Action Trusts (HATs) 
- 
to tackle major concentrations of run-down local authority housing in 
England and Wales. The Government sees the HAT concept as a vital part of its housing policy. It 
opens the way to bringing both private and public sector resources to bear on some of the worst 
areas of public sector housing; securing a substantial improvement in the conditions of those who 
live there; and providing them with a wider choice of ownership and management arrangements. 
2. The purpose of this document is to describe in more detail how the Government envisages HATs 
might work and their implications for the position of residents and local authorities. It is intended to 
serve as a basis for consultation both with those who may be directly affected by the setting up of 
HATs and with those organisations and interests which may play a part in their activities. 
Background 
3. In recent years, a number of local authorities have made significant progress in dealing with their 
worst estates, often in partnership with the Department of the Environment's Estate Action 
programme. But in a number of cases the size of the areas involved and the extent of the problems 
are such that they are beyond the capacity of local authorities to tackle. Typically, such areas 
comprise large concentrations 
- 
running to several thousand dwellings 
- 
of poor quality public 
sector housing which have associated with them a combination of social, economic and 
environmental problems: a high level of crime and vandalism; high unemployment; a concentration 
of families with sever disadvantages and heavily dependent on income support; a low level of 
commercial and economic activity, badly designed estates and dwellings; a poor environment and an 
atmosphere of general decay and decline. Many such areas are, of course, to be found in the inner 
cities; others are to be found on the outskirts of conurbations. Those who live there often feel 
trapped by their circumstances and environment with little prospect of improvement or escape. 
4. The Government considers that the nature and extent of the problems in such areas require novel 
and radical solutions beyond the normal run of local authority housing activity. It believes that the 
process of decline in such areas can be reversed, and a concentrated approach to tackling their 
problems should be adopted. This is the role and purpose of HATs. In designated areas they will 
take over responsibility for local authority housing; devise and implement a programme to secure the 
renovation of properties; and pass them on to different forms of ownership and management. They 
will also, working closely with local bodies concerned with economic development in the area, seek 
to encourage local enterprise and development. 
5. The experience of the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) has shown that a single-minded 
organisation can be the most effective way of dealing with arcs with intractable problems. Against 
that backs und, the Government believes that HATs should be modelled broadly on UDCs as 
organisations appointed solely and specifically to apply expertise and resources to tackling those 
problems a transforming the prospects of areas otherwise destined for continual decline. The 
problems with which HATs will be dealing will, however, be rather different from the problems of derelict land and buildings which UDCs normally tackle. 
How HAT areas will be selected 
6. The Government plans to introduce enabling legislation into Parliament in the forthcoming 
session which will provide for individual HATS to be established by subordinate legislation. This 
will be effected by order subject to affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The orders 
will define the areas for which HATs are to be established and provide for the astablidwient the 
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HAT organisations themselves. 
7. In deciding which areas to designate, the Government intends to concentrate on areas in need of 
improvement where there is a predominance of local authority housing; and in deciding whether to 
designate such areas it will take into account such factors as the extent and nature of social 
problems; the general condition of the local environment; and the local authority's housing 
management record. 
& The size of HATs could vary widely. However the Government envisages that HATs would 
generally cover several thousand properties. A HAT might cover a single area, or several smaller 
areas in the same locality. The area could fall within one or more local authority areas. And while 
HAT areas would mainly comprise local authority accommodation, they might also include within 
their boundaries some privately-owned homes if they naturally from part of the local community. 
9. In identifying possible areas for designation as HATs, the Government envisages drawing in the 
first instance on its knowledge of housing conditions in different areas of the country and 
supplementing this as necessary with further detailed studies. In all cases, however, the Government 
will consult the appropriate local authorities before putting proposals to designate a HAT area 
before Parliament. 
10. The process of identifying HAT areas need not, however, depend upon Government initiative 
alone. It will, of course, be open to local authorities, on the basis of their detailed knowledge and 
experience of their own locality, to propose areas which they consider would benefit from the HAT 
approach. The Government would welcome any such proposals, though the final decision on 
whether to seek a particular designation must remain with the Government. 
How HATS will work 
11. It is envisaged that in designated areas HATs will take over ownership of all housing owned by 
the local authority and assume the local authority's landlord function in relation to that housing. 
the primary task of a HAT will be to secure the renovation of properties in its ownership; to 
transfer them to a range of diffemat forms of ownership and management; and generally to improve 
conditions in its area so that it becomes acceptable and attractive to those who already live there and 
to prospective tenants and owners. As part of that function, HATs will also be able to encourage 
and facilitate the improvement of any private sector property in their areas. And that may need to 
improve the general environment of the area, and if necessary make better use of vacant land within 
it. 
12. It is envisaged that ownership of local authority housing in the designated area would be vested 
in the HAT by order subject to negative resolution of either House of Parliame t. In the past, the 
basis on which transfers of local authority housing have been made to other public sector bodies has 
been transfer of the properties together with the outstanding loan debt to the new owning body. 
However, this basis bears no relation to the current market value of the stock. The Government's 
preferred approach would be to base transfers of local authority housing to HATs on their estimated 
marladt value subject to tenancy. 
13. It is not envisaged that HATs would take over any privately-owned homes within its boundaries. 
There may, however, be the occasional instance where, in order to achieve its objectives, a HAT 
might need to acquire a particular property or properties. In order to enable it to do this, it is 
envisaged that HATS, like UDCs, would have compulsory purchase powers. However, in any case 
where they proposed to exercise those powers they would first have to obtain the approval of the Secretary of State. 
14. At an early stage and in close consultation with the local people, each HAT would draw up 
proposals for the area and its housing. These would be expected to cover proposals for renovation 
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and refurbishment; changes in design of properties or estate layout; any new housing development; 
any non-residential development or works (e. g., refurbishment of a shopping precinct or provision of 
small business premises); and any other general environmental improvements. There would also be 
a description of the expected programme and timetable of work; its implications for tenants; and the 
mix of different forms of ownership and management eventually envisaged for properties. This 
would serve as a basis for further consultation with and involvement of local people. 
15. Refurbishment programmes would probably include works undertaken by the HAT itself, before 
it passed properties on to new forms of ownership and management; and refurbishment undertaken 
by private developments at their own risk or by some of the larger housing associations. In the case 
of housing refurbished by the HAT itself, those who might eventually take it on would include 
housing associations, tenants co-operatives, private sector landlords and owner-occupiers. 
Developers or other organisations could buy unimproved properties from the HAT and refurbish 
them prior to disposal. 
16. While it remains owner of the property it acquires from the local authority, the intention is that a 
HAT will assume the functions of a local authority landlord under current housing legislation in 
relation to that property; and also the authority's functions in respect of privately-owned housing 
within the designated area, for example the payment of grants to improve properties. It is also 
intended that HATs may be given various functions by order subject to approval by Parliament for 
example, in respect of development control, highways, and sewerage within the designated area. 
17. HATs will also have an important role alongside other support organisations in the area in 
encouraging local enterprise and employment. HATs might particularly, in association with, for 
example, the local enterprise agency, consider the rehabilitation of buildings for the provision of 
workshop space for small businesses. HATs should seek to contribute fully to other programmes 
and initiatives in the area aimed at promoting local enterprise and employment. 
The position of tenants 
18. The Govern nnent believes that a HAT's tenants and other residents in its area will benefit from 
the presence of a single-minded body devoted to improving the area and its housing. A HAT will 
only be able to do its job properly with the involvement and co-operation of the people who live in 
the area. HATs will therefore put great stress on consulting tenants, asking them for their own ideas 
and keeping them informed about plans and progress. 
19. The Government will want to keep closely in touch with both the local authority and local people 
from the outset. Where it decides to seek Parliamentary approval for the designation of a HAT 
area, local residents will be fully informed as to what this is likely to mean for them. And when the 
HAT has been established it will be placed under a statutory obligation to consider local residents' 
views about its detailed plans for the area and its housing. 
20. The transfer of ownership of housing from the local authority to the HAT will not have any 
immediate effect on the position of tenants. They will continue to have security of tenure under the 
Housing Ad 1985 and will retain their right to buy and their other rights under the `Tenants' 
Charter'. Bis not expected that rent levels will change at the time of transfer prior to refurbishment. 
21. The prime task of HATs however will be to improve their houses and flats, and to make their 
areas better places to live. They will be able to offer tenants improved levels of service as a result 
of more efficient tenant-centred management. But in many cases, the present unsatisfactory living 
conditions are associated with rents which are too low to maintain the property in reasonable order. 
Once HATs have put such properties right, the cycle of decline must not be allowed to happen 
again. Rents may rise to allow the improvement to be maintained. Housing benefit will continue to 
be available to provide help for tenants on low incomes. 
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22. The status of owner-occupiers and private sector tenants of properties within the designated area 
will generally be unaffected by the establishment of the HAT. They will, however, have to deal with 
the HAT rather than the local authority on matters where the HAT is given the functions of the local 
authority. Such matters might include planning and building control permissions and grants for 
home improvements. The HAT might also have the local authority's functions in respect of housing 
conditions, for example taking action where houses are unfit and serving notices in respect of 
properties where there is overcrowding. And all residents in the HAT area will of course benefit 
from general improvements to the local environment resulting from the HAT's activities. 
23. When property has been refiubished, the HAT will seek a permanent owner for it. In the case of 
property which is still tenanted, the tenants will be folly consulted. There are a number of options 
for such housing, including transfer to housing associations or private sector landlords and the 
creation of tenants' co-operatives. Alternatively, tenants would be free at any time to exercise the 
proposed new right to transfer to an approved landlord of their choice, details of which are described 
in Chapter 5 of the White Paper, Housing 
- 
The Goveannent's Proposals. 
24. In the case of untenanted property, it is proposed that HATS should be free to enter into 
agreements giving local authorities the right to nominate some of the tenants while the property 
remains in HAT o mership. The HAT may also transfer some of its property to the local authority 
after refurbishment. The Government would, however, expect this to the exception rather than the 
rule, in view of the change in emphasis it envisages for the housing role of local authorities, from 
acting as landlords towards acting as enablers and facilitators of housing provision by others. 
The role of local authorities 
25. Local authorities will no longer have a direct landlord role in respect of property transferred to 
the HAT. But their role as general enabler in the field of housing will continue in their whole area. 
There will therefore continue to be a major role for local authorities, and the HAT should be 
required to consult than wherever appropriate. A high degree of co-operation between these 
organisations will be very desirable. 
26. Local authorities will also retain their responsibilities towards homeless people. The 
Government does not consider it appropriate to place any duties on HATs in respect of 
homelessness. HATs will be responsible for a concentrated programme of improvement of an area 
in housing which in most cases will be much smaller than the total housing stock of the local 
authority. To place a duty of a HAT with regard to homeless people would distract it from its 
regeneration function. However, the Government recognises that HATs as major landlords in the 
area will be well-placed to assist local authorities in finding homes for homeless people. The 
Government therefore intends that HATs should be able to enter into local agreements giving 
authorities access to their accommodation. 
27. As indicated in paragraph 21 above, arrangements will also be made for the continued operation 
of the housing benefit system in HAT areas. The Goverment is still considering what the most 
appropriate arrangements would be. 
2& The Goverment reco uses that many other interests are involved in housing, including various 
voluntary organisations. It will be important for the HAT to establish and develop relationships 
with such bodies, with a view to focussing available resources to the maximum possible extart on 
the housing problems of the area. It will not always be the business of the HAT to solve problems itself; often its role will be to enable others to do so on its behalf. The details of this will vary in diffe it cam, and will be for the HAT to decide in consultation with all concerned including the local authority and residents. 
Organisati®n and 5nancW matten 
29. Each HAT will consist of a cdhairman, a deputy chairman and members appointed by the 
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Secretary of State. They will be accountable through the Secretary of State to Parliament for their 
activities. Members might include among them people with a good knowledge of the HAT area and 
representatives of tenants. The HAT will also have a permanent staff who will need a range of 
skills and experience, including contract and project management, housing management and finance. 
They are likely to be drawn from both the private and public sectors. We local authority housing 
staff will dearly have relevant skills, they will not have any particular rights to employment with a 
HAT over and above other possible applicants; the overriding criterion will be suitability for the job 
on offer. 
30. Each HAT will have various sources of finance. These will include their income from runts, and 
borrowing and grants direct from Govemment. In addition, each HAT will be expected to seek the 
maximum possible support from the private sector, and to involve private sector resources in the 
work of refurbishing stock and taking over landlord responsibilities. In this way the Govemmei t 
believes that the maximum possible use will be made of public sector resources, and that tenants 
should benefit through a breaking down of monolithic estates and a wider choice of landlord and 
property. 
31. The detailed arrangements under which the HATs' finances will function are still under 
consideration, but they are likely to be modelled on those governing other non-Departmental public 
bodies. In line with the Government's Financial Management Initiative arrangements will also be 
made for evaluating the performance of HATs in relation to their objectives. 
Scale of the HAT programme 
32. The Government is committed to establishing a pilot programme of HATs and it is expected that 
this will contain only a modest number of schemes. This will nevertheless provide a sufficiently 
wide span of schemes for experience to be developed and lessons to be learned in different 
environments. It is expected that HATs will be established in London and elsewhere. Decisions on 
further designations will take into account the speed and success with which the initial projects 
develop, and the lessons learned from than. 
Conclusion 
33. The Government welcomes comments on the proposals in this consultation document. 
Respondents should indicate whether they are content for the Department to place a copy of their 
response in the Library for both Houses of Parliament; otherwise responses will be treated in 
confidence, but may be counted in any numerical summary of views received. 
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B. 6 HOUSING MINISTER'S LETTER IN THE PILOT HAT AREAS 
Transcript of letter from the housing minister, David Trippier, to tenants in the pilot HAT areas, 
issued October 1988: 
- 
Dear Occupier, 
When I visited Leeds to meet tenants where the Government is proposing to set ip a Housing 
Action Trust, I answered a lot of questions. But there were two questions which came up again 
and again and tenants' representatives asked me to write to each of you to let you know the 
position. 
First, on rents 
- 
council tenants want to know what will happen to their rents if they transfer to a 
Housing Action Trust. The answer is that we have promised a rent freeze before improvements 
are carried out. Rents will then move in line with council rents. 
Seconaj tenants are also worried about how much choice they will have about who their landlord will 
be after the Trust has curried out improvements. You need have no fear. You will be given a choice by 
the Trust about who you would like to see managing your home. And you will be able to make your 
own suggestions. You might it to go to a housing association, a tenants' co-operative or back to the 
council. We shall make sure that the council have the resources to enable them to buy your home back 
ifyou want them to. 
The important thing is that your indvidual choice will be respected You will be able to refuse any 
landlord the HAT offers you that you do not like. But if you choose to tºrmsfer to an approved social 
landlom you will get legally binding guarantees about the rent you will then pay and your long-term 
security. 
Yours sincerely, 
David Tnppier. 
AinisterforHousing 
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B. 7 CORE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
TO RW OVE THE PHYSICAL CONDMO OFTHE HOtEINGSTOCK 
Nuo3bcänewham cm3pldedfaldtäg Ahmberdne betas tedkrldmg 
-Tn 
. 
Number drefudishadprcparties completed 
-HaaekgAmcetim (atiabodied) %vaiin6m in oaetfmm ippwved cost 
-ä Pat mbip Number inatfiable sold is an sie 
TO MANAGE THE ESTATES EFFECTIVELY 
%ratadlatod %rgm=c dadaiw uvgotthw 
in&xWitHousiogBaufi u gB 
-eDvgFny 
Nhmbaätmintsmomdun 13weeisä&ic 
-u921 
Weddyni n -opa k dIig 
-tafire 
We 1ycoetspa&Vgftgofi+epaes 
TO Th1PROVE THE PHYSICAL, SOCIAL & ENVMON1hNTAL CONDITIONS OF THE AREA 
Tnmttmimtsmtcaimgadmwes Trmt, & stojabs&w&&&ice 
-omgnidim ThA dimfsuingaammniLY&M ties 
-abs CciýmiyGrois citedbyTru t 
Ira gwe apiovidedbyteTnim Cmwniysädy veer 
-äomehudim Fav talprojedacom, 1ded 
-aha Privaesodaävedm 1 
Jobs aeakedbyteTnut 
-w MTiu 
, 
L4, T19templo'0s 
-wBtnTiu haters 
-o t"Tnn. 
TO ENCOURAGE DIVERSITY OFTENt RE 
Number afhousehol&telcägup Tn i gives Number afpnpatin at year and 
-RTB 
-Fredtoldsalso 
-Tnd. taovfed 
-Ts®fsbandveSane 
-Watte iFaaetCDHAt id 
-I. o A=&c*tm®fmd 
-dha(am4m me) 
TO 1EGABOUT SUSTAMIZZ AL DIW ILASIMW DdFWVZM NI IN THE AREA 
Rapatimäreddmtsävulvu1Ec iteadivitier PhVatimofmidmfsvºýiTostozmmmä9heareafir5yam 
TABLE B. 1- HAT CORE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
NB Each HAT lists and calculates the core indicators aligbtlY dandy 
(Source: WFHAT1997/99 Annual R oct) 
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Appendix C 
STOCKBRIDGE VILLAGE & 
THAME SMEAD ESTATE 
C. 0 INTRODUCTION 
Although not mentioned in the 1987 White Paper. Stockbridge Village 
- 
formerly Cantril Farm 
estate 
-- 
in Knowsley, Liverpool and certain aspects of the Thamesmead estate were important 
precedents for HAT policy. Both were repeatedly mentioned - usually by the Opposition -- during 
the debates in Parliament. Given their mixed success, however, it is not surprising that they were 
not explicitly cited. With regard to HAT policy, Thamesmead is an example of a large-scale 
transfer of public sector housing stock to a private landlord. The Stockbridge Village initiative 
concerns the transfer of an estate and an improvement and development programme and is therefore 
especially important background for HAT policy; the relevance of which is evident in the discussion 
of the case study HATs in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. This Appendix therefore gives an 
overview of the Stockbridge Village and Thamesmead initiatives. 
C. 1 STOCKBRIDGE VILLAGE 
C. 1.1 BACKGROUND 
On a visit to Merseyside following the riots of the early 1980s, the then Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Michael Heseltine, asked to be taken to Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council's 
(KMBC) worst estate and was directed to Cantril Farm (Brindley, et at., 1989, p. 141). Ten miles 
from central Liverpool, the estate had been built in the 1960s as an overspill estate and was tenanted 
mainly by people displaced by Liverpool city council's slum clearance schemes (RTP, 1987, p. 5). 
Consisting of about 3000 units, the estate had been planned on semi-Radbum principles with 
seventeen housing areas separated by a series of footpaths and stretches of open space. The central 
area comprised three 22-storey, system-built tower blocks 
- 
The Denes 
-- 
and an underground car 
park with a surface deck supporting community buildings and the only shops on the estate. ' KMBC 
had acquired four-fifths of the estate following the reorganisation of local government in 1974; the 
remaining fifth stayed with Liverpool city council. 
Heseltine (1987, p. 174) later wrote that only ten years after completion, the estate was "... a 
disaster which looked beyond retrieving. It was losing the council fl million a year 
... 
there were 
400 vacant fats, many of them vandalised; 900 outstanding repairs; 8,000 tenants queuing up for 
a transfer. Crime flourished ". The estate epitomised many of the area's problem: 
- 
by the early 
1980s, the male unemployment rate was 49%, rising to 80% among the young; there was only a 
small number of RTB applications; a large backlog of outstanding repairs, and problems of violence 
and vandalism. A report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 5) stated that families were leaving at a rate of 
more than 20 per week and that the maisonettes, in particular, were a complete failure. By 1982, 
KMBC had demolished 112 of them. By 1982, re-letting of the 546 remaining maisonettes and the 
510 tower block flats in The Danes 
- 
in total about one third of the estate's properties 
- 
had 
virtually halted (ibid, p. 5). The prospect was that within ten years the estate would be half-vacant 
and demolition would be the only option (ibid, p. 5). 
In June 1982, Heseltine invited Tom Baron, Chairman of Christian Salvesen (Properties) Ltd., to 
prepare a scheme for the estate's renewal. In consultation with the chief executive of the Abbey 
National Building Society 
- 
Clive Thornton (subsequertly involved at Tbamesmead) 
- 
and the 
1 This form of estate is similar to those at Waltham Forest HAT. 
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Chairman of Barratts, Baron drew up a plan. Baron (from RTP, 1987, p. 9) diagnosed the estate's 
problems as follows: 
- 
" 
first, its design and layout. 
" 
Second, the estate's population and tenure balance. Those with the ability to leave had already 
done so, leaving behind an over-concentration of young, unemployed and problem families, and 
creating conditions for the high level of crime and vandalism on the estate. The absence of 
owner-occupiers was also considered a problem. Baron, for example, considered owner- 
occupiers offered the advantage of a `natural' commitment to the area in order to protect their 
investment (Brindley, et al., 1989, p. 141). 
" Third, inadequate management by KMBC exacerbated by the problems inherent in the estate's 
planning and design as a one-class, one tenure, over-spill dormitory estate. 
Baron's solution was for a private trust to take over the estate and proposed the establishment of a 
non-profit making trust incorporating within it both a registered HA (to receive HAG funding for the 
new dwellings for rent) and a non-registered HA (to purchase the estate and raise capital by selling 
houses to existing tenants and land and property to developers, implement the development 
programme and manage the remaining stock) (RTP, 1987, p. 14). Baron's argument was that 
unfettered by bureaucracy or political accountability, a trust would be able to draw on private- 
sector resources and skills, which 
-- 
coupled with a minimum amount of public expenditure 
- 
would 
be able to renovate and revive the estate. Baron's approach was premised on a rise in confidence in 
the area and the estate's transformation into "... a place where people will want to live 
. 
from 
choice, not economic circumstances. " (Grosskurth, 1984, p. 25). In particular, the estate's image 
was to change so that it could attract new residents from Knowsley and elsewhere in Merseyside; the 
name change being the first part of this strategy. The tenure balance was also to be changed, with 
substantial levels of owner-occupation being established and higher-income groups attracted to live 
on the estate. By the end of the project, it was hoped over 50% of the estate's population would be 
owner-occupiers (see Table Cl). 
At transfer in 1983 Original target At mid-term 1986 
SVHA rented 
- 
375(11%) 252 (7.4%) 
Barraft owners 
- 
1110 (32.7%) 126 (3.7%) 
(600 new homes) 
(510 data in The Denes) 
RTB owners 185 (5.7%) 583 (17.2%) 425 (12.5%) 
(183 had purchased their 
dwellings prior to 
transfer to SVT) 
SVT rented 3055 (94%) 1325 (39.1%) 2594 (76.4%) 
TABLE Cl- TENURE OF DWELLINGS AT STOCKBRIDGE VILLAGE 
(Source: adopted from RIP, 1987, p. 25) 
Baron's plan was drawn up by the aid of July 1982. The private sector partners 
-- 
Barclays, Abbey 
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National and Barratts 
-- 
committed themselves to the scheme. KMBC's involvement was also 
essential and included inter alia the sale of the estate to the trust. As Brindley, et al., (1989, p. 141) 
note, the controlling Labour group had a reputation for being `moderate' but was under increasing 
pressure locally from left-wing and Militant-influenced elements in the party. Hence, to be seen to 
be co-operating with a Conservative government in the privatisation of a council estate was a high- 
risk strategy. The report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 6), however, noted that the sale of the estate 
was an attractive financial prospect for KMBC (the cost of retaining the estate was expected to 
continue rising, while a sale would remove the burden). Although the prospective selling price of 
Cantril Farm was half the estate's outstanding debt, the sale would leave KMBC with increased 
capital resources and a smaller stock on which to spend them. The leader of the Labour group, 
Councillor Jim Lloyd, was particularly instrumental in persuading his party to accept the scheme. 
In the end, the Labour councillors agreed to participate because they had little faith in the 
authority's ability to obtain the required resources (Brindley, et al., 1989, p. 141-2) and, at the very 
least, the plan proposed by Baron offered a solution to the estate's problems. In September 1982, 
KMBC accepted the scheme in principle and by November had agreed to the terms of the sale. In 
November 1982, Heseltine formally launched the scheme and stated: "If it succeeds, we will have 
learnt lessons that could lead to the transformation of numerous other problem estates throughout 
our inner cities. " (from Grosskurth, 1984, p. 25). 
Grosskurth (1984, p. 26) noted that, although a series of public meetings were held in December 
1982 with tenants overwhelmingly endorsing the plan, this `apparently ready approval' had only 
been achieved by closing off discussion of alternative strategies. Grosskurth (ibid, p. 25) also 
reported that although, according to the director of Shelter's North West regional office, several 
alternatives were supported by large numbers of tenants (among them HA management and tenant- 
run co-operatives), the Haseltine plan "... was imposed too hurriedly for all the options to be 
presented adequately to tenants. ". She further notes that Tim Lloyd, leader of KMBC and a 
prospective member of the Trust's board, had warned tenants that "... if you don't agree to the 
basic proposals, there will be no changes whatsoever. " (ibid, p. 26). Thus, in effect, tenants were 
told if they wanted to see investment in the area, this was the only option open to them. It was 
therefore a Hobson's choice. 
C. 1.2 THE STOCKBRIDGE VILLAGE TRUST 
In February 1983, the Stockbridge Village Trust was legally registered as a non-profit distributing 
company limited by guarantee. At the same time, Stockbridge Village Housing Association (SVHA) 
(later to become Villages Housing Association) was also established to receive HAG funds and 
build new dwellings for rent. Although the Trust and SVHA shared staff, they were separately 
accounted. The Trust also earned a managelne it fee for handling SVHA's rental stock. The Trust 
undertook to protect 
-- 
among other things 
-- 
taunts' RTB (RTP, 1987, p. 14). Furthermore, the 
Trust pledged that as many as possible of those displaced by the development would be offered a 
home in Stockbridge Village should they wish it (ibid, p. 14-15). 
Tom Baron became the Trust's Chairman and other board members included represaitatives of 
Abbey National and Barclays, one councillor (initially the leader of KMBC), and two community 
representatives (one from the local parish council and one elected by residents) 2 The Trust's day- 
to-day management was the responsibility of a chief executive and a small team of staff, who in the 
main were recruited from or seconded by Knowsley MBC. The Trust's task was to take over the 
ownership, management and renewal of the estate, which consisted of over 3000 dwellings made up 
of 1227 two-storey houses, 1056 flats in raine high-rise blocks and 826 two-to-four storey flats and 
maisonettes. In addition, there was a run-down shopping area with an underground car park, a 
library and limited community facilities. The aim was to remodel the estate over a five-year period, 
with renewal work being completed by March 1988. 
2A second council appointment wm made in 19$6. 
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C. 1.3 THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
The first step in changing the estate's image was its re-christening as Stockbridge Village. The fact 
that it was `under new management' by a private trust was also promoted. More fundamental 
change was to result from the first phase of an improvement and development programme to be 
completed by mid-1985. Despite the estate's physical and other problems, one asset was the 
availability of land that could be developed. The development programme involved: 
-- 
" Demolition of all 546 remaining maisonettes. 
" 
Sale (to Barratts) and refurbishment of the three tower blocks (510 flats) in the central area 
(The Denes) for owner-occupation. 
" Refurbishment of the remaining 1949 houses and flats, including the creation of defensible 
space and the `turning around' of some properties by the addition of front porches on what had 
previously been backs. 
" Development by Barratts of 600 properties for sale. This would be in two land deals: 
-- 
the first 
would be a 15 acre site on which Barratte would build 280 dwellings, while the second would be 
a 22 acre site on which Barratts would build 320 dwellings. 
" Development by SVHA of 375 properties for fair rent or shared ownership (these were to be for 
tenants displaced by the demolition programme and were to be built mostly on small infill sites 
in the existing housing areas). 
" Construction of a new shopping arcade of 14 units, a police station, leisure centre (fimded by 
KMBC) and a small supermarket in the central area. 3 
In addition, there was also a restructuring of the management and repairs service, by which the 
Trust aimed to achieve substantial progress in basic repairs and mai denance work. 
The total scene was underwritten by a £50 million investment package of public and private funds, 
including, on the public side: 
-- 
" 
funds from the DoE under the Urban Programme (75% of £4.8 million for the improvement and 
development programme); 
" £8 million from the Housing Corporation to SVHA to build 375 new dwellings for fair rent and 
further funds to finance the shared ownership of houses; and 
" £2.42 million from Knowsley MBC as a mortgage payment and contributory funds through the 
Urban Programme (25% of 14.8 million). 
The Trust's purchase of the estate for £7.42 million was financed by mortgage loans of £3 million 
from Abbey National, £2 million from Barclays and £2.42 million from Knowsley MBC. In 
addition, Barclays provided an overdraft facility of £2 million. A key player in the development 
programme was Barratts who agreed to buy land on the estate and build 600 dwellings for sale. 
They also made a provisional agremnent to refurbish for sale the 510 flats in the three tower blocks 
in the central area, which they would purchase for £1 million. Barratts were also to act as the sole 
contractor for all renovation and new building work undertaken by the Trust and SVHA, this status 
being intended to underwrite the risks of their building for-sale schemes. 
The developmuit programme was to be substantially complete within five years (i. e., April 1988). 
To secure the early confidence of residents and the Trust's financial backers, the programme was 
heavily weighted in favour of Years 1 and 2. By April 1985, the Trust aimed to have completed 
more than half of the maisonette demolitions and the scheduled improvements to the dwelling areas 
as well as the redevelopment of the central area and a third of the new dwellings for rent (RTP, 
1987, p. 13-14). 
3 Hetherington (1988, p. 8) noted that although a new £1.2 million shopping centre was completed, it was 
promptly burned down by vandals and subsequently rebuilt at a cost of £750,000. 
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C. 1.4 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
The Trust's approach to tenant involvement was outlined in its first annual report where it 
committed itself to consulting "... with our tenants to ascertain that what we plan to do has their 
general support and approval. " (from Brindley, et al., 1989, p. 154). Thus, although regular 
newsletters and street meetings sought to keep people informed, there was no explicit commitment to 
participation; instead, tenant acquiescence was required. Brindley, et al., (ibid, p. 154) note that the 
non-involvement of tenants in the early years was an explicit policy approach: 
"Tom Baron argued that, in order to get the redevelopment programme going, 
strong specialist leadership from the professionals and private sector managers 
was required; the community were to take a back seat, becoming more involved 
once the renewal programme was completed At this stage the balance of the 
population would have shifted with over 50% owner-occupancy, providing an 
appropriate base for more participation of local people. ". 
Nevertheless, writing in 1984, Grosskurth (1984, p. 25) noted the biggest problem then facing the 
Trust was "... quelling dissent among a small 
- 
but very vocal 
- 
minority of tenants who accuse 
their new landlords of broken promises, unresponsive and secretive management practices and 
sinister plans for social engineering. ". Organised into the Cantril Farm Combined Tenants' 
Association, the tenants had been ".. a thorn in the side of the Trust since the word go. " (ibid, 
p. 25). Grosskurth (ibid, p. 26) also noted that heading the TA's catalogue of grievances were, first, 
what it regarded as `clandestine decision-malting' by the Trust. The board's meetings were held in 
private and its minutes were confidential. Brindley, et al., (1989, p. 153) observed that most of the 
crucial decisions appeared to be made in a financial sub-committee of the board, consisting of the 
chair and the representatives of the mortgagees (Abbey National, Barclays and KMBC). This 
effectively excluded the community representatives and it appeared that "... many proposals and 
plans [were] first agreed by the finance sub-committee, with the full board formally ratifying 
them. " (ibid, 1989, p. 153). Thus, as Brindley, et al., (ibid, p. 154) argue, the community 
representatives were there to add `legitimacy' but "... not to act as delegates from their 
constituencies; rather they [were] meant to represent the Trust's views to residents. ". Grosskurth (1984, p. 26) reported that the Trust insisted "... that nothing [was] being held back from the 
tenants, and that community and political representation on the board [was] an adequate 
guarantee of accountability. ". She, nevertheless, also cited Stuart Speedon of SCAT (Services to 
Community Action and Tenants) who had been working with dissident tenants over the previous 
year: "It's coercive planning in the classic mould ". (ibid, p. 26). A tenant stated: "... they tell us 
what they're going to do and then ask for our approval. " (ibid, p. 26) 
Second was an allegedly `divide-and-eile' approach to consultation. With development proceeding 
on a phased basis, the Trust had been holding separate meeting with small groups of tenants. The 
TA argued that these meetings should have been opened up to the euere estate as decisions in one 
area would affect the future of another. The Trust countered that the approach was practical since 
it was not possible to involve 2500 people in a discussion of what would happen in the first phase. 
A further concern was the issue of decanting. The maisonettes to be demolished and some of the 
tower blocks had to be deca ted. Although decanted tenants were given alternative accommodation, 
no guarantees were given that tenants could return to the estate; the Trust had only pledged to use its 
best endeavours to enable people to say on the estate. Furthermore, the declared aim of the Trust 
was to increase the proportion of owner-occupiers an the estate. In some quarters, those bang 
decanted were regarded as the `problem families' and it seemed there might be a deliberate policy 
not to allow them to return. Ton Baron, for example, was reported by Grosskurth (1984, p. 26) as 
having said: "Eighty per cent of the problems on this estate were caused by 10% of the erlies, 
and we'll get rid of them if wer can. ". 
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Brindley, et al., (1989, p. 155) regard the approach to tenant involvement as paternalistic: "... 
helping those whom its advocates believe are not capable of helping themselves. ". Although the 
Trust provided information and sought to take tenants along with it, it did not regard itself as 
accountable to local people nor did it actively seek their involvement in decision-making. Arguably, 
the relationship's tone had been set at the project's launch, where, at public meetings and in 
newsletters, residents were "... offered the opportunity to have their area taken over by a private 
trust, but it was made plain that no alternative was in the offing 
- 
the choice was something or 
nothing. " (ibid, 1989, p. 154). 
C. 1.5 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
By early 1985, the Trust had 
- 
at least temporarily 
-- 
created the impression that a private agency 
could achieve more, had more money and was more efficient than the council. Despite criticism 
regarding tenant involvement, the Trust had fostered a lot of goodwill among tenants and 
redevelopment had begun. The report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 17), for example, noted tenants 
were optimistic and their confidence had been engaged. A key indicator was that the rate of tenants 
leaving the estate had slowed considerably and the number of tenants wishing to be re-housed in the 
Village was far higher than anticipated. In 1985, the Trust had a housing waiting list of over 300 
applicants. Furthermore, even before the Trust had started to promote the scheme heavily, some 
tenants had exercised their RTB. Nevertheless, although the Trust had made substantial progress 
toward achieving its Phase 1 target, it was still well short of meeting it. By April 1985, the 
remodelling of the estate's housing was considerably behind schedule. The maisonette demolition 
programme was half the level planned. The improvement programme was also running substantially 
behind; by April 1985 only 14% of the dwellings due for treatment had been dealt with. 
The Trust had, in fact, run into a number of major obstacles that came to the fore in mid 1985. The 
intention had been for the estate to be self-financing after the completion of an initial improvement 
and development programme. The central issue was for the programme to succeed as an 
investment, with the improvements being designed to increase property values on the estate. The 
Trust could then realise the additional value through sales and increased rents (RTP, 1987, p. 16). 
The capital programme would be financed by a combination of private money raised from RTB 
sales and other sales of vacant and vacated dwellings and land for development and public sector 
grant support. The revenue account would be balanced with rental income covering running costs 
and debt charges. Although the number of rented dwellings would fall, it was anticipated rents on 
the remainder would rise, while improvements in management efficiency and the condition of the 
rented stock would reduce running costs. There were a number of risks in this approach, including: 
- 
- 
the level of take-up of the RTB; interest rates on loans remaining close to the estimated level of 
11%; the achievement of rent increases in line with the costs of running the estate and servicing the 
loan charges; and the ability to implement the development programme at the estimated cost (ibid, 
p. 16). 
By the autumn of 1985, the financial strategy had unravelled and the Trust was in financial crisis. 
On the revenue side, the existing rent levels were too low to cover management and other costs. 
Debt charges had also increased as interest rates rose. The plan had been for a high standard of 
maintenance and repair, to be paid for by higher rants and more efficient management. The Trust, 
as a private landlord, was bound by fair reit legislation and its rants 
-- 
its only source of current 
income 
- 
were subject to the decisions of the reit officer. On properties it had improved, the Trust 
asked for reut increases. Generally, however, only modest rant increases were allowed as the rent 
officers made judgements on criteria such as local rents for a similar type and quality of dwelling. 
As the report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 27) noted, contributing to the Trust's difficulties was the fact that the rents inherited from KMBC in 1983 were, even in 1985, higher than fair rents on 
equivalent improved properties elsewhere in the region. Although in part this could be attributed to 
the problems caused for landlords by reit controls, it also demonstrated a lack of foresight on the 
part of the Trust and its promoters. Thus, although the Trust had been established as a commercial 
venture, no action had been taken to clarify the criteria by which its principal revenue source would 
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be determined (ibid, p. 27). By 1985, the gap between the rental income and the running costs was 
in the order of about £400,000 per year, which had to be made up from its capital account at a time 
when there was severe pressure there as well (Hetherington, 1988, p. 8). 
Problems also beset the capital side. It had been envisaged that this would be financed via property 
and land sales, with any shortfall being made up by public funding and a bridging overdraft. The 
Trust's problem was that while the public sector contribution was forthcoming, the funds to be 
generated from the private sector were not. Furthermore, the costs of the various projects had 
spiralled. The cost of the improvement programme, for example, was increasing because the 
physical condition of the estate was much poorer than had been assumed. The report for the DoE 
(ibid, p. 19) noted the housing stock on the estate had been "... surveyed only in a superficial way. 
... 
many of the initial estimates were not bared on detailed costings. " (RTP, 1987, p. 19). Interest 
rates also soared much higher than had been anticipated. Essentially the Trust had massively 
underestimated the cost of work and substantially over-estimated its receipts from sales (Brindley, et 
al., 1989, p. 148-9). The Government's auditors were also critical of the accounting control 
exercised by the Trust over Barratts as the sole contractors for renovation and building work on the 
estate. The consultants were `disconcerted' to discover the `informal nature of interactions' (ibid, 
1989, p. 149) and recommended that in future the Trust's contract work should be put out to tender. 
Although confidence had been boosted, there was no great influx of higher-income newcomers and 
the estate's tenure structure was to a large extent unchanged with only a small increase in the 
number of owner-occupiers. Including those who had brought from Barratts (including a shared 
ownership scheme), owner-occupiers made up 15% of total households in Stockbridge 
- 
almost 
three times the level in 1983 (RTP, 1987, p. 24) (see Table Cl). By 1985,221 tenants had brought 
their homes from the Trust, bringing the total number of RTBs to 404 (RTP, 1987, p. 17). Although 
RTB sales had a target rate of 120 each year and were to be a major source of funds for the Trust, 
the ability of Stockbridge tenants to purchase their houses under RTB or the shared ownership 
scheme should have been examined more closely at the outset. RTB sales depend not just on the 
value of the asset being bought but also on the tenant's ability-to-pay. Market research, for 
example, into incomes and employment levels would have revealed whether there was an effective 
demand for the purchase of improved houses at increasing prices (RTP, 1987, p. 27). In addition, 
the difference in terms of value for money between renting and buying must be relatively clear-cut. 
During it first years, for example, the Trust had been handicapped by low rents and high mortgage 
interest rates; had it been able to impose higher rents and if there had been lower interest rates, its 
position would have been better (ibid, p. 27). Furthermore, although the Trust had slowed the rate of 
leaving of the estate with more tenants than expected expressing a preference to stay on the estate, 
this also resulted in a dramatic reduction in vacancies and preventing the Trust from achieving sales 
with vacant possession (RTP, 1987, p. 25). Furthermore, Barratts' first development of 56 houses 
had been built an the most promising of the available sites 
-a vacant site, detached from the 
reminder of the estate, and prominently situated at the entrance to the area. The pace of sales, 
however, was disappointing. Barratts considered this indicated a weak market for private housing 
and, although they started work on a further 42 properties, were reluctant to undertake the level of 
new build 
-- 
600 new units 
- 
envisaged in the Trust's original plans. 
Barratts' involvement was also crucial to the renovation of the estate's central area, which was 
dominated by three 22-storey tower blocks, known as The Denes. The intention was for the blocks 
to be decanted and sold to Barratts, who would refurbish than for sale. On loser inspection, the 
blocks were in much poorer condition than anticipated, which meant both that the refurbishment 
would be more eacpensive and that Barratts would want to offset these costs by a lower purchase 
price. Although progress was made on decanting tenants, Barrafts became increasingly uncertain 
about the scheme's viability and, early in 1985, withdrew. The failure to proceed with this project 
removed the prospect of a £1 million receipt for the Trust and effectively blighted the remainder of 
the plans for the central area. As Brindley, et at., (1989, p. 147) noted: "... the refurbishment of 
The Denes w, as at the heart of the confidence-bui ding renewal plan. The Danes project was to 
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bring in higher-income groups, introduce a further S10 owner-occupiers to the area and provide 
an appropriate catchment population for the new shopping centre. ". By mid-summer 1985, it had 
become clear to all parties that the only remaining option was to demolish them (RTP, 1987, p. 19). 
With hindsight, the £7.42 million 
-- 
the price set by the District Valuer 
-- 
the Trust had paid for the 
estate was seen as far too high. Hetherington (1988, p. 8). for example, argued that "... by common 
consent, the `market value' of the estate 
- 
and many believe it had a `negative value' anyway 
-- 
was nearer to £5 million instead of £7.42 million. ". By the late 1980s, the emerging view was 
that, if a viable longterm solution to an estate's problems was to be found, the costs of buying 
tenanted estates had to be consistent with the purchaser's ability to pay. 
The report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 28) concluded "... with the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious 
that there was a high probability that the costings were too low, that the expected receipts were 
too high and the programme timing too ambitious. ". In mitigation, however, the report did note 
that in `large part' this was explained by political factors, including "... the pressure on the 
participants to launch the project and demonstrate an early response to the problems threatening 
Merseyside in the wake of the Toxteth riots. ". The key problem was the original financial plan had 
been both optimistic and relatively inflexible, and, in particular, there was very little scope for 
raising additional finds. None of the private sector partners was an equity partner: each was 
involved for what it could gain from the initiative and, if it ceased to make `business sense', could 
withdraw. On the public side, the various grants were all cash-limited. The report for the DoE (ibid, 
p. 27) cogently outlined the problem: 
"In a commercial financial structure, such as that adopted by the Trust, 
unforeseen cost increases should be identified through monitoring and 
accommodated either through adjustments to the programme or through raising 
additional capital if it can be justified to the investors. A fundamental weakness 
in the Trust's financial plan was that it had no flexibility. The Trust had 
committed itself to a standard level of improvement throughout the estate, yet it 
had no straightforward access to additional funds: the grants were cash-limited 
and there were no equity investors. This left the Trust ill-equipped to meet the 
changes that arose in the first two years, regardless of whether those changes 
could have been anticipated or not. ". 
C. 1.6 THE RESCUE 
Brindley, et at, (1989, p. 149) noted that the private and public partners involved in the Trust 
reacted differently to the financial crisis: "... the former eared themselves out or sought to 
minimise their role, while the latter became more deeply committed in directing and resourcing 
the Trust's programme. ". At the local level, as the council had given its backing to the scheme and 
its reputation depended on it succeeding, the leadership of KMBC did not want to see the Trust 
publicly fail. Nevertheless, as Brindley, et al., (1989, p. 150) noted, "... a number of councillors, 
parry activists and officials, felt that the Trust's problems provided a useful weapon with which to 
attack the Government's housing policy and demonstrate the inadequacies of private sector 
solutions. ". Having given its support thus far, it was difficult for KMBC to withdraw. Hence, 
somewhat reluctantly, the council found itself committed to propping up the Trust (ibid, 1989, 
p. 150). There was also increasing pressure on the Government for a rescue to be mounted since it 
was a high-profile initiative closely allied to its own ideology. 
After nearly a year of negotiations, in the Autumn of 1986, a revised financial package and 
reformulated development progrannne was agreed. The financial package consisted of an additional 
funding of £10 million from the Urban Programme, with central Government and KMBC splitting 
their support on a 3: 1 basis (Brindley, et at., 1989, p. 150). The rescue package also confirmed the 
abandonment of a private sector-led recovery for Stockbridge. Baron's original plan had envisaged 
15% public sector financial support with the remaining resources coming from the private sector. 
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By the time the Trust had been formally established in April 1983, the ratio of planned funding had 
moved closer to an equal split between the sectors. After 1986, the financial package for the 
modified programme involved the public sector taking the dominant role and providing two-thirds of 
the funding. The report for the DoE (RTP, 1987, p. 32) nevertheless concluded with the observation 
that tenants had "... continued to place their confidence in the Trust, and if anything, it would 
appear that the financial difficulties have helped strengthen ties between the community and its 
Trust. ". 
C. 1.7 THE EXIT STRATEGY 
In 1994, the Trust felt it had completed its task and was developing an exit strategy. The plan was 
for the Trust to be wound up and the remaining housing transferred o the VHA. 4 The two 
organisations were closely related; sharing a chief executive, chair and several board members. 
According to Bright (1994c, p. 12), the Trust saw its job as done, admitted it had become harder to 
secure private sector finance and believed that borrowing would be easier if it was by a registered 
HA. Asa private company, the Trust did not need to ballot tenants on the transfer, but, following a 
request from the then housing minister, Sir George Young, agreed to hold a ballot. Public meetings 
in each area were held to explain the transfer. The ballot was conducted by KMBC. There was 
only one day to vote, although postal votes were available. The ballot showed a clear majority in 
favour of the transfer (466 votes in favour with 35 votes against). The turnout, however, was only 
28%; hence, of the 2000 eligible tenants only one quarter had actually voted in favour of transfer. 
Bright (1994c, p. 13) compared the ballot process with the method used by the Electoral Reform 
Society for LSVT ballots, which were typically undertaken by post, usually over a three-week 
period, with reminder letters being sent out halfway through and with turnouts usually in excess of 
70%. George Jewell, Secretary of the Stockbridge Village Tenants' & Residents' Association (from 
Bright, 1994c, p. 13) argued that: "Local people have not been properly involved there was no 
independent advice for tent and no financial information about the transfer. ". The positive 
power in terms of a ballot is to enhance the ability to negotiate prior to the ballot, the power at the 
time of this ballot is only a negative power of veto. Without prior negotiations, the ballot can only 
show acquiescence and arguably, therefore, the tenants did not got as good a deal as they might have 
done. 
C. 2 THAMESMEAD 
C. 2.1 BACKGROUND 
The Thamesmead estate was developed m east Landon during the late 1960s by the Greater London 
Council (GLC). With the prospect of the GLC's abolition in 1986, the future of its housing estates 
became the responsibility of the London Residuary Body (LRA). For the Thamesmead estate, there 
were initially three options: 
-- 
to transfer it to LB Greenwich or LB Bentley (the two local councils 
- 
neither of which actually wanted it), or to split it between than (Fielding, 1986, p. 26). In 1985, 
Clive Thornton 
- 
at that time chief executive of Abbey National 
- 
visited the estate with the then 
junior environment minister, Sir George Young. On the way back, they discussed the possibility of 
a trust along the lines of Stockbridge Village; but, as Thornton (from Fielding, 1986, p. 26) 
describes, that kind of trust 
- 
mostly run by builders and financial institutions 
-- 
would not 
appropriate: "We weren't dealing with a sink estate, but with a community which wants to grow. 1 
suggested to Sir George the idea of a ballot and a board chosen from people living there, and 
things started rollingfrom that point on. ". 
Thor ton was girren an office at the DoE and some staff to help him develop his ideas. They 
considered the 18,000 residents at Thamesmead could be split into nine groups of 2000, each of 
which could elect a local representative to sit an the board of a community trust, which would run 
and manage the estate. There would also be a chair, a chief executive and finance director. In late 
Other possible options were for the VHA and the Trust to merge; to transfer the housing to other HAs; or 
for the properties to return to the local authority. 
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1985, LB Greenwich announced it wanted to put a counter-proposal to Thamesmead residents. 
According to Thornton (from Fielding, 1986, p. 26): "Their first option was for a board of twenty- 
one Greenwich councillors, very few of whom would have been local, although this was then 
modified to fourteen Greenwich councillors -- two of whom would have represented Thamesmead - 
- 
and seven others. All the same, control would have rested outside the site. ". It was agreed to 
hold a ballot of tenants to decide between the two options. The ballot was held on Friday 25 and 
Saturday 26 October 1985. Preceding the ballot was a two-week consultation period in which both 
Thornton and LB Greenwich leader, John Austin-Walker, addressed large public meetings. The 
ballot was organised by consultants who delivered ballot papers to every adult resident, including 
the 1,650 owner-occupiers. Voters cast their votes in booths set up in shops, community centres 
and libraries. Given the disappointing 36% turnout, it was decided to go door-to-door to ask 
residents to hand in their papers. A further 9% turnout was achieved over the next five days. 
Despite this unorthodox balloting procedure, there were no complaints of foul play and the result 
was accepted by all parties (Fielding, 1986, p. 26),. The result was 3,461 for Thornton's 
Thamesmead Community Trust and 2,861 for Greenwich's Thamesmead Community Developers; a 
600 majority for the Community Trust! 
C. 2.2 THAMESMEAD TOWN LTD 
In late 1985, following the ballot, the proposed community trust was established as a private 
company, Thamesmead Town Limited (TTL). The terms of the estate's transfer to the Trust were 
controversial. The estate had an outstanding debt of £130 million borne by London ratepayers. The 
district valuer valued the estate at £25 million. The Trust could not afford to pay this and the 
Secretary of State was required to adjudicate. He imposed a transfer for £2.5 million (10% of the 
market value or £400 per property) (from LD, 28 July, 1988, col. 440). There was also a promise 
that the proceeds from RTB sales until 1999 would be given to the London Residuary Body. The 
outstanding debt would continue to be paid by all the ratepayers in London at an annual cost of £16 
million. in return, Londoners would get access to the housing in Thamestnead through the Greater 
London Mobility Scheme (Brimacombe, 1988, p. 13) 6 
As a private company, TTL received no direct subsidies from either central or local government and 
had to be run as a commercial venture. It therefore had to raise capital at commercial rates; the 
costs of which were included in its calculations for rats and services. It found it difficult to run and 
maintain the estate, however, and sought to increase its revenue by raising rents. Four months after 
it acquired the estate, it made 5,500 applications to the rent officer for the registration of new rents. 
Ian McCartney MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 430) argued that there was no consultation, 
referendum or regular communication, and that it was clear from the number of applications the 
action must have been planned months in advance. When the rent officer failed to increase the rents 
sufficiently, the company decided to increase service charges instead, tenants therefore found 
themselves with rent levels substantially increased by the imposition of various types of service 
charges (McCartney, Commons Committee G. 16 February, 1988, col. 873). As McCartney (ibid, 
col. 881) said in committee, "... the upshot is that the so-called trust or limited company is now 
imposing swingeing additional weekly costs on tenants. Their rents include service charges. 
Those arrangements were not made clear to residents or meaningfully discussed before 
Thamesmead Town Ltd was established ". By 1988, the rents including service charges had risen 
by 50% in the three years after TTL had taken over. Furthermore, as Brimacombe (1988, p. 13) 
observed, tenants argued that increases in rents and service charges subsidised homeowners in the 
' Ian McCartney MP (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 430) argued in the Commons that a document titled, 
Thamesmead in Private Hands. stated that, according to a MORI poll conducted in 1988, it was the votes of 
the owner occupiers that swung the vote against the local authority joint community trust option, and, 
second, that a vast majority of tenants would prefer some form of public ownership. The controversy was 
nether fuelled by later reports that "... the derelict land holding of Thamesmead plc is worth about £300 
million. That has been stripped from the public pease. " (McCartney, ibid, col. 514). 
6 In 1988, however, TTL withdraw from this scheme. 
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town who did not have to pay such charges but benefited from many of the services. 
C. 2.3 TENANT INVOLVEMENT 
Despite the fact that the company's board was overwhelmingly made up of community 
representatives, TTL also attracted criticism for the manner in which it consulted with its tenants. 
McCartney (CD, 14 June, 1988, col. 430) argued that Thornton had publicly said that he wanted 
`direct democracy' on Thamesmead and what that meant could be seen in the way in which the 
operations of the nine community directors were restricted: 
"None of them is an executive director. The company has all the real power, and 
it consists of Clive Thornton, the chairman, Phillip Glascoe, the chief executive, 
and a finance director, who is seconded from the National Westminster bank 
The nine directors cannot be deselected or reselected for three years. They may 
not disclose any material relating to confidential items. Although Board meetings 
are public, any item of interest to tenants, such as rents and repairs, is treated as 
confidential. The community directors may not disclose how they voted on any 
item, but must uphold the majority decisions in public. In practice, that means 
that there is no way of knowing how or whether they represent their 
constituencies. The board has control over the election rules, and anyone who 
leaves it for any reason, such as resignation, cannot run again for election for 
three years. That prevents any kind of principled opposition being expressed 
through the ballot box. ". 
Furthermore, Brimacombe (1988, p. 13) noted that, although there was no evidence of foul play in 
the election procedures, the balance of interests on the board fell in favour of home owners. 
C. 2.4 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
One of 'ITL's prime assets was development land and, by the late 1980s, it had been able to 
encourage several private sector housing developments around the estate. The funds generated also 
eased its financial difficulties. Further developments, however, fell victim to the late 1980s property 
recession. Nevertheless, by 1995, it had stabilised its position. As Hatchett (1995, p. 14) reported, 
it had assets of £120 million, a turnover of £20 million and "... hardly any debts to speak of. ". It 
also had a town centre, 5000 rented units, 300 acres of parks and open spaces, 600 acres of 
development land and plans for a new 3000 unit urban village (ibid, p. 14). The company, however, 
was still uncertain of its role and found difficulty in striking an appropriate balance between its 
property and community interests. Hatchett (ibid, p. 15), for example, commented that the company 
had "... drifted along, raising rents with a vengeance, but uncertain whether it war a hard-nosed 
commercial landlord or a community organisation. ". 
C. 3 ISSUES FOR HAT POLICY 
To conclude this Appendix, it is useful to highlight the important issues for HAT policy arising from 
the experiences in Stockbridge Village and Thamesmead: 
- 
" arrangements for ballot; 
" transfer teams of estates from local authorities; 
" local authority support and involvement; 
" striking appropriate balance between property interests and community/people interests; 
" tenants support, liaison and consultation; 
" tenant organisation and representation; 
" tenant involvement in decision-making; 
" accountability of managing board to local people; 
" tenure diversification and displacement of existing tenants; 
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" assessment of local housing demand and strength of local housing markets; 
" possibility of new build development to help fund improvements; 
" commitment and reliability of private sector partners; 
" rent regimes and possibility of rent increases; 
" necessity of through surveys to establish condition of housing accommodation prior to costing 
of improvement programme; 
" reliability of funding stream and especially the funding of the improvement programmes, 
including probability of unexpected costs; and 
" coherence of exit strategy. 
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Appendix D 
SUMMARY OF WALTHAM FOREST HAT 
TENANTS' EXPECTATIONS DOCUMENT 
TENANTS EXPECTATIONS DOCUMENT 
The TED had seven main sec bens: 
- 
" Tenants consultation & influence; 
" 
Tenancy agre neat & reats; 
" Lettings policy, 
" Redevelopmad 
" Financial issues; 
" Sating up the HAT; 
" 
Options ate end ofthe HAT 
TENANT CONSULTATION & INFLUENCE 
Al. Roo- the eswes 
The JSG: Tama to have a guaranteed say in the running of their esp. 
The DoE: The DoE would expect the HAT to consider allowing tenants to form Estate Manalenernt 
Boards, which would be given responsibility for running the estates widhin HAT policy, or consultative 
Ndgibourhood Management Committees. 
John Chumrow: The HAT could only succeed if there was maximum involvement of tenants in all estates. 
It would be his firm intention that Estate Afinagenient Boards or similar, tenant led bodies, should be 
established as soon as possible after a positive ballot. 
A2. Twnmts members of the HAT board 
The JSG: Tenants should be able to choose the tenant members of the HAT board, who should make up a 
majority of the HAT board. Failing that there should be at least four tenant board members. The persons 
who reouve the most votes in any election on each estate should be appointed as one of the tenant board 
members. 
The DoE: By law, all board members will be appointed by the Secretary of State for the envirocune 
. Four board mirnbets will be appointed fron persons nominated by tenants. To allow the Secretary of 
State discretion, and to ens= the best possible balance of men and women is achieved and that ethnic 
minorities an represented on the Board, each estate will be asked to nominate two or three members. 
John Chumrow: Supports the view of the DoE. It would be important to have members who were eacpert 
in a number of fields which could include: 
- 
capital expernditure an buildings; housing mane neat; 
finance; training; job creation and architectural design. On the question of the `first past the post' 
requirement, he would be happy to support the view of the JSG and would make this paint direct to the 
minister. There would be no question of an `us and tan' situation; the board must have collective 
responsibility for discharging the duties of the HAT. 
A3. RRnavd of beard members 
The JSG: If ter s are not satisfied with the performance of tenant board members it should be possible 
to have than removed 
The DoE: Only the Secretary of State can appoint or remove board manbers. If traft are dissatisfied 
with the perfonnanoe of any board member, they can make a complaint to the Secretary of State and ask 
that he review die membership of that person. 
John Chow. If some duly constituted body representing twants' views indicated that they wem 
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dissatisfied with the performance of a board member then he would support representation to the minister 
that the person should be removed from the board. 
At Rat of local mit 
The JSG: If local management proves unsatisfactory there should be a guaranteed procedure for 
organising the election of more suitable people. 
The DoE: It is up to tenants to consider how dley wish to take patt in estate man gament and then to 
negotiate suitable array s with the HAT board. 
Join Chumvw: He is committed to the formation of EMBs, or similar, tenant-controlled bodies, to 
manage the estates. 
AS. Right to vote in ballot 
The JSG: Every tenant whose name appears on a tenancy agr+eemait shall have the riglrt to vote in the 
ballot which will determine whether or not the HAT should go ahead. 
The DDoE: All secure tenants 
- 
including both tenants where there is a joint tenancy, tied tenants such as 
caretakers and, where they live on the premises, long leaseholders of flats bought wider the RIB, and 
business tos, are entitled under the 1988 Heg Aid to vote in the ballot. 
A6. Majority vote 
The JSG: The ballot of the ballot will be based an the wishes of a majority of those voting. 
The DoE: thder the 1988 How' Act. the Secretary of State cannot proceed with a designation order to 
set up a HAT if a majority of tenants who vote are opposed to the proposal. The finster has said that he 
does not consider it appropriate to propose a minimum turnout in advance 
- 
the question of a minimum 
turnout should be immaterial in practice. 
A7. Separate ballots 
The JSG: There should be a separate ballot on each estate and dariäcation of the position if only one 
estate voted `Yes'. 
The DoE: Tiere will be a separate ballot for each estate. On their own, one of the four Waltham Forest 
estates would not normally qualify for a Trust. A Trust might be justified where there were well over 
1000 dwellings on those estates that voted m favour of a HAT proposal. If there were fewer than 1000 
the Govenun 1 would have to look very carefully to see what machinery ni& be appropriate. 
AS. I+Mme consdtaian 
The JSG: Guarantee of co tinued consultahan with tos over housing mane nuit and development 
issues throughout he HAT's life ima. 
The DDoE: The 1988 Bbusirmt Act requires a HAT to consult tenants on the 
, 
Statement of Proposals and on 
the choice, of a new landlord before the aid of a HAT. In addition, Ministers would expect the HAT 
board to work in dose co-operation with the tenants, in various ways: 
- 
consultation with all affected 
tare nts an key issues; consultation with representative towns; duo* the formation of bodies to maces 
the ; or advise in their managanel, which could include election oftanart representatives. 
John Chamrow: Consultation would continue at all times throe out the life of the HAT. It would be the 
responsibility of the tenants as a whole to decide an the nature and membership of the representative 
bodies with whom the HAT would negotiate. The meetings of the HAT would be opera to no-participating 
obsesvm, subject to private discussion of confidential matters. 
A9. Consalbfioa with Shadow Board 
The JSG: There should be an oppottmiity for tenazls to consult directly with the Shadow Board prior to 
the ballot. 
The DoE: Shadow board members will need to be involved in discussion with tenants, prior to the ballot, 
in agreeing what can be said in response to toasts' expectation and other matters. 
John Ononro 
. 
HAT board numbers nominated befiore the ballot would be invdved directly in the pro- 
ballot consultation. He would only be proposing people for the Board who were in tie with the aims and 
objectives of the HAT, neutral to which was the need to consult taw ts. As soon as poter tial members 
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were idedified he would introduce than to the JSG before any Enal decisions were takmi on 
app. 
TENANCY AGREEMENT & RENTS 
Bl. Rents & service costs 
The JSG: Rents including service charges should be frozen at the level of council rents which exist at the 
time the HAT takes over ownership of the estates until the end of each phase of the redevelopment works 
and that as tenants move into their now dwellings their rent will increase in stages to the level of the 
average council rat for similar properties. 
The DoE: The government accept the proposals that a tenant's rat should be frozen until after a tenants 
moves into his/her new home and that thereafter the rat should not be higher than the average of the LB 
Waltham Forest rents for similar properties. The HAT would be required by Section 85 of the 1988 
Housing ABC to review rents from time to time, however Meisters have agreed to make grant aid available 
to meet revenue wqxnditure if it proves necessary. It is therefore expected that such reviews would not 
lead to increases in rents during the period that ministers had agreed rents should be Ste. It would be 
for the Hat Board to determine whether it would be appropriate for a separate service charge to be 
identified. This elemern would not be frozen, but the Act requires any such charges to be reasonable. 
John Charanaw: Rents would be fromm until tenants move into th it new hones. Individuals would be 
permitted to pay more than their frozen rats if they so desired. It was likely that a single charge for rent, 
including services, would continue to be made and that any rat freeze would apply to the whole charge. 
BZ. Security of teu re 
The JSG: Taunts will be guaranteed security of tenure throughout the life of the HAT. 
The DoE: All secure tenants with LB Waltham Forest are guaranteed to retain that status with the HAT 
by Seilion 83 of the 1988 Hu ing Ad. 
B3. Tmcy agremient 
The JSG: Tenants will have a right to negobate and qm the proposed tenancy agmwient prior to the 
ballot. 
The DDoE: The principles of a draft tenancy agreement can be negotiated with the Chaim= designate (and 
1h& Shadow Board Members) before the HAT ballot. 
B4. Rim to buy 
The JSG: RTB is guaranteed and that presst discount entitleinurts are retained. 
The DoE: The 1988 1g Ad ensures that RTB discounts are retained, and the gowanmw t confirmed 
that discounts will take account of tenants' time with the council. Wheflher the tenants remains with the 
HAT or returns to the ooucicil, the cost floor rules means that the discount must not reduce the purchase 
price below, what has been spent an works to the houses over the previous eigt years. Where Ow mad at 
value is lower than the cost floor, die tenants buys at the mauset value but fiere is no discaart. If the 
tuet dwoses to tiarnfer to a private landlord the cost floor becomes the price the landlord pays for the 
property. 
BS. Involveux in eet- be mannageownt 
The JSG: Tenants' rights to be involved in estate n nagernat and maintenance should be guarar*eed in 
the Tananay Agreemecrt. 
The DoE: The consols of the Ta an y Agr+eeniert would be a matter for negotiatian between the Trist 
and the taunts. 
John Chumrow. C. ommwts at Al deal with this issue. 
IS& Rat wraes 
The JSG: Rent arrears incurred prior to the tiaraffi of properties to the Trust should remain the 
responsibility of the Borough. 
77w DoE: To be resolved as part of the ferse to identify the total value of the an transfer. 
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John Chumrow: For practical purposes, a rent wears policy shotdd be agreed prior to the ballot. 
B7. Relocadon expenses 
The JSG: Relocation expenses d fully compensate tenants for their removal costs and associated 
expenses. Double decanting to be avoided Wherever possible. 
The DDoE: Tenants would be appropriately compensated. The Government would wqmd double 
decanting to be avoided wherever possible. 
John Chumrow: The HAT would aim to ensure that no telant would be worse off as a result of 
relocation. The HAT would hope to arrange for tenants to move directly from their existing 
accommodation into new housing. Double decanting will be avoided wherever possible. 
LETTINGS POLICY 
C1. A lettings policy 
The JSG: The lettings policy drawn up by tenants should be agreed by the JSG before the Ballot. 
The DoE: The contents of the lettings policy would be a matter of Nation between the Trust and the 
tenants. 
John Chummw: No difficulties in accepting, in principle, the proposed lettings policy set out in the 
discussion paper included as a supplement to the TED. 
C2. Priority to existing t ii. i s 
The JSG: Existing tenants will be re-housed in the new dwellings before leäings are made to other people. 
The DoE: The goverrttna teq ects the Trust to give first priority in leäings to the re-housing of existing 
tenants. 
John Chumrow: It is essential that existing tenants can be re-housed in the new dwellings before any new 
lang tam 1ettngs are considered. 
C3. Sufficient homes for ess 
The JSG: There should be sufficient homes for all existing tenants. 
The DoE: The redevelopment proposals are based on a prudent view of the number of people who will 
leave the estate over the period of the redevelopment and that the problem of insufficient new homes will 
not arise. It if does it will be the responsibility of the HAT to ensure that more housing is provided. 
C4. No on rig1rt for cow 
The JSG: After all eaisdng tuna nts have been re-housed, the Borough should have guaranteed nomination 
rights to available housing. 
The DoE: The importance of the estates in the wider context of housing in LB Waltham Forest. The 
question of nomination rights would be a inaäer for negotiations between the borough council and the 
HAT Board. Seilion 70 of the 1988 Housing Act requires the HAT to co-operate in raxdering such 
assistance as is reasonable to the local and oiity in relation to the housing of the homeless. 
C5. Vacant flab 
Y he JSG: Flats which become vacant before redevelopmart should be used productively, to prevat 
unauthorised squatting, or vandalism, and to provide such housing for people in need. Such properties 
should be let on a short-term basis. 
The DoE: T is is a matter for discussion with the HAT board and borough council. 
John Chumm r There is no@iing worse than vacant properties. Where they arise, every effort will be 
made to re-let this accommodation paiding redevelopment. 
REDEVELOPMENT 
Before the mmisber of housing offered a HAT for the four edate% a considerable amotmt of work had 
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been done in assessing whidier the estates could be improved or whether they should be redeveloped. It 
had been decided that the redevelopment offered better value for money. Outline designs for the 
redevelopment had been prepared in dose consultation with tenants by two groups of architects: LB 
Waltham Forest's Chief Architect and the private practice of Hunt Thompson Associates. The designs 
for all four estates have received outline planning approval. The JSG was anxious to ensure that, in 
setting up the HAT, the Government would agree to support the redevelopment option and sought a 
number of guarantees. Successive Ministers have confirmed that the HAT's programme of work will be 
based on the redevelopment proposals. 
D1. Pro-redevelopment mainbwance 
The JSG: Essential maintenance, repair and improvemerts on the existing housing will be carried out until 
the major redevelopment works go ahead. 
The DoE: It is the responsibility of the Trust to undertake repairs and consider which improvements best 
represent value for money. However, very careful consideration will need to be given to whether 
investment will represent value for money. 
John Chumrow: The HAT would have a dear obligation to carry out essential repairs and maintenance. 
It would also wish to carry out improvements where these are regarded as necessary. 
D2. Redevelopment prograne 
The JSG: The building works will be guaranteed to follow an agreed proWamme, without any delays and 
that a programme will be published and agreed with tenants prior to the ballot. 
The DoE: An outline development programme, based on the existing redevelopment proposals, will be an 
esse dial clement on the proposals on which tenants will be balloted. In agreeing to proceed with a ballot, 
Ministers have accepted that if a HAT goes ahead it will be on the basis of redevelopment of the estates. 
John Chumrow: Illustrative programmes for the redevelopment of the estates are included in the 
supplement to the TED. These programmes should be discussed with each ESG and the relevant 
architect, in more detail, with a view to agreeing an outline pine of work over the HAT'S lifetime. 
D3. AN booming to be for lei 
The JSG: All the new housing will be available for rating and that no sales will take place 
. The DoE: It is intended that all of the new housing required to house emoting tenants will remain in the 
subsidised sector, subject to RTB, shared ownership an other low cost home ownership schemes. The 
r developmacýt proposals involve the raten ion, refurbishment and sale to the private sector of four tower 
blocks, on which the HAT would have to decide what to do in due course. 
John Chummw. All new housing will be available for letting to wasting tenants, who may, in due course, 
wish to charge the basis of their tenure, for example, by RIB. The future of any wasting house which is 
shown in the present design proposals as being retained will be discussed with the individual estate's ESG. 
D4. Retention of existing architects 
The JSG: Guarantees that the service of the existing architects will continue and that no changes would be 
made to the proposed schemes without consulting the tenants. 
The DOE: Existing architects would be retained to complete any work that is necessary for the purpose of 
the ballot. However, given the major scale of the project, other profianal practices might need to become involved, an a competitive basis, in the inplanaitation process. The HAT will be expected to 
provide for full tenant consultation with tenant representatives and individual tenants, throughout the 
project Section 64 of the 1988 Amin& Ac gives tenants the right to be consulted over the HAT's 
proposals, and these are expected to include the development programme. 
Jahn Onwiro : Quality, service and capacity, as well as price, would play important parts in any decisions about award contracts to ardutects. It is e visagd that the existing thief architects, Hunt 
Thompson Associates and the Borough Architect, would continue with the overall design brief Some of 
the more detailed design work would be put out to tender, but under the overall cocrtrol of the emisting 
architects. 
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Dä Niisancx during works 
The JSG: Building works will be organized to minimise nuisance, hazards and pollution. 
The DDoE: In addition to the statutory requirements, the Trust will introduce specific requiremarts to the 
building oorti s in order to mina ise nuisance, hazards and pollution. 
FINANCIAL ISSUES 
The establishm t of a HAT and the assurance which were given by the DoE and which were sought 
from the chairman designate and shadow HAT board members could only be fulfilled if money was made 
available to pay for the redevelopment and for the running of the estates. The JSG was therefore anxious 
to be reassured on these issues and to that end set out a number of expectations. 
El. Money for the HAT 
The JSG: Maley for the project should be guaranteed, despite any charges of 1Vfinistas. 
7 DoE: The gewm ner it firmly intends to provide the necessary resources to ensure that redevelopment 
can be canplerted and to allow social and economic problems in the area to be tacided. 
EL Money for corm t to buy bads housing 
The JSG: The council be guaranteed sufficiat finding to buy back the housing at the and of the HAT. 
The JSG had received assurances from the Labour council in LB Waltham Forest that if it was in power 
at the and o£the HAT it would be happy to buy bade the estate should that be the wish of the tenants and 
should the government make the necessary finance available. 
The DioE: Ministers have agreed that if tenants wish to return to the council, the council will be given 
additional resources to cover 100% of the repurrhase price. 
E3. Tias%rdle discounts 
The JSG: Tenants should be able to transfer their RTB discount to the purchase of a property an the open 
modest. 
The DoE: The Trust will consider whether they will offer cash incentives to tenants to buy properties 
elsewhere, thus releasing accommodation. 
E4. Hoasissß benefits 
The JSG: Housing benefit e tiflennnts should not be domed. 
The DDoE: Paymat of housing benefit is a mater for the courxil, but thoe is no reason why entitlements 
to housing benefit should dian®e. 
John Chumrow: As a mattet of principle, the HAT would follow the best local authority predige such as 
helping tenants obtain benefits to whidi they are entitled. To that end, he would want to open advice 
cakes an the ester. 
SETTING UP THE HAT 
Fl. Tesimst membership 
The JSG: For tenants to be able to chooae the tenants members of the HAT board and for these to make 
up a majority ofthose on the board, failing the latter that there should be at least four. 
The DoE: Minister Of Housing is not prepared to allow tenant members to form a majority an the HAT 
Board. See also section A2. 
John Chummw See also section A2. 
F2. Creations of jobs & co-. ty enbezpiise 
The JSG: The Trust should strive to create jobs locally and promote community a*ecprise. 
17m DoE: This falls within the Trust's statutory objectives and fiat will be available for such work. 
John Chumrow: The HAT will not succeed if it is unable to ina+ease employment opportunities on, or for 
the tenants a( the four estates. 
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F3. The time needed to setup the HAT 
The JSG: A target period of six months between completion of the ballot process and the formal 
establishina1 of the HAT. 
The DoE: Agree to endeavour to make every effort to shorten the time between a ballot and setting up the 
HAT and starting the redevelopment. 
F4. Equal oppor ies 
The JSG: The Trust should adopt the taunts groups' Equal Opportiuties Policy. 
The DoE: The Trust will meet statutory equal opportunities requiranerts and consult tenants an its future 
policy. 
John Chumrow. Will discuss with JSG its Equal Opportunities Policy as the basis for the HAT's position 
in this matter. 
OPTIONS AT THE END OF THE HAT 
G1. Taub' choice of f ihnt landlord 
The JSG: At the and of each stage of the redevelopment, tenants being re-housed in the new homes should 
have the rig1Yt to choose their future landlord 
. The DoE: The 1988 Hou W Act contains procedures for tenant consultation an the potions which will 
face than after the HAT has completed its work (or an appropriate phase of it). The HAT would be 
expected to meet tenants' wishes as far as possible and not to move than to a new landlord against their 
wishes during the life of die IHAT. However it is not intended that the HAT should remain perky in 
existence. When its work of rem the area was complete as far as possible, the HAT would be 
wound up. If at that stage, despite the previous consultation and opportunities to transfer, the HAT still 
owned some tenanted properties the HAT would be expelled to give those tenants nine months to consider 
the options open to than. At that final stage, however, it is conceivable that Ministers would have to use 
their order-making powers to transfer those remaining properties if a minority of tenants were unable to 
agree with any of the proposals. 
John Chuinrow: Until the red"opmait is complete and the HAT is wound up, it will still remain 
responsible for the overall management of the areas and the job training and job creation programmes. It 
will also need to ensure that all existing tenants can be re-housed before it can contemplate disposing of 
new stock. Within this overall principle, he saw no difficulty in endorsing the principles set out in the 
discussion paper Tenants' Choices of Future Landlords' contained in the supplement to the TED. 
SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION PAPERS 
The TED contained four suppl iy papers: 
- 
" Proposed HAT Lettings Paper 
" 
Cmtrol of Nuisance on Budding Sites 
" Tenants' Choice of Future Landlord 
" Current Deadlopn t Programmes 
THE TED ADDENDA 
In Jupe 1991, just prior to the HAT ballot, Addenda to the TED were produced. The Addenda contained 
the MawiIIg whidi clarified and added find detail to that in tha TED: 
- 
" Proposed HAT rend arrears reoov y policy, 
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" 
Triable discounts; 
" Proposed HAT equal opportunities policy, 
" 
Proposed HAT policy for repairs, maintenance and improvements; 
" Proposed HAT policy on tenant's clue of future landlord, 
" Proposed Tenancy Agreement; 
" Exists gg rat arrears; 
" Proposed HAT consultation arrangements; 
" 
Proposed HAT policy on compensation for relocation disturbance; 
" Proposed HAT lungs policy and 
" 
Proposed HAT policy on jobs and enterprise. 
PROPOSED HAT CONSULTATION ARRANGEMENTS 
The following proposed arrangements for consultation have been drawn up by the JSG. The 
Chairman Designate of the HAT has said that he would expect the HAT to adopt these proposals if 
the HAT is set up. The HAT should be committed to consult with tenants and actively to encourage 
tenants participation in its activities throughout its lifetime. The HAT should publish a dear and 
comprehensive statement of its consultation arrangements to include the following commitmerrts in 
addition to the statutory requirements: -- 
" To make available to tenants information about all matt rs of housing manag ont whidi affect then 
eider directly or indirectly. This information should also be made available in translation for tenants 
who speak languages other than English 
... 
" To consult tenants and representative tenant organisations beyond the statutory requireme its for 
consultation 
... 
" To use a range of appropriate methods of consultation and participation that should include tenant 
forums, public nmetmgs, joint pes, as well as letters, newsletters and questionnaires. On some 
issues, more than one method of consultation will be necessary 
. 
Where an issue affects tenants on 
only estate, consultation may be restricted to that estate. 
" 
To use appropriate methods of feedback fron the HAT, once tenants' views have been considered 
... 
" In parallel with the formal framework for consultation, the HAT should undertake to obtain feedback 
from tenants on services and activities at regular intervals, through appropriate measures (e g. 
surveys, postal questionnaires, tenants' panel meetings). Results of such feedback should be 
published, as well as the response of the HAT to the findings and should be linked into a framework 
for performance monitoring 
" Realistic time-scales for consultation should be adhered to on all issues, allowing sufficiat time for 
tenants and representative t nants' groups to respond. (from Addenda to the TED, WFHAT, 1991b). 
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Appendix E 
SUMMARY OF THE 
LIVERPOOL JOINT STATEMENT 
LIVERPOOL HAT JOINT STATEMENT 
The Foreword to the Liverpool HAT Joint Statemerrt (LHAT, 1992, p. 1) states that: 
"This statement has been prepared to set out: 
- 
the HAT's objectives; how it will 
be setup and run; what it will do; the HAT's housing and other policies; what will 
happen at the end of the HAT; undertakings by various parties. The statement 
responds to tenants' concerns about these issues and shows how tenants will be 
involved in the decision-making process. It also covers tenants' rights with a 
HAT landlord This is an agreed statement: it has been drawn up in consultation 
with residents. The Shadow Chair, the Chairperson of the HRTG, the Leader of 
Liverpool City Council and the Minster of Housing are content with the 
statement, as indicated by their signatures below. ". 
The following is an abridged version of the main parts of the Joint Statement. 
OBJECTIVES 
1.1 The overall objectives of the Liverpool HAT will be: 
- 
to improve the physical condition and 
security of the housing in its designated area; to secure the proper and effective mange! nt and use 
for that housing; to improve the social conditions and the environment, in the are, and wherever 
possible, to improve the local economic conditions; and to provide a wider choice of housing tenure. 
SETTING UP THE HAT 
Consultation 
Section 2.1 
Ballot 
Sections 2.2 to 2.6 including: 
-- 
2.5 In the ballot, residents will be asked to vote either Yes or No on whether they are in favour of a 
HAT being established for the blocks on their site. 
2.6 Voting will be conducted on a site by site basis on the 39 sites. The HAT will take over blocks 
on a site only where the proposal has been supported by a majority of those who voted in the ballot 
an that site. 
Ballot to Transfer 
Sections 2.7 to 2.10 including: 
-- 
2.7 Following as aful ballot, the HRTG will move quickly to select the four tenant board 
members and the city council will nominate them to. the Secretary of State for appointor t. 
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Boundaries 
Section 2.11 
The HAT Board 
Sections 2.12 to 2.17 including: 
- 
2.13 The Secretary of State for the environment is responsible for the appointment of all board 
members. The Secretary of State will wish to be satisfied that every board member is committed to 
achieving the HAT's objectives and to the best interests of the tenants in each block. 
2.14 The Secretary of State will appoint eleven board members. The chair (Mrs Paula Ridley -- 
already appointed) and five members will be nominees of the Secretary of State 
... 
2.15 The other five members will be the nominees of Liverpool city council and the tenants. Of 
these, one is Councillor Harry Rimmer, already appointed as deputy chair, and four will be tenant 
members selected by the tenants of the dwellings to be transferred to the HAT. 
2.16 Although the Secretary of State is formally responsible for the appointing the tenant members 
to the board, he will not become involved in their selection and nomination. The arrangements for 
selecting the tenant members are a matter for the tenants and the council, although the Secretary of 
State will wish to be assured that the process is fair and reasonable. 
2.17 Only the Secretary of State can appoint or remove a board member, and all are appointed in 
their personal capacities. However, if tenants become dissatisfied with the performance of any 
board member, they will be able to make a complaint to the Secretary of State and request his 
review of that person's membership 
... 
The HAT Executive 
Sections 2.18 
FINANCE 
F=Wing 
Sections 3.1 & 3.2 
Land 
Section 3.3 
STRATEGY /POLICY 
Sections 4.1 to 4.3 including: 
-- 
4.1 Once formally established, the HAT will need to prepare a Manageinent Stateme t. The 
Management Statement will set out the main elements of the statutory framework and the lines of 
aaýountability. It should clarify the position of the HAT in relation to the secretary of state, the 
local authority and tarts, and provide a framework for the preparation of corporate plans and for 
the approval of budgets. 
U The HAT is also required, under Section 64 of the Housing Act 1988, to draw up a Statement of 
is consultation with the tenants and city council setting out haw the Trust intends to 
exercise its functions 
... 
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TENANTS' RIGHTS 
Security of Tenure 
Sections 5.1 to 5.3 including: 
-- 
5.1 Tenants of the HAT will enjoy all the rights of secure tenants as set out in the Housing Act 1985 
and the Tenants Charter (this applies equally to new tenants who move into HAT properties after 
the transfer). 
Right to Buy (RTB) 
Sections 5.4 to 5.6 including: 
-- 
5.4 Secure tenants of the HAT will retain their Right to Buy and the discounts to which they will be 
entitled will include their time with the council. The HAT will extend the right to tied tenants. 
Those who do not have the Right to Buy (apart from tied tenants) will not acquire that right as a 
result of becoming tenants of the HAT 
... 
5.5 Any discounts given for RTB purchases may be affected by the cost floor rule which means 
that, if more than £5000 has been spent on building, buying or improving a property over the 
previous 8 years, discounts must not reduce the purchase price below what has been spent. Where 
the market value is lower than 'cost floor' price, the tenant pays market value with no discount 
... 
The Tenancy Agreement 
Sections 5.7 to 5.13 induding: 
-- 
5.7 All the rights and obligations of the HAT board and the tenants will be included in a tenancy 
agreement, which will be determined following designation in consultation with the HRTG. It is 
recognised that it is, principally, the terms included in the tenancy agreement which establish the 
nature of their relationship between the HAT board and tenants. The HAT wishes to develop a 
close working relationship with tenants and to reflect good landlord and tenancy practice. 
5.8 
... 
Amendments to the tenancy agreement (apart from changes in rent or other changes) will 
only be made after full consultation with the tenants and, except in the case of legal requirements, 
the written agreement of both the tenants and the HAT Board. The HAT undertakes to make no 
amendment which reduces either security of tenure or tenants' rights to be consulted on matters of 
housing manage<ne t or maintenance. 
5.11 The High Rise Tenants' Group has produced a draft tenancy agreement which is indicative of 
tenants' expectations and will be used as a basis for further discussion 
... 
Rents & Service Charges 
Sections 5.14 to 5.20 induding: 
- 
5.14 The HAT is responsible for reviewing and determining its rein levels. Rents in North Hull and 
Waltham Forest HATs have been frozen following undertakings given to tenants. As Sir George 
Young made dear when he wrote to the Liverpool tenants on 28 February 1992, this approach is in 
line with government policy on HATs. The shadow dWr, Paula Ridley, has said that she would 
expect a Liverpool HAT to follow suit and freeze rents until properties have been unproved. 
5.17 When improvemeirts have been completed, Paul Ridley has indicated, in line with the 
Govemment's declared policy, that she would eoxpect the Liverpool HAT to peg rent to a level 
equivalent to the average of those rents charged by local authorities in the Merseyside Region for 
similar tower block properties. The HAT would have the option of introducing these mses 
immediately upon completion. There will be no obligation on the HAT to 'phase in' increases once 
13 
THE DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION OF HOUSING ACTION TRUST POLICY 
the freeze ends. However, to soften the impact of the rise in rents at the end of the freeze, the HAT 
will discuss the possibility of offering tenants the option of making additional payments, during the 
period of the freeze into a savings scheme. Tenants will be given at least six months notice of the 
introduction of the new rent levels, and there will be the full consultation before they are introduced. 
During the period of the rent freeze, tenants will be given an annual indication of the rise in 
equivalent local authority rents. 
5.18 Post-freeze, the new charges will clearly identify, as a matter of course, the rental and service 
charges. The guideline ceiling (of equivalent local authority rents) will be applied to the total 
charges, once again reflecting the Government's commitment on rents. 
5.19 Currently, the city council does not distinguish the service charge element within rents charged. 
Service charges are, in any case, spread across the rental charges for the whole of the city's housing 
stock, rather than allocated only to those tenancies which incur them. For these reasons, prior to 
and for some time after transfer, it is unlikely that the HAT will be in a position to calculate reliably 
the cost of the service element. However, by the end of the first year and at subsequent annual 
intervals during the rent freeze, all tenants will be entitled to receive, on request, a breakdown of the 
charges payable for their flat (i. e., the rental; element and the service charge). 
Rent Arrears 
Sections 5.21 to 5.24. 
Rent Arrears at Transfer 
Sections 5.25 & 5.26 including- 
5.25 The city council will retain responsibility for the collection of arrears of rents and service 
charges until the properties are transferred to the HAT. 
Housing Benefit 
Section 5.27 including: 
-- 
5.27 Tenants transferring to the HAT will retain the same right to claim Housing Benefit as local 
authority tenants. The transfer process itself will not affect or delay any further the payment of 
Housing Benefit arrears already due to tenants 
... 
Adaptations 
Seeion 5.28. 
Decanting /Relocation 
Section 5.29 including: 
-- 
5.29 Following designation, the HAT will, in consultation with tenants, draft a policy covering 
decanting/ relocation. 11m policy will be based on the following principles: 
- 
" Where an improvement programme has been agreed, every effort will be made to plan and carry 
out works in such a way that decanting is unnecessary. 
" In exceptional circumstances, however, the HAT and a tenant may agree that decanting is the 
only realistic option 
... 
" 
Any tenant who is decanted will have the right to return to his/her original dwelling without any 
change in the tenancy agreement 
" Tenants will also be offered the first refusal on the decant property. If they wish to stay, rather 
than move malte to their original dwdling, this would not alter their existing tenancy rights. 
" Where tenants are decanted, they will only pay the lower of the two rents of there is varimice. If 
the tenant decides to stay in the decant property he/she will then pay the rent which is 
applicable. 
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" Where tenants are required to move, the HAT will meet the following reasonable costs: 
- 
storage; removal; disconnections; reconnections; temporary re-siting of telephones; 
compensation for disturbances or for accidental damage to personal belongings; insurance of 
personal belongings. 
Tenant Involvement 
Sections 5.30 to 5.37 including: 
-- 
5.30 The HAT is committed to the principle that tenants should be involved in decisions which 
affect their homes. It believes that tenant involvement can lead to better decision making and more 
efficient use of resources. The HAT will ensure that its housing policies and procedures, staff 
training and management regime are conducive to tenants participation. 
5.31 The HAT will also ensure that: 
-- 
" tenants are properly consulted on housing policy, management, maintenance, improvement, 
demolition, services, amenities and rents issues and about disposal to future landlords; 
" tenants' groups wishing to participate in the management of their housing are encouraged and 
supported; 
" there is a positive response to any tenants' groups which decides that it wants to take control of 
the management of its block /site, or even to consider long term ownership; 
" tenants are kept properly informed of all decisions and activities that affect them; 
" adequate resources and training are made available to tenants' groups, and to the HAT staff or 
agents, to ensure the full implementation of these policies; resource levels will be set taking into 
account the framework for Section 16 funding for similar initiatives. 
5.32 In considering applications from prospective landlords to acquire and manage blocks post- 
HAT, both the HAT and its tenants will regard the landlord's proposed policies and tenant 
involvement as a key factor. Landlords will be required to provide full information on these policies 
as part of their application. 
5.33 In providing information and carrying consultation, the HAT will use a range of methods 
including, for example, letters, leaflets, newsletters, block meetings and exhibitions. All written 
material will be in plain English. 
5.34 The HAT will provide all tenants with an annual Performance Monitoring Report comprising 
dearly summarised statistics (costs, targets and outputs) under a number of headings 
- 
e. g., re t, 
repairs and maintenance, housing allocations, homelessness, development and managoma t. The 
HAT will be prepared to provide information broken down to block or site level. Tenants will be 
consulted on the format, content and outputs of the reports. 
5.35 The four tenant members on the HAT board will have, as part of their responsibilities as board 
members, a key role to play in reflecting tenants' views and concerns at board level. In addition, the 
HAT will support and consult, where appropriate, the High Rise Tenants' group as the organisation 
representing the common interests of tenants. On maäers affecting individual blocks or sites, the 
HAT will work directly with the local tenants' groups. The HAT will encourage and support the 
establishment of a arrange of structures which will give tenants a choice about the level of 
participation or control that is most suited to their own local circumstances 
... 
5.36 The extern to which tenants want to become involved in decision making will vary from block 
to block and this will be reflected in the type of structure that may be set up. In order to respond to 
those tenants groups who wish to be heavily involved, the HAT will be prepared to share with 
tenants those decisions affecting their own blocks across the full range of management and development functions 
... 
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5.37 The HAT is committed to provide adequate resources to promote, support, and develop tenant 
involvement and will make resources available in its budget for this purpose. The HAT will agree 
and publish a clear policy and procedure for the promotion and funding of tenant involvement. 
Harassment 
Sections 5.38 & 5.39. 
Succession 
Section 5.40. 
Tenants' Complaints & Grievances 
Sections 5.41 & 5.42. 
HOUSING MANAGEMENT & MAINTENANCE 
Principles of Customer Care 
Sections 6.1 to 6.3 including: 
-- 
6.1 The HAT will face a housing management challenge which will probably be unique amongst 
social landlords in this country 
-- 
71 tower blocks, widely dispersed, many of them standing alone 
and all requiring intensive, responsive management. 
6.2 The HRTG and the HAT are aware of the potential problems of dealing with a landlord who is 
remote from the tenants and the dwellings it manages. By taking the tower blocks out of the 
surrounding council stock for separate management, there is a risk of creating a situation where 
blocks are isolated from their landlord 
... 
Localised Arrangements 
Sections 6.4 to 6.9 including: 
-- 
6.4 The HATs overriding approach will be to relate to tenants as valued customers. To this end, 
the HATS management arrangements will be devised with regard to the advantages of, amongst 
other things: 
-- 
" local management offices to provide a convenient point of contact for tenants 
... 
" delegated authority to those local management offices 
... 
"a central office which co-ordinates and supports the local managers but is as small as possible 
and does not unduly interfere with their day-today numagement, within agreed policies; 
" Local arrangement for ordering repairs and inspections, with their housing managers enjoying 
clear and proper client control over the maintenance contractors and/or direct labour force and 
with local bases for maintenance teams; 
" local arrangements for ideifying, securing, repairing and re-letting empty dwellings; 
" convenient rent collection facilities and money advice, including a facility for Giro payments; 
" resident caretaking 
... 
" 24 hour concierge/ security services where requested and appropriate; 
" provision of warden services for sheltered accommodation where requested and appropriate; 
" adequate staffltenant ratios; 
"a commitment to customer care 
... 
6.5 The determination of the HATs managoment arrangunerrts will also take account of expected 
rental income and the levels of management and maintenance allowances necessary per unit to 
support a responsive and effective management service. 
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Repairs & Maintenance 
Sections 6.10 & 6.11 
Allocations 
Sections 6.12 to 6.26 
Dedicated Staff 
Sections 6.27 to 6.29 
Letting of Contracts 
Sections 6.30 to 6.32 
Unauthorised or Illegal Occupalon 
Sections 6.33 & 6.34 
Arrangement for Owner Occupiers 
Sections 6.35 to 6.41 including: 
- 
6.37 Owner-occupiers (existing and new) will pay no more for services than tenants. When 
improvements are complete, charges for management and maintenance will be re-assessed in 
consultation with owner-occupiers to ensure that they reflect the costs of the services provided. 
6.38 Owner-occupiers will have the option of having works carried out to the interior of their flats at 
an agreed price. Works for a whole block carried out to wiring, plumbing or heating services will 
include those flats belonging to owner-occupiers at no charge. 
6.40 Own. occupiers will be fully consulted about the form of housing management o be provided 
and about improvement options. 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
General Principles 
Sections 7.1 to 7.10 including: 
- 
7.1 The HAT is committed to tenant involvement in planning and carrying out both the overall 
development programme and the detailed proposals for each site. At each stage, consultation will 
take place between the HAT and the appropriate tenants' organisations. 
7.2 The base-line for consultations will be the range of improvements identified in the city council's 
feasibility report. Subsequent informal discussions between the HAT and tenants indicate that the 
following improvements have, broadly speaking, the highest priority: 
- 
roof repair/ replacement; 
window replacement; security enhancement (either to individual blocks or sites); heating 
replacement to affordable standards; lift replacement/ refurbishment; upgrading of communal areas. 
7.3 Secondary but still important priorities are: 
- 
replacement of kitchen and bathroom fittings; re- 
wiring; insulation; plumbing modifications (communal); environmental enhancement. 
7.5 The HAT accepts that following further feasibility studies, st udural surveys and consultation, 
the improvement proposals for individual sites and blocks may be different to those outlined in the 
city council's feasibility report. The HAT will work to ensure that the appropriate additional funding 
- 
where the HAT in consultation with tenants considers such funding to be necessary 
- 
is 
provided to carry the programme which are finally agreed. The government has guaranteed that, 
over the period of the HATs life, sufficient funding will be made available to make the HAT a 
success. 
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7.6 The HAT recognises that it could be some time before full improvements are carried out across 
the whole stock. It will therefore consider carefully with tenants the option of an emergency repairs 
programme (e. g., window replacement, heating system) for all blocks as a first step, and whether 
this would be a cost-effective and sensible way of proceeding. The HAT recognises that tenants feel 
strongly that this should be a first priority. 
7.8 The HAT undertakes to discuss with the HRTG the development policy framework which will 
determine the order in which the sites /blocks are improved 
... 
Site Block Improvements 
7.11 The HAT will involve a properly representative, local tenants' organisation in the planning of 
the improvement programmes for each site /block, including the commissioning of surveys to 
establish options. Tenant debate on the options will be encouraged, and full written information 
provided to all tenants on the package which is fully agreed. During the building phase, regular 
reports will be made to tenants and a policy of minimum disruption will be applied; the HAT is very 
much aware that a majority of the tenants is elderly. 
Scale of Development /Resources 
Sections 7.12 to 7.13 including: 
-- 
7.12 The HAT recognises that tenants will have views on, for example, demolition and new build 
options, and on le Ling policies for their sites/ blocks (e. g., whether a block should be sheltered). It 
undertakes to consult fully on these issues. 
7.13 The HAT rec o ises and will take into account the HRTG's concerns about the scale of 
development requirements and the likely level of resources needed. These conoems, which have 
Ply emerged from a block by block survey carried out by Tenants' Friends, are set out in 
Appendix 4. The Appendix includes a specification of improvements which tenants believe need to 
be carried out in addition to those identified in the city council's feasibility report. This Appendix 
represents the tenants' assessment but not necessarily the HATs. 
New Build 
7.14 In carrying out any new build on or around those sites which transfer to the HAT, the HATs 
concern will be to meet the housing needs of its existing tenants and others on low incomes who are 
in housing need. New build is likely to be, therefore, either for rent or, in particular where existing 
tenants need to transfer to different accommodation and also wish to buy, for low-cost home 
ownership. 
Letting of Contract 
Section 7.15 
JOBS & ENTERPRISE 
Sections &1 to &S including: 
- 
8.1 The HAT will have a responsibility to maximise local training and employment opportunities during all phases of its existence. It will be committed to promoting those opportunities for people living in the tower blocks and in the neighbourhoods around them. This commitment applies equally 
to directly employed labour and to work contracted out. To achieve this, the HAT will aim to be not just a housing project but also to help regenerate the local economy, increase employment and improve social conditions. 
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EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Policy 
Section 9.1. 
Monitoring 
Section 9.2. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN AT THE END OF THE HAT 
Choice of future landlord /ownership 
Sections 10.1 to 10.4 including: 
-- 
10.1 Once homes have been improved, and the HAT is satisfied that it no longer needs to retain the 
properties, the HAT will consult tenants fully about their preferences for the future ownership and 
management of their properties. Options will include: 
-- 
a return to the council; right to buy; transfer 
to a local housing association; setting up one or more new tenant co-operatives or community-based 
housing associations. 
10.2 Disposals will be considered on a site by site basis. The tenants' representatives will be fully 
involved an decisions about the timing of any disposals to new landlords. 
10.3 The wishes of tenants should be respected as far as possible where, for example, they request a 
delayed disposals to allow time to remedy defects or carry out additional works, or where they 
prefer a prompt disposal. 
10.4 Tenants representatives will be involved in the process of ensuring that alternative responsible 
social landlords are available for each site before consultation with tenants. 
The disposal problem 
Sections 10.5 to 10.11 including: 
-- 
10.5 Disposals can only be made with the 
, 
consent of the Secretary of State, and prospective 
landlords other than local authorities must be approved by the Housing Corporation. The criteria 
for approval are likely to be similar to those already adopted by the Corporation for Tenants' Choice 
landlords. 
10.6 The HAT will itself wish to be satisfied that prospective landlords: 
- 
are up to the job of owning 
and managing rented housing in a responsible way; will use the housing for long-term renting to 
people in need at rents with this the reads of those in low paid auployme t; will meat professional 
standards of housing management and repairs. 
10.7 The HAT will make available adequate and, if the tenants wish, independent advice during the 
disposal process (and be prepared to finance it). This will include, if tenants require it, advice on 
how to set up tenant co-operatives, community-based housing associations or companies as 
alternative options for acquiring and managing their housing. 
10.8 As part of the process, them will be independently supervised secret postal ballot to determine 
taunts' wishes for the disposal of each site and a minimum period of six months for providing 
information and for consultation prior to any ballot. Tenants also have the right to initiate Taunts' Choice procedures. 
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10.9 The HAT will inform each tenant about all the landlords interested in acquiring his/her home. 
Each prospective landlord will be required to give tenants full information, according to a code of 
practice laid down by the HAT. 
10.10 Before the HAT can transfer any property subject to a secure tenancy, it must, by law, ask 
the city council whether it is willing to take the property back. Liverpool city council has said that it 
would be prepared to take back any or all of the sites in the HAT, should the tenants so wish. 
10.11 Owner-occupiers will enjoy the same entitlements as secure tenants in terms of consultation 
and ballots. 
Tenants' rights at transfer 
Sections 10.12 to 10.14 including: 
-- 
10.12 Tenants of dwellings transferred to housing associations or other landlords will retain their 
right to buy. 
10.13 The other rights which tenants enjoy on transfer to a new landlord will, broadly speaking, 
depend on the statutory position of that particular landlord and its tenants. In the case of housing 
associations, for example, tenants will have the statutory rights of assured tenants supplemented by 
the Tenants' Guarantee. Prospective landlords will be required to provide tenants with full 
information on their future rights (including security of tenure) in the run-up to the pre-disposal 
ballot for each site. 
10.14 The HAT may, however, as part of the terms of disposal/ transfer to the new landlord, 
negotiate additional contractual rights, for example, in respect of initial rent levels, arrangements for 
rent review, or a framework for tenant consultation. 
Transfer at the end of the HAT 
Sections 10.15 to 10.18. 
Financial Arrangements for Disposals 
10.19 It is intended that disposals will be at tenanted market value. The terms of disposal, including 
valuation, will be determined by the HAT and DoE, with the consent of the Treasury. The overall 
terms will need to recognise that prospective non-city council landlords should be able to put 
forward proposals on the basis of a long-term financial package which produces affordable levels of 
rent at disposal and thereafter. In the case of transfers back to the city council, the Secretary of State would make available to the council Supplementary Credit Approvals (SCA) covering the 
entire cost to the council of borrowing to pay for such transfers, and the full costs of servicing the 
loans would feed directly into the calculation of Housing Revenue Account (HRA) Subsidy 
errtitleme t. These additional credit approvals would not be offset against the council's Annual 
Capital Guideline (ACG), Basic Credit Approval (BCA) or other Supplementary Credit Approvals. 
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